MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Judge

Plaintiff Ruth Figueroa ("Figueroa") brings this lawsuit based on offensive behavior she has endured at her job. Figueroa's five-count second amended complaint asserts federal and state law claims. In count I, Figueroa invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants the City of Chicago ("the City"), Rick Santella ("Santella"), Rudy Urian ("Urian"), and Eileen Joyce ("Joyce"), alleging violations of her equal protection right to be free from sexual harassment under the Fourteenth Amendment. In count II, Figueroa claims that the City, Santella, Urian, and Joyce violated § 1983 by penalizing her for exercising her First Amendment right of free speech. Count III is Figueroa's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois law against the City, Santella, Urian, Joyce and Noel Murtagh ("Murtagh"). Figueroa brings counts IV and V against the City for sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII.

The defendants have filed three separate motions to dismiss Figueroa's complaint. The City, Santella, and Joyce jointly filed a motion to dismiss ("the City's motion") pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The City's motion seeks to dismiss all five counts of Figueroa's complaint for failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted. The City's motion also asks the court to strike paragraph 63 of Figueroa's complaint, which alleges a pattern of greed, corruption and other misconduct, under Rule 12(f), and to dismiss all requests for punitive damages against the City.

In addition to the City's motion, defendant Urian filed his own motion to dismiss counts I through III against him as time barred or for failure to state a claim. Defendant Murtagh also filed a separate motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Murtagh claims that this court lacks jurisdiction on count III for intentional infliction of emotional distress (Figueroa's only claim against Murtagh). Alternatively, Murtagh claims that Figueroa fails to state a cause of action against him. For the following reasons, the court: (1) grants in part and denies in part the City's motion; (2) grants in part and denies in part Urian's motion to dismiss; and (3) denies Murtagh's motion to dismiss.

Background

The court draws the following facts from Figueroa's second amended complaint and accepts them as true for purposes of this motion to dismiss. Figueroa has been a Supervisor of Service Writers for the Department of Fleet Management ("Fleet") at the City of Chicago since April 1992. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 18.) Figueroa is the only female supervisor assigned to Fleet's garage. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 20.) Santella is the Commissioner of Fleet; Urian is Deputy Commissioner of Fleet; Joyce is Executive Assistant to the Commissioner of Fleet; and Murtagh is the Manager of Vehicle Maintenance with Fleet. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-14.) For most of her time with Fleet, Figueroa reported directly to Urian, who in turn reported to Santella. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22.)

Figueroa alleges that Urian subjected her to repeated verbal and physical sexual advances and suggestive sexual comments. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 23.) Figueroa told Urian that his conduct was offensive and unwelcome, but Urian persisted and even threatened Figueroa with adverse consequences if she reported his conduct. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 23.) Beginning in May 1996, Figueroa was also subjected to sexual graffiti, consisting of offensive comments about her and parts of her body and graphic depictions of sexual activity, repeatedly written on the wall of the men's washroom and the door of the women's washroom. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 25.) The graffiti generated embarrassing attention for Figueroa, and she became the target of office gossip. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 26.) Figueroa repeatedly reported the graffiti to Urian, but Urian failed to take any corrective action. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27.)

Figueroa also alleges that Murtagh repeatedly referred to her in a vulgar and demeaning manner. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 28.) Fully aware of Murtagh's behavior toward Figueroa, Urian placed Figueroa's activities and duties directly under Murtagh's supervision. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 29.) Figueroa also complained about this arrangement to Sergeant Chiczewski ("Chiczewski"), a City of Chicago police officer responsible for the security at Fleet, but Chiczewski failed to take any corrective action. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 30.)

In May 1997, the day after Figueroa complained to Chiczewski, she attempted to complain to Joyce about the offensive conduct, but Joyce refused to hear Figueroa's complaint. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) Joyce instructed Figueroa not to report the harassment to the City Sexual Harassment Office, whose purpose is to investigate complaints by City employees and prevent sexual harassment. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31-32.) Figueroa, however, did complain to the Sexual Harassment Office several times in May, June, and July of 1997; the Sexual Harassment Office did not respond to Figueroa's complaints, nor did it take any corrective action. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 34.)

