In Flores, we applied the standard first articulated in Sam Andrews' Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1972), which stated that the Attorney General's regulations must be upheld if they are founded on "considerations rationally related to the statute he is administering."

In Flores, we characterized the regulation governing the release of alien minors as a condition on release, rather than a condition of bond. Still, Flores' requirement of a rational relationship to the statute and our approval in that case of the regulation regarding children must be considered in evaluating bond conditions.

In Flores, we noted the requirement of rational relationship to the statute, but did not decide whether this had changed the detention power.

In Flores, we therefore found that the bill upon which this statutory section was patterned "was meant to confer broad power upon the Attorney General to detain aliens prior to a final determination of deportability," at 1325, and that the Attorney General was authorized to prescribe bond conditions "beyond merely insuring appearance.

In Flores, the court expressed the recent view of a number of courts that the exercise of that power will be subject only to the very limited review described in Fiallo, even when the challenged legislation impinges upon the due process rights of an alien who is being detained during the deportation process.

In Flores, the Ninth Circuit determined that even though fewer procedural due process protections are afforded in the immigration context, the Mathews test is nevertheless required to assess the constitutionality of the procedures employed.