JUSTICE MARTINEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The issue presented by this case is whether a trial de novo clause in an uninsured motorist provision of an automobile insurance policy violates public policy. The trial de novo clause allows the insured or insurer to demand a trial on the merits after arbitration when the amount awarded in the arbitration proceeding exceeds a specified limit. The trial court ruled that the trial de novo clause was unenforceable. The court of appeals reversed the judgment. See Huizar v. Allstate Ins. Co., 932 P.2d 839 (Colo.App. 1996). We closely scrutinize the effect of the trial de novo clause for consistency with Colorado law and determine that it is in conflict with the public policy of this state. We therefore reverse and hold that the trial de novo clause is unenforceable.

I.

The petitioner, Gloria Huizar, was a passenger in an automobile driven by her neighbor, an uninsured motorist. The neighbor lost control of the automobile and hit a curb, slamming Huizar's head into the interior post and windshield of the vehicle. Huizar immediately experienced pain in her neck and head. After six days, she began medical treatment. Allstate Insurance Company, Huizar's insurer, paid her medical expenses pursuant to the personal injury protection coverage of her policy. Because of her neighbor's uninsured status, Huizar also looked to Allstate for her additional claims.

Huizar and Allstate were unable to agree about additional compensation under the terms of her uninsured motorist protection policy. Consequently, Huizar elected to invoke the arbitration clause in her insurance policy, which provides:

If [Huizar] or [Allstate] don't agree on [Huizar's] right to receive any damages or the amount, then at the request of either, the disagreement will be settled by arbitration.

After two days of arbitration proceedings, the arbiter awarded Huizar "$30,000 plus interest from the date of the accident and appropriate costs."

The arbiter's award exceeded the $25,000.00 minimum liability coverage required by Colorado's Financial Responsibility statute. Allstate initiated an action in district court by filing a "motion for trial de novo" and naming itself as the defendant. The motion was based on the trial de novo clause in Huizar's policy, which provides:

Regardless of the method of arbitration, when any arbitration award exceeds the financial responsibility limits in the State of Colorado [$25,000.00], either party has a right to trial on all issues in a court of competent jurisdiction. This right must be exercised within 60 days of the award. Costs, including attorney fees, are to be paid by the party incurring them.

In response, Huizar moved to dismiss the action and requested that the trial court docket the arbiter's award pursuant to section 13-22-216, 5 C.R.S. (1997).

Huizar argued that the trial de novo clause unduly limited her ability to recover and was therefore contrary to the public policy of providing just compensation to victims injured by uninsured motorists. After additional briefing on the issue, the trial court denied Allstate's motion and held that the trial de novo clause was "patently unfair" to Huizar because it permitted Allstate "to litigate . . . issues [of liability as well as damages] twice if it's not satisfied with the first decision." The trial court concluded that the trial de novo clause "limit[s] uninsured motorist coverage [and] is void against public policy."

Allstate appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, concluding that Colorado law does not specifically require binding arbitration for uninsured motorist claims. See Huizar, 932 P.2d at 840. Thus, the court of appeals held that the trial de novo clause does not violate public policy. We do not agree.

II.

Insurance policies, as several courts have observed, differ from ordinary, bilateral contracts. See Jones v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 937 P.2d 1360, 1361 (Ark. 1997); Wiggam v. Associates Fin. Serv., Inc., 677 N.E.2d 87, 91 (Ind. 1997); Rodman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 208 N.W.2d 903, 905 (Iowa 1973); U.S. Fidelity Guaranty, Co. v. Ferguson, 698 So.2d 77, 80 (Mo. 1997). Because of both the disparity of bargaining power between insurer and insured and the fact that materially different coverage cannot be readily obtained elsewhere, automobile insurance policies are generally not the result of bargaining. See Schmidt v. Midwest Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 426 N.W.2d 870, 874 (Minn. 1988) (recognizing that although an insurance policy may not technically qualify as a contract of adhesion, it possesses some of the earmarks of an adhesive contract). Instead, the provisions in a policy are often imposed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. It is not a negotiated contract but one with terms required by legislation or dictated by the insurer. Thus, courts have assumed a "heightened responsibility" to scrutinize insurance policies for provisions that unduly compromise the insured's interests and have concluded that any provision of an insurance policy which violates public policy and principles of fairness is unenforceable. See Milbank Ins. Co. v. Henry, 441 N.W.2d 143, 148 (Neb. 1989); Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1260 (N.J. 1992).