After learning that Figueroa had complained to the Sexual Harassment Office, Urian interrogated and scolded Figueroa about her complaints. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 35.) Urian even threatened to fire Figueroa's husband, who was also employed at Fleet. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 36.) Murtagh then began making offensive comments about Figueroa in the presence of others. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 37.) Figueroa claims that her tires were slashed and that she receives harassing phone calls at home because defendants failed to promptly investigate and resolve her complaints. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 38.) In August of 1997, Figueroa's husband was placed on suspension, stripped of his duties, and transferred to the midnight shift. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 39.) Urian told Figueroa that her husband had been punished because she had "pissed off" Santella by complaining to the Sexual Harassment Office and that she was an embarrassment to Santella and other city officials. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 40.)

In November 1997, Figueroa filed a charge of sexual harassment and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Illinois Department of Human Rights ("IDHR"). (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 41.) Figueroa alleges that defendants have continued in their harassment and retaliation even after she filed her administrative charge of discrimination. Defendants have removed Figueroa's responsibilities and tried to transfer her to less desirable locations. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43-44.) Defendants have labeled her as a "troublemaker" causing her co-workers to avoid and ignore her. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 45.) Figueroa also alleges that an unknown official issued orders to her co-workers not to speak to Figueroa and threatened their jobs if they disobeyed. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 48.)

In December 1997, Figueroa complained to Joyce about being ostracized and isolated, but Joyce again refused to listen to Figueroa's complaints. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 49.) Figueroa claims that this isolation is interfering with her ability to do her job and adversely affecting her mental and emotional state. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 52.) Figueroa now fears for her job, her well-being, and her safety. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 53.) Figueroa also claims to have suffered severe mental anxiety and emotional and physical distress as a result of her working conditions. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 79.)

Figueroa maintains that Murtagh has behaved in a threatening, hostile, and violent manner toward her. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 58.) Specifically, Murtagh has repeatedly used profane language with Figueroa, stared at her in a threatening fashion, refused to speak with her about work-related matters over which he exercises supervisory authority, and refuses to cooperate with her on work-related matters. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 58.) Murtagh also swore at Figueroa in an extremely angry and aggressive tone when she attempted to talk to him and directed other employees not to deal with Figueroa, referring to her as "the Enemy." (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 58.) According to Figueroa, Santella, Joyce and Urian knew about Murtagh's conduct, but failed to take corrective action although each had the power to do so. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-61.) Figueroa contends that Joyce and Urian even tried to cover up Murtagh's harassment of her. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-60.)

Figueroa alleges a pattern and practice of discrimination on the part of the City. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 63.) In support of this allegation, Figueroa refers to a newspaper article about Chiczewski, who was investigated for racial harassment and other irregularities. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 63(a).) Figueroa also alleges that Urian has solicited and engaged in sexual liaisons with other unnamed female Fleet employees who found such advances unwelcome and offensive. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 66(b).)

Figueroa filed this lawsuit against the City, Urian, Joyce, Santella and Murtagh for sexual harassment, retaliation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants have filed several motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), and a motion to strike a portion of Figueroa's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because Figueroa's complaint contains five counts, and there are three separate motions to dismiss or strike all of those counts, the court will analyze the Figueroa's claims in sequential order.

Analysis

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not the merits of the suit. See Triad Assocs. Inc. v. Chicago Housing Auth., 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 1989). Therefore, the court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See LeBlang Motors, Ltd. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 148 F.3d 680, 690 (7th Cir. 1998). The court will dismiss a claim only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 369 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

I. Count I — § 1983 Equal Protection Sexual Harassment

Figueroa alleges in count I of her complaint that the City, Santella, Urian, and Joyce "intentionally subjected [her] to unequal and discriminatory treatment by creating a hostile and abusive work environment that altered the conditions of [her] employment and by knowingly failing and refusing to protect [her] from those hostile and abusive conditions." Figueroa contends that this hostile environment reflects a "policy, custom, or pattern of official conduct." Figueroa alleges that this conduct violated her right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from sexual harassment.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from intentional and purposeful discrimination.Bloomenthal v. Lavelle, 614 F.2d 1139, 1141 (7th Cir. 1980). The Seventh Circuit has recognized that sexual harassment is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Bohen v. City of East Chicago, Ind., 799 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986). Generally, a claim alleging sexual harassment under the equal protection clause follows the guidelines used in Title VII cases with one exception. See King v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990). The defendant "must intend to harass under equal protection." Id. (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1719-21 (1986)).

The United States Supreme Court has recently stated that the terms "quid pro quo" sexual harassment and "hostile environment" sexual harassment were only of use to distinguish those cases in which job-related threats were carried out from those in which either such threats were not carried out or were absent altogether.Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2263 (1998). Thus, a Plaintiff need not establish that she suffered a tangible employment action to establish actionable sexual harassment. Id. at 2264. Rather, she need only establish that the sexual harassment was severe or pervasive such that an abusive work environment was created. Id.

