OPINION

ANDERSON, P.J. —

I. INTRODUCTION

Richard Gayer (appellant) appeals from a dismissal of the first and fourth causes of action in his first amended complaint. The first cause of action alleged that Polk Gulch, Inc. (respondent), owner of a public drinking establishment, violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act (hereafter the Act) (Civ. Code, §§ 51 and 52), when its employees refused to serve appellant. For this alleged violation of his civil rights, appellant sought punitive damages. The fourth cause of action alleged that respondent permanently excluded him from entering the bar. Appellant sought damages and an injunction to enjoin the bar from continuing to exclude him. Both causes of action were dismissed after the court below sustained respondent's demurrer without leave to amend.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arose out of a series of events that took place in respondent's bar on the evening of December 9, 1988. That evening appellant attempted to enter the Polk Gulch Saloon (hereafter Polk Gulch), a public drinking establishment owned and operated by respondent. An employee of Polk Gulch stopped appellant at the door and, after consulting other employees, informed him that although he was free to enter the bar he would not be served anything to drink. The doorman told appellant that Polk Gulch refused to serve him because he had previously brought an action against the bar in small claims court for a violation of the Act. The small claims suit was ultimately heard and decided in favor of respondent on December 14, 1988. Thus, at the time the incidents giving rise to this lawsuit occurred, the prior lawsuit was still pending.

Appellant seated himself on a bench against the wall inside the bar. While seated, he saw the doorman talking with another customer named Corey Chapman. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Chapman aimed his glass at appellant and "intentionally caused its contents to land squarely in [appellant's] lap." Appellant attempted to call the police, but several Polk Gulch employees prevented him from using the telephone. Mr. Chapman left the bar, and appellant followed him to another bar where he was allowed to use the phone. He called the police and Mr. Chapman was taken into custody. A short while later appellant attempted to reenter Polk Gulch. The doorman prevented him from entering the bar and told appellant that he was permanently excluded from the bar. Appellant alleged that the doorman induced Mr. Chapman to cause appellant to leave the bar and that this inducement was related to the pending lawsuit appellant had filed against Polk Gulch.

On December 13, 1988, appellant filed his original complaint for compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. He alleged that Polk Gulch had violated the Act when it initially refused to serve him and then later permanently excluded him. These acts, he asserted, were in retaliation for his previous discrimination suit against the bar. Respondent successfully demurred to all causes of action. The trial court allowed appellant 30 days to amend his complaint. Appellant filed a first amended complaint which was essentially the same as the original complaint except that an action for premises liability was added. Respondent again demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to three causes and appellant dismissed the remaining two. On appeal appellant raises issues related solely to the first and fourth causes of action.

III. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review

B. Appellant Failed to State a Cause of Action for Violation of the Act

(3a), (4)(See fn. 3.) The only question for this court is whether respondent violated the Act when its employees excluded appellant from Polk Gulch in retaliation for his having previously filed a discrimination suit against its owner. (3b) Appellant asserts that he is protected from that retaliation under the Act either as an individual or as a member of a class of civil rights litigants. We conclude that the Act does not encompass discrimination based on retaliation and, therefore, we agree with the trial court that appellant has failed to state a cause of action. (5) Section 51 provides in part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Despite the Act's reference to a set of specifically enumerated protected classes, California courts have stated repeatedly that the "identification of particular bases of discrimination — color, race, religion, ancestry, and national origin — . . . is illustrative rather than restrictive." ( In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 216 [ 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992]; Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 732 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115, 30 A.L.R.4th 1161].)

The Act has been held to prohibit discrimination based on several classifications which are not specifically enumerated in the statute. In Cox, our Supreme Court applied the statute to prohibit discrimination by a shopping mall against someone because he associated with a young man "who wore long hair and dressed in an unconventional manner." ( In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal. 3d at p. 210.) Other examples of application of the Act to nonenumerated classifications include: Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 736-741 (tenants with children); O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 794 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427] (persons under the age of 18); Rolon v. Kulwitzky (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 289, 292 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 217] (sexual preference); and Long v. Valentino (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1298 [ 265 Cal.Rptr. 96] (on-duty police officers).

(3c) Appellant, relying on the nonexclusive language of Cox and its progeny, asserts that class membership is not a requirement for protection under the Act. He first cites Cox and Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club (1951) 36 Cal.2d 734 [ 227 P.2d 449]) in support of his proposition that the Act protects "persons or classes of persons." In Orloff a racetrack excluded the plaintiff because he was of an "immoral character," and the court found that this exclusion did violate the Act. However, contrary to appellant's argument, Orloff actually held that an exclusion based on a customer's conduct, whether or not the customer was a member of a class, was reasonable as a matter of law. ( Id. at pp. 740-741.) Appellant's reliance on Cox is likewise misplaced. Cox itself involved discrimination based on membership of a class of persons with an unconventional personal appearance. ( In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218.) See also Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at page 744, where the court stated, "under the Unruh Act we have condemned any arbitrary discrimination against any class." (Second italics added.)

