WORKMAN, Chief Justice

Lyne Ranson, Esq., Lyne Ranson Law Offices, LC, Charleston, WV, for Petitioner.

Allyson E. Hilliard, Esq., Swartz Law Offices, PLLC, St. Albans, WV, for Respondent.

Opinion

WORKMAN, Chief Justice:This is an appeal by Glenna. H. (hereinafter “grandmother”) from an order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County affirming an order of the family court terminating the grandmother's eight-year guardianship of her granddaughter, K.H. The family court granted full custody to Anthony B., the child's father (hereinafter “father”) with no ongoing visitation granted to the grandmother. On appeal, the grandmother contends that the family court erred in failing to recognize her as the psychological parent of the child; failing to properly consider the child's best interests or material changes in circumstances; and failing to grant any ongoing visitation to the grandmother.

Subsequent to a thorough review of the appendix record, the parties' briefs, and oral arguments of counsel, this Court affirms the family court and circuit court orders terminating the grandmother's guardianship of the child, but we remand this matter with directions to the circuit court to remand to the family court for a hearing on the issue of visitation and the entry of an order granting liberal visitation rights to the grandmother, the specific contours of which are to be fashioned by the family court.

I. Factual and Procedural History

K.H. was born in June of 2006. The father had no contact with the child during the first year of her life and requested multiple paternity tests. He first saw the child on August 1, 2007. The child's mother and brother died in an automobile accident on September 15, 2007, and the maternal grandmother, petitioner Glenna H., thereafter filed for guardianship of the child on September 27, 2007. By order dated October 30, 2007, the family court appointed the grandmother as guardian of the child. The father appeared at the guardianship hearing and did not object to the grandmother's appointment.

On November 6, 2008, the father filed a petition to establish custodial responsibility for the child. This action resulted in an April 2009 agreed order granting primary custody to the grandmother with parenting time to the father every other weekend and one night per week. The father also began paying child support. On November 18, 2010, the father filed a petition to revoke or terminate the grandmother's guardianship. This action resulted in a 2011 agreed order granting the father additional parenting time. The father and grandmother also agreed to refrain from seeking further modification of the custody arrangements until December 31, 2012.

On January 16, 2013, the father filed another petition to terminate the grandmother's guardianship of the child. By order dated April 11, 2013, Attorney Woody Hill was appointed as the guardian ad litem for the child. Subsequent to his investigation, Mr. Hill opined that the child should be placed in the custody of the father. Mr. Hill reported that he considered the child's best interests and determined that the father was capable of providing a stable environment for the child, with no further need for guardianship.

On July 16, 2013, the grandmother filed a motion with the family court seeking to be designated as the child's “psychological parent” and also objected to the termination of her guardianship of the child. The family court held hearings in July, October, and November, 2013. In addition to the parties and the guardian ad litem, Dr. Timothy Saar, a psychologist retained by the grandmother, testified that the grandmother and the child have a significant bond and that the child honestly views the grandmother as “mom.” Dr. Saar did not meet with the father.

By order dated December 18, 2013, the family court terminated the grandmother's guardianship and denied her motion to be considered a psychological parent. The grandmother appealed to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County on January 17, 2014. The circuit court refused the appeal, and the grandmother thereafter appealed to this Court.

II. Standard of Review

This Court has held that the standard of review in custody decisions, including guardianships, is as follows:

“ ‘The exercise of discretion by a trial court in awarding custody of a minor child will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion has been abused; however, where the trial court's ruling does not reflect a discretionary decision but is based upon an erroneous application of the law and is clearly wrong, the ruling will be reversed on appeal.’ Syllabus point 2, Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 158 W.Va. 964, 216 S.E.2d 570 (1975), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in David M. v. Margaret M., 182 W.Va. 57, 385 S.E.2d 912 (1989).” Syl. Pt. 1, In re Abbigail Faye B., 222 W.Va. 466, 665 S.E.2d 300 (2008).

Syl. Pt. 2, In re Antonio R.A., 228 W.Va. 380, 719 S.E.2d 850 (2011). We have also explained as follows:

In reviewing a final order entered by a circuit court judge upon a review of, or upon a refusal to review, a final order of a family court judge, we review the findings of fact made by the family court judge

under the clearly erroneous standard, and the application of law to the facts under an abuse of discretion standard. We review questions of law de novo.

Syllabus, Carr v. Hancock, 216 W.Va. 474, 607 S.E.2d 803 (2004). Guided by these standards, we now consider the parties' arguments.