We have previously recognized that "a contractual provision is void if the interest in enforcing the provision is clearly outweighed by a contrary public policy." FDIC v. American Cas. Co., 843 P.2d 1285, 1290 (Colo. 1992) (citing University of Denver v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Colo. 505, 509, 335 P.2d 292, 294 (1959)). We have extended this principle to the conditions and terms of an insurance contract that undermine legislatively-expressed public policy. See, e.g., Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585, 589 (Colo. 1984) (household exclusion in automobile liability policy held invalid as contrary to public policy expressed in Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act); Newton v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 197 Colo. 462, 468, 594 P.2d 1042, 1046 (1979) (insurance policy provision which permitted insurer to subtract PIP payments from uninsured motorist coverage so as to reduce that coverage to less than statutory minimum violative of public policy in Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act).

In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Avis, 947 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1997), we held that competing excess clauses would not be enforced, even in the absence of a direct expression of public policy or a specific statute addressing the issue and despite freedom of contract, because "an unintended consequence or absurdity contrary to public policy would result. " Id. at 346. In Avis, we examined not only the facial validity of a clause in the insurance policy, but the result created by the operation of a provision of the policy in particular circumstances. We determined that Colorado's insurance laws favor adequate, fair and timely resolution of claims. See id. Similarly, here we do not confine ourselves to scrutinizing the insurance policy on its face, but we also examine whether the effects created by the operation of the trial de novo clause are consistent with public policy. We consider public policy derived from several sources and take an integrated approach to understanding public policy as it affects the resolution of disputes involving uninsured motorist claims.

We begin our analysis by considering the pertinent public policies within the automobile insurance context. Next, we examine the effects created by the operation of the trial de novo clause and we closely scrutinize the de novo clause for consistency with public policy.

III.

The following public policies are pertinent to a consideration of the trial de novo provision: (1) the policy against dilution of the uninsured motorist coverage evinced by the adoption of section 10-4-609, 3 C.R.S. (1997), (2) the policy against undue delay in access to the courts and in favor of speedy resolution of disputes contained in Colorado Constitution Article II, Section 6, and (3) the policy in favor of encouraging arbitration as an alternative to litigation embodied in Colorado Constitution Article XVIII, Section 3 and in sections 13-22-201 to -233, 5 C.R.S. (1997).

A.

The General Assembly enacted the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act (Act) in 1965 to "assure the widespread availability to the insuring public of insurance protection against financial loss caused by negligent financially irresponsible motorists." Ch. 91, sec. 1, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 333 (declaration of purpose). The current uninsured motorist statute requires insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage under the liability provisions of an automobile insurance policy. See 10-4-609, 3 C.R.S. (1997). Uninsured motorist insurance ensures that victims injured by an uninsured motorist recover as if they had been injured by a driver covered by the required liability insurance. See Terranova v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 800 P.2d 58, 60-61 (Colo. 1990); Alliance Mut. Cas. Co. v. Duerson, 184 Colo. 117, 124, 518 P.2d 1177, 1181 (1974) (legislative intent is satisfied by recovery which assures that an injured motorist will be compensated at least to the same extent as one injured by a motorist who is insured in compliance with Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act); Briggs v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 859, 861 (Colo.App. 1992) (the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is to compensate insureds for losses caused by negligent and financially irresponsible motorists).

An insurance policy provision is void and unenforceable if it violates public policy by attempting to "dilute, condition, or limit statutorily mandated coverage." Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585, 589 (Colo. 1984) (superseded by statute as stated in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Feghali, 814 P.2d 863, 865-66 (Colo. 1991)); but see Kral v. American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 784 P.2d 759, 766 (Colo. 1989) (plaintiff is entitled to the benefits of coverage only "to the extent necessary to fully compensate the insured for the loss, subject to the limits of the insurance contract").

In Kral, we held that a subrogation clause contained in an insurance policy and a release-trust agreement executed pursuant to the subrogation provision were enforceable only to the extent that they did not impair the ability of the insured to gain full compensation for any loss caused by the conduct of an uninsured motorist. See Kral, 784 P.2d at 765-66. Thus, Colorado courts have held unenforceable those insurance policies which operate to significantly dilute uninsured motorist coverage. See Terranova, 800 P.2d at 63; Newton, 197 Colo. at 465, 594 P.2d at 1043; Briggs, 833 P.2d at 862 (recognizing that an insurer's attempt to dilute uninsured motorist coverage through a consent-to-sue clause is an impermissible burden to recover damages).

