MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YOUNG, District Judge.

Stephen Furtick and his three children, Sanhita, Veronica, and Crystal (the "Furticks"), commenced this action against the Medford Housing Authority (the "Authority"), the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), and the present secretary of HUD, Andrew M. Cuomo ("Cuomo"), in his official capacity. The Furticks claim that the defendants' policies, practices, and procedures have created and perpetuated racial discrimination within the federal Section 8 Existing Housing Program. Specifically, the Furticks allege that 1) the residency preference used by the Authority in distributing Section 8 vouchers has a disparate impact on African-Americans because the majority of Medford residents are white; 2) HUD has failed to fulfill its constitutional and statutory obligations to monitor the criteria used by the Authority to determine who may receive a Section 8 voucher; and 3) Cuomo breached his duty to ensure HUD's compliance with the law. The Furticks seek declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, attorneys' fees, and costs against all defendants.

Cuomo and HUD have moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). They contend that 1) the Furticks lack standing to pursue their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; 2) the Furticks may not pursue their claims for monetary damages under the United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437, 1441, and 1441a, because those provisions do not confer a private right of action; and 3) all of the Furticks' claims for monetary damages are barred by sovereign immunity.

I. BACKGROUND

Under the Section 8 Existing Housing Program, HUD authorizes local public housing authorities ("PHA's") to issue federally-funded vouchers to eligible low income families. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b). A Section 8 voucher entitles a family to have the PHA pay a portion of its rent directly to its landlord, provided that the landlord meets certain eligibility requirements. Id Under HUD's supervision, the PHA's determine which applicants receive the vouchers and which privately-owned residences meet the eligibility criteria for leasing to qualified applicants. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c), ( o).

To obtain a Section 8 voucher, an eligible family must apply directly to a PRA such as the Authority. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f. The PHA then places the family on a waiting list according to the date of application and certain selection preferences. Some of these preferences, known as "federal preferences," are statutorily mandated ( e.g., preferences for families who have been involuntarily displaced and are homeless, families who live in substandard housing, and families that pay more than fifty percent of their income for rent). 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(3)(B). "Non-federal preferences," in contrast, are those preferences which are proposed by a local PHA and, if approved by HUD, incorporated into the PHA's administrative plan Id., 24 C.F.R. § 982.207. The residency preference at issue in this case is an example of a non-federal preference.

On October 20, 1992, Stephen Furtick, on behalf of himself and two of his daughters, submitted an application to the Authority for a Section 8 voucher. On January 11, 1993, the Authority placed the Furticks' application on the waiting list for two-bedroom apartments. At that time, the Authority ranked applicants on its waiting list in the following order: 1) residents of Medford who qualify for a federal preference; 2) non-residents who qualify for a federal preference; 3) residents of Medford who do not qualify for a federal preference; and 4) non-residents who do not qualify for a federal preference. At the time of their application, the Furticks qualified for a federal preference but did not live in Medford, and thus were placed in the second category.

On September 28, 1993, the Furticks filed an administrative complaint with HUD, claiming that the Authority's residency preference discriminated against them on the basis of race in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3619. On April 11, 1995, HUD issued a Determination of Reasonable Cause and Charge of Discrimination against the Authority. HUD found that 1) whites constituted 72% of the Authority's applicant pool and received 89% of the vouchers, while African-Americans constituted 17% of the applicant pool but received only 9% of the available vouchers, and 2) the residency preference used by the Authority accounts for this racially disproportionate allocation of Section 8 benefits. But on July 25, 1995, HUD withdrew its Determination of Reasonable Cause and Charge of Discrimination, and in August, 1995, HUD dismissed the Furticks' administrative complaint.

The Furticks lived in homeless shelters and transitional housing in the Greater Boston area from August, 1992 until July, 1995, when they received a voucher from another public housing authority and secured a residence with that voucher. On October 18, 1995, the Furticks filed suit in this Court.

II. DISCUSSION

A motion for judgment on the pleadings tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the plaintiffs' likelihood of ultimate success. "The standard for evaluating a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as the standard for evaluating a Rule (12)(b)(6) motion." Nedder v. River College, 944 F. Supp. 111, 120 (D.N.H. 1996) (quoting Metromedia Steakhouses Co. v. Resco Management Inc, 168 B.R. 483, 485 [D.N.H. 1994]). A court may grant a dismissal on the pleadings "only if `it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief.'" Gaskell, 3 F.3d at 497-98 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80).