The court presumes that Figueroa brings count I against the City as a "policy" claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Additionally, in the absence of an express statement that defendants are being sued in their individual capacities, a § 1983 claim against individuals "is construed as a suit against the defendants in their official capacities only."Yeksigian v. Nappi, 900 F.2d 101, 104 (7th Cir. 1990). However, where a complaint employs language that suggests that the claims are against the defendants in their individual capacities, and there is a claim for punitive damages or the defense of qualified immunity is raised, courts construe the complaint to sue the defendants in their individual capacity. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 581 (7th Cir. 1998). Because Figueroa uses the "policy" language of Monell, asks for punitive damages, and defendants raise qualified immunity as a defense, the court presumes that Figueroa brings this claim against Santella, Urian, and Joyce in both their official and individual capacities.

Figueroa seeks to hold the City, Santella, Urian, and Joyce liable for sexual harassment under § 1983 by claiming that a policy or custom of sexual harassment violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In general, a municipality such as the City cannot be held liable for the acts of its employees under § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Only when a municipality's policy or custom causes the constitutional deprivation is the municipality responsible under § 1983. Id. at 694. Additionally, because Figueroa's "official capacity" claims against Santella, Urian, and Joyce are really claims against the City, the same standards of liability apply. See Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 494 (7th Cir. 1997); Ruehman v. Sheahan, 34 F.3d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 1994).

Ordinary notice pleading is sufficient to bring a civil rights action against governmental entities under § 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1993); Gustafson v. Jones, 117 F.3d 1015, 1022 (7th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff's complaint must, however, provide "fair notice" of the claim and "the grounds upon which it rests."Conley, 355 U.S. at 47; Jackson v. Marion Cty., 66 F.3d 151, 152 (7th Cir. 1995); Baxter v. Vigo Cty. Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 1994).

To state a claim of a custom, policy, or widespread practice underMonell, Figueroa must assert some factual basis to suggest that (1) the defendants maintain an express policy of intentional sexual harassment against females, see McTigue v. City of Chicago, 60 F.3d 381, 382 (7th Cir. 1995); (2) defendants have a practice of subjecting female employees to intentional sexual harassment, though unauthorized or unwritten, is "so widespread as to have the force of law," Board of the Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388 (1997); or (3) that "a person with final policymaking authority," McTigue, 60 F.3d at 382, made "a deliberate choice" to deny Figueroa her right to be free intentional sexual harassment.West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1997). That is, he knew of and condoned the constitutional deprivation or acted with deliberate indifference to it, "turn[ing] a blind eye for fear of what [he] might see." Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, 110 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1997).

In other words, to state a claim under Monell, a plaintiff must "allege a specific pattern or series of incidents that support the general allegation of a custom or policy." Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1237 (7th Cir. 1986). A single incident of unconstitutional activity is not enough to trigger liability, "unless proof of the incident also includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy." Sivard v. Pulaski County, 17 F.3d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985)).

Figueroa does not state a viable equal protection claim against the City or an "official capacity" claim against Santella, Urian, and Joyce. Figueroa does not allege facts establishing a specific pattern or series of incidents that support her conclusory allegation of a custom or policy. In her complaint, Figueroa alleges that the City has recently engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination. However, the only fact alleged in support of this statement is that Chiczewski, who failed to take action on Figueroa's complaints of sexual harassment, might be investigated on reports of racial harassment. (Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 63.) Figueroa makes vague references in her complaint to other women who were allegedly subjected to harassing conduct as well; however, Figueroa does not provide any names or describes any specific instances. These allegations do not establish a specific pattern or series of incidents which would show a policy or custom of sexual harassment. Moreover, without specific facts to back up the allegation, Figueroa's bald assertion that the defendants maintained a "policy, custom, or pattern" of condoning sexual harassment does not adequately support her claim. See McTigue, 60 F.3d at 382-83; Baxter, 26 F.3d at 730.

Nor does Figueroa allege that an official with final policy making authority made a discriminatory decision that constituted an act of official government policy. Instead, Figueroa alleges that Urian sexually harassed her. She does not allege that Urian had any final policy making authority. Figueroa also does not allege that Santella or Joyce made any discriminatory decisions. She only alleges that Santella and Joyce were aware of the offensive conduct and failed to take action. Figueroa also fails to allege that either Santella or Joyce had any final policy making authority. Figueroa only alleges that they had the authority to take corrective action, which is distinct from policy making authority. Accordingly, the court dismisses count I against the City, and against Santella, Urian, and Joyce in their official capacities.