B.

The public policy of this state, as expressed in the Colorado Constitution, favors both access to the courts and timely resolutions of claims. Article II, Section 6 of the Colorado Constitution provides that "[c]ourts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character; and right and justice should be administered without sale, denial or delay." We have recognized that Article II, Section 6 of the Colorado Constitution ensures the availability of a judicial forum to effectuate a right if that right has accrued under the law. See Estate of Stevenson v. Hollywood Bar Cafe, Inc., 832 P.2d 718, 721 (Colo. 1992); Sigman v. Seafood Ltd. Partnership I, 817 P.2d 527, 533 (Colo. 1991); Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Colo. 1991).

A burden on a party's right of access to the courts does not violate this public policy provided the burden is reasonable. See People v. Spencer, 185 Colo. 377, 381-82, 524 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1974) ("In a proper case . . . the right of free access to our courts must yield to the rights of others and the efficient administration of justice."). For example, in Firelock Inc. v. District Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Colo. 1989), we determined that the Colorado Mandatory Arbitration Act did not deny the right of access to the courts. We specifically found that the requirement that a prevailing party pay costs of arbitration up to $1,000.00 if the party did not increase its position by at least 10% did not place an unreasonable burden on this right. See id.

C.

Arbitration as a method of alternative dispute resolution is a convenient mode of resolving disputes and is favored by the public policy of Colorado. See Colo. Const. art. XVIII, 3; see also City County of Denver v. District Court, 939 P.2d 1353, 1362 (Colo. 1997); Dominion Ins. Co. v. Hart, 178 Colo. 451, 454, 498 P.2d 1138, 1140 (1972); Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 412, 232 P. 680, 681 (1925); Wilson v. Wilson, 18 Colo. 615, 620, 34 P. 175, 177 (1893).

The General Assembly adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA) in 1975 to reflect its endorsement of arbitration. See 13-22-201 to -233, 5 C.R.S. (1997). The General Assembly adopted the UAA to (1) validate arbitration agreements, (2) assure an effective arbitration process, (3) provide necessary procedural safeguards, and (4) provide an efficient procedure when judicial assistance is necessary. See 13-22-202, 5 C.R.S. (1997).

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Broadnax, 827 P.2d 531, 535-37 (Colo. 1992), we rejected constitutional challenges to a statute requiring binding arbitration in disputes involving personal injury protection benefits. Our decision in Broadnax was based on our observation that the arbitration award was subject to the limited judicial review provided for in the UAA, rather than de novo review.

In Broadnax, we reviewed the Connecticut Supreme Court's consideration of the Connecticut mandatory arbitration statute, which employed a similar limited judicial review. See Broadnax, 827 P.2d at 537 (quoting Chmieleweski v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 591 A.2d 101, 109 (Conn. 1991)). The Chmieleweski decision acknowledged that de novo review of an arbitration proceeding is inconsistent with the purposes of binding arbitration, which are "avoiding congestion of the courts with piecemeal litigation and leveling the playing field by avoiding the risks that insurers would use their superior economic resources by subjecting claims for coverage to undue litigation." See Chmieleweski, 591 A.2d at 109. We also recognized in Broadnax that de novo review may also render arbitration proceedings "`merely way stations to the courts, and would thereby create the very risks the compulsory arbitration provision was designed to avoid.'" Broadnax, 827 P.2d at 537 (quoting Chmieleweski, 591 A.2d at 109). Thus, we have previously acknowledged that de novo review of arbitration proceedings may frustrate the public policy goals of arbitration.

IV.

The arbitration provision in this case results in mandatory arbitration when invoked by either party. The Allstate policy also provides that an arbitration award not exceeding the limits of Colorado's financial responsibility law ($25,000.00) is binding upon the parties. However, an award exceeding $25,000.00 is not binding if either party elects to have the issues tried de novo in a court of competent jurisdiction.

The practical effect of a party's exercise of its right in the policy to a trial de novo is to render the completed arbitration proceeding meaningless because the policy provides for a trial de novo on all issues. Thus, the arbiter's determination of liability, the amount of damages, and the awarded costs are all subject to a trial de novo. Nothing is preserved from the arbitration process to be utilized at a subsequent proceeding.