III. Discussion

A. West Virginia Code § 44–10–3, Best Interests, and Changed Circumstances

The grandmother asserts that the family court and lower court erred in the consideration of the father's petition to terminate the guardianship by failing to properly evaluate the best interests of the child and the existence of changed circumstances. In so arguing, the grandmother raises the issue of the legislative amendments to the requirements articulated in West Virginia Code § 44–10–3 that became effective between the father's filing of the petition for termination of the guardianship and the court's hearings on the matter. The grandmother contends that the family court erred by applying the version of the statute in effect at the time of the filing, rather than the amended version. The primary distinction between the prior and amended versions is the addition of the requirement for consideration of the best interests of the child and a material change in circumstances supporting the need to terminate the guardianship.

This Court's review of the record reveals that the family court recognized the existence of the statutory amendment in its order, but it did not specifically identify the statutory underpinnings for its conclusion that the grandmother's guardianship should be terminated. It simply stated that the father had filed his petition for termination under West Virginia Code § 44–10–3(c)(4), and it thereafter proceeded to articulate its findings. The family court did, however, address the issue of the best interests of the child and the change in circumstances that had gradually occurred in the father's level of participation in his daughter's life. The family court observed that “striking a balance between a biological parent's constitutional rights and the child's best interests can be difficult.” The court also recognized the immeasurable importance of the child's best interests, as discussed by this Court in In re Antonio , 228 W.Va. at 388, 719 S.E.2d at 858. The court explained that the “record clearly reflects that throughout the years Father has continually stepped up to care for his child and has willingly assumed additional and substantial parental responsibilities as well as all caretaking functions for his minor daughter.”

This Court finds the parties' arguments regarding deficiencies in the application of the statute to be unavailing. Beyond any statutory requirement for consideration of best interests and changed circumstances, this Court has emphatically declared the requirement for a thorough consideration of

the best interests of the child and changed circumstances in all matters relating to altering custody of children. The substantive law in effect at both the time of filing of the petition and the time of hearings on the matter required such consideration. This Court addressed these requirements in the specific context of a termination of guardianship in In re Haylea G., 231 W.Va. 494, 745 S.E.2d 532 (2013), and has consistently required analysis of best interests and changed circumstances in matters involving custody of children. Id. at 498, 745 S.E.2d at 536. A child's best interests have been heralded as the paramount consideration by which all custody determinations should be made. We have repeatedly held that “[i]n a contest involving the custody of an infant the welfare of the child is the polar star by which the discretion of the court will be guided.” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Cash v. Lively, 155 W.Va. 801, 187 S.E.2d 601 (1972) (internal citation omitted); see also Syl. Pt. 3, in part, In re Katie S., 198 W.Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996) (“Although parents have substantial rights that must be protected, the primary goal ... in all family law matters ... must be the health and welfare of the children.”); Syl. Pt. 5, Carter v. Carter, 196 W.Va. 239, 470 S.E.2d 193 (1996) (“In visitation as well as custody matters, we have traditionally held paramount the best interests of the child.”).

We find that the family court, while not clearly specifying the statutory basis for its conclusions regarding termination of the guardianship, satisfactorily considered both K.H.'s best interests and the change in circumstances that had occurred over the several years in which the father's level of participation had increased. Moreover, the family court also considered the advice and conclusions of the guardian ad litem, formulated subsequent to a thorough investigation. In his January 2015 update on the current status of the child, the guardian ad litem specifically informed this Court that the child reported a preference to live with her father and also expressed a desire to spend additional time with her grandmother. This Court finds neither clear error nor abuse of discretion in the family court's conclusion that the guardianship should be terminated and custody granted to the father.

B. Psychological Parent

The grandmother also contends that the family court and circuit court erred by failing to recognize her as the psychological parent of the child based upon her eight-year guardianship and the relational bonds created during that time. The “psychological parent” concept, as employed in this state, was originally associated with an individual's right to intervene in child custody matters pursuant to West Virginia Code § 48–9–103 (2014). As enunciated in syllabus point

three of In re Clifford K., 217 W.Va. 625, 619 S.E.2d 138 (2005),

A psychological parent is a person who, on a continuing day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills a child's psychological and physical needs for a parent and provides for the child's emotional and financial support. The psychological parent may be a biological, adoptive, or foster parent, or any other person. The resulting relationship between the psychological parent and the child must be of substantial, not temporary, duration and must have begun with the consent and encouragement of the child's legal parent or guardian. To the extent that this holding is inconsistent with our prior decision of In the Interest of Brandon L.E., 183 W.Va. 113, 394 S.E.2d 515 (1990), that case is expressly modified.

