Summary
finding debtor's characterization of a non-exempt personal injury claim as a fully exempt worker's compensation claim was without merit
Summary of this case from In re KellyOpinion
Case No. 02-72620
October 9, 2002
OPINION
The issue before the Court is whether the Debtors should be permitted to voluntarily dismiss their voluntary Chapter 7 petition where the Debtors have significant debt and no apparent ability to repay the debt other than through the successful prosecution of a personal injury action.
The Debtors, Thomas and Theresa Stults, filed a voluntary petition pursuant to Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 18, 2002. The Debtors have a three-bedroom house which they value at $95,000. Their schedules show that the house has an $80,000 mortgage on it. The Debtors show personal property valued at $118,030, consisting primarily of a $100,000 pension, a 1996 Blazer, a camper and a four-wheeler. The Debtors have scheduled $98,124.97 in unsecured debt, more than three-quarters of which is credit card debt. The Debtors' income is limited to social security disability payments; Mr. Stults receives $1,366 per month and Mrs. Stults receives $536 per month. The Debtors list monthly expenses of $3,352.
At the time they filed their bankruptcy petition, Mrs. Stults had a personal injury claim against Aldi's for a slip-and-fall injury. This action was not disclosed in Paragraph 4 of the Statement of Financial Affairs which asks about suits and administrative proceedings or in their Schedule B — Personal Property. In addition, the Debtors did not claim an exemption in the personal injury action. The Trustee discovered the personal injury action at the meeting of creditors. The Trustee moved to withdraw his Report of No Distribution and the Trustee's Motion was allowed on August 9, 2002.
On August 9, 2002, the Debtors filed a Motion to Dismiss their Chapter 7 case. In support of their Motion, the Debtors stated:
that they misunderstood the exempt status of Theresa Stults' personal injury claim. They understood it to be a workman's compensation claim instead of personal injury claim. Also the debtors are contemplating a divorce and Theresa does not want her award money going to pay Thomas' credit card debts.
It is unclear how the Debtors could have construed a slip-and-fall at Aldi's to be a worker's compensation claim. Moreover, the law is clear that even exempt assets must be scheduled. See In re Yonikus, 974 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1992).
On September 17, 2002, the Debtors, now with a new attorney, filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss. According to the Amended Motion to Dismiss, the alleged tort occurred on August 14, 2001.
The claim was being processed at the time that the bankruptcy was filed, but the personal injury action was not actually filed until two weeks after the bankruptcy filing. The Debtors claim that the personal injury action was not disclosed in their bankruptcy schedules because of a misunderstanding with their original attorney about the exempt status of the claim. They assert that they would not have filed for Chapter 7 protection if they had known that the personal injury claim would be exempt only to the extent of $7,500. The Debtors maintain that their creditors would not be prejudiced by the dismissal of their bankruptcy petition because those creditors may still look to Mrs. Stults' personal injury claim for satisfaction of their claims.
The Trustee opposes dismissal. The Trustee notes that the Debtors have significant debt, and the negative cash flow shown in their budget demonstrates that they do not have the ability to pay their debts. The only way that creditors will receive any payments on these claims is through the liquidation of the personal injury claim. The Trustee believes that the Bankruptcy Court is the best place to ensure that the proceeds from the personal injury action are distributed fairly among the creditors.
A Chapter 7 debtor does not have an absolute right to dismiss a bankruptcy case. In re Byam, No. 02-80538 (Bankr.C.D.Ill. Aug. 14, 2002) (Perkins, J.); In re Kidder, No. 88-71129 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1989 (Lessen, J.). Dismissal is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 707(a), which provides that "the court may dismiss a case under [Chapter 7] only after notice and hearing and only for cause." See Bankruptcy Rule 1017(a). The question of whether there is cause for dismissal is decided on a case-by-case basis. In re Taylor, No. 01-84995 (Bankr.C.D.Ill. March 27, 2002 (Perkins, J.). A primary factor to be considered is the effect of dismissal on creditors. In re Watkins, 229 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1999). Voluntary dismissal is not allowed where it will cause prejudice to the debtor's creditors. In re Turpen, 244 B.R. 431, 434 (8th Cir. BAP 2000). Prejudice exists where assets which would be available for distribution are lost as a result of dismissal. In re McCullough, 229 B.R. 374 (Bankr.E.D.Va. 1999).