We are not only concerned with the fairness of the clause on its face, but also with the unfairness of its application. Although the insurance policy seemingly puts the insurer and the insured on equal footing because either party can demand a trial de novo, as a practical matter the trial de novo clause may unfairly favor the insurer. See 3 Irvin E. Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance 49.12 (3d ed. 1995) (explaining that "an arbitrator's award exceeding the state's financial responsibility limits would be challenged by the insurer, and thus such provisions only benefit the insurer"). Many jurisdictions which have found identical trial de novo clauses contrary to public policy have concluded that the clause favors the insurer because it is unlikely that the insured would ever seek to avoid a high award, even if the award was lower than the insured's expectation, due to the additional expense and the risk of failing to obtain a higher award. See Worldwide Ins. Group v. Klopp, 603 A.2d 788, 791 (Del. 1992) (recognizing that "[w]hile high awards may be appealed by either party, common experience suggests that it is unlikely that an insured would appeal such an award"); 3 Irvin E. Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance 49.12 (1995) (noting that "[i]t would be difficult to envision a situation in which an insured would be willing to gamble away a favorable decision on both liability and damages . . . where he could wind up a total loser at the end of trial"); see also O'Neil v. Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co., 786 F. Supp. 397, 399 (D. Vt. 1992) (applying Vermont law); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 472 N.E.2d 1061, 1063-64 (Ohio 1984).

In this case, Huizar invoked the arbitration clause, thus requiring Allstate to participate in arbitration, and requiring both parties to be bound by the arbitration if the award did not exceed $25,000.00. Allstate made no attempt to avoid arbitration, nor could it avoid arbitration consistent with the policy. Huizar's counsel explained to this court at oral argument that Huizar requested arbitration rather than filing her claim in district court because of her expectation that Allstate would forestall any court proceedings she initiated by requesting arbitration. According to Huizar, since she would have been required to arbitrate by Allstate anyway, requesting arbitration was necessary to make progress toward resolution of the dispute. Regardless of the accuracy of Huizar's expectation, under the insurance policy arbitration became mandatory for both parties once she requested it.

After Allstate invoked the trial de novo clause, the parties were subjected to new proceedings in a separate forum, increased costs, and delayed resolution of the dispute. Because nothing survived from the arbitration, the proceeding was reduced to a meaningless exercise or, at best, a non-binding guide to evaluating the claim for settlement purposes. Our inquiry is whether this effect of the trial de novo clause offends the previously discussed public policy.

Not every deviation in uninsured motorist coverage from the protection an insured would be provided if the uninsured motorist was insured constitutes an impermissible attempt to dilute uninsured motorist coverage in violation of public policy. See, e.g., Union Ins. Co. v. Houtz, 883 P.2d 1057, 1063 (Colo. 1994) (recognizing that an insurer may aggregate the amount of damages from multiple insureds for purposes of calculating the amount of benefits due under insurance motorist coverage without violating public policy). But see Newton v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 197 Colo. 462, 468, 594 P.2d 1042, 1046 (1979) (insurance policy provision which permitted insurer to subtract PIP payments from uninsured motorist coverage so as to reduce that coverage to less than statutory minimum violative of public policy in Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act). An insurance policy provision is void and unenforceable, even if unambiguously written, when the effect of the contractual provision is to dilute or avoid legislatively mandated coverage. See Terranova, 800 P.2d 58, 60 (Colo. 1990). On its surface the exercise of the trial de novo right under the policy does not directly dilute uninsured motorist coverage because the amount of the available coverage and the possible award does not change by proceeding to trial. However, when an insurer invokes the trial de novo clause, the amount that the insured victim ultimately recovers is necessarily reduced. The insured will incur additional expenses, such as witness fees, attorney fees, process fees, arbiter fees, and other costs of presenting a case, not to mention the unquantifiable hardship of prolonging a final resolution of the case. That these costs may be substantial is evidenced by the fact that Huizar already incurred over three thousand dollars in similar costs at arbitration.

Furthermore, the interference here with a party's access to the courts and speedy resolution of its legal claims is unreasonable. Invoking one's right to an arbitration proceeding ultimately has no impact or effect other than to interfere with and delay access to the courts and dilute uninsured motorist coverage. The Colorado Mandatory Arbitration Act, reviewed in Firelock, required the party demanding trial de novo to pay the costs of arbitration up to $1,000.00 if the party did not increase its position by at least 10%. See 13-22-405(3), 6A C.R.S. (1987), repealed by 13-22-411, 5 C.R.S. (1997). Here, no such consequence attaches to a request for a trial de novo, and, hence, the parties are not discouraged from needlessly requesting a trial. Under the clause, the dissatisfied party may unilaterally render the entire arbitration meaningless by requesting a trial de novo. When considered in the uninsured motorists insurance context, this unproductive delay is entirely inconsistent with the public policy in favor of a speedy resolution of disputes.

