OPINION AND ORDER

NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Cheryl Ellenbogen ("Ellenbogen" or "plaintiff") is a former employee of Projection Services Technology, Inc. ("Projection" or "defendant"). She brings this action alleging that her supervisors and co-workers at Projection violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as well as the New York State and City anti-discrimination laws, see New York Executive Law § 296; New York City Administrative Code § 8-107. Now pending is defendant's motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, defendant's motion is granted.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ellenbogen was hired as an audio-visual ("A/V") technician at the New York Hilton ("the Hilton") in 1991 by Bauer Audio-Visual, Inc. See Complaint, ¶ 12. The Hilton and other major New York City-area hotels contract with companies like Bauer to provide A/V services for conferences and exhibitions on their premises. Projection procured the A/V contract for the Hilton in late 1996, and assumed its responsibilities on January 1, 1997. See Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, ¶ 1 ("SOUDF").

Technicians at the Hilton, including Ellenbogen, were members of the New York Hotel Motel Trades Council, Local No. 1 ("the union"), and their employment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement to which Projection was a party. (¶¶ 2-3) Thus, when Projection secured the contract at the Hilton, Projection was required by the collective bargaining agreement to hire Ellenbogen, and she continued her work at the Hilton in Projection's employment. (¶¶ 2-3).

A substantial aspect of the instant dispute concerns the various job titles and promotional opportunities available to Ellenbogen at Projection, and it is therefore important to review the relevant facts in detail. Ellenbogen alleges, and defendant disputes, that she was promised managerial responsibilities by her first supervisor at Projection, Mr. Bo Manna. See Plaintiff's Local Rule 56.1 Statement, ¶ 3. Shortly after Projection assumed the Hilton contract, though, they hired a new management team, beginning with a new Regional Manager, James Loftus. In May, 1997, Projection named Gerald Gaston to be Director of Audio-Visual Services at the Hilton, Gilbert Osle was appointed assistant director, and two recently-hired individuals — Del Reese and George Santiago — were assigned to be Operations Managers. (¶ 4) Reese and Santiago were classified as management employees, and thus not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. (¶ 6) It is undisputed that there were no union-represented Operations Managers employed by Projection at the Hilton. (¶ 7)

Projection continued to employ Ellenbogen as a technician at the Hilton, which meant that her wages were based on an hourly rate, and included overtime when appropriate. She often worked on weekends when neither of the Operations Managers were present at the facility, and consequently in 1997 and 1998 her compensation exceeded that of managers Reese and Santiago. (¶ 7-8)

In the spring of 1997, Ellenbogen first lodged complaints with Projection's management about what she perceived to be harassment by Osle and various other Technicians. (¶ 10). Specifically, Ellenbogen complained that Osle employed profanity on one occasion when she requested time off. (¶ 10) In response to this complaint, a note was put in Osle's personnel file and he was admonished not to use profanity in the workplace. (¶ 11).

A subsequent meeting was held in the spring of 1997, to discuss the alleged harassment, at which at least Ellenbogen, her father, Gaston, Loftus, Projection's Human Resources Manager, and Ellenbogen's Union representative, Philip Stiebel, were present. (¶ 12). At this meeting, Ellenbogen complained about the workplace environment, including the widespread use of profanity and the presence of adult magazines that featured nude women. (¶¶ 12-13) After Ellenbogen's complaint, technicians were instructed to remove the adult magazines from the workplace, and Ellenbogen believes that they complied with this directive. See Ellenbogen, at 97-101. Also discussed at this meeting was Projection's decision not to promote plaintiff to Operations Manager. (¶ 12)

Following the events of November 18, 1998, Ellenbogen's employment with Projection came to an end. Earlier that month, Projection posted a notice that employees' belongings might be subject to search at random. (¶ 15). On November 18, Gaston testified that he "believe[d]" he smelled marijuana in the back office where Projection employees kept their personal effects. (¶ 16; Gaston, at 121). Thereafter, consistent with the earlier promulgated policy, he decided to conduct a search of employees' coats, bags, and other personal items left in the back office, which was also where some Projection employees changed from their street clothes into work uniforms. (¶ 16).

Present at this search was Assistant Director Osle, Operations Manager Santiago, and union delegate Kendall Pollidore. (¶ 17) Several employees (including management employees) were called in, one by one, and Gaston asked each one to open his or her bags and display the contents. See Pollidore, at 55-61. Plaintiff was called in for a search, and as she opened her bag some marijuana wrapped in a napkin fell to the floor. The parties agree that the substance found was marijuana (Ellenbogen, 276-77); however, the source of that marijuana and how it ended up in plaintiff's bag are the subjects of considerable disagreement. Although defendants attribute the drug to plaintiff, Ellenbogen insists that it was planted in her bag. (¶ 19).

