Summary
In Hald v. Pearson, 197 Miss. 410, 20 So.2d 71, the deed provided that "the title to the above land does not pass to him until my death."
Summary of this case from Buchanan v. BuchananOpinion
No. 35719.
December 11, 1944.
1. WILLS.
The difference between a "deed" and a "will" is that by means of a deed a present interest passes, while a will takes effect only at death of testator.
2. WILLS.
An instrument conveying land to grantee in consideration of $10 and other valuable considerations, and providing that grantee was to support grantor during remainder of her life, and that title to land did not pass until grantor's death, was a "deed," conveying title during grantor's lifetime charged with obligation to support grantor for balance of her life, and was not a "will" which was invalid because not properly executed.
APPEAL from the chancery court of Sunflower county, HON. J.L. WILLIAMS, Chancellor.
Hugh F. Causey, of Cleveland, for appellants.
The instrument under consideration did not vest a fee simple title to the land in William Pearson because the instrument is testamentary in its terms.
Mims v. Williams, 192 Miss. 866, 7 So.2d 822; Gaston v. Mitchell, 192 Miss. 452, 4 So.2d 892; Thomas v. Byrd, 112 Miss. 692, 73 So. 725; Tapley v. McManus, 175 Miss. 849, 168 So. 51; Kelly v. Covington, 119 Miss. 658, 81 So. 485; Wall v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91; Cunningham v. Davis, 62 Miss. 366; Martin v. Graham, 114 Miss. 653, 75 So. 447; Simpson v. McGee, 112 Miss. 344, 73 So. 55; Ates v. Ates, 189 Miss. 226, 196 So. 243; Cox v. Reed, 113 Miss. 488, 74 So. 330; Knight v. Knight, 133 Miss. 74, 97 So. 481; Murphy v. Gobbert, 166 Mo. 596, 66 S.W. 536; Glover v. Fillmore, 88 Kan. 545, 129 P. 144; Crocker v. Smith, 94 Ala. 295, 10 So. 258; Hazleton v. Reed, 46 Kan. 73, 26 Am. St. Rep. 86; Pinkham v. Pinkham, 55 Neb. 729, 76 N.W. 411; Conrad v. Douglas, 59 Minn. 498, 61 N.W. 673; Carlton v. Cameron, 54 Tex. 72, 38 Am. Rep. 620.
William Pearson was a tenant under Mattie King while she lived and was estopped to claim that he owned the land, and this estoppel operates in favor of her privies.
McKissack v. Bullington, 37 Miss. 535; City of Bay St. Louis v. Board of Supervisors of Hancock County, 80 Miss. 364, 32 So. 54; Vaughan v. McCool, 186 Miss. 549, 191 So. 286; Ezelle v. Parker, 41 Miss. 520; Allen v. Russell (Ohio), 52 N.E. 121; Pollman v. Schafer (Mo.), 138 S.W. 898; 21 C.J. 1179, Sec. 183.
The defendants are not entitled to have the purported deed reformed.
Watson v. Owen, 142 Miss. 676, 107 So. 865; Progressive Bank of Summit v. McGehee, 142 Miss. 655, 107 So. 876; Wall v. Wall, 177 Miss. 743, 171 So. 675; Cresswell v. Cresswell, 164 Miss. 871, 140 So. 521, 144 So. 41; Jones v. Jones, 88 Miss. 784, 41 So. 373; Harrington v. Harrington, 2 How. 701, 718; Paris v. Treadway (Ga.), 142 S.E. 693; Atherton v. Roche, 192 Ill. 252, 55 L.R.A. 591, 594; 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence (4 Ed.), Sec. 843, pp. 1756, 1757, Sec. 858; 10 R.C.L. 294-304; 45 Am. Jur. 588, Sec. 8, pp. 631, 632, Sec. 78, 79; 53 C.J. 926, Secs. 35, 37.
Appellees cannot claim that appellants are estopped to claim the property, because appellees have not shown by their proof the essential elements of estoppel.
Turnipseed v. Hudson, 50 Miss. 429, 436; Canal-Commercial Trust Savings Bank v. Brewer, 143 Miss. 146, 184, 108 So. 424, 430, 109 So. 8; Roberts v. Bookout, 162 Miss. 676, 139 So. 175; Scottish-American Mortg. Co. v. Bunckley, 88 Miss. 641, 41 So. 502; Watson et al. v. Vinson et al., 108 Miss. 600, 67 So. 61; Yazoo Lumber Co. v. Clark et al., 95 Miss. 244, 48 So. 516; Estes v. Jackson, 111 N.C. 145, 32 Am. St. Rep. 784; Davis v. Davis, 26 Cal. 23, 85 Am. Dec. 157, 166; 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence (4 Ed.), p. 1644, Sec. 805; 2 Lawrence on Equity Jurisprudence 1157, Sec. 1071; 31 C.J.S. 254, Sec. 67.