Appellant relies heavily on Vaughn v. Hugo Neu Proler International (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1612 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 426] ( Vaughn) which held that membership in a class which is the basis of discrimination is not a requirement under the Act. ( Id. at p. 1617.) Vaughn involved a woman who alleged that she had been excluded from a sheet metal scrap yard because she had previously filed a suit against the scrap yard for gender-based discrimination. In Vaughn, just as in this case, defendants urged the court to construe the Act and the language in Cox and Marina Point narrowly, as requiring membership in a protected class. In response, the Vaughn court stated: "Such a construction would be inconsistent with the express language of the statute which does not limit the application of the statute to identifiable members of a particular class but includes `all persons.'" ( Ibid.) While we agree that some language in those earlier Supreme Court cases can be interpreted to support the holding in Vaughn, we do not find they compel it ( In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205 and Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d 721).

The Vaughn court emphasized language from Marina Point to the effect that the "`rights afforded by the Unruh Act similarly are enjoyed by all persons, as individuals.'" ( Vaughn, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1617, quoting Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 738.) However, the Marina Point court went further to clarify that statement: "the Unruh Act does not permit a business enterprise to exclude an entire class of individuals on the basis of a generalized prediction that the class `as a whole' is more likely to commit misconduct than some other class of the public." (30 Cal.3d at p. 739, italics in original.) Thus, the language of Marina Point is properly read as stating that an individual, as a member of a class, is protected under the Act. Marina Point nowhere states that a person who is not a member of any class protected under the Act, is nonetheless protected as an individual.

If Vaughn, Marina Point, and Cox were the only cases confronting this issue, it would be easier to accept appellant's position. However, shortly after Vaughn was filed, our Supreme Court decided Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d 1142. Harris involved a group of low-income tenants who were excluded from renting an apartment because their income was less than three times the amount of the rent. The tenants argued that as a class of low-income tenants they had been the victims of "economic discrimination." Harris rejected their argument that, although they were not members of one of the classes expressly included in the statute, the expansive reading given the Act by earlier cases compelled further expansion of the act to cover this new class: "[P]laintiffs' argument in favor of an additional classification . . . would effectively discard the listed classifications as surplusage in violation of the mandate to attribute significance to `every word and phrase' used by the Legislature. However, in view of our prior decisions and the Legislature's sometimes equivocal reactions to them, we will also consider other relevant factors in construing the Unruh Act. . . ." ( Id. at p. 1159.) Harris then proceeded to consider other factors including prior case law, statutory language, the legitimate business interests of the defendants and the consequences that would flow from protection of the plaintiff under the circumstances. We focus on those same factors in concluding that membership in a protected class is a requirement for protection under the Act.

(1) Statutory Language

The court's analysis of the statutory language of the Act and the appropriate limitations of its coverage was aided by its reliance on the principle of ejusdem generis. (6) " [E]jusdem generis holds that `"where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those enumerated."'" ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1160.) Thus, the court found that the specific classes enumerated in the statute each involved personal characteristics; therefore, coverage of the Act should be limited to discrimination which is based upon personal characteristics. ( Ibid.)

More generally, the court in Harris concluded that the repeated enumeration of specific classes contained within the statute, when viewed in light of settled principles of statutory construction, "strongly suggests" a legislative intent that the protection of the Act is limited. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1161.) The court warned against further expansion of coverage under the Act: "[W]ere we writing on a clean slate, the repeated emphasis in the language of sections 51 and 52 on the specified classifications of race, sex, religion, etc. would represent a highly persuasive, if not dispositive, factor in our construction of the Act." ( Id. at p. 1159.)

The court, however, refused to overrule its prior decisions (e.g., In re Cox, Marina Point). ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1155.) Instead, it reconciled its new, more narrow reading of coverage under the Act with the holdings of those cases. Although prior cases had held that certain nonenumerated classes were protected under the Act, the court found that each of those cases had involved discrimination based on the personal characteristics of the plaintiffs (including geographical origin, physical attributes, and personal beliefs). ( Id. at p. 1160.)

(2) Legitimate Business Interests

Harris also considered whether or not the defendant possessed a legitimate business interest in excluding plaintiffs, which might justify denial of access to a place of public accommodation: "`A business establishment may, of course, promulgate reasonable deportment regulations that are rationally related to the services performed and the facilities provided.'" ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1162, quoting In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 217.)