A number of our cases reflect this State's dedication to the strong public policy of favoring arbitration because it provides the parties thereto with a convenient, speedy, and efficient alternative to litigation. See City County of Denver v. District Court, 939 P.2d at 1362; Judd Constr. Co. v. Evans Joint Venture, 642 P.2d 922, 924 (Colo. 1982); Columbine Valley Constr. Co. v. Roaring Fork Sch. Dist., 626 P.2d 686, 690 (Colo. 1981); Ezell v. Rocky Mountain Bean Elevator Co., 76 Colo. 409, 411, 232 P. 680, 681 (1925). While an arbitration clause is not against public policy merely because it permits nonbinding arbitration, see Water Works Employees Local 1045 v. Board of Water Works, 44 Colo. App. 178, 615 P.2d 52 (1980), the public policy of encouraging arbitration is not served by a meaningless proceeding which unreasonably interferes with court access and dilutes uninsured motorist coverage. Furthermore, the increases in costs and delay, coupled with the fact that there is no corresponding benefit derived therefrom, are inconsistent with the public policy of providing an efficient procedure for the resolution of legal claims. See 13-22-202, 5 C.R.S. (1997).

Pursuant to the UAA, parties agreeing to arbitration may agree to a form of arbitration which differs from that provided in the UAA. See 13-22-202, 5 C.R.S. (1997). The UAA provides for a method of selecting arbiters, for a majority vote of the arbiters to exercise their power, and for a method of conducting the hearing. See 13-22-202 to -205, 5 C.R.S. (1997). The UAA also provides that the parties may make different arrangements for selecting arbiters, exercising the power of the arbiters, and conducting the hearing. See 13-22-205 to -207, 5 C.R.S. (1997). Similarly, the UAA provides for notice of the award and authority to award expenses and fees, unless the parties otherwise agree. See 13-22-210 and -212, 5 C.R.S. (1997). The UAA also provides for a limited appellate-like review of the arbiter's award. See 13-22-213 to -216, 5 C.R.S. (1997).

Under the insurance policy, if an award does not exceed $25,000.00, it may either be confirmed as provided by section 13-22-213, vacated on the specific grounds provided for in section 13-22-214, or modified for the specific reasons provided for in sections 13-22-214 to -215. After such limited review, it may be reduced to a judgment and enforced. See 13-22-216, 5 C.R.S. (1997).

The effect of the trial de novo clause here would be to allow the parties to establish a condition which determines whether the arbitration award is subject to the judicial review provided for in sections 13-22-213 to -215. Under the insurance policy, if an award exceeds $25,000.00, then the effect of the trial de novo clause is to expand a court's traditional limited powers of review in favor of de novo review. Although the trial de novo clause is couched in terms of a "right" to a trial de novo, it effectively subjects the arbiter's award to de novo review. Thus, where an award exceeds $25,000.00, the trial de novo clause effectively changes the limited jurisdiction of the court to conduct a review by giving it general jurisdiction to conduct a trial de novo.

We note that the UAA does not expressly permit contractual deviation from its judicial review procedures. Thus, the UAA neither expresses nor implies a public policy in favor of the use of a trial de novo clause. Regardless of whether or not the trial de novo clause conflicts with UAA appellate review procedures, the increases in cost and delay are inconsistent with the public policy of providing an efficient procedure for court review of arbitration. See 13-22-202, 5 C.R.S. (1997).

Because of the unique nature of insurance policies, we closely scrutinize their operation for consistency with public policy. Applying this heightened scrutiny and considering the potential unequal impact of the trial de novo clause, we find that by invalidating arbitration which has already been completed, it needlessly increases costs, dilutes uninsured motorist coverage, impedes timely resolution of claims, unreasonably burdens the right of access to the courts, and renders arbitration a less effective means of dispute resolution. While no single statement of public policy contained in any statutory or constitutional law directly prohibits the trial de novo clause in the insurance policy before us, the de novo clause violates the public policy of Colorado favoring fair, adequate, and timely resolution of uninsured motorist claims.

V.

We hold that the trial de novo clause is unenforceable. Therefore, it may not be relied upon by either party to demand a new trial after arbitration has been completed and an award rendered. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUSTICE SCOTT dissents, and CHIEF JUSTICE VOLLACK joins in the dissent.

JUSTICE KOURLIS does not participate.