One estoppel destroys another. William Pearson is estopped to claim estoppel because of his representation to appellants that he had bought the property, paid for it, and had a deed to it.
Hopkins, v. Hopkins, 174 Miss. 643, 165 So. 414; Florida Land Inv. Co. v. Williams (Fla.), 116 So. 642; 31 C.J.S. 281, Sec. 75.
The facts with regard to William Pearson's lack of title cannot be imputed to Ida and Nathan by the recording of the purported deed.
Lucas v. New Hebron Bank, 181 Miss. 762, 180 So. 611; Ligon v. Barton, 88 Miss. 135, 40 So. 555; Elmslie v. Thurman, 87 Miss. 537, 40 So. 67; Robinson v. Noel, 49 Miss. 253, 258; Board of Trustees, M.E. Church South v. Odom, 100 Miss. 64, 56 So. 314.
William Pearson had knowledge of the true state of the title, or the means of acquiring such knowledge.
Roberts v. Bookout, supra; Stewart v. Matheny, 66 Miss. 21, 25, 5 So. 387; Dead River Fishing Hunting Club v. Stovall, 147 Miss. 385, 113 So. 336; Eagle Lumber Supply Co. v. DeWeese, 163 Miss. 602, 135 So. 490, 494; Scottish-American Mortg. Co. v. Bunckley, supra; Davis v. Butler, 128 Miss. 847, 91 So. 279, 281, 709; Staton v. Bryant, 55 Miss. 261, 274, 275; Sulphine v. Dunbar, 55 Miss. 255; 31 C.J.S. 270, 272; 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence (4 Ed.), Sec. 810.
Where both parties have the same means of ascertaining the condition of the title, there can be no estoppel.
Mississippi Power Light Co. v. Pitts, 181 Miss. 344, 179 So. 363; Brant v. Virginia Coal Co., 93 U.S. 326, 23 L.Ed. 927, 930; Sheffield Car Co. v. Constantine Hydraulic Co., 171 Mich. 423, 137 N.W. 305, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 984, 994; Odlin v. Gove, 41 N.H. 465, 77 Am. Dec. 773, 775; Bigelow v. Topliff, 25 Vt. 273, 60 Am. Dec. 264.
The defendant, William Pearson, cannot claim that he is entitled to recover compensation for the improvements and taxes, because: (1) He did not place the improvements on the land or pay the taxes in good faith. He either knew, or had available to him the means for learning, that the instrument under which he claimed title conveyed to him no title. He cannot claim ignorance of the recitals in such instrument. He was bound by its recitals. (2) William Pearson has not shown by his proof the means for arriving at compensation for the improvements. His proof showed only the cost of making the improvements and what he paid for them, when the rule for arriving at the value of the improvements was not the cost or what he paid therefor, but the value of the property as enhanced by such improvements.
Stewart v. Matheny, supra; Cole v. Johnson, 53 Miss. 94; Pass v. McLendon, 62 Miss. 580; Deanes v. Whitfield, 107 Miss. 273, 65 So. 246; Holmes v. McGee, 64 Miss. 129, 8 So. 169; Thomas v. Thomas, 69 Miss. 564, 13 So. 666; Gum Carbo Co. v. New Orleans German Gazette, 90 Miss. 177, 43 So. 82; Pritchett v. Stevens, 126 Miss. 221, 88 So. 627; Code of 1930, Sec. 1474.
If the court should decide that William Pearson is not bound by the recitals in his purported deed, we say his proof is insufficient to authorize a recovery for the improvements, because his proof is based upon the cost of the improvements or what was charged to him therefor, and not the enhanced value of the land by the erection of the improvements.
Nixon v. Porter, 38 Miss. 401, 416; Wilie v. Brooks, 45 Miss. 542, 551; Clark v. Hornthal, 47 Miss. 434, 478; Massey v. Womble, 69 Miss. 347, 11 So. 188; Hicks v. Blakeman, 74 Miss. 459, 21 So. 7; Pritchett v. Hibbler, 126 Miss. 379, 88 So. 882.
