Summary
refusing to reduce the quarter hour billing increments because the fees requested are reasonable
Summary of this case from Cavaretta, Jr. v. Entergy Corp.Opinion
No. 00-1080.
February 14, 2001.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff, Sheila Harper's Application for Attorney's Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (a), Cd) . In the instant motion plaintiff seeks an award in the full amount of $3,562.50, representing 28.5 hours of judicial time at a rate of $125.00 per hour. The Commissioner has not disputed the hourly rate. Its formal opposition rather is directed at the total number of hours claimed by plaintiff "s counsel. The Government argues that the total time claimed was not reasonably expended and that plaintiff's counsel has failed to comply with EAJA requirements for itemized statements of actual time expended in a case. Plaintiff filed formal reply, noting that its quarter hour billing practice is not legally prohibited and properly reflects the time expended by plaintiff's counsel. Additionally, plaintiff's counsel submits that considering that her firm's practice is exclusively in the social security area, it should come as no surprise that similar procedures are often followed in the cases it handles and thus, many of its legal services and billing practices are standardized. Plaintiff's counsel maintains that the EAJA application/itemization of time at issue reveals counsel's attempt to clearly, adequately and accurately explain the services provided in the case at bar and that further itemization would be unduly burdensome and would constitute an unreasonable expectation. As to the similar and successful EAJA application submitted in the similar but unrelated Gwendolyn Smith case of which the Government complains in its opposition to plaintiff's application for an EAJA award, plaintiff's counsel notes that the court in the Smith case complimented the plaintiff's billing practices and granted Smith's EAJA application, finding nothing unclear, unseemly or otherwise inadequate.
Plaintiff, Sheila Harper, is the prevailing party in a claim for social security disability benefits. The position of the United States was not substantially justified.
Plaintiff supports her application with a memorandum and an itemization of time in her case which the Government submits bears an uncanny similarity to an itemization of time spent submitted by the same law firm in connection with another EAJA attorney's fee application in a similar but unrelated Social Security matter allotted to another Section of court. The Court agrees with counsel for plaintiff that the itemizations submitted in support of these two unrelated but similar EAJA fee applications simply reflect the firm's standardized billing process and nothing more.
This Court, finding the request for fees in the full amount of $3,562.50, representing 28.5 hours of judicial time at a rate of $125.00 per hour in the case at bar, both reasonable and sufficiently documented, GRANTS plaintiff's application for an EAJA award.
A. The Relevant Provisions of the EAJA .
Until March 29, 1996, the EAJA provided that "attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $75 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved justifies a higher fee." 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(2)(A) (ii) (before 1996 amendment). In Hall v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 367, 370 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit held that the district court has discretion to award attorney's fees at or below the $75 statutory hourly rate, but that the $75 rate is a ceiling which cannot be exceeded unless the district court determines a higher fee is justified by inflation or a special factor.
The Fifth Circuit in Hall invited the judges of the Eastern District of Louisiana to address any lack of uniformity in fees awarded under the EAJA in this district. Accordingly, the district judges met en banc and issued a General Order dated September 12, 1995, which provided that "'the amount of attorney's fees warded [under the EAJA] shall be $75.00 per hour, conditioned upon the ability of the judge for good to increase the amount of attorney's fees awarded to that which is appropriate under the circumstances.'" Adams v. Chater, 914 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (E.D. La. 1995) (quoting the General Order).
The EAJA was amended in 1996 to increase the maximum statutory rate from $75 to $125 per hour. 28 U.S.C. § 2412. That amendment applies to civil actions, such as this, commenced on or after its effective date of March 29, 1996. Id., Historical and Statutory Note to 1996 Amendment (quoted in Federal Civil Judicial Procedure and Rules 965 (West pamph. 1999 ed.)). In October of 1997, the district judges of this Court again met en banc and amended the General Order to conform with the new statutory rate. The General Order now provides "[t]hat in cases in which the Equal Access to Justice Act applies, the amount of attorney's fees awarded may be $125.00 per hour, conditioned upon a finding by the Judge of good cause to increase the amount of attorney's fees to $125.00 or that which is appropriate under the circumstances."
The instant action was commenced after the effective date of the amendments to the statute and the amended General Order. Accordingly, the amended statute and the General Order apply to this case.
In determining an appropriate award, the district court must take into account the goals of the EAJA. The hourly rate must satisfy the dual purposes of the EAJA: (1) to ensure adequate representation for those who need it; and (2) to minimize the cost of this representation to taxpayers. Baker v. Bowen, 839 F.2d 1075, 1083 (5th Cir. 1988) . The Court finds that a rate of $125 per hour is reasonable. This rate satisfies the dual purposes of the EAJA by ensuring adequate representation while minimizing the costs to taxpayers.
B. Computation of Hours .
As previously indicated, the Court disagrees with the Commissioner's argument that the number of hours claimed by plaintiff's counsel in this case is excessive. The Commissioner maintains that: (1) plaintiff's quarter-billing practice and consolidating entries into one generalized time entry rather than separately identifying time spent on each activity does not provide an accounting and is contrary to the EAJA requirements; (2) there is no indication that Barkan § Neff were representing the plaintiff on 2/15/00, when the 4.25 hour "in depth review of the file to evaluate appeal" was logged; (3) in any event, the itemization of time logged for the date of 7/21/2000 reflects another 3.50 hours for the "initial" review of the record which appears to have been previously accomplished; (4) the itemization of 2.5 hours of legal research on 7/24/00 deserves a close look since plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment addressed no extraordinary issues and contained only three citations (i.e. a Social Security Ruling, a C.F.R. citation and one Eighth Circuit case); and (5) billing in quarter hour increments to review short, basic documents does not reasonably reflect the hours worked.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the fee applicant bears the burden of documenting and supporting the reasonableness of all time expenditures for which compensation is sought. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983) . Applying the Hensley rationale, the Fifth Circuit has observed that "the burden of proof of reasonableness of the number of hours is on the fee applicant and not on the opposing party to prove their unreasonableness." Leroy v. City of Houston, 831 F.2d 576, 586 (5th Cir. 1987) "Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, and otherwise unnecessary. . . ." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
The Court believes that plaintiff's counsel should be compensated for reasonable legal services rendered and properly documented by contemporaneous time records. Plaintiff's counsel's time records present no challenge in this regard.
The Court recognizes that it is within the its discretion to discount the attorney fee bill when the applicant fails to comply with the requirements of the EAJA and where it appears the total time claimed is not reasonable. The Court, however, is not persuaded by the Commissioner's argument that plaintiff's counsel's practice of quarter hour billing does not reflect a realistic accounting of the time actually expended providing legal service to the plaintiff in the case at bar. Moreover, the Court is of the opinion that the fees requested are reasonable. Moreover, this Court applauds the plaintiff's counsel's practice of providing the EAJA application to the Commissioner several weeks before filing, doing so in the spirit of judicial economy and professional courtesy , with the purpose of resolving any objections and obviating any misunderstandings, expeditiously and prior to filing.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees under the EAJA is GRANTED and plaintiff's counsel is awarded fees in the amount of $3,562.50, which represents 28.5 hours of judicial time at a rate of $125.00 per hour.