Summary
In Harrington v. Mayflower Mfg. Co., 173 Pa. Super. 130, 96 A.2d 180, the Court had before it the question that was involved in Ratto v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., supra, and followed the latter decision, saying that the period of limitation in the Workmen's Compensation Act was "not a technical statute of limitation" but that it was "strictly a statute of repose which completely extinguishes the right and not merely the remedy" (96 A.2d p. 181).
Summary of this case from Natale v. Upjohn CompanyOpinion
March 17, 1953.
April 14, 1953.
Workmen's compensation — Reinstatement of agreement — Limitation of time — Necessity of pleading by employer — Statute of repose — Rules of pleading — Workmen's Compensation Act — Statutory Construction Act.
1. The provision in § 413 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, that no compensation agreement shall be reinstated unless a petition is filed within one year from the date of the most recent payment of compensation, may be applied by the Board even though it has not been pleaded by the employer.
2. Such provision is not a technical statute of limitation which, in conformity with common law practice, must be affirmatively pleaded as a defense; it is strictly a statute of repose which completely extinguishes the right and not merely the remedy, and may be invoked even though it has not been pleaded.
3. Proceedings under the workmen's compensation legislation are not litigation and the rules of pleading established in the practice of common law actions are not applicable to them.
4. Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, § 64, cited.
Before RHODES, P.J., HIRT, RENO, DITHRICH, ROSS, GUNTHER and WRIGHT, JJ.
Appeal, No. 23, Feb. T., 1953, from judgment of Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Sept. T., 1952, No. 967, in case of Amanda Harrington v. Mayflower Manufacturing Company. Judgment affirmed.
Appeal by claimant from decision of Workmen's Compensation Board refusing award.
Appeal dismissed, opinion by ROBINSON, J. Claimant appealed.
Richard P. Conaboy, with him James J. Powell and James J. Powell, Jr., for appellant.
David J. Conroy, with him James W. Scanlon, for appellee.
Argued March 17, 1953.
Appellant suffered a compensable accident in the course of her employment with appellee. A compensation agreement was executed and the last payment thereon was made as of February 7, 1950. The final receipt was signed on March 6, 1950. On July 13, 1951, she filed a petition for modification, alleging a recurrence of the disability. The petition was treated as a petition for reinstatement, and allowed by the referee. Upon appeal the Board reversed the referee, holding that the petition was filed more than one year after the date of the last payment, although appellee had not pleaded the bar of the statute. The court below affirmed the Board.
The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, § 413, as amended, 77 P. S. § 772, authorizes the Board to reinstate a compensation agreement "at any time" upon proof that the disability of an injured employe has recurred, and further provides that "no agreement . . . shall be . . . reinstated, unless a petition is filed with the board within one year after the date of the most recent payment of compensation made prior to the filing of such petition: . . ." Appellant concedes that the one-year limitation is literally applicable to her petition but contends primarily that the Board may apply it only when it has been pleaded by the employer.
Our cases negate that proposition. Proceedings under the workmen's compensation legislation are not litigation and the rules of pleading established in the practice of common law actions are not applicable to them. Thatcher v. Weinstein, 154 Pa. Super. 368, 35 A.2d 549. Moreover, the provision in § 413, supra, (like those contained in § 315, 77 P. S. § 602, and § 426, 77 P. S. § 871) is not a technical statute of limitation which, in conformity with common law practice, must be affirmatively pleaded as a defense. It is strictly a statute of repose which completely extinguishes the right and not merely the remedy, and may be invoked even though it has not been pleaded. Ratto v. Penna. Coal Co., 102 Pa. Super. 242, 156 A. 749; Demmel v. Dilworth Co., 136 Pa. Super. 37, 7 A.2d 50; Cosenza v. General Baking Co., 147 Pa. Super. 591, 24 A.2d 735; Reichert v. Penna. R. R. Co., 156 Pa. Super. 213, 40 A.2d 158; Calabria v. State Workmen's Insurance Fund, 333 Pa. 40, 3 A.2d 322.
The clause "at any time" does not, as appellant further contends, authorize reinstatement of compensation agreements regardless of the one-year limitation. The clause was contained in the original Workmen's Compensation Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 736, § 423, and was not eliminated by the amendatory Act of April 13, 1927, P. L. 186, § 6, which added the limitation. The clauses may be irreconcilable and hence the clause last in position, the one-year limitation, must prevail. Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1019, § 64, 46 P. S. § 564.
Judgment affirmed.