In establishing those parameters for the psychological parent concept in Clifford K., this Court specifically warned:



With the announcement of this holding we also wish to make it abundantly clear that the mere existence of a psychological parent relationship, in and of itself, does not automatically permit the psychological parent to intervene in a proceeding to determine a child's custody pursuant to W. Va.Code § 48–9–103(b). Nothing is more sacred or scrupulously safeguarded as a parent's right to the custody of his/her child.

217 W.Va. at 644, 619 S.E.2d at 157 ; see also Syl. Pt. 1, In re Willis, 157 W.Va. 225, 207 S.E.2d 129 (1973) (“In the law concerning custody of minor children, no rule is more firmly established than that the right of a natural parent to the custody of his or her infant child is paramount to that of any other person; it is a fundamental personal liberty protected and guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the West Virginia and United States Constitutions.”); Syllabus, Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W.Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960) (“A parent has the natural right to the custody of his or her infant child, unless the parent is an unfit person because of misconduct, neglect, immorality, abandonment or other dereliction of duty, or has waived such right, or by agreement or otherwise has transferred, relinquished or surrendered such custody, the right of the parent to the custody of his or her infant child will be recognized and enforced by the courts.”). Recognizing the inherent rights of a biological parent to his or her child, this Court observed in Clifford K. that “the limited rights of a psychological parent cannot ordinarily trump those of a biological or adoptive parent to the care, control, and custody of his/her child.” 217 W.Va. at 644, 619 S.E.2d at 157 ; see also Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W.Va. 448, 452, 388 S.E.2d 322, 325 (1989) (stating that “[a]lthough we recognize the attachment and secure relationship” between a child and a psychological parent, “such bond cannot alter the otherwise secure natural rights of a parent[.]”).

This Court also addressed the concept of psychological parent in In re Visitation & Custody of Senturi N.S.V., 221 W.Va. 159, 652 S.E.2d 490 (2007), and observed:

In the cases in which this Court has determined a person to be a psychological parent to a child, that person typically has resided in the child's household and interacted with the child on a daily basis. See, e.g., In re Clifford K., id.; In re Jonathan G., 198 W.Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893 (1996) ; Simmons v. Comer, 190 W.Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530 (1993) ; Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W.Va. 448, 388 S.E.2d 322 (1989). Moreover, a psychological parent is one who essentially serves as a second parent to a child and is a relationship to which the child's parent has consented. See generally “In re Clifford K., 217 W.Va. 625, 619 S.E.2d 138 [ (2005) ]; Simmons, 190 W.Va. 350, 438 S.E.2d 530 ; Honaker, 182 W.Va. 448, 388 S.E.2d 322.”

221 W.Va. at 167, 652 S.E.2d at 498. In Senturi, the Court was also deliberate in its recognition of the potential for the concept of psychological parent to be inappropriately extended.

Obviously, a child will hold in high esteem any person who looks after him/her, attends to his/her needs, and lavishes him/her with love, attention, and affection. However, simply caring for a child is not enough to bestow upon a care giver psychological parent status. Were this the law of the State, any person, from day care

providers and babysitters to school teachers and family friends, who cares for a child on a regular basis and with whom the child has developed a relationship of trust could claim to be the child's psychological parent and seek an award of the child's custody to the exclusion of the child's parent. Clearly, this is not the result contemplated by this Court's prior holding [in Clifford K. ]....

Id. at 168, 652 S.E.2d at 499.

This Court also exhibited reluctance to apply the psychological parent concept in a manner that would unnecessarily detract from the rights of the natural parents in In re N.A., 227 W.Va. 458, 711 S.E.2d 280 (2011) :

Simply because a person is found to be a child's psychological parent, however, does not translate into the psychological parent getting custody of the child. Rather, this Court has only gone so far as to hold that the status of “psychological parent” entitles the individual to intervene in a custody proceeding, “when such intervention is likely to serve the best interests of the child(ren) whose custody is under adjudication.” ... Thus, custody determinations regarding a child or children are still controlled by what is in the best interests of the child(ren).