Figueroa also seeks to hold Santella, Urian, and Joyce liable for sexual harassment in their individual capacities. To state a § 1983 claim against defendants in their individual capacity, a plaintiff must allege that the defendants caused or personally participated in the statutory or constitutional violation. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). Merely alleging liability based on theories respondeat superior or negligent supervision of subordinates is not sufficient to establish a claim against an individual under § 1983. Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1241 (7th Cir. 1993).

However, to hold an individual liable under § 1983, a plaintiff need not allege direct participation in the deprivation of constitutional rights. Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1006 (7th Cir. 1982). An individual may be held liable under § 1983 if "she acts or fails to act with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff's constitutional rights, or if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at her direction or with her knowledge and consent." Id. (citations omitted). Supervisors may be held liable for the misconduct of their subordinates where the "supervisors [knew] about the conduct and facilitate[d] it, approve[d] it, condone[d] it, or turn[ed] a blind eye for fear of what they might see." Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988). Such conduct by supervisors satisfies the deliberate, reckless indifference standard required for liability under § 1983. Jones, 856 F.2d at 993.

Accepting as true all well-pleaded facts in Figueroa's complaint, and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, Figueroa properly states an equal protection claim pursuant to § 1983 against Santella, Urian, and Joyce in their individual capacities. Even though Figueroa has not alleged that Santella and Joyce were directly participating in the sexual harassment, Figueroa has alleged facts that, if accepted as true, establish that Santella and Joyce knew about the sexual harassment and turned a blind eye to it. Figueroa alleges that she informed Joyce of Urian's sexual harassment and that Joyce did nothing, and even ordered Figueroa not to complain. Figueroa further alleges that this was done with the acquiescence of Santella. Urian told her that she was an embarrassment to Santella and that Santella was "pissed off" at her for complaining about sexual harassment. Assuming Figueroa's allegations are true, a reasonable inference to be drawn from these facts is that Santella was aware of the conduct but intentionally disregarded it. Figueroa also alleged that Santella failed to take any corrective action. Therefore, Figueroa has also established that Santella was aware of the conduct and turned a blind eye to the alleged harassment.

Urian argues that Figueroa's allegations relating to events prior to December 1995 are barred by the 2 year statute of limitations.See Ownes v. O'Kure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989). Although some of the conduct that Figueroa complains about occurred prior to December 1995, Figueroa alleges that Urian engaged in sexual harassment well after that date. Figueroa also asserts that through at least October of 1997, Urian subjected her to unwelcome verbal and physical sexual advances and suggestive sexual comments. He threatened her with adverse consequences if she reported him. These previous occurrences are highly relevant and may be admissible under the continuing violation theory. See Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operation, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1996). Therefore, Urian's statute of limitations argument fails.

Alternatively, Urian argues that although Figueroa claims quid pro quo sexual harassment against Urian, she alleges no facts to support this claim. This argument fails because, contrary to Urian's belief, Title VII does not distinguish between quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment. Figueroa need not allege that she suffered adverse employment action to succeed in her equal protection sexual harassment claim. Rather, underEllerth, Figueroa need only allege that she was subjected to sexual harassment that was either severe or pervasive. Figueroa has satisfied this requirement. Therefore, Urian's motion to dismiss count I against him for failure to state a claim is denied.

Santella and Joyce also raise the defense of qualified immunity. Under this defense, a government official is shielded from liability for performing discretionary functions "insofar as [the] conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Lanigan, 110 F.3d at 471-72 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). A constitutional or statutory right is clearly established where "its contours are sufficiently clear so that a reasonable official would realize that what he is doing violates that right." Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 495 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). There need not be a case on point; but in light of the existing law, the violation must be apparent. Id.

The qualified immunity defense fails on this motion to dismiss because the law concerning supervisor liability for the constitutional violations of subordinates was clearly established when the alleged offenses occurred. Sexual harassment has long been recognized as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1185. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit recognized at least as early as 1988 that a supervisor is liable under § 1983 for the misconduct of his subordinates if the supervisor acts with deliberate, reckless indifference. See Jones, 856 F.2d at 993. A supervisor acts with deliberate, reckless indifference if he knows about the conduct and turns a blind eye to it. Id. at 992. Because Figueroa alleges that Santella and Joyce intentionally disregarded the conduct Figueroa complained about, the court cannot dismiss her claims against Santella and Joyce under qualified immunity.

In sum, the court dismisses count I of Figueroa's complaint against the City, and against Santella, Urian, and Joyce in their official capacities. However, the court denies defendants' requests to dismiss count I against them in their individual capacities. The court also rejects defendants' arguments that Figueroa's claims are time barred and that defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

II. Count II — § 1983 First Amendment Claim

In count II, Figueroa alleges that the City, Santella, Urian, and Joyce violated her rights under the First Amendment by retaliating against her for complaining about sexual harassment and filing a charge of harassment with the EEOC. The City, Santella, and Joyce argue that the court should dismiss this claim because Figueroa does not allege that she was speaking out on a matter of public concern.

The United States Supreme Court has established a threshold for determining whether speech by a public employee is protected under the First Amendment: the speech must be about an issue of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983). In determining whether speech involved a matter of public concern, the court must examine the content, form, and context of the speech. Id. at 147-48. The Court reasoned that this public concern threshold is necessary because federal courts are not the appropriate forum to review employment decisions taken by public agencies in reaction to an employee's speech on a matter of a private concern. Id. at 147.

As defined in Connick, issues of public concern are those "relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community." 461 U.S. at 146-47. The Seventh Circuit has also looked at the motivation underlying the protected activity. See, e.g., Cliff v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1994) (although plaintiff's speech involved a matter of public concern, plaintiff's motivation behind the utterance was purely private; hence the Connick test was not satisfied.) The purpose of the Connick test is to separate "matters in which the public might be interested [from] wholly personal grievances." Dishnow v. School Dist. of Rib Lake, 77 F.3d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1996).

Because a person may have mixed motives in her speech, a sliding scale may be employed to determine whether the motives are primarily private or public in nature. Wales v. Board of Educ., 120 F.3d 82, 84-85 (7th Cir. 1997). In determining whether a plaintiff's speech satisfies the Connick public concern test, the court must place heavy emphasis on the fact that a plaintiff brought her grievances in private to the administration and not in a public forum. Id. at 84.

Sexual harassment may inherently be a matter of public concern.See Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 411 (7th Cir. 1989). However, the court must "look to the point of the speech to see if the plaintiff addressed a matter of public or private concern." Id. InGray the court held that although the plaintiff's speech was about sexual harassment, the speech was not protected because she only complained to her supervisors to stop the sexual harassment. Id. Her speech only related to "the resolution of a personal problem."Id.

As in Gray, Figueroa's First Amendment claim is not actionable because Figueroa's speech was not a matter of public concern. Although sexual harassment itself can be an issue of public concern, the forum of Figueroa's speech along with her purpose clearly indicate that Figueroa's complaints of sexual harassment were solely related to a private concern. Figueroa complained about the sexual harassment first to Urian. When the sexual harassment continued, she tried to complain to Joyce. After Joyce and Santella failed to take action to stop the sexual harassment, Figueroa then took her complaint of sexual harassment to the City's Sexual Harassment Office. Nothing in Figueroa's complaint alleges that her speech was motivated by anything other than her desire to stop the sexual harassment against her. Therefore, Figueroa's complaint about the alleged harassment does not relate to a matter of public concern, and is not protected under the First Amendment. The court therefore dismisses count II of Figueroa's complaint in its entirety. III. Count III — Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Figueroa alleges in count III of her complaint that the City, Santella, Urian, Joyce, and Murtagh intentionally caused her emotional distress. Defendants first move to dismiss this claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to defendants, Figueroa's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") is barred by the Illinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA"). The IHRA provides that "no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this Act." 775 ILCS 5/8-111(C). Employment discrimination, including sexual harassment and retaliation, are included under the IHRA's definition of a "civil rights violation." See 775 ILCS 5/1-101; 775 ILCS 5/1-101(A); 775 ILCS 5/1-102(D).

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that, under the IHRA, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear tort claims that are "inextricably linked" to civil rights violations under 775 ILCS 5/8-111(C). Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 639 N.E.2d 1273, 1277 (Ill. 1997). In Geise, the plaintiff alleged "negligent hiring" and "negligent retention" where the defendant employer should have known that the harassing employee had engaged in sexual harassment in previous jobs and had previously been terminated for sexual harassment. The court dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning that "absent the allegations of sexual harassment, [the plaintiff] would have had no independent basis for imposing liability." Id. at 1277. Because the plaintiff's tort claims necessarily depended on the allegations of sexual harassment, the court held that the tort claims were inextricably linked to civil rights violations under the IHRA.

