MEMORANDUM OPINION ORDER

DENISE COTE, District Judge

This case arises out of a dispute between plaintiff, Dr. Michael Wesley Frierson-Harris ("Harris"), and his former employer, Union Theological Seminary (the "Seminary"). Harris alleges that various people affiliated with the Seminary — as well as the Seminary's lawyers, Harris's own lawyers, a moving company, and an employee of a property management firm — conspired to violate his civil rights on the basis of his race. A more complete description of the facts alleged by Harris is contained in the Opinion and Order previously issued in this case, familiarity with which is assumed. Frierson-Harris v. Hough, No. 05 Civ. 3077 (DLC), 2006 WL 298658 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2006) (the "February 7 Opinion"). Through separate Orders bearing today's date, motions to dismiss Harris's second amended complaint were (1) granted with respect to David E. Frazer, one of plaintiff's former attorneys, and (2) granted in part and denied in part with respect to L. Robert Batterman and John F. Fullerton, III, the Seminary's outside counsel. The remaining defendants ("moving defendants") bring this motion to dismiss the claims against them.

I. The Section 1981 Claim

Harris brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981") against defendant Joseph H. Hough ("Hough"), the current president of the Seminary. The moving defendants argue that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel prohibit Harris from arguing that he was contractually entitled to the apartment he desires, since Harris litigated — and lost — that issue in an Article 78 proceeding before a New York State court. According to the moving defendants, if Harris does not have a contractual right to that apartment, he cannot bring a Section 1981 claim. This argument is flawed.

"Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action." D.H. Blair Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 112 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).Res judicata, however, does not apply to preclude federal civil rights claims brought by an unsuccessful Article 78 plaintiff "because a state court entertaining an Article 78 proceeding does not have the power to award the full measure of relief available" in federal civil rights proceedings. Vargas v. City of New York, 377 F.3d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 2004). Therefore, res judicata does not bar Harris's Section 1981 claim.

Under New York law, collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, occurs if "(1) the issue in question was actually and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, and (2) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first proceeding." Id. at 205-06. Even assuming that the moving defendants' characterization of the state court proceedings is accurate, however, it does not provide a legal basis for dismissing the claims against them. While it is true that "a plaintiff cannot state a claim under Section 1981 unless he has (or would have) rights under the existing (or proposed) contract that he wishes `to make and enforce,'" Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1246, 1252 (2006) (quoting Section 1981), moving defendants err in assuming that Harris's claim cannot survive in the absence of a contractual guarantee to the apartment at issue. Harris, after all, does not bring a claim for breach of contract, but for race discrimination. Harris's employment agreement provides him with the contractual relationship required for a Section 1981 claim, and his assertion that the Seminary assigned him "substandard" housing on the basis of his race is sufficient to survive this motion to dismiss.

II. The Section 1985 Claim

Harris brings a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against all defendants in this action. As explained in the February 7 Opinion, a Section 1985 claim cannot be maintained if the plaintiff does not "provide some factual basis supporting a meeting of the minds, such that defendants entered into an agreement, explicit or tacit, to achieve the unlawful end."Frierson-Harris, 2006 WL 198658 at *5 (quoting Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2003)). With respect to defendants Michael Maloney ("Maloney"), Nick Zuhusky ("Zuhusky"), and Despatch Moving Storage ("Despatch"), the second amended complaint includes no facts that would support such a meeting of the minds. Indeed, even according to plaintiff's version of events, these defendants have done nothing inconsistent with their roles as agents of the Seminary or their duties as property managers, movers, and storage facilities, respectively. Further, they had no involvement in — and no decision-making authority over — the allegedly discriminatory employment decisions made by the Seminary. The action will therefore be dismissed as to Maloney, Zuhusky, and Despatch.

It will also be dismissed as to defendant Randall Balmer ("Balmer"), a professor of religion at Barnard College. Again, Harris has not pled any facts that would support a conclusion that Balmer conspired with the other defendants. Furthermore, Balmer is not an employee of the Seminary, and his role in the discrimination allegedly suffered by Harris is therefore far too attenuated to support a claim.

The Section 1985 claim against the other defendants will, however, go forward. Harris claims that Hough and the named members of the Seminary faculty conspired to alter the Seminary's housing assignment policy, to make changes to the curriculum that impaired Harris's ability to do his job, and ultimately, to fire him. Certain of these adverse employment actions apparently required faculty approval and, therefore, the active involvement of Hough and the faculty defendants.

Conclusion

The motion to dismiss the second amended complaint is granted with respect to defendants Maloney, Zuhusky, Despatch, and Balmer. It is otherwise denied.

SO ORDERED: