1. Where the petition alleges neither fraud nor mistake in connection with the subject matter of the litigation or as a basis for reformation, the mere inclusion of a prayer for reformation does not make it an equitable proceeding and this court has jurisdiction of an appeal from a judgment therein.

2. (a) That an individual may own a substantial amount of its stock and hold the office of president of a corporation does not afford an identity of parties or of interests.

(b) An insurable interest in the vehicle is not a requisite to the obtaining of liability insurance in connection with its operation.

3. An alteration of the coverage afforded by an insurance policy must be by endorsement or rider in writing.

4. A modification of the coverage in an insurance policy requires some consideration.

5. Under a medical expense payment provision in an insurance policy "to or for each person who sustains bodily injury, sickness or disease, caused by accident, while in or upon or while alighting from the automobile . . ." there is coverage only as to the automobile described in the policy.

6. A medical expense payment provision in an insurance policy "to each insured who might sustain a bodily injury while in or upon, or while entering or alighting from an automobile . . ." affords coverage as to an accidental injury caused by or in connection with any automobile, but only to the insured or insureds named or designated in the policy.

ARGUED JULY 6, 1967 — DECIDED JULY 12, 1967.

On November 1, 1963, Great American Insurance Company issued to Aero Marine Supply Corporation an automobile liability policy, covering a 1964 Corvair and a 1955 Chevrolet sedan delivery. The policy carried in Coverage C, Divisions 1 and 2, provisions for medical payments "1. To or for each person who sustains bodily injury, sickness or disease, caused by accident, while in or upon or while entering or alighting from the automobile, provided the automobile is being used by the named insured . . . ; or 2. To or for each insured who sustained bodily injury, sickness or disease, caused by accident, while in or upon, or while entering into or alighting from, or through being struck by an automobile." (Emphasis supplied). It was further provided by Agreement III that "With respect to the insurance for extended medical payments the unqualified word "insured" means: (1) the named insured, if an individual or husband and wife who are residents of the same household, otherwise, the person designated in Item 5 of the declarations, which provided: "5. Designation of insured for purposes of Division 2 of Coverage C, if required by Agreement III ________________________________." (There was none).

On December 18, 1963, the 1955 Chevrolet sedan delivery was eliminated from the policy by endorsement, showing a return of premium for the elimination in the amount of $60.52.

On April 24, 1964, Robert H. Lipe, individually, purchased in his own name and with his own funds a 1963 Chevrolet Corvette.

The Chevrolet Corvair was repossessed by a finance company from Aero Marine Supply Corporation July 8, 1964.

Plaintiff alleged that it was the "obvious intention of the parties, as evidenced by a continuation of coverage by retention of premium, [that] the Corvette be substituted for the station wagon as the insured vehicle, [and] likewise, the intention of the parties was for the named insured to include plaintiff, as owner of said new vehicle and as the principal party of Aero Marine Supply Corporation." There was a prayer for process and "that said policy be reformed to show the true intention of the parties," and for a recovery of $1,000, interest, penalty and attorney's fees.

In a deposition Lipe testified that at some time after he purchased the Corvette and before the Corvair was repossessed he gave the necessary information concerning the Corvette (serial number, model, etc.) to Mr. Williams, the agent who had written the policy, informing him that he contemplated disposing of the Corvair and wished to have the Corvette substituted as an insured vehicle when that was accomplished. He also testified that on the date of the repossession of the Corvair he called Mr. Williams' office on the telephone for the purpose of asking him to proceed with the substitution, but that Williams was out and he could not reach him. However, he left a message for Williams with a lady who answered the telephone, asking that the substitution be accomplished. There was no communication relative to the matter in writing and he never received from Williams any acknowledgement of the request or any endorsement for effecting the substitution. Concerning the matter of premium he testified that at the time he discussed the substitution with Williams, "he didn't have the figures at the time, and he never made any commitment one way or the other whether it would be higher or lower, or what." There was no payment of any additional premium and no refund in connection with any substitution of the Corvette for the Corvair.

On September 22, 1964, Mr. Lipe was injured while driving the Corvette, and thereafter he made claim against Great American for $1,000 as medical expenses (his expenses having been in excess of that amount), supplying an itemized statement. The claim was denied and he brought suit.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied and it appeals.

EBERHARDT, Judge.

1. Since there is a prayer for reformation, an equitable remedy, we must determine whether this appeal is properly in this court, or whether we should transfer it to the Supreme Court. In making this determination "both the allegations and the prayer must be examined, and where as in the case sub judice, the reformation of a contract is prayed for but the allegations of the petition fail to allege fraud or mutual mistake, the action seeking a money judgment is one at law and not in equity." Sutker v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 223 Ga. 58 ( 153 S.E.2d 540). An examination of this petition reveals not a single allegation of fraud or of mistake. Consequently, we conclude that the appeal is properly in this court.