The sole "cause" for dismissal asserted by the Debtors is that they filed their petition under the mistaken belief that Mrs. Stults' personal injury action would be entirely exempt. This is not a compelling reason for dismissal. As one court recognized:
A mistaken belief by the Debtor and her counsel, that she could retain all of her assets as exempt and receive a discharge of all her dischargeable debts, is not "cause" within the meaning and intent of Section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code.
In re St. Laurent, 17 B.R. 768, 770 (Bankr.D.Maine 1982).
The Debtors argue that creditors would not be prejudiced by the dismissal of their bankruptcy case because:
the creditors' rights to pursue any claims they would have against the Debtors and to seek collection based upon the Debtors' assets, including filing a lien against the Debtor, THERESA A. STULTS', pending tort claim in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County would be reinstituted by the dismissal of the proceeding and the removal of the automatic stay previously entered by this court.
This is exactly the kind of "race to the courthouse" scenario that the Bankruptcy Code was designed to protect against. Bankruptcy courts uniformly deny dismissal under these circumstances. In In re Wilde, 160 B.R. 625 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1993), the debtor sought to voluntarily dismiss her Chapter 7 case after she came into some life insurance money. The court denied dismissal:
The Trustee in the Chapter 7 case is required to collect the insurance monies and distribute them pursuant to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, every creditor receives its fair share, and debtor is entitled to only that share which may be claimed as exempt under applicable law. There is no assurance that the debtor will distribute these funds as fairly. Since the creditors did not affirmatively consent to the dismissal, and since a dismissal would not be in their best interests, the debtors voluntary motion should be denied.
Id. at 627. The court reached a similar conclusion in In re Komyathy, 142 B.R. 755 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 1992) where the debtor sought dismissal after she received partial payment of an inheritance:
In the absence of a dismissal, the trustee is available and indeed has the duty under § 704 to make this disbursement. Hence, taking as true the debtor's claim that the inheritance is sufficient to pay all of the creditors in full, the creditors are guaranteed payment of all monies owed to them. However, if dismissal were to be granted, the parties would no longer be under the jurisdiction of the court nor the Bankruptcy Code. The trustee would be relieved of his obligation to ensure payment to the creditors, and conversely, the creditors would lose the guarantee of repayment. In the absence of affirmative consent of the creditors, this lost guarantee constitutes plain legal prejudice.
Id. at 757.
A Central District of Illinois Bankruptcy Court confronted a factual situation similar to the case at bar in In re Higbee, 58 B.R. 71 (Bankr.C.D.Ill. 1986) where the debtor scheduled a personal injury claim valued at $2,000. When the debtor and her attorned re-appraised the value of the personal injury claim at more than $200,000, the debtor sought voluntary dismissal of her bankruptcy case. As cause for dismissal, the debtor expressed her fear that the trustee would settle the personal injury action in a manner beneficial to her creditors but detrimental to her best interests. Judge Altenberger rejected this argument:
In the matter before this Court, if the motion to dismiss were allowed, creditors could lose an asset which might otherwise be available to them. It should first be noted, that once her Chapter 7 proceeding is dismissed, she would no longer be subject to the jurisdiction of this court and her creditors, through this court, would have no claim to any recovery. Furthermore, in an attempt to obtain a large recovery which would accrue to her benefit, she could refuse a settlement offer beneficial to creditors, and elect to try the personal injury claim. The results of such an election could be that nothing, or a small amount, would be recovered. Conversely, if the Chapter 7 proceeding is not dismissed, the Trustee will be in a position to attempt to maximize the amount that creditors will receive.
This Court recognizes that her personal injury claim might be settled in a manner beneficial to creditors without any benefit accruing to her. However, she knew of the existence of the personal injury claim and voluntarily elected to file the Chapter 7 proceeding. She must accept the consequences of her voluntary act.
Id. at 72.
Based upon the schedules, the Debtors do not have the ability to pay their debts. The creditors' only hope for payment is the successful resolution of Mrs. Stults' personal injury action, and the only guarantee of a fair and equitable distribution of those proceeds is by the Trustee in the Bankruptcy Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the Debtors' Amended Motion to Dismiss their Chapter 7 case is denied.
This Opinion is to serve as Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 7052 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
See written Order.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in an Opinion entered this day,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Debtors' Amended Motion to Dismiss be and is hereby denied.