OPINION

THOMAS L. PERKINS, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.

Since the State of Illinois opted out of the federal exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522, bankruptcy debtors in this state are required to utilize the exemptions provided by state law. Each individual is entitled to a homestead exemption of $7,500 and in the proceeds from sale of the homestead up to that amount for one year after receipt. The question presented in this case is whether the exemption in proceeds is available only if the Debtor, Hugh J. Sizemore (DEBTOR), intends to reinvest in a new homestead.

The Court heard evidence, the parties have submitted briefs and the facts may be summarized as follows. The DEBTOR and his ex-wife, Julie C. Hanes (JULIE), owned as joint tenants a home located at 454 E. Townhall Road, Metamora, Illinois, as their marital homestead. In 1998, an action was commenced to dissolve the marriage and an Order adopting a marital settlement agreement was entered by the Peoria County Circuit Court on May 27, 1998. The Order requires JULIE to sign over her interest in the real estate to the DEBTOR after which the property was to be sold with JULIE to receive the first $4,000 of the net proceeds with the balance retained by DEBTOR.

The real estate was marketed and sold generating $5,824.19 in net proceeds after payment of all liens. The DEBTOR did not pay any portion of the proceeds to JULIE and instead deposited the entire amount into a joint checking account that he held with his daughter on August 29, 2000. It is undisputed that the DEBTOR'S daughter was a joint account holder as a matter of convenience and never made any deposits into or withdrawals from the account. Immediately prior to the deposit, the account had a balance of $2,692.44. The deposit brought the balance up to $8,516.63. Subsequently, the DEBTOR made various deposits and withdrawals from the account.

On October 13, 2000, he withdrew an amount equal to the net proceeds from the sale of the real estate, $5,824.19, and deposited those funds into a separate account at the same financial institution. The funds remained segregated in the separate account when the DEBTOR filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on October 24, 2000. On November 29, 2000, the DEBTOR paid the segregated funds over to his bankruptcy attorney, Charles E. Covey, who deposited the funds into his trust account. The DEBTOR concedes that at no time did he intend to reinvest the net proceeds into a new homestead. Rather, he considered paying some of the funds to JULIE and also thought about using the proceeds to buy a car.

On his bankruptcy Schedule C, the DEBTOR claimed an exemption in the net proceeds in the amount of $5,824.19 pursuant to the Illinois Homestead Act. The Trustee, Gary T. Rafool (TRUSTEE), filed a timely objection to the DEBTOR'S claim of exemption in the net proceeds. The TRUSTEE argues that, in order for the DEBTOR to claim the exemption in the net proceeds, the DEBTOR must have intended to reinvest the proceeds in a new homestead. Since the DEBTOR concedes that he had no such intention, the TRUSTEE claims that the exemption in proceeds is not available to the DEBTOR.

Pursuant to Section 12-906 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, proceeds from the sale of homestead property are temporarily exempt. That Section provides:

When a homestead is conveyed by the owner thereof, such conveyance shall not subject the premises to any lien or incumbrance to which it would not be subject in the possession of such owner; and the proceeds thereof, to the extent of the amount of $7,500, shall be exempt from judgment or other process, for one year after the receipt thereof, by the person entitled to the exemption, and if reinvested in a homestead the same shall be entitled to the same exemption as the original homestead.

735 ILCS 5/12-906.

The DEBTOR points out that the exemption statute does not expressly require an intent to reinvest the proceeds in a new homestead and argues that it would amount to judicial legislation to read such an intent requirement into the statute. The DEBTOR construes the statute to give a former homeowner one year in which to decide whether to reinvest exempt proceeds in a new homestead.

Even if no such intention exists upon sale, argues the DEBTOR, the former homeowner has up to one year in which to "change his mind" and decide to use the funds to purchase or contribute equity to a new homestead. The DEBTOR maintains that the prior decision to the contrary by Bankruptcy Judge William V. Altenberger, this Court's predecessor, in In re Ziegler, 239 B.R. 375 (Bankr.C.D.Ill. 1999) is incorrect.

In Ziegler, Judge Altenberger held that under Section 12-906, proceeds received upon sale are entitled to protection only if the seller has a good faith intent to reinvest the proceeds in another homestead. In that case, the court found that the Zieglers did not intend to reinvest the proceeds in another homestead. The court therefore allowed the trustee's objection to the debtors' claim of exemption in the proceeds from sale of the homestead property.

This Court agrees with Judge Altenberger's opinion in Ziegler. There is no need to reprise the entire opinion here. The central premise of the Ziegler opinion is that "intent plays a critical role in the entitlement to a homestead exemption, both in its creation and its abandonment." 239 B.R. at 378.