227 W.Va. at 469, 711 S.E.2d at 291 (quoting Clifford K., 217 W.Va. at 640, 619 S.E.2d at 153 ).

This Court had occasion to speak to the psychological parent issue again in In re Antonio. In that case, the child's maternal grandmother had filed a petition for guardianship, and the child's biological mother had objected. In appealing the denial of her petition, the grandmother argued that she had been the psychological parent to the child for ten years. 228 W.Va. at 384, 719 S.E.2d at 854. This Court held that the statutory scheme granting a trial court discretion to appoint a nominee selected by a minor over the age of fourteen did not obligate the trial court to appoint the grandmother as guardian, over the mother's objection and absent a showing of the mother's unfitness. Id. at 388, 719 S.E.2d at 858. The grandmother in Antonio argued that she should be appointed as Antonio's guardian. However, Antonio had been living with his mother for the three years preceding the filing of the guardianship petition. “While [the grandmother] might have been able to succeed under this theory during the approximately ten years that Antonio lived with her, at this point in time, this Court cannot find that [the mother] has voluntarily transferred or relinquished custody of Antonio.” Id. at 392, 719 S.E.2d at 862.

The Court recognized Antonio's desire to have a continued relationship with his grandmother, and found that while the guardianship should be terminated, Antonio would be entitled to have visitation with his grandmother. In so ruling, this Court relied upon Honaker for the proposition that the best interests of the child may, in certain cases, necessitate visitation with other parties: “[a]lthough custody of minor child should be with the natural parent absent proof of abandonment or some form of misconduct or neglect, the child may have a right to continued visitation rights with the stepparent or half-sibling.” 182 W.Va. at 451, 388 S.E.2d at 325, syl. pt. 2.

In In re A.C., No. 13–1120, 2014 WL 2782131, at *1 (W.Va. Supreme Court, June 19, 2014) (memorandum decision), this Court affirmed the lower court's determination that a non-parent had served the role of a psychological parent and observed that the family court had

made detailed findings regarding the child's living situation with Brooke B. in Kanawha County, detailing how, for example, Brooke B. maintained A.C.'s school papers, how A.C. celebrated holidays in the Kanawha County home, how friends of A.C. dropped her off at the home, how Brooke B.'s address was A.C.'s official school address, and how Brooke B.'s authority to give consent for medical treatment of A.C. was never challenged.

2014 WL 2782131, at *1. This Court affirmed the order appointing the psychological parent as the guardian and granted custody to the psychological parent while the biological father was incarcerated.Id.

In the case sub judice, the family court found that the grandmother was not the psychological parent of K.H. because she failed to satisfy the second two elements of the “psychological parent” test. Specifically, it found that her guardianship was only temporary and was not begun with the consent of the father. Upon review of the record, this Court finds that the family court clearly erred. The grandmother had custody of this child for eight years, albeit increasingly a shared-custody arrangement as the father became gradually more involved in the life of his daughter and sought additional custodial responsibilities. The child's mother, prior to her death, had sought assistance from her mother and had encouraged the relationship between grandmother and grandchild. The father, while not involved in the child's life for over a year, consented to the guardianship arrangement and entered into agreed orders resolving custody issues in favor of joint custody arrangements with the grandmother. From the child's birth and over the course of the next eight years, the grandmother has served as a parent to K.H. in every conceivable capacity. Such relationship is not properly characterized as temporary. This was a significant relationship that unquestionably qualifies as a psychological parenting situation under this Court's definition in Clifford K., as well as the subsequent cases chronicled above. We consequently find that the family court erred in finding that the grandmother's relationship with K.H. was temporary and that it was begun without the consent of her parents. We find that the grandmother is a psychological parent to K.H.

C. Right of Psychological Parent to Continued Association

The psychological parent doctrine is an equitable theory and judge-made construct which permits courts, under appropriate circumstances, to recognize an individual who has maintained a parent-like relationship with a child and consequently has a right to continued visitation with that child. See Nicole M. Onorato, Note, The Right to Be Heard: Incorporating the Needs and Interests of Children of Nonmarital Families into the Visitation Rights Dialogue, 4 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 491, 519–20 (2005) (explaining the psychological-parent doctrine). In such instances, a court will evaluate the issue of whether an adult has formed a bonded relationship with a child and whether the continuation of such relationship is in the best interests of the child.

These principles are consistent with this Court's approach to the right of a child to continued association, as expressed quite concisely in Honaker. In that case, this Court determined that the natural father had a right to custody of his child, but also considered whether it was in the child's best interests to maintain a continued relationship with her stepfather and half-brother. 182 W.Va. at 452, 388 S.E.2d at 325. This Court stated:

[u]ndoubtedly, ... [the child's] best interests must be the primary standard by which we determine her rights to continued contact with other significant figures in her life. Clearly, “these interests are interests of the child and not of the parent. Visitation is, to be sure, a benefit to the adult who is granted visitation rights with a child. But it is not the adult's benefit about which the courts are concerned. It is the benefit of the child that is vital.” “Visitation is not solely for the benefit of the adult visitor but is aimed at fulfilling what many conceive to be a vital, or at least a wholesome contribution to the child's emotional well being by permitting partial continuation of an earlier established close relationship.”Looper v. McManus, 581 P.2d 487, 488 (Okla.Ct.App.1978).