The Illinois Supreme Court clarified its position on this issue shortly after Geise in Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21 (Ill. 1997). In Maksimovic, the court held that the plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to establish the elements of certain torts because the "sexual harassment aspect of the case [was] merely incidental to what are otherwise ordinary common law tort claims." 687 N.E.2d at 24. The same facts that gave rise to the civil rights violation in Maksimovic also gave rise to the common law torts claims.

The Maksimovic court explained that "[t]he rule from Geise is not that the Act precludes the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction over all tort claims related to sexual harassment."Id. Rather, the IHRA only preempts tort claims which are "inextricably linked to a civil rights violation such that there is no independent basis for the action apart from the Act itself."Id. But where a "plaintiff has alleged the elements of [a tort] without reference to the legal duties created by the Act, she has established a basis for imposing liability on the defendants independent of the Act." Id. Therefore, courts have jurisdiction over such a claim. Id.

To establish a prima facie case of IIED, a plaintiff must allege that (1) defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) defendant knew or should have known that such conduct would cause severe emotional distress; and (3) the conduct caused plaintiff severe emotional distress. See McGrath v. Fahey, 633 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988). The elements of IIED do not require that the conduct be considered unlawful by a statute or violate any other legal duty. Therefore, offending conduct may give rise to both a claim of sexual harassment under the IHRA and a claim of IIED if the IIED claim is not necessarily dependent on a sexual harassment claim or the legal duties created by the IHRA.

As Maksimovic clarified, the test is not, as defendants suggest, that all claims for IIED in a sexual harassment context are inextricably linked to a civil rights violation simply because the two claims arise from the same set of facts. Instead, where a sexual harassment plaintiff can allege the elements of IIED without reference to any legal duties created by the IHRA, the plaintiff has established a basis of liability for IIED independent of the IHRA. In such a case, the sexual harassment claim is only incidental to what is otherwise a common law IIED claim and courts may exercise jurisdiction over such a claim. However, if a plaintiff alleges that the conduct is extreme and outrageous simply because it violates a legal duty created by the IHRA, then the plaintiff has failed to establish a basis of liability independent of the IHRA. In such a case, the claim for IIED is inextricably linked to a civil rights violation covered by the IHRA, and the IDHR has exclusive jurisdiction over the IIED claim.

With these legal principles in mind, the court turns to Figueroa's specific IIED claims. In her claims against Urian and Murtagh, Figueroa alleges the elements of IIED without any reference to the legal duties created by the Act. Figueroa alleges that both Urian and Murtagh engaged in threatening and insulting behavior towards her. Figueroa also alleges that Urian repeatedly made unwelcome sexual advances and suggestive sexual comments toward her and threatened her and her husband with adverse consequences if Figueroa reported the conduct. Additionally, Figueroa alleges that Murtagh called her obscene names in the presence of coworkers, refused to work with her on job related matters, and otherwise treated her in a threatening fashion. Figueroa makes these factual allegations without implicating or invoking any duties created by the act. The fact that these actions also give rise to her civil rights violation does not automatically bar her IIED claim that is based on the same facts.

Figueroa also alleges facts against Urian and Murtagh in support of the remaining elements of IIED without referring to any legal duties created by the IHRA. Figueroa claims that Urian and Murtagh acted willfully and maliciously. She also alleges that she has suffered severe emotional distress as a result in the form of fear for her safety, job and well-being, mental anxiety, and emotional and physical distress. None of these allegations depend on any legal duties created by the IHRA. Therefore, Figueroa's IIED claims against Murtagh and Urian are not inextricably linked to a civil rights violation and are properly before this court.

In contrast, Figueroa's IIED claims against the City, Santella, and Joyce are inextricably linked to her claim of a civil rights violation and therefore barred. Figueroa asserts that she complained of the harassment, and that Joyce, Santella, and the City failed to take any corrective action even though they knew about the alleged harassment. Figueroa further alleges that Joyce told her not to report the harassment. Figueroa then alleges that when she did complain about the conduct to the Sexual Harassment Office, the Office failed to take remedial action. The essence of Figueroa's IIED claim against the City, Santella, and Joyce is that Figueroa suffered emotional distress because these individuals failed to remedy the alleged sexual harassment. These allegations are only relevant to Figueroa's claims of IIED by virtue of the legal duties created by the IHRA. By relying on these facts for her IIED claim against the City, Santella, and Joyce, Figueroa fails to allege a basis for imposing liability on these defendants independent of the IHRA. Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction over Figueroa's claims for IIED against the City, Santella, and Joyce.