2. (a) It is clear that the Aero Marine Supply Corporation, the corporation of which Lipe was president and a substantial stockholder, neither held nor claimed an interest in the 1963 Corvette which Lipe purchased for himself. He so testified in his deposition. Consequently, it had no insurable interest in the Corvette. Code Ann. § 56-2405. That Lipe was president and a substantial stockholder in Aero Marine Supply Corporation does not afford an identity of parties. Exchange Bank of Macon v. Macon Constr. Co., 97 Ga. 1, 5 (1) ( 25 S.E. 326, 33 LRA 800)).

(b) However, we can perceive no reason why the corporation, though having no insurable interest in the car itself, could not obtain liability insurance with medical payment provisions to protect it against the eventualities that might occur when the vehicle should be used by its officers, agents or servants in the performance of duties on its behalf. The policy here does not insure against loss of the vehicle; it insures against liability. Consequently, the matter of insurable interest is not controlling of the issues and we must look to provisions of the contract itself.

3. Although Mr. Lipe testified that he contemplated substituting the Corvette as an insured vehicle when the Corvair should be disposed of and in connection with that contemplation supplied Mr. Williams, the agent who wrote the policy, with the necessary information for making the substitution, the evidence demands a finding that it was not done. The most that Mr. Lipe testified was that he, unable to get in touch with Williams when he called the office, left a message with some lady who answered the telephone asking that Williams proceed with the substitution. Williams testified in his affidavit that he received no such message.

There is no question here of an oral binder on the Corvette; it is a question of an alteration or change of the coverage in the policy issued to Aero Marine Supply Corporation, which could have been accomplished only by a writing. Simonton v. Liverpool, London c. Ins. Co., 51 Ga. 76 (1).

Another provision of the policy is: " Changes. Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agent or by any other person shall not effect a waiver or a change in any part of this policy or estop the company from asserting any right under the terms of this policy; nor shall the terms of this policy be waived or changed, except by endorsement issued to form a part of this policy." (Emphasis supplied). The provision is a valid one. Gainous v. Ga. Cas. Co., 34 Ga. App. 562 ( 130 S.E. 540); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Collier, 69 Ga. App. 235, 242 (2) ( 25 S.E.2d 136). Cf. Andrews v. Ga. Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Ga. App. 92 ( 137 S.E.2d 746). The uncontradicted evidence is that no endorsement was ever issued to add the Corvette as an insured vehicle on the policy or to add plaintiff as a named insured.

4. The substitution of the Corvette for the Corvair as an insured vehicle would have been a modification of the coverage provisions of the policy, requiring a consideration — which was absent here. See Dunn v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 108 Ga. App. 368 ( 133 S.E.2d 60); Wackerle v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 219 F.2d 1.

5. Under Coverage C, Division 1 of the policy there was coverage for medical payments to any person who might sustain an accidental injury while in or upon, entering or alighting from the automobile — which is the automobile described in the policy, and no other. The Corvette was never described in or insured under the policy, and there was no coverage as to medical payments for an accidental injury as to it under this provision.

This conclusion is demanded by the further provision of the policy that "Except with respect to Division 2 of coverage C and except where stated to the contrary, the word `automobile' means . . . the motor vehicle or trailer described in this policy or, if none is so described, with respect to coverages A, B (liability and property damage) and Division 1 of coverage C, any private passenger automobile owned on the effective date of this policy by the named insured. . . ." (Emphasis supplied).

6. Under Coverage C, Division 2, there was coverage to each insured who might sustain a bodily injury while in or upon, entering or alighting from any automobile. Mr. Lipe is not a named insured in this policy. In Agreement III of the policy it is provided that as to this division "the word `insured' means the named insured, if an individual . . . otherwise (hence, if a corporation), the person designated in Item 5 of the declarations." Mr. Lipe was not named in Item 5. Indeed, no one was.

These provisions of the contract are clear and free of ambiguity. We can afford them no construction save that which they clearly import. Code Ann. § 56-2419; Wheeler v. Fidelity Cas. Co., 129 Ga. 237 ( 58 S.E. 709); Hartford Acc. c. Co. v. Hulsey, 220 Ga. 240 ( 138 S.E.2d 310); Maddox v. Life Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., 79 Ga. App. 164, 173 ( 53 S.E.2d 235); Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hutto, 115 Ga. App. 164, 166 ( 154 S.E.2d 375).

Under the pleadings, with their exhibits, and the evidence in this case there was no question for resolution by the jury; there was simply no coverage afforded under the policy sued on as against the claim made, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Judgment reversed. Hall, J., concurs. Felton, C. J., concurs, save as to Division 1, in which he concurs specially.