CALABRIA

Appeal by respondent from order entered 28 July 2011 by Judge J. Henry Banks in Granville County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 June 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Janette Soles Nelson, for the State. Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender David W. Andrews, for respondent-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.

Lorenzo Richardson (“respondent”) appeals from an order committing him to involuntary inpatient treatment for a period of 21 days and involuntary outpatient treatment for a period of 69 days. We reverse.

I. Background

On 21 July 2011, respondent saw an unfamiliar vehicle in his neighborhood in Raleigh, North Carolina. Respondent believed the car was following him, and respondent followed the car to a nearby gas station. The driver of the car saw respondent following her and called 911. When law enforcement arrived, respondent returned to his parents' home. When he exited his vehicle, respondent was placed in custody. Subsequently, a Wake County magistrate ordered respondent to be transported to Central Regional Hospital (“CRH”) in Butner, North Carolina, for a psychiatric evaluation.

Dr. Manijeh Boustani (“Dr.Boustani”) examined respondent. In Dr. Boustani's opinion, respondent met the criteria for involuntary commitment. Specifically, Dr. Boustani determined that respondent was mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others. In addition, respondent had a history of paranoid schizophrenia, was not compliant with his medication, believed in conspiracy theories, and believed his neighbors were “subliminally sticking” him.

On 23 July 2011, another doctor, Dr. Sonal Patole, examined respondent and found him to have delusional disorder with symptoms of psychosis, active paranoia, and found him dangerous to self or others. On 25 July 2011, respondent was evaluated by Dr. Behrovz Namdari, who found respondent mentally ill and dangerous to himself and others.

On 28 July 2011, respondent appeared for an involuntary commitment hearing in Granville County District Court. During the hearing, a psychiatrist, Dr. Carrie Brown (“Dr.Brown”), testified regarding respondent's diagnosis. Dr. Brown testified that respondent believed he was being hospitalized because the government was attempting to sabotage him. As a result, Dr. Brown diagnosed respondent with chronic paranoid schizophrenia. Respondent was prescribed Respirdal, an anti-psychotic medication. However, Dr. Brown was concerned that if respondent were released, he would not comply with the medication. Dr. Brown testified that while at CRH, respondent was concerned the food might be poisoned. In addition, respondent was hesitant to give blood because he was afraid the hospital would “implant something in him.”

Respondent testified that he was not mentally ill, but believed the government was attempting “to silence, sabotage and discredit [him] as mentally ill.” Respondent also testified that he was not a danger to himself or others; instead he believed that the “industry” was a danger to society.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ordered respondent's commitment to CRH or any other twenty-four hour care facility for 21 days of inpatient treatment, followed by 69 days of outpatient treatment. Respondent appeals.

II. Involuntary Commitment

Respondent argues that the trial court erred by ordering his involuntary commitment without recording sufficient findings of fact to show that he was dangerous to himself or others. We agree.

Prior to ordering an involuntary commitment for an individual, the trial court must conclude that the individual is either dangerous to himself or dangerous to others, and this conclusion must be supported by sufficient findings of fact. In re Booker, 193 N.C.App. 433, 667 S.E.2d 302 (2008); see alsoN.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–268(j) (2011). This Court reviews an involuntary commitment order to determine “(1) whether the court's ultimate findings of mental illness and danger to self are supported by the facts which the Court recorded in its order as supporting its findings, and (2) whether, in any event, there was competent evidence to support the court's findings.” In re Lowery, 110 N .C. App 67, 71, 428 S.E.2d 861, 863 (1993)(citing In re Frick, 49 N.C.App. 273, 271 S.E.2d 84 (1980)). Whether that evidence is “ ‘clear, cogent, and convincing’ is for the trier of fact alone to determine.” Lowery, 110 N.C.App. at 71, 428 S.E.2d at 864 (citing In re Collins 49 N.C.App. 243, 271 S.E.2d 72 (1980)).

