Summary
noting that the parties agree that duration is an essential element of a lease
Summary of this case from Ross v. RossOpinion
No. 3964.
Decided December 5, 1950.
Where a clear reference is made to the premises leased and it appears reasonably certain what premises were meant by the parties, a lease is not void for want of sufficient identification. A written lease for a term of years signed by the parties and providing that the amount of rent was to be later agreed upon, followed by letters agreeing upon the amount to be paid per month, sufficiently satisfies the statute of frauds. In such case, where the premises were to be occupied to conduct a summer school, the fact that the subsequent agreement as to the amount of rental mentioned summer months only does not contradict the stipulation that the lease was to run for five years.
PETITION, for declaratory judgment to determine whether a certain instrument as set forth in the plaintiff's petition was a valid lease. The defendant demurred on the grounds that the petition did not "state facts sufficient in law to entitle the petitioner to relief sought, or any relief." The Court sustained the demurrer and the plaintiff excepted. The lease in question reads as follows:
"This is to state that the undersigned: Mrs. Dorothy V. Bell, Owner of properties known as Bell Studios; and Folkways Foundation, owned and managed by Gene Gowing; enter into the following agreement:
"The party of the first part is from this date, leasing her properties, as stated above, for a period of five (5) years, to the party of the second part.
"The party of the first part agrees to pay taxes and insurance on said properties; while the party of the second part agrees to pay rental on said properties, the fees of which are to be agreed upon when the party of the first part returns from Europe.
"This agreement shall hold for both parties from this day forward, and their signatures hereby affixed consummate said agreement.
"Dorothy V. Bell, "Legal Owner of Bell Studios "Gene Gowing, "Owner of `Folkways Foundation'."
The petition also alleged in substance the following:
That in October, 1949, the plaintiff wrote the defendant who was then in Europe suggesting that the rent be $50 for the months of May, June and September and $100 for the months of July and August. On November 26, 1949, the defendant wrote the plaintiff, "Your suggestions of rental for the Studio are all right by me." After receipt of this letter the plaintiff began making arrangements to mail descriptive and advertising matter, to engage teachers and to enroll students for the conduct of his summer school which he had conducted for the last three years at the so-called Bell Studios. On December 21, 1949, the defendant wrote the plaintiff indicating that contrary to the lease she insisted on having a part in the management of the school although it had been leased to the plaintiff on August 31, 1949. On January 11, 1950, the plaintiff's attorney wrote the defendant asking for a clarification of her last letter and on January 19 her attorney replied stating that the lease was invalid and that the defendant forbade the plaintiff going upon or occupying the Bell Studios. Other facts appear in the opinion. Transferred by Goodnow, C.J.
Howard Lane (by brief and orally), for the plaintiff.
Chretien Craig and Dunlap, Holmes, Ross and Woodson of California (Mr. Chretien orally), for the defendant.
The defendant raises no question as to the propriety of declaratory judgment proceedings here and the cause being plainly presented we shall grant the appropriate remedy. Faulkner v. Keene, 85 N.H. 147, 156.
The defendant contends that the instrument is invalid, arguing that purporting to lease for a term of years and thereby conveying an interest in land, it must be in writing signed by the party to be charged under R. L., c. 259, s. 15, and also under R. L., c. 383, s. 1, known as the statute of frauds. She further claims that the lease is lacking in four other essentials; first, that the parties are inadequately described; second, that the premises cannot be identified with sufficient certainty; third, that the term is indeterminate; and fourth, that there is uncertainty as to the rent. The plaintiff concedes it is the law that these requirements must be met. Taking up the question first as to the parties it appears they are sufficiently identified. Each is described in the agreement as owner of certain property and each has signed individually as owner of such property. We believe it is plain as to who the contracting parties are and that this requirement is fairly met.
The defendant's second objection that the premises are not identified cannot be sustained. In describing the property as "Bell Studios" there is a clear reference to certain premises. Viewing all the circumstances here it seems reasonably certain what premises were meant, and this is sufficient. Gilbert v. Tremblay, 79 N.H. 431, 432, 433; White v. Poole, 74 N.H. 71, 73.
We now come to the objections that there is uncertainty as to the term and the rent and that the memorandum does not satisfy the statute of frauds. The lease states the term is to be for five years from date and that the amount of rent is to be later agreed upon. No objection to this feature of the instrument appears. Dunlap v. Foss, 82 N.H. 449, 450. The plaintiff in a letter written and signed subsequent to executing the lease suggested the amount of rent and the months for which it was to be paid. To this suggestion the defendant replying by a signed letter agreed. These memoranda appear to satisfy both the law relative to leases and the statute of frauds. Huot v. Janelle, 95 N.H. 10. The property being leased by the plaintiff to run a summer school, as admitted by the demurrer (Barnard v. Insurance Company, 88 N.H. 292) the reason for the apportionment of rent seems obvious. This involves no contradiction of the stipulation that the lease is to run for five years, a fact which is further evinced by the plaintiff's undertaking to pay taxes and insurance on the premises for the entire term. It appears to us that all the requisites of a valid lease for a term of years exists and the order must be
Demurrer overruled.
All concurred.