A. Standing for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Under the Constitution, a federal court has but limited jurisdiction and can hear only disputes that raise an actual "case or controversy" between the parties before it. U.S. Const. art. 3, § 2; see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). The standing requirement that arises from this language in Article III ensures that cases "will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). "It is for that reason that the emphasis in standing problems is on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has `a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.'" Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663).

A plaintiff satisfies the constitutional requirements for standing when she alleges a "personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. at 3324 (citation omitted); see also Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663-64, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 2301-02, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). "The responsibility for `clearly and specifically setting forth facts sufficient to satisfy the Article III standing requirements' rests with the claimant." Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d at 915, 919 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 109 L.Ed.2d 135).

Cuomo and HUD argue that the Furticks lack standing to pursue their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Furticks already possess a Section 8 voucher — albeit one obtained from another housing authority — and thus are free to live anywhere in the Commonwealth, including Medford. See Williams v. Hanover Hous Auth., 926 F. Supp. 10, 12-13 (D.Mass. 1996) (citing Williams v. Hanover Hous. Auth., 871 F. Supp. 527, 534 [D.Mass. 1991]) (noting that housing agencies agreed to accept prior ruling by this Court that policy of restricting where recipients of Section 8 vouchers may live violates state law). Accordingly, any order issued by this Court requiring HUD to prohibit the use of residency preferences in the application process for Section 8 vouchers would not redress harms presently being suffered by the Furticks. As the Supreme Court reiterated in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), "[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects." Id. at 564, 112 S.Ct. at 2138 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675-76, 38 L.Ed.2d 674).

The Furticks counter that even though they already possess a Section 8 voucher, they stand to benefit from the equitable relief sought because there is a possibility that they will lose their current section 8 voucher, apply for a new voucher with the Authority, and again be subject to the residency preference. The Constitution, however, requires more than the mere possibility that the Furticks will be injured in the future. The plaintiffs must allege facts that indicate a "real or immediate threat that [they] will be wronged again — a `likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.'" City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1670, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (quoting O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 502, 94 S.Ct. at 679); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. at 2138 (threat of future injury must be "imminent"). In Lyons, the Supreme Court held that the possibility that the plaintiff would again be stopped by a police officer and subjected to the chokehold he sought to enjoin was too speculative to confer standing. Id. at 105, 111, 103 S.Ct. at 1666-67, 1670; see also American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1377 (1st Cir. 1992) (current union members lack standing to challenge Postal Service policy of drug testing job applicants because, as current employees, the plaintiffs do not face "a realistic risk of future exposure" to the testing). By the same token, here, the possibility that the Furticks will again be subject to the residency preference is "far too speculative," see Frank, 968 F.2d at 1376, to confer standing.

The Furticks also assert that the continued use of the residency preference by the Authority perpetuates racially segregated housing patterns and denies them the "benefits of living in a racially integrated society." Plaintiffs' Opposition to Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 6; see generally Charles M. Haar, Suburbs Under Seige Race, Space, and Audacious Judges 3-8, 200-08 (1996). The Supreme Court, however, has long recognized that this type of "generalized grievance" is insufficient to confer standing. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-27, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2929-35, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575, 112 S.Ct. at 2144 (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634, 58 S.Ct. 1, 1, 82 L.Ed. 493) ("It is an established principle . . . `that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.'"). As the Furticks already possess a Section 8 voucher permitting them to live anywhere in the Commonwealth, the only direct, non-generalized harm asserted in the Complaint — the alleged discrimination in the application process for Section 8 vouchers — no longer impacts the Furticks in any way that this Court might redress through equitable relief. The Furticks' rights are to be free of invidious discrimination, not to reorder society more to their liking. However desirable might be the Furticks' ultimate goal, it is difficult to see what order this Court could enter that would affect their current living arrangements.

The Furticks have, however, pled another injury in fact which might conceivably form a basis for standing — HUD's alleged mishandling of the investigation and adjudication of their administrative complaint. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that "[a] person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702; see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Secretary of Hous Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 152 (1st Cir. 1987). In order to maintain a claim pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, however, a plaintiff must satisfy the Article III requirements for standing. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org, 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) (citing Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152, 90 S.Ct. 827, 829, 25 L.Ed.2d 184). Although "[t]here is no question that a `procedural injury' can constitute an injury in fact for the purpose of establishing standing," such a procedural injury must also "impair a separate concrete interest." Yesler Terrace Community Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 446 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572, 112 S.Ct. at 2142-43). Here, that interest is absent because he Furticks already possess a portable Section 8 voucher. As the Furticks have failed to demonstrate an injury likely to be redressed by declaratory or injunctive relief, any exercise of jurisdiction by this Court "would be gratuitous, and thus inconsistent with the Art[icle] III limitation." Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 96 S.Ct. at 1924.