Since the court has subject matter jurisdiction over Figueroa's IIED claim against Urian and Murtagh, the court must address their additional arguments to dismiss Figueroa's IIED claim against them. Urian does not argue that Figueroa fails to allege a prima facie case of IIED; instead, Urian argues that Figueroa's IIED claim is barred by the two year statute of limitations. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202; Koelle v. Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868, 872 (Ill.App.Ct. 1996). As discussed previously, although a portion of Figueroa's allegations occurred prior to December 1995, Figueroa does allege that Urian engaged in offensive conduct well after that date. Figueroa alleges that through at least October of 1997, Urian subjected her to unwelcome verbal and physical sexual advances and suggestive sexual comments. He threatened her with adverse consequences if she reported him. Figueroa also alleges that Urian retaliated against her after she filed her complaint. Much like sexual harassment, IIED often manifests itself over a period of time and can rarely be limited to one specific act. Since the discovery rule applies to limitations periods for IIED, and this rule necessarily raises questions of fact, Koelle, 672 N.E.2d at 874, the court will not resolve this issue on a motion to dismiss. Therefore, Urian's statute of limitations argument fails.

Unlike Urian, Murtagh does argue that Figueroa fails to properly allege the elements of an IIED claim. Under Illinois law, to state a claim for IIED, the plaintiff must allege: (1) defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) defendant intended to cause severe emotional distress or knew that there was a high probability that his conduct would cause such distress; and (3) defendant's conduct caused severe emotional distress. See McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 809. To establish extreme and outrageous conduct, the plaintiff must allege more that "mere insult, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression or trivialities." Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 360 N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ill. 1977). However, abuse of power weighs in favor of finding the conduct extreme and outrageous. McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 810. Furthermore, offensive conduct that is not otherwise extreme and outrageous may become extreme and outrageous if it is retaliatory in nature. Johnson v. Federal Reserve Bank, 557 N.E.2d 328, 331 (Ill.App.Ct. 1990). To establish the second element, the plaintiff need not allege intent to cause severe emotional distress. A plaintiff will satisfy the second element if she alleges facts to support the inference that the defendant recklessly disregarded that his actions would cause emotional distress. See Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 702 (7th Cir. 1997).

Murtagh first claims that the conduct he allegedly committed was not extreme and outrageous. Assuming her assertions to be true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in Figueroa's favor, the court finds Figueroa's allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Figueroa alleges that Murtagh acted in a rude and offensive manner toward her during 1996. After she complained about his conduct, Murtagh retaliated by repeatedly saying "fuck you" to Figueroa. Murtagh also stared at Figueroa in a threatening manner and refused to speak with her about work-related matters. Murtagh also swore at Figueroa in an extremely angry and aggressive tone when attempted to talk to him. Additionally, Murtagh directed or intimidated other employees not to have dealings with her and referred to her as "the Enemy."

Based on these facts, the court finds that Figueroa's allegations satisfy the extreme and outrageous element of IIED for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Not only are these allegations beyond mere insults or other trivialities, they were also retaliatory in nature. Figueroa also alleges that Murtagh abused his authority as Figueroa's superior, which weighs in favor of a finding of extreme and outrageous conduct.

Murtagh next argues that Figueroa failed to establish the requisite intent element of IIED. The court, however, finds that Figueroa's allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Figueroa alleges that Murtagh's conduct was willful and malicious. This conclusory allegation alone may not be sufficient, but taken with the complaint as a whole, Figueroa alleges facts that would support a finding that Murtagh recklessly disregarded a probability of severe emotional distress. Even after Figueroa complained about Murtagh, Murtagh not only continued his offensive conduct, but engaged in additional offensive conduct.

Contrary to Murtagh's argument, Figueroa also alleges facts that establish the third element of IIED. Figueroa claims that she has suffered severe mental anxiety and emotional and physical distress. In support of her claim of mental anxiety, Figueroa asserts that she fears for her job, her well-being, and her safety. These facts sufficiently establish the third element in a prima facie case for IIED. Therefore, Murtagh's motion to dismiss count III against him is denied.

In sum, the court dismisses Figueroa's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against the City, Santella, and Joyce for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, Figueroa states a viable claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Murtagh and Urian.

