Where a trip is wholly a personal venture outside the scope of an employee's employment, and his conduct is a complete departure instead of a deviation or detour incidental to his employment, the master will not be liable for the acts of negligence of the employee.

DECIDED APRIL 17, 1957 — REHEARING DENIED APRIL 29, 1957.

Mrs. Audrey D. Eudaly filed an action against Stafford Benedict and the Fulton Bag Cotton Mills for damages arising out of a collision between a vehicle driven by the defendant, Benedict, and an automobile in which the plaintiff was riding. The entire case against the Fulton Bag Cotton Mills rests on the doctrine of respondent superior as there were no allegations of negligence on its part.

On the trial the evidence disclosed that: Benedict was a traveling salesman for Fulton Bag Cotton Mills; his territory was part of the States of Tennessee and Mississippi with his headquarters in Memphis, Tennessee; he used his own personal automobile and was reimbursed on a mileage basis; he sold all types of paper and textile bags; there was no control over the time or manner of his work; he made his own itinerary; he was staying at a hotel in Jackson, Mississippi, the night prior to the collision; he left the hotel at approximately 8 a. m. the day of the collision; he made no calls that morning; he left Jackson and drove to Bemis, Mississippi, a town which is a short distance from Jackson; the purpose of the trip was to do a friend a "courtesy" and was in no way connected with his business; the collision occurred on the return trip from Bemis; he planned to go to the hotel on his return and check his mail and make phone calls; he had not planned to make calls on any of his customers until approximately 10 a. m.; no business of any type was transacted on the trip to Bemis; he did not intend to transact any business on the behalf of the Fulton Bag Cotton Mills until he returned to the hotel to see if he had any further instructions.

At the conclusion of the evidence the defendant, Fulton Bag Cotton Mills, made a motion for a directed verdict, which was denied. The jury returned a verdict against both defendants. The defendant, Fulton Bag Cotton Mills, then filed a motion for new trial and a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial judge denied the motions and the defendant, Fulton Bag Cotton Mills, excepts.

QUILLIAN, J.

For the sake of convenience we shall refer to the Fulton Bag Cotton Mills as the defendant, and Mrs. Audrey D. Eudaly as the plaintiff. Stafford Benedict, the codefendant, will be referred to by name.

The defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was predicated on the theory that the evidence did not prove the plaintiff's case as laid; that the evidence demanded a finding that at the time of the collision made the basis of the case, Stafford Benedict was not acting for Fulton Bag Cotton Mills, but was engaged upon a mission which was purely personal to him; and that the evidence demanded a finding that Benedict was driving his personally owned car on a personal mission and was not acting as the agent of the defendant Fulton Bag Cotton Mills, and, as a consequence, was not acting in the furtherance of the business of that defendant, or in the course of, or in the scope of his employment with Fulton Bag Cotton Mills.

The plaintiff's argument is based on two positions: first, that Benedict being a traveling salesman, his employment is continuous both day and night; second, even if Benedict had temporarily departed from his employment, when he began his return trip he again resumed the duties of his employment and was so engaged when the collision occurred.

It is true "that a traveling salesman, away from home or headquarters, is in continuous employment, and that an accident to him arises in the course of his employment `if it occurs while the employee is doing what a man so employed may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time.'" U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Skinner, 188 Ga. 823, 826 ( 5 S.E.2d 9).

It is also true that "Although a servant may have made a temporary departure from the service of his master, and in so doing may for the time have severed the relationship of master and servant, yet where the object of the servant's departure has been accomplished and he has resumed the discharge of his duties to the master, the responsibility of the master for the acts of the servant reattaches." Atlanta Furniture Co. v. Walker, 51 Ga. App. 781 (1) ( 181 S.E. 498).

In the present case the evidence disclosed that the trip to Bemis was a totally personal matter and had no connection with Benedict's employment. Thus, the trip was a personal venture outside the scope of his employment. Reddy-Waldhauer-Maffett Co. v. Spivey, 53 Ga. App. 117 ( 185 S.E. 147); Selman v. Wallace, 45 Ga. App. 688 ( 165 S.E. 851); Fambro v. Sparks, 86 Ga. App. 726 ( 72 S.E.2d 473); United States Fidelity c. Co. v. Skinner, 188 Ga. 823 ( 5 S.E.2d 9).

The judge erred in denying the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In view of this ruling it is not necessary to rule on the motion for new trial. Judgment reversed with direction that the trial judge enter judgment for the defendant, Fulton Bag Cotton Mills, in accordance with what is herein held. Felton, C. J., and Nichols, J., concur.