KAREN ROBY, Magistrate Judge

Before the Court is Freeport's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Magistrate's Minute Entry Regarding Draft SEC Documents (doc. #236) requesting the undersigned to reconsider her previous Minute Entry dated June 3, 2004 regarding certain documents relating to Freeport's quarterly and annual SEC filings submitted to the Court for an in camera review. Further, Freeport filed a Request for Oral Argument on the same day. The Court finds that oral argument on this matter is unnecessary.

Freeport contends that the undersigned erred when ruling that certain documents relating to Freeport's quarterly and annual SEC filings were not privileged. Specifically, Freeport requests that the undersigned reconsider the ruling with respect to the Interoffice Memoranda attached to Documents Numbers 5, 10, 15, and 21 and the draft SEC documents relating to documents 3, 5, 6, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 32, 42, 47, 51 and 53. Freeport suggests that review regarding the draft SEC documents ordered produced is necessary because the undersigned did not accept their proof regarding the author of handwritten comments on the documents such that they wish to provide an affidavit of the attorney who authored the handwritten modifications to the document.

I. Analysis

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a "motion for reconsideration" in those exact terms. See Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990). However, the Fifth Circuit has held that a motion to reconsider is analogous to a motion to "alter or amend the judgment" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or a motion for "relief from judgment." See id. A motion for reconsideration is considered a Rule 59(e) motion if it is served within ten (10) days of the court's ruling.

There are three possible grounds for any motion for reconsider: "(1) intervening change in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence not previously available, and (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice". See, e.g. Motiva Enterprises LLC v. Wegmann, 2001 WL 246414 (E.D.La. March 12, 2001). It is settled further that a motion to reconsider is not to re-debate the merits of a particular motion. If a party is allowed to address a court's reasons as to why a motion was or was not granted, it would render the entire briefing process irrelevant and lead to endless motion to reconsider. Bulley v. Fidelity Financial Services of Mississippi, 2000 WL 1349184 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 8, 2000).

A. Documents 5, 10, 15 and 21 Inter-Office Memoranda

Freeport initially requests reconsideration of the Court's order regarding the Inter-Office Memoranda attached to Documents 5, 10, 15, and 21. In support of its argument, Freeport suggests that the Court now should review Mr. Currault's affidavit which attests that the documents referenced above were circulated to himself and Mr. Pilant as well as "other" Jones Walker lawyers for review and comment.

The mover, despite the court's repeated instructions to fully brief why a matter was privileged, only after the ruling issued by the undersigned decided to provide Currault's affidavit. The Court notes that this particular motion to compel has been pending since March 1, 2004, and continued for consideration before the undersigned since March 23, 2004. As it is Freeport's burden to demonstrate documents are protected by the asserted privileges, Freeport had approximately 3 months to provide the Court with such an affidavit.

Contrary to the suggestion of Freeport, it provided no proof other than its argument that the documents in question were privilege. It well settled that the burden is on the moving party who seeks the protection of the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine to establish that it is appropriate, and Freeport's argument alone is insufficient.

The Court further notes that there has not been a change in the law and this information was available to the mover prior to the Court's ruling on the matter. Further the Court finds that its ruling regarding these documents is based upon sound law regarding the determination of whether the privilege applies to attorney transmittal documents. See Dixie Mill Supply Co., Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co. 168 F.R.D. 554, 559 (E.D. La. 1996) (finding that mere transmittal document which do not contain confidential information, attorney advice, opinion or mental impressions, are not privileged merely because they are sent to an attorney). See also Westside-Marrero Jeep Eagle, Inc. 1998 WL 310799, *1 (E.D. La. June 10, 1998) (finding that "letters that merely transmit documents to or from an attorney, even at the attorney's request for purposes of rendering legal advice to a client are neither privileged nor attorney work product."). Therefore, the request to reconsider the ruling regarding Documents 5, 10, 15, and 21 is denied. Further, contrary to what is suggested by Freeport, the Court did not find that the memoranda attached to document numbers 1 and 19 were protected by any privilege.