Honaker, 182 W.Va. at 452, 388 S.E.2d at 325 (footnotes omitted). In Honaker, this Court also explained:

The best interests of the child concept with regard to visitation emerges from the reality that “[t]he modern child is considered a person, not a sub-person over whom the parent has an absolute and irrevocable possessory right. The child has rights....” Another concern is “the need for stability in the child's life.... [T]ermination of visitation with individuals to whom the child was close would contribute to instability rather than provide stability.[”]

Id., 388 S.E.2d at 326 (footnotes omitted). “[C]ontinuity and stability in a child's life most certainly count for something.... Children are not dogwood trees, to be uprooted, replanted, then replanted again for expediency's sake.” Guardianship of Kassandra H., 64 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 668 (Cal.App.1998).

As apparent from the extensive line of cases decided by this Court, the rights of K.H. to continued association with her grandmother must be a vital part of this equation. The father emphasizes the United States Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), and the fundamental right of a parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her children. In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court held that awarding visitation to a non-parent, over the objections of a parent, is subject to constitutional limitations. The Court in Troxel invalidated a Washington statute authorizing “any person” to petition for visitation rights “at any time[,]” and described the statute as “breathtakingly broad.” Id. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054. This Court has examined the Troxel case, noting that it “instructs that a judicial determination regarding whether grandparent visitation rights are appropriate may not be premised solely on the best interests of the child analysis.”

Cathy L.M. v. Mark Brent R., 217 W.Va. 319, 327–28, 617 S.E.2d 866, 874–75 (2005) (emphasis supplied). Instead, this Court emphasized in Cathy L.M. that the evaluating court “must also consider and give significant weight to the parents' preference, thus precluding a court from intervening in a fit parent's decision making on a best interests basis.” Id. That is the gravamen of the Troxel decision; the true failing of the Washington statute in Troxel was “not that the [trial court] intervened, but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to [the parent's] determination of her daughters' best interests.” 530 U.S. at 69, 120 S.Ct. 2054.

As this Court explained in footnote seven of In re Visitation of A.P., 231 W.Va. 38, 743 S.E.2d 346 (2013) :

Although Troxel does not define “special weight,” state courts attempting to interpret and apply Troxel have reasoned that “special weight” indicates considerable deference. In In re M.W., 292 P.3d 1158 (Colo.App.2012), for instance, the Colorado Court of Appeals explained that “[g]iving special weight means that the presumption favoring the parent's decision can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that granting parental responsibilities to the nonparent is in the child's best interests.” Id. at 1161.

231 W.Va. at 42 n. 7, 743 S.E.2d at 350 n. 7. In State ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats, 209 W.Va. 752, 551 S.E.2d 674 (2001), this Court held that the West Virginia grandparent visitation statute was constitutional because it is much narrower than the Washington statute evaluated in Troxel. Id. at 760, 551 S.E.2d at 682. This Court, in Brandon L., did not identify “the amount of weight that should attach to the factor of parental preference....” Id. at 763, 551 S.E.2d at 685. We noted, however, that “in light of the Troxel decision it is clear that ‘the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination’ provided that the parent has not been shown to be unfit.” Id. (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70, 120 S.Ct. 2054 ).

An enlightening discussion regarding Troxel was included a dissenting opinion in In re Marriage of Winczewski, 188 Or.App. 667, 72 P.3d 1012 (2003) (Brewer, J., dissenting), as follows:

When the competing rights of child and parent are pitted against each other, a balancing of interests is appropriate. That notion finds support in the Troxel test. As discussed, Troxel teaches that a court cannot award parenting time to a nonparent over the objection of a fit parent based solely on best interest considerations. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). However, the presumption that must be applied before best interests are considered focuses solely on the parent's ability to act in the child's best interests. In other words, the presumption relates to the very factual determination that must be made if it is rebutted. Because, in a real sense, the Troxel presumption blends with the best interests test, there is a certain circularity to the Court's analysis. That circularity leaves one to wonder whether there is less to the presumption than initially meets the eye. As one commentator has observed:

The significance of Troxel lies in its subtlety, not in any rigid analysis of recognized and established constitutional law doctrine. The opinion marks an evolution in parental autonomy protection by

what it pronounces as well as by what it avoids. By balancing the State's interest in protecting the child with the parent's interest in making child-rearing decisions free from unnecessary State interference, the Court no longer accords blind, unquestioning deference to the decisions of presumptively fit parents. Ideally, when courts decide to balance the competing interests equally, the child's needs will be served and will prevail.