3d Respondent argues that appellant's exclusion from the bar was based on his conduct. In his first amended complaint, appellant acknowledges that the parties had known each other and had had dealings for many years before the first or second discrimination suits were filed. Additionally, appellant asserted that respondent, a "gay bar," excluded him because he is gay. Despite the fact that appellant has abandoned this allegation on appeal, we cannot fail to recognize its obvious absurdity and the tensions raised between the parties by such an allegation.

Respondent argues that it refused to serve and then excluded appellant because of appellant's prior conduct and his presence in the bar just a few days before the parties were to face each other in court. Thus, although this case is one which deals with retaliation, it is factually different than Vaughn. In Vaughn the previous discrimination suit between the parties had been settled several years before the alleged retaliatory exclusion took place. ( Vaughn v. Hugo Neu Proler International, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1616.) The defendant in Vaughn could hardly argue that plaintiff was excluded because tensions between the parties were running high as the result of the pending lawsuit.

Respondent also points out that it did not immediately exclude appellant, but did so only after appellant was involved in a battery incident with another customer. Based upon appellant's prior and present conduct and dealings with respondent and the circumstances existing between the parties at the time of the exclusion, we cannot say as a matter of law that appellant's exclusion was not "rationally related to the services performed and the facilities provided." ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1162.)

(3) Consequences of Inclusion

First, appellant concedes that these women could still bring a subsequent suit for discrimination based on gender. In addition to the compensatory damages allowed under section 52, the victims of such discrimination could bring an action for an injunction enjoining further exclusion based on gender. (7) "`"[A]lthough the Unruh Act makes no express provision for injunctive relief, that remedy as well as damages may be available to an aggrieved person."'" ( Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1062 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 213], affd. in Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club (1987) 481 U.S. 537 [95 L.Ed.2d 474, 107 S.Ct. 1940], quoting Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 463, 470 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 609, 370 P.2d 313].)

(3e) Appellant's argument is not completely without merit. The Act might indeed offer better protection for victims of class-based discrimination if an action for retaliatory discrimination were added to the list of remedies currently available under the Act. However, the Act as it currently stands, offering no such remedy, has existed since 1959, and the predecessor to the Act was enacted nearly 100 years ago. Prior to September 1990 when the Second District decided Vaughn, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d 1612, California had in place a statutory scheme which successfully protected the public from arbitrary discrimination without the need for a cause of action for retaliatory discrimination. The Legislature has not specifically included such protection under the Act; and, just as in Harris, the respondents alleged retaliatory discrimination does "not make distinctions among persons based on the classifications listed in the Act (e.g., race, sex, religion, etc.) or similar personal traits, beliefs, or characteristics that bear no relationship to the responsibilities of consumers of public accommodations." ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1169.)

Appellant also argues that his conduct in bringing the first action gives rise to his status as a member of a class of civil rights litigants. However, filing a lawsuit is clearly conduct which may be engaged in by persons of any sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, natural origin, or blindness or other physical disability. Nevertheless, appellant urges that such conduct creates a class of persons who have filed lawsuits. But such logic could be applied to any kind of conduct. Were we to hold that the conduct involved here gave rise to a protected class under the Act, we would open the door for a seemingly endless stream of new cases never contemplated by the Legislature. Given such lack of legislative direction, this court is reluctant to add a new class of "civil rights litigants" within the protection of the Act.

IV. CONCLUSION

Appellant has asked us to expand coverage of the Act to retaliatory discrimination. We refrain from amending the Act to so expand coverage thereunder, whether that expansion is based on individualized discrimination, a never before protected class of litigants, or on asserted needs of the statutory scheme.

The plaintiffs in Harris did not fall into any listed class nor were they discriminated against on the basis of some personal characteristic. Therefore they were not eligible for statutory protection. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1160.) In light of our Supreme Court's adoption of a new, more narrow construction of the Act and its refusal to add a new class of protected persons described by economic status, this court is precluded from accepting appellant's invitation to extend the Act to cover discrimination which is neither based on status as a member of a class nor on personal characteristics but is, instead, based on the conduct of an individual. (See Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 96 [ 234 Cal.Rptr. 178] ["The Unruh Act seeks to remedy arbitrary discrimination. It does not seek to remedy traditional wrongs arising out of tort or breach of contract, nor does it seek to remedy discrimination based on purely personal grounds."].)

Appellant has thus failed to state a cause of action under the Act in either his first cause (punitive damages) or his fourth cause (injunctive relief and compensatory damages). The sustaining of respondent's demurrer without leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion.

The judgment is affirmed.

Perley, J., concurred.