B. Draft SEC documents and Draft Press Releases

Freeport next requests that the Court reconsider its decision regarding pre-publication draft SEC filings and Draft Press Releases because they contain handwritten and electronic "blackline comments". Freeport advances several arguments. First, it contends that Currault's affidavit should be considered now because it proves that he made the revisions to the draft SEC filings.

Secondly, Freeport contends that the simple fact that Freeport gave its attorneys pre-publication drafts of the SEC filings and the draft press releases is sufficient for it to be deemed information that would enable the Jones Walker lawyers to give informed advice regarding what should be disclosed to the public. Further, Freeport contends that to the extent some of the information did not make it in the final document, it is protected by the attorney-client privilege.

In advancing its newest position, Freeport relies upon Apex Municpal Fund et. al v. N-Group Securities, et. al, 841 F. Supp. 1423, 1426 (S.D. Tex 1993), which may be used as persuasive authority at best for the proposition that preliminary drafts of public offering statements made between attorney and client during the drafting process are privileged."

Not only was the Apex case decided years prior to the undersigned's ruling on the subject order such that there has been no intervening change in the law, but it further does not apply specifically to draft Press Releases or draft SEC filings. To follow the logic of the mover, it seeks a broad application of Apex that would include any draft document or communication made between an attorney and a client would aid in giving of advice and would therefore subject the document to the attorney-client privilege. Such a broad rule is not established by the court in Apex and the undersigned hereby rejects such an application in this case.

It should be noted that Freeport does not suggest or direct the Court by in camera request which information did not make it in the final SEC document or Draft Press Release. Nor did Freeport provide the Court with the "final" documents to demonstrate what was incorporated into the final documents. Even if, arguendo, the Court conceded that such a broad rule should be accepted by this Court, the "final" documents were not included or attached any pleading submitted by Freeport during the 3 month pendency of the motion.

The issue in Apex was whether information or documents collected for the purpose of ultimately publishing it to the general public in offering statements, was subject to the attorney-client privilege. It remains the burden of the mover in this instance to prove that the information was intended to be confidential. Id. at 1423. Further, even if the press releases are submitted to the SEC in the form of 8-K filings, Freeport has not carried its burden in demonstrating that the particular draft documents submitted to the Court are privileged. See Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 124 F. Supp.2d 207, 209 (draft press release not protected because it disclosed neither confidential communication nor was created for the purpose of seeking legal advice). Regarding the newly submitted affidavit of Currault, the Court finds that this information existed prior to the filing of the motion and is not grounds for reconsideration.

The Court's decision was based upon sound law and there has been no evidence submitted here that was previously unavailable to Freeport. The Court can only decide matters based on the information presented to it at the time. It is not the duty of the Court to meet the mover's burden in demonstrating certain documents are privileged by extrapolating information or arguments the mover failed to put before the Court. Allowing Freeport to continue to re-argue its position regarding these documents only serve to waste the Court's time, and that in and of itself would be manifestly unjust.

Although Freeport does not assert that the Court's prior opinion constituted a manifest injustice, even if Freeport had, the Court finds that no injustice suffered. To the extent Freeport suffered the adverse decision due to the lack of the Currault Affidavit, any injustice imagined by Freeport is of Freeport's own making. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pham, 193 F.R.D. 493, 495 (S.D. Miss. 2000) (finding that the motion to reconsider should be denied where the parties failed to raise a particular defense previously when it had the opportunity, and further stating that any manifest injustice was suffered by the mover was of their own making).

It is the Court's opinion that Freeport has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 59(e) such that the undersigned should reverse her prior ruling regarding the SEC related materials. Aside from submitting the affidavit of Douglas Currault, which has always been available, Freeport has simply cited disagreements with this Court's conclusions, only seeking to re-argue what the Court has rejected. This is exactly what Freeport should not be allowed to do, especially in light of the fact that it has been afforded an extensive amount of time to present its best case to the Court.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that pursuant to the District Court's request that the undersigned reconsider the matter, the Court's previous Minute Entry date June 21, 2004 (Rec. Doc. No. 252), denying Freeport's request for Reconsideration, is hereby REVOKED AND RESCINDED to the extent that the undersigned previously ruled on the motion on procedural grounds.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Freeport's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Magistrate's Minute Entry Regarding Draft SEC Documents (doc. #236) is DENIED on the merits for the reasons stated herein.