STANWOOD R. DUVAL, JR., Judge.

Before this Court are plaintiff's Objections to the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Wilkinson in the above captioned matter. Plaintiff filed this suit pro se and in forma paiperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Washington Correction Employees ("WCI"), Dr. Quyen Tran, Kathleen McGinnis, Warden Day and Barbara Jo Miley. Specifically, plaintiff claims that: (1) he was assigned an improper work status by Dr. Tran, (2) defendants infringed his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and (3) defendants retahated against him after he filed the present suit. hi his Report and Recommendation, Judge Wilkinson concluded that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed as legally frivolous. Because plaintiff timely submitted objections to Judge Wilkinson's Report and Recommendation, the Court has reviewed the matter de novo pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). For the reasons contained herein, the Court concurs with the Report and Recommendation and concludes that plaintiffs claims against defendants should be DISMISSED.

Background

Plaintiff filed his complaint in the above captioned matter on May 24, 2001. In that pleading, plaintiff explained that he was infected with Hepatitis C and HIV and that the prison officials were aware of his condition. Because they were aware of his conditions, plaintiff alleged that defendants violated his rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by assigning him to "regular duty with restrictions" work duty status which required him to work in the field and caused his conditions to worsen, but prohibited him from participating in contact sports, kitchen duty, or weighthfting.

On August 23, 2001, Judge Wilkinson conducted a Spears hearing in this matter pursuant to Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985). During the hearing, plaintiff: (1) embehished and explained the allegations made in his original complaint related to his work duty status and the defendants' "deliberate indifference" to his condition and (2) supplemented his original complaint with an ADA claim and a retaliation claim. Plaintiff specified that his complaint was not related to the medical treatment he received at WCI.

As noted in the Report and Recommendation, plaintiffs primary complaint relates to his work duty status, as "regular duty with restriction," that he was assigned by the prison physician, Dr. Tran when he arrived at WCI in June 2000. According to plaintiff, that "work duty" status required him to work in the field — swinging blades, digging with shovels, chopping with a hoe, and carrying 50-pound water buckets with other inmates. Such duties, according to plaintiff hastened the progression of his diseases and caused a host of physical ailments including rectal bleeding, headaches, back and kidney pain, and cramps.

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that he repeatedly reminded Dr. Tran of his HIV and Hepatitis C conditions and requested to be placed on a work duty status that would require him to work only inside the compound or indoors. On July 25, 2000, for example, plaintiff visited Dr. Tran and requested that he be placed on a different work duty status. Plaintiff testified at the hearing, however, that Dr. Tran refused to change his work duty status because he believed plaintiff was just trying to get out of work because there was nothing wrong with him.

On August 7, 2000, plaintiff visited Charity Hospital for and HIV "work-up." Plaintiff testified at the hearing that during that visit to Charity, the physician recommended that he work out of sunlight and commented that he definitely should not be working in the field. Plaintiffs medical records from the August 7, 2000 visit to Charity, however, do not indicate any limitation on plaintiffs work duty status. Plaintiffs medical records from his visit to Charity on September 20, 2000, however, do indicate that the physician at that hospital believed that plaintiffs work duty status should be restricted to "indoor — out of sunlight."

Dr. Tran did not modify plaintiff's work duty status until November 29, 2000. On that date, Dr. Tran specified that plaintiff should perform work "inside the fence" only. Plaintiff was notified of his change in work duty status by a letter dated November 29, 2000. Plaintiffs work duty status has not been modified since November 29, 2000. Dr. Tran never restricted plaintiffs work to "indoors and out of sunlight." At the Spears hearing, however, plaintiff testified that his work duty status was not changed until February 2001 — when allegedly, Dr. Tran offered to change plaintiffs work duty status if plaintiff would drop the administrative suit he had brought against him.

Plaintiff also mentioned during the hearing that he believed his rights under the ADA had been infringed. Plaintiff explained that he had physical impairments (HIV and Hepatitis C) which prevented him from working on regular duty. Furthermore, plaintiff reasoned that it was "not right" for him to be restricted from kitchen duty, contact sports, and weighthfting because of his condition, but a the same time, to be required to work in the field like every other inmate without any restrictions on the labor he was to perform.

Finally, plaintiff noted that since he filed his lawsuit, certain guards at WCI have called him "legal aid counselor" Plaintiff also testified that he recently requested a new cell-mate because he was afraid of his present one. When his request was denied, plaintiff refused to enter his cell and was sent to lockdown as punishment for his action. Plaintiff now contends that both of these actions the "name calling" and his punishment in lockdown— were in retaliation to the instant lawsuit.

Analysis

The Court has reviewed plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation and the relevant law. For the reasons that follow, however, the Court concludes that plaintiff's objections do not cause this Court to overrule with the magistrate judge's determination that plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed as legally frivolous.

Work Duty Status

Plaintiff's first contention is that with his medical conditions, HIV and Hepatitis C, Dr. Tran should not have placed plaintiff on "regular duty status" and forced him to work outside of the compound performing grueling tasks such as swinging blades and chopping with a hoe. Plaintiff also argues that requiring him to work under that duty status caused his diseases to advance. Furthermore, plaintiff posits that the recommendation provided by the Charity Hospital physician and ignored by Dr. Tran for a month, that he should only be required to work indoors and out of the sunlight, supports his claim.

In Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1247, the Fifth Circuit noted that prisoners have no constitutional right to a specific work assignment. Furthermore, the Court explained that "prison officials have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage and lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interest. Classification of inmates is one of those administrative functions." Cain at 1247-48 citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983) and Wilkerson v. Maggio, 703 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Circuit has also permitted prison officials to require inmate with medical conditions to work, provided that the officials (10 not act with deliberate indifference to the inmate's health or safety. Richardson v. Spurlock, 260 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 2001). Therefore, absent an abuse of discretion, federal courts are loathe to interfere with custodial classifications established by prison officials. Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 889 (5th Cir. 1998).

In the case at bar, the Court first notes that the medical records indicate that Dr. Tran modified plaintiff's work duty status to "inside fence/compound" in November 2000 — not February 2001, as plaintiff testified at the hearing.

Furthermore, the fact that Dr. Tran assessed plaintiffs physical condition and ability to perform certain job tasks differently from plaintiff's physician at Charity, is not tantamount to an abuse of his discretion. As the Fifth Circuit noted in Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1999), prison doctors are not required to follow the recommendations of non-prison doctors for treating inmates. Even so, Dr. Tran agreed to modify plaintiffs work duty status to inside the compound only two months after the physician at Charity recommended that plaintiffs work duty status be changed to "indoors." While Dr. Tran never specified that plaintiff should only be required to perform work indoors, plaintiff testified at the Spears hearing that "inside compound" was the correct work duty status for him.

Finally, while plaintiff alleged that the months he was required to work in the field (1) could have caused his diseases to progress and (2) caused him various sorts of pain, plaintiffs medical records do not support his assertions. There is no indication that either of plaintiffs diseases have progressed since his transfer to WCI in June 2000. And, the only physical complaint noted in plaintiff's medical records while he was on "regular duty" work status was lower back pain. There was no indication that plaintiff complained of rectal bleeding, headaches, kidney pain, or cramps to Dr. Tran. Accordingly, this Court cannot find that Dr. Tran abused his discretion when he continued plaintiff on "regular work" duty status for the five months after he arrived at WCI.

Plaintiffs Claim under the ADA

While not included in his original complaint, plaintiff mentioned at the Spears hearing that he thought his rights under the ADA had been violated. As noted in the magistrate's Report and Recommendation, Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public entities. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has permitted state prisoners to bring claims against their jailors for disability discrimination. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-10 (1998). However, it has also been determined that the term "public entity" as used in Title U does not include individuals. Therefore, any claims asserted by plaintiff against defendants in their individual capacitie; must be dismissed.

To the extent plaintiff intends to pursue his ADA claim against defendants in their official capacities, his claims must be dismissed for the following reasons.

To proceed under Title II, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) he or she is being excluded form participation in or being denied the benefits of some service, program, or activity by reason of his or her disability, and (3) the entity which provides the service, program or activity is a "public entity." Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

Plaintiff alleged that his "disability" is his infection with HIV and Hepatitis C. Furthermore, he explained in his objections to the Report and Recommendation that he is substantially limited in the major life activities of "walking. breathing, and working."

In Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 625 (1998), the Supreme Court explained that from the moment of infection and throughout every stage of the disease, HIV satisfies the statutory and regulatory definition of a "physical impairment" for purposes of the ADA. Even in its asyrnptomatic phase, HIV is considered an impairment which substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction. Id. at 647.

However, plaintiff has not proven that he was denied participation in or refused the benefits of any services, programs, or activities offered by the jail because of his condition. Plaintiffs medical records note that his physicians limited him from participating in contact sports, weighthfting, or food services work tasks because of his medical conditions. As to plaintiffs restrictions from contact sports or weighthfting, it is not the role of this Court to second guess the prison medical staffs determination that plaintiff's medical condition prevents him form taking part in those activities. As the Third Circuit explained, "[t]he medical care of prison inmates is entrusted to prison doctors, to whose judgment and training courts owe substantial deference. Courts are ill equipped to specify the medical information that must be provided to prison patients." White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (1989). There has been no evidence that plaintiffs restriction from participation in contact sports or weighlifting stemmed from anything but his physicians' medical opinion that those activities were not conducive with his medical condition. Certainly there has been no proof that plaintiff's physicians had any discriminatory intent or purpose in placing those restrictions on plaintiff.

And, as to plaintiff's restriction from working in the kitchen, the Ninth Circuit has noted that "deference is due to the prison authorities' policy not to open food service jobs to HIV-infected inmates." While the Court noted that the medical risk of HIV prisoners infecting others through food service is slight, the prison was allowed to prohibit HIV infected individuals from working in the kitchen based on perceptions that the non-HIV-infected inmates may have. Specifically, the Court explained that:

If HIV-seropositive inmates are placed in food service jobs, the other inmates will think the worst — that they will bleed into the food, spit into the food, or even worse. If the inmate population perceives a risk form the food they must eat, they will want the infected inmates removed from the food service jobs. If they have no assurance that the infected inmates are removed, there may be violent actions against the inmates with the virus, inmates they perceive to have the virus, or the staff that permits the perceived risk."

Therefore, plaintiff has not persuaded the Court that he has a claim for damages under the ADA.

Retaliation

As noted in the Report and Recommendation, plaintiff was placed in extended lockdown because of his refusal to obey an order to enter his cell. Plaintiff, however, explains that he refused to enter the cell because he was afraid of his cell-mate and contends that his placement in extended lockdown was in retaliation for his institution of this suit against defendants. Plaintiff also notes that individuals at WCI called him names that made reference to his legal action.

In order to maintain a retaliation claim in the Fifth Circuit, a prisoner must:

[A]llege the violation of a specific constitutional right and be prepared to establish that but for the retalitory motive, the complained of incident . . . would not have occurred. This places a significant burden on the inmate. . . The inmate must produce direct evidence of motivation or, the more probable scenario, "allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred."

As noted in the Report and Recommendation, plaintiff's testimony concerning the events surrounding his placement in extended lockdown satisfies the requirement of Woods that an inmate "adequately allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred." However, this Court concurs with the magistrate in finding that plaintiff can not maintain his retaliation claim because he has not alleged that he has been deprived of any constitutionally protected right.

In Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 481-83 (1995), Supreme Court explained that in order to analyze a prisoner's due process claim relating to prison disciplinary action, it must be determined that a constitutionally protected liberty interest exists. Therefore, when a prisoner was placed in disciplinary segregation for 30 days and the discipline did not inevitably affect the duration of his sentence, the Court held that due process does not require that the prisoner be afforded the procedural mechanisms previously prescribed . . ." Similarly, in Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 1997) the Court held that a prisoner's 30 day commissary and cell restrictions imposed as punishment for disciplinary violations were "merely changes in the conditions of his confinemerit" and did not implicate due process concerns." Rather, the Court has explained that disciplinary hardship that would imiplicate due process consideration include unwanted administration of psychotropic drugs, involuntary commitment to a mental hospital or extension of the prisoner's sentence for his underlying criminal conviction. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.

In the case at bar, plaintiff has not maintained his burden to establish that any of his constitutional rights were violated as a result of his punishment in lockdown for his refusal to enter his cell.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge is APPROVED and ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court for the reasons stated herein.