Since the purpose of Section 12-906 is to protect the proceeds from the sale of a homestead until they can be reinvested in another, Section 12-906 is properly construed as a continuation or extension of the general homestead exemption granted by Section 12-901. 239 B.R. at 379.

The necessity of an intent to retain the homestead and the loss of the homestead exemption through voluntary abandonment is firmly imbedded in homestead jurisprudence in Illinois going back well over one hundred years. See, e.g., Shepard v. Brewer, 65 Ill. 383 (1872). To now construe the exemption in homestead proceeds to be available without an intent to use the proceeds for homestead purposes would be so fundamentally inconsistent with the well-established requisite of intent applied to the general homestead provision as to be, in this Court's opinion, illogical and contrary to the legislative intent behind the Illinois homestead statute.

Statutory construction is a holistic endeavor. Matter of Lifschultz Fast Freight Corp., 63 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 1995). Different sections or parts of a single statute or law should be considered to be in pari materia, and each section should be construed with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 147 Ill.2d 548, 591 N.E.2d 427, 169 Ill. Dec. 254 (1992).

Sections 12-901 and 12-906 are part of a single legislative enactment, P.A. 82-280, dealing with a single subject, the right of an exemption in a homestead. These sections must be construed as parts of a unified whole, in a manner that avoids inconsistencies. This Court agrees with Judge Altenberger's characterization in Ziegler of the exemption in homestead proceeds as an extension of the exemption in the homestead itself. Implying the same intent requirement that exists with respect to the homestead to the proceeds as well, is holistically logical and proper. The absence of an express intent requirement in Section 12-906 gives this Court little pause. Section 12-901 does not contain an express intent requirement either, yet Illinois courts have consistently held that the homestead exemption may be lost if the requisite intent is absent.

There is no published opinion from an Illinois court directly on point. Under these circumstances, it is the role of the bankruptcy court to predict how the Illinois Supreme Court would rule if the issue came before it and to apply the predicted ruling. Smith v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 67 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 1995). It is this Court's considered opinion that the Illinois Supreme Court would hold that a former homeowner could claim an exemption in homestead proceeds under Section 12-906 only so long as the former homeowner intended to reinvest the proceeds in a new homestead. Since the DEBTOR admits the lack of such intent, the exemption in proceeds is not available to him.

In support of his position, the DEBTOR relies upon In re Harlan, 32 B.R. 91 (Bankr.W.D. Tex. 1983). Applying a Texas law providing for an exemption in homestead proceeds for six months after sale, the court held that since the bankruptcy petition was filed within the six-month period, the proceeds were exempt regardless of what use the debtors might make of the proceeds post-petition.

The court rejected the creditor's request that any part of the proceeds not reinvested in a new homestead upon expiration of the six-month period should not be allowed as exempt. The debtors' intent with respect to use of the proceeds at the time that the bankruptcy was filed was not at issue.

The DEBTOR also relies upon In re Golden, 789 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1986). Like Texas, California also exempts proceeds from the sale of a homestead for six months. The debtor in Golden filed his bankruptcy petition within the six-month period. Contrary to Harlan, the 9th Circuit held that when a debtor fails to reinvest homestead proceeds within the six-month period, the exemption is lost and the proceeds should revert to the bankruptcy trustee. Since Harlan and Golden applied Texas and California law, respectively, they play little, if any, role in this Court's determination that the Illinois Supreme Court would imply an intent requirement to Section 12-906. Because this Court finds that the DEBTOR'S claim of exemption fails for lack of the requisite intent, this Court does not need to address the further issue decided in Harlan and Golden, whether a debtor who has an allowable claim of exemption in homestead proceeds as of the petition date may thereafter lose the exemption if the proceeds are not reinvested in a new homestead within the time required by the state statute.

It is also not necessary for this Court to address the alternative issue raised by the TRUSTEE, whether the DEBTOR'S claim of exemption in the proceeds was lost because the proceeds were commingled with other nonexempt funds or because the DEBTOR was unable to adequately trace the homestead proceeds out of his checking account given the various deposits and withdrawals that were made after the proceeds were deposited into his account.

For the reasons stated in this Opinion, a separate Order will be entered allowing the TRUSTEE'S objection to the DEBTOR'S claim of homestead exemption in the funds now held by his attorney in the amount of $5,824.19 and further ordering his attorney to remit those funds to the TRUSTEE.

This Opinion constitutes this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052.

ORDER

For the reasons stated in an Opinion filed this day, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. TRUSTEE'S Objection to Debtor's Claim of Exemption is ALLOWED; and

2. DEBTOR'S attorney, Charles E. Covey, is directed to remit the sum of $5,824.19, which is representative of the proceeds from the sale of the DEBTOR'S homestead and currently being held by DEBTOR'S attorney, to the TRUSTEE within ten (10) days.