The rule which should govern the court is not to require William Pearson to pay rent for land as improved, but to require him to pay such rent as shown by the proof as if no improvements had been placed on the land.
Tatum v. McLellan, 56 Miss. 352, 358; Miller v. Ingram, 56 Miss. 510, 512; Johnson v. Futch, 57 Miss. 73; Pritchett v. Hibbler, supra.
Appellants have no objection to William Pearson removing the improvements from the land.
Roberts v. Bookout, supra.
Elbert Johnson, of Indianola, for appellees.
The conveyance made by Mattie King to William Pearson took effect as a conveyance in praesenti and operated in her life.
Stubblefield v. Haywood, 123 Miss. 480, 86 So. 295; Williams v. Green, 128 Miss. 446, 91 So. 39; Wall et al. v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91; Graham et al. v. Triplett et al., 148 Miss. 299, 114 So. 621.
Appellees respectfully submit that if the Court should be of the opinion that the instrument in controversy is not a deed and is not susceptible to reformation under the proof adduced, then they should be allowed the value of the improvements made on the land and the amount of taxes paid by them, and charged with reasonable rents. The improvements were unquestionably made in good faith and were valuable and permanent and not ornamental. The value of the land was enhanced by the improvements, which had increased in value before the time of the trial, and consequently the value of the land was accordingly enhanced.
Appellees further submit that should the Court be of the opinion that the instrument in its present form is not a deed, then under the uncontradicted evidence in the case it should be reformed to express the true intention and purpose of the parties, which was that Mattie King thereby intended to convey to William Pearson a title in fee simple to the land, and that the instrument at that very time should be effective as a conveyance. The deed was immediately delivered to William Pearson, who at once went into possession and occupation of the land as the owner thereof and paid the consideration of the deed, as provided therein, namely, he supported Mattie King during the remainder of her life and paid the taxes on the land.
The chancellor held that the proof would justify a reformation of the deed if necesary, and counsel for complainants argues that the effect of the decree is a reformation of William Pearson's purported deed. There was no reformation of the deed by the trial court because the chancellor expressly says in his opinion that he does not think a reformation is necessary for the reason that the instrument conveyed the land to William Pearson.
Appellees, with confidence, submit that the instrument is a deed and that the opinion of the learned chancellor in so holding is correct and that his decree dismissing the bill of complaint and quieting and confirming in the defendants the title to the land is likewise correct and that the case should be affirmed.
On the 10th day of February, 1936, and for some time prior thereto, Mattie King owned a farm in Sunflower County. On that day she executed and delivered to appellee William Pearson the following instrument:
"For and in consideration of the sum of Ten no/100 dollars and other valuable considerations hereinafter set out I hereby bargain, sell and convey to William Pearson the following tract or parcel of land situated and being in the County of Sunflower, State of Mississippi, and described as follows:
"The North Half of Northwest Quarter of Northeast Quarter of Section Nineteen Township Twenty Range Five Containing Twenty Acres more or less.
"It is understood and agreed that said William Pearson is to cultivate said land free of rent, but is to pay the taxes and to support me during the remainder of my life, and that the title to the above land does not pass to him until my death."
She acknowledged its execution in the usual form, except the acknowledgment does not state that the instrument was delivered. It was filed for record in the chancery clerk's office on the 16th day of the same month.
Mattie King died on February 21, 1941, approximately five years after the execution of this instrument. Her sole heirs were the appellants Ida Hald and Nathan Warren, who were her first cousins. They filed the bill in this cause against the appellee William Pearson and his wife to set aside and have the instrument held for naught on the ground that it was an attempted will and not a deed, and was void as such because neither witnessed nor wholly written by the hand of the maker.
The court held that it was a deed, which resulted in a decree for the appellees, from which appellants prosecute this appeal.
On the execution and delivery of the instrument appellee Pearson and his wife went into possession of the farm and paid all taxes on it and supported the grantor, Mattie King, the balance of her life; and in addition expended something over $1,000 in improvements on the place. We are of opinion that the decree should be affirmed. The difference between a deed and a will is that by means of the former a present interest passes, while the latter takes effect only at the death of the testator. Manifestly this instrument took effect when delivered. Pearson acquired during the lifetime of the grantor the title to the land charged with the obligation on his part to maintain and support her the balance of her life, and after her death the title in fee simple. Applying the principles laid down in the cases of Stubblefield v. Haywood, 123 Miss. 480, 86 So. 295; and Graham et al. v. Triplett et al., 148 Miss. 299, 114 So. 621, that result necessarily follows.
Affirmed.