B. The Furticks' Claims for Monetary Damages

1. The United States Housing Act Claims

In Count VIII of the Complaint, the Furticks aver that Cuomo and HUD,

by failing to administer the Section 8-Existing Housing Program in Medford in a manner which insures decent affordable housing and equal housing opportunities to all Americans, and by failing to eradicate racial segregation in the Section 8 rental housing program in Medford, have violated federal housing policy established by the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437, 1441, and 1441a.

Compl. ¶ 66. Cuomo and HUD argue that sections 1437, 1441, and 1441a do not confer a private right of action to support the Furticks' claims for monetary damages. The Furticks respond that although these provisions do not expressly provide for a private right of action, one may properly be implied.

The Supreme Court has articulated a four-part inquiry to determine if a statute implies a private right of action: 1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose "especial benefit" the statute was enacted; 2) whether there is any indication of legislative intent to create or deny the remedy sought; 3) whether an implied remedy would be "consistent with the underlying purposes" of the statutory scheme; and 4) whether "the cause of action [is] one traditionally relegated to state law" such that it would be inappropriate to imply a federal remedy. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975) (citations omitted). The second factor, however, is of primary importance. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179, 108 S.Ct. 513, 516, 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988) (holding that the other Cort factors are useful only as "guides to discerning [Congressional] intent"). Furthermore, in assessing these factors, there is a presumption against an implied right of action. Stowell v. Ives, 976 F.2d 65, 70 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Ltd. Partnership v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, 989 F.2d 1266, 1271 (1st Cir.), cert. den, 510 U.S 1024, 114 S.Ct. 634, 126 L.Ed.2d 593 (1993) ("a statutory provision phrased as a command to specific people is unlikely to breed an implied private right of action because such language usually evinces a congressional concern with instructing the putative violator rather than with providing a remedy to the putative victim").

Applying these principles, this Court holds that although low income families in need of affordable housing are intended beneficiaries of sections 1437, 1441, and 1441a, see Falzarano v. United States, 607 F.2d 506, 509 (1st Cir. 1979), these provisions contain only broad declarations of housing policy which Congress did not intend be transferred into a private right of action for monetary damages. "[U]nless congressional intent to allow the private right of action `can be inferred from the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.'" Royal Bus. Group, Inc v. Realist, Inc, 933 F.2d 1056, 1060 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179, 108 S.Ct. at 516). Other courts that have examined the language, structure, and legislative history of sections 1437, 1441, and 1441a have similarly concluded that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action. See Perry v. Housing Auth of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1216-17 (4th Cir. 1981) (no private right of action under sections 1437, 1441, and 1441a); Cedar-Riverside Assocs, Inc. v City of Minneapolis, 606 F.2d 254, 257-59 (8th Cir. 1979) (no private right of action under sections 1441 and 1441a); Edwards v. District of Columbia, 628 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.D C. 1985), aff'd, 821 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (no private right of action under section 1437); West Zion Highlands v. City of Zion, 549 F. Supp. 673, 676 (N.D.Ill. 1982) (no private right of action under section 1441); Thompson v. Binghamton Hous. Auth., 546 F. Supp. 1158, 1181-83 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (no private right of action under section 1437).

2. Sovereign Immunity for the Remaining Damage Claims

The Furticks also seek to recover monetary damages from Cuomo and HUD for their alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1982, 42 U.S.C. S § 3604 and 3608, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., and the Fifth Amendment. Cuomo and HUD contend that all of these remaining claims are barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Furticks counter that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to these claims.

A waiver of sovereign immunity must be "unequivocally expressed in [the] statutory text." Lane v. Pena, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 2096, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 1014-15, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 ). "To sustain a claim that the Government is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims." Id at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2096-97 (citation omitted). Such a waiver will not be implied and will be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Id at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 2096 (citation omitted).

In arguing that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to all of their claims for monetary damages, the Furticks rely exclusively upon 42 U.S.C. § 1404a. That provision, however, merely provides that "[t]he Secretary of [HUD] may sue and be sued only with respect to its functions under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended [ 42 U.S.C. § 1437, et seq]." As Section 1404a does not "unequivocally express" an intent to extend this waiver to claims alleging violations of other housing acts or more generalized civil rights statutes, this Court holds that the Furticks' remaining claims for monetary damages are barred by sovereign immunity.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motion of Cuomo and HUD for judgment on the pleadings is hereby GRANTED in its entirety.