MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice FRANCIS.

Steven E. Spradling appeals an order on a writ of attachment. In four issues, he contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and erred in issuing the writ, awarding attorney's fees, and limiting the time to present evidence. We affirm.

Spradling (Father) and appellee Martha Jo Johnston (Mother) divorced in Texas in 1991. Mother was awarded custody of their child, S.C.S. In 2001, a Colorado district court issued a modification order granting custody to Father, a resident of Dallas County, Texas, and establishing a parenting plan with a report due no later than August 29, 2002. On May 10, 2002, the Colorado court issued a second order limiting Mother, an Air Force officer then stationed in Turkey, to supervised visits with the child and requiring her to attend family therapy.

On May 12, 2006, Mother filed this case seeking to modify the first Colorado order and vacate the second. On May 19, 2006, Father and Mother announced on the record an agreement resolving the modification issues. The trial court stated it would "approve the agreements of the parties and render judgment in accordance therewith." Accordingly, Mother notified Father that she would exercise her right to possess S.C.S. on June 18-23, 2006. She sent Father a plane ticket for S.C.S. to travel to New Mexico, where she now resides, and paid for S.C.S. to attend a golf camp during his visit. Father failed to put S.C.S. on the flight.

On June 22, 2006, Mother filed a motion seeking a writ of attachment for S.C.S. The trial court issued two writs of attachment, but Father delivered S.C.S. to Mother before the writs were executed. On August 7, 2006, the trial court conducted a hearing on the modification suit and the aborted attachment. At the hearing, the trial court again approved the May 19th agreement and signed a written order approving the modifications of parental rights. On September 25, 2006, the trial court signed an order on the writ of attachment ordering Father to reimburse Mother for certain expenses involved in the refusal to send the child as well as attorney's fees. Father appeals the order.

Before addressing Father's issues, we address Mother's pending motion to dismiss the appeal. Mother contends the appeal should be dismissed, and sanctions awarded, because an order on a writ of attachment is not appealable except by writ of mandamus. Further, she argues that since the writ of attachment was not executed, the appeal is moot.

Mother presents this argument as if Father is appealing the merits of the issuance of the writ of attachment, when in fact, Father's appeal is directed at the September 25th order granting reimbursement and attorney's fees. The mootness doctrine dictates that courts avoid rendering advisory opinions by only deciding issues that present a "live" controversy at the time of the decision. Camarena v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988). Whether the trial court properly ordered Father to pay reimbursement expenses and attorney's fees is a live controversy. Accordingly, we deny the motion to dismiss.

In his first issue, Father contends the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction because the Colorado court had already entered orders and asserted continuing jurisdiction over the custody dispute, thus obligating the trial court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). We review the trial court's determination for an abuse of discretion. Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Tex. 2005). Because statutory construction is a matter of law, we review de novo the trial court's interpretation of the UCCJEA. Id. We conclude the trial court acted properly.

Texas has enacted the UCCJEA as chapter 152 of the family code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.001 et seq. (Vernon 2002). Under sections 152.201 and 152.203, the trial court has jurisdiction to modify a child custody order of another state if (1) Texas is the home state of the child on the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and (2) a Texas court determines that the child and the child's parent do not presently reside in the other state. See id. at § 152.201(a)(1), 152.203(2). At all relevant times, Father and S.C.S. were residents of Dallas County, Texas while Mother resided, successively, in Turkey, South Korea, and New Mexico. Thus, because Father and S.C.S. lived in Texas, and none of the affected parties resided in Colorado, the trial court would have jurisdiction to consider the modification dispute. See id.

To the extent Father contends that section 152.206 required the trial court to communicate with the Colorado court and allow it to make the determination whether to yield jurisdiction to the trial court, we disagree. See id. at § 152.206. The UCCJEA only requires such deference where the other state has jurisdiction substantially conforming or in accordance with the UCCJEA. See id. at § 152.206(a)(b). We overrule Father's first issue.

Father's second issue generally asserts that the trial court erred in issuing a writ of attachment pursuant to section 152.311 because the "orders are clearly erroneous." Father's argument on this issue is confusing. It appears, however, that he is complaining that Mother's verified application for writ of attachment failed to comply with the requirements of section 152.308. Father does not direct us to any place in the record where he made these complaints known to the trial court. See Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge v. Jackson, 732 S.W.2d 407, 412 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd) ("It is not the duty of the court of appeals to make an independent search of the statement of facts."). We overrule Father's second issue.

In his third issue, Father contends the evidence was factually insufficient to support the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Mother. Specifically, Father questions whether the trial court could rely upon counsel's redacted fee statement to support Mother's claim and he contends the evidence is contradictory because the court reporter mislabeled the date of the hearing on Father's motion for new trial as May 25, 2006. Because the parties discuss in the hearing on the motion for new trial matters that occurred in June and July 2006, Father contends evidence of such hearings should be disallowed. We disagree.

We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees. See Bruni v. Bruni, 924 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. 1996). Factual insufficiency of the evidence is not an independent ground of error, but rather a factor to consider in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Diamond v. San Soucie, 239 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.).

During the August 7, 2006 hearing, Mother's counsel testified to the number of hours she and her assistant worked on Mother's case, the hourly rates charged, and the total fees and expenses incurred. The trial court admitted into evidence, over objection, a redacted fee statement further supporting the fees charged. Father cites no authority supporting his contention that the fee agreement is inadmissible in its redacted form and, in any event, his brief states unequivocally that his objection is to the factual sufficiency of the evidence. Even without the fee statement, counsel's testimony regarding her fees constitutes some evidence to support the trial court's award. See Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam). The fees awarded represent the amount of fees and expenses counsel testified Mother had incurred. Because the trial court's award is supported by counsel's testimony, we conclude it did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees. See Bowie Mem. Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002); Recognition Comm., Inc. v. Am. Auto Ass'n, Inc., 154 S.W.3d 878, 891 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (op. on reh'g) (permitting recovery of fees as described in attorney's uncontroverted testimony). To the extent he complains that the reporter's record of the new trial hearing was misdated, there is nothing in the record to undermine the credibility of the evidence recounted therein or harms Father in any way. We overrule Father's third issue.

In his fourth issue, Father contends the trial court deprived him of a fair opportunity to present his case by limiting each party's evidentiary presentation to ten minutes. The trial court exercises broad discretion in conducting trials and processing its docket to promote the economical and efficient use of time and effort by itself, counsel, and litigants. See Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 38 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied), quoting Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936). Further, Father did not object to the time limitations during the hearing nor did he request a continuance so the matter could be reset for a longer presentation of evidence. The record reflects Father first raised a complaint regarding the time limitations in his motion for new trial filed four days after the hearing. We conclude Father's complaint was untimely raised and, therefore, does not preserve any error for appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). We overrule the fourth issue.

We affirm the trial court's order on writ of attachment.