Sandra Martinez, The Misinterpretation of Troxel v. Granville: Construing the New Standard for Third Party Visitation, 36 Fam. L.Q. 487, 499 (2002). In sum, Troxel neither requires nor presages a strict scrutiny analysis of rights in nonparent custody and parenting time cases; instead, the deference to parental prerogative that it requires entails a balancing of distinct family interests.

72 P.3d at 1057–58 (Brewer, dissenting).

A fundamental principle, properly gleaned from the scholarly writings and legal opinions reviewed by this Court, is that the pronouncements of Troxel do not predispose every case to an ultimate determination favoring the natural parent in a complete and conclusive manner. An assessment of the specific circumstances of each case is still required, and while the reviewing court must accord special weight to the preferences of the parent, the best interests of the child are not to be ignored and must be included as a critical component of the dialogue regarding visitation or custody.

As the New Jersey Supreme Court in Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 827 A.2d 203 (2003), concisely stated, “[t]he possibilities are as varied as the factual scenarios presented.” 827 A.2d at 224. These possibilities should be deliberated in a manner conducive to the protection of the child. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania summarized the process aptly in Hiller v. Fausey, 588 Pa. 342, 904 A.2d 875 (2006) : “[W]e refuse to close our minds to the possibility that in some instances a court may overturn even the decision of a fit parent to exclude a grandparent from a grandchild's life, especially where the grandparent's child is deceased and the grandparent relationship is longstanding and significant to the grandchild.” Id. at 886–87.

The father in the present case contends that the family court allowed for a gradual transition and that nothing further is necessary. In reality, the family court order only provided for a limited period of gradual transition, the terms of which have now expired.

No further visitation is delineated in the family court order. While the grandmother has apparently continued to exercise visitation during the pendency of this appeal, the family court order did not actually require any ongoing visitation.

Based upon a thorough evaluation of the appendix record, this Court finds that K.H. and her psychological parent/grandmother are entitled to continued visitation. This Court is confident that such visitation can be structured in a manner which will not substantially interfere with the parent-child relationship or adversely affect the father's fundamental rights to custody of K.H.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the family court did not abuse its discretion by terminating the grandmother's guardianship of K.H., and the decision terminating the guardianship is consequently affirmed. However, due to the grandmother's status as psychological parent to the child, the grandmother and the child are entitled to continued association with one another. Thus, we remand this matter for the entry of an order, consistent with this opinion, specifying a liberal visitation schedule to permit significant and meaningful opportunity for the grandmother to interact with K.H. In formulating such arrangement, the family court must also be cognizant of the grandmother's recent filing of a petition for grandparent visitation rights under West Virginia Code §§ 48–10–101 to–1201 (2014), and the two separate and distinct methods of seeking relief initiated by the grandmother should be merged for consideration by the family court.

The court must also be cognizant of the need to formulate a visitation schedule “as expeditiously as possible[,]” as this Court explained in Honaker , 182 W.Va. at 453, 388 S.E.2d at 326. Transitions in the life of a child should be fashioned in a manner which minimizes the trauma to the child. The plan “should give due consideration to both parties' work and home schedules and to the parameters of the child's daily school and home life, and should be developed in a manner intended to foster the emotional adjustment” of the child “while not unduly disrupting the lives of the parties or the child [ ].” Id. As this Court in Honaker advised:

No matter how artfully or deliberately the trial court judge draws the plan for these coming months, however, its success and indeed the chances for [the child's] future happiness and emotional security will rely heavily on the efforts of these two [caretakers]. The work that lies ahead for both of them is not without inconvenience and sacrifice on both sides. Their energies should not be directed even partially at any continued rancor at one another, but must be fully directed at developing compassion and understanding for one another, as well as showing love and sensitivity to the [child's] feelings at a difficult time in all their lives.

Id. at 453, 388 S.E.2d at 326–27.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.

Justice BENJAMIN, deeming himself disqualified, did not participate in the decision of this case. Judge NIBERT, sitting by temporary assignment.