In the instant case, the trial court found the following facts “by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence:”

1. The Respondent was admitted on 7–23–11 with chronic schizophrenia and delusional disorder.

2. He has had two previous hospitalizations within the last year.

3. Respondent believes that the government is trying to control him. He keeps to himself and eats only pre-packaged foods.

4. He is currently taking Respiridol (sic).

5. The Respondent feels his parents are on the side of the government, despite their support.
Respondent does not challenge any of the trial court's findings of fact. Therefore, these findings are binding on appeal. In re Zollicoffer, 165 N.C.App. 462, 469, 598 S.E.2d 696, 700 (2004). The trial court relied solely on these facts to conclude that respondent was dangerous to himself and dangerous to others.
A. Dangerous to Self

Under our General Statutes, an individual is dangerous to himself if there is evidence (1) that within the relevant past the individual has shown he/she is unable to care for their own medical, personal, and physical well-being and (2) that there is the reasonable probability of the individual experiencing serious physical debilitation in the near future. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–3 (11)(a) (2011).

In the instant case, the trial court's first two findings, that respondent was admitted to CRH with chronic schizophrenia and delusional disorder and that he had two previous hospitalizations in the previous year, do nothing more than demonstrate respondent's mental illness. The third finding establishes that respondent has specific eating habits and may believe in conspiracy theories. The fourth finding, that respondent is taking anti-psychotic medication, again reflects that respondent is mentally ill. None of these findings demonstrate that respondent was unable to care for his own medical, personal, and physical well-being, or that there was a reasonable probability respondent would experience serious physical debilitation in the near future. Indeed, at least two of the trial court's findings reflect that respondent was taking care of himself by feeding himself and taking medication. Thus, the trial court erred by concluding that respondent was dangerous to himself. B. Dangerous to Others

An individual is dangerous to others if

within the relevant past, the individual has inflicted or attempted to inflict or threatened to inflict serious bodily harm on another, or has acted in such a way as to create a substantial risk of serious bodily harm to another, or has engaged in extreme destruction of property; and that there is a reasonable probability that this conduct will be repeated.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–3 (11)(b) (2011). In the trial court's involuntary commitment order, the fifth finding, that respondent believes his parents are on the government's side, was the only finding that mentions others. However, this finding does not reflect that respondent's belief caused him to threaten to inflict serious bodily harm on his parents or to act in such a way as to create a substantial risk of bodily harm to his parents. Thus, the trial court's conclusion that respondent was dangerous to others was also erroneous.

Ultimately, the trial court's findings merely demonstrate that respondent was mentally ill. Under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 122C–268(j), this is insufficient to justify involuntarily committing respondent. Since the trial court's findings of fact do not support its conclusion that respondent was dangerous to himself and others, the trial court's order must be reversed. See Booker, 193 N.C.App. at 437, 667 S.E.2d at 304–05. C. Oral Findings

In its brief, the State contends that the trial court rendered oral findings which would support its conclusion that respondent was dangerous to himself and others, and that these findings could be incorporated pursuant to this Court's opinion in In re Allison, ––– N.C.App. ––––, 715 S.E.2d 912 (2011). The State purports to quote these findings in its brief. However, the portion of the transcript which appears in the State's brief does not appear in the transcript of the 28 July 2011 hearing which is the subject of the present appeal. Instead, it appears to be a portion of the transcript from respondent's 18 August 2011 hearing, which is not at issue in this appeal. This subsequent proceeding cannot be used to support the commitment order entered 28 July 2011.

The trial court did render oral findings at the conclusion of the 28 July 2011 hearing. However, these findings were materially the same findings that were contained in the trial court's written order. Consequently, the oral findings entered by the trial court on 28 July 2011 likewise do not support its conclusion that respondent was dangerous to himself and others.

III. Conclusion

The findings of fact recorded by the trial court do not sufficiently support the trial court's conclusions that respondent was dangerous to himself and others. Therefore, the trial court erred in ordering respondent to be involuntarily committed. The trial court's order must be reversed.

Reversed. Judges STROUD and McCULLOUGH concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).