IV. Counts IV and V — Title VII Sexual Harassment and Retaliation

In count IV, Figueroa alleges sexual harassment in violation of Title VII against the city. In count V, Figueroa alleges that the City retaliated against her after she complained of sexual harassment also in violation of Title VII. The City argues that the court should dismiss certain allegations in counts IV and V as untimely. Specifically, the City contends that paragraphs 23 and 25-28 should be dismissed. The court rejects this argument because, while these allegations did occur before the 300 day statute of limitations imposed by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), they may be admissible under the continuing violation theory. See Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operation, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1996). Since the City does not address the continuing violation theory in its brief, the court draws this inference in Figueroa's favor and presumes that these seemingly untimely facts would be admissible under the continuing violation theory. The court therefore denies the City's motion to dismiss these paragraphs as time barred.

The City next asserts that Figueroa fails to state a claim of sexual harassment in count IV. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individuals with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). However, Title VII is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). Sexual harassment "so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment violates Title VII." Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998) (citations omitted). In determining whether the environment is sufficiently abusive, the courts should look at all circumstances including the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).

An employer is liable to a "victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee." Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293. Where the employee has not suffered any tangible employment action, the employer may raise an affirmative defense if it establishes that (1) it had exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct sexual harassment and (2) plaintiff failed to take advantage of such preventive and corrective opportunities.Id. at 2293.

Figueroa has properly alleged in her complaint that she has suffered sexual harassment so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment. Figueroa alleges that Urian repeatedly made verbal and physical sexual advances and suggestive sexual comments to here even though she informed Urian that such conduct was offensive and unwelcome and repeatedly asked him to stop. Urian also threatened her with adverse consequences if she reported him.

Figueroa also alleges that she was subject to sexual graffiti and that her male coworkers would laugh in a degrading manner while referring to the graffiti. Her coworkers shunned her and ignored her seriously interfering with her ability to do her job and adversely affecting her mental and emotional state. She also has alleged that despite her complaints to Joyce and the Sexual Harassment office, no corrective action was ever taken. Figueroa has established that she was subjected repeated and frequent discriminatory conduct. Figueroa maintains that the conduct was humiliating and interfered with her work performance. Furthermore, Figueroa claims that the City never took any corrective action even after Figueroa complained. Therefore, Figueroa has stated a sexual harassment claim under Title VII, and the City's motion to dismiss Count IV is denied.

V. The City's Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike Paragraph 63

The City brings a Rule 12(f) motion to strike paragraph 63 from Figueroa's complaint. In paragraph 63 of her complaint, Figueroa boldly alleges "a pattern of greed, corruption, discrimination, nepotism and cover-up of misconduct [that] has engulfed City Hall and various departments including Fleet." Figueroa then lists several scandals reported in the newspaper that allegedly support her rather sweeping and conclusory claim.

Under Rule 12(f), a court may strike from a plaintiff's complaint "any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Figueroa's general allegations of greed, corruption, nepotism and coverup of misconduct are all immaterial to her claims of sexual harassment, retaliation, and IIED. Similarly, Figueroa's allegations of specific instances of nepotism and other misconduct are also immaterial. The only portions of paragraph 63 that are even arguably relevant to Figueroa's claims are her conclusory contentions that the City maintains a pattern of discrimination and her allegation of other harassment paragraph 63(a). Because the remainder of paragraph 63 has no bearing whatsoever on Figueroa's case, the court strikes from paragraph 63 of Figueroa's complaint: (1) the terms "greed," "corruption," "nepotism,"and "cover-up of misconduct;" (2) paragraphs 63(b)-(h); and (3) all attached newspaper articles relating to the stricken portions.

VI. Motion to Dismiss Punitive Damages against the City

The City moves to dismiss all claims for punitive damages against the City. Punitive damages may not be assessed against a municipality in a civil rights action. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981); Spanish Action Committee of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 81 F.2d 1129, 1134 (7th Cir. 1987). Therefore, the court dismisses all claims for punitive damages against the city for civil rights violations are stricken.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the court: (1) grants in part and denies in part the City's motion to dismiss [doc. 36-1]; (2) grants in part and denies in part the City's motion to strike [doc. 36-2]; (3) denies Murtagh's motion to dismiss count III [doc. 31-1]; and denies Urian's motion to dismiss. The court also dismisses Figueroa's punitive damages claim against the City. The parties should discuss settlement before the next court date.