After the marijuana was discovered, Gaston instructed Ellenbogen to leave the premises of the Hilton. (¶ 19). A meeting was held several days thereafter, as required by the collective bargaining agreement. (¶¶ 20) Ellenbogen, her union representative Stiebel, Gaston and Loftus were present at this meeting, and Ellenbogen presented her version of events. (¶ 21) Loftus then told Ellenbogen that if she submitted to a drug test by providing a sample of her hair, she would be permitted to keep her job regardless of the test results. If the drug test were negative, she would be reinstated with no loss of pay; if the drug test were positive, Ellenbogen would be reinstated in her position provided that she successfully completed a rehabilitation program at Projection's expense. (¶ 21).

Ellenbogen declined to submit a hair for a drug test, and was consequently terminated. (¶ 22) She maintained then, and continues to maintain, that she does not use illegal drugs. (¶ 22, Ellenbogen, 280). Plaintiff, represented by the union, entered a grievance regarding the termination, and demanded an arbitration of the grievance. The arbitrator issued his decision on June 25, 1999, and upheld the termination. See Block Decl., Exh. 16.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is properly granted "'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, 112 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986)

In reviewing the record, we are "required to resolve all ambiguities, and to credit all factual inferences that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 150-51 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). It is, of course, not our role to decide what inferences should be drawn, but rather to assess whether it is possible for a reasonable inference to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party which would create a question of material fact properly resolved by a jury. See, e.g., Stern v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1997); Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37-8 (2d Cir. 1994).

We are additionally mindful that summary judgment can often be inappropriate in the context of workplace discrimination cases because the allegations usually require an exploration into an employer's true motivation and intent for making a particular employment decision. See Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1984); Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1996). However, this caution does not absolve the plaintiff from the responsibility of producing sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50(1986); see also Lane v. Sotheby Parke Bernet, Inc., 758 F.2d 71, 72 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming grant of summary judgment in Title VII action where plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case).

B. Ellenbogen's Three Claims of Discrimination

Plaintiff's complaint presents three allegations: first, that she was treated differently (and negatively) because of her gender and sexual orientation; second, that she was wrongfully terminated because of her gender and sexual orientation; and third, that Projection maintained a working environment that was hostile to women. We address each gender-related claim in turn, and subsequently address the sexual orientation claims collectively.

1. Disparate Treatment Claims

Plaintiff's disparate treatment claims comprise two general sets of allegations. First, she alleges that Projection failed to promote her into vacant Operations Manager positions despite her qualifications, and instead hired less-qualified men for those positions. See Complaint, ¶ 1-3. Second, she argues that she was underpaid when compared to similarly qualified male employees performing similar tasks. See id., ¶ 4-6.

A failure to promote claim is evaluated using the three-step burden-shifting analysis established by the Supreme Court inMcDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792(1973). Under that framework, a plaintiff must first state a prima facie case, a burden that has been described as "not onerous," Texas Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253(1981), and even "de minimis." Chambers v. TRM Copy Centers Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). In the failure to promote context, a prima facie case consists of four elements. A plaintiff must allege that "(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she 'applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants'; (3) she was rejected for the position; and (4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants having the plaintiff's qualifications," or hired someone from without the protected class. Brown v. Coach Stores, 163 F.3d 706, 709(1998) (quotingMcDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).

If the plaintiff meets that minimal burden, the employer must then come forward with admissible evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for its adverse employment action. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56; Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2000). This burden is "one of production, not persuasion; 'it can involve no credibility assessment.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 142(2000) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509(1993)). Once the employer makes this showing, the only relevant remaining burden is the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer was motivated by unlawful discrimination. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.

A. Prima Facie Case

Here, plaintiff has undoubtedly supported a prima facie case. As a woman, she is a member of a protected class, and repeatedly sought a promotion to Operations Manager. Her qualifications for that position, although disputed by some of defendant's evidence, are sufficient to establish her as a qualified applicant. The many pieces of evidence marshalled by plaintiff in this regard include, inter alia,: (1) letters of commendation from Projection customers, see Licata Decl., Exh. 8; (2) statements by her supervisor Gerald Gaston that she was a capable employee who had been considered for a management position by her previous supervisor, Bo Manna, see Gaston, 18-20, 108-110; and (3) the testimony of Joseph Capasso, her supervisor, see Capasso, at 24-26 (describing Ellenbogen as a "good employee"). It is undisputed, additionally, that the two candidates selected for the Operations Manager positions, Reese and Santiago, were male.

B. Defendant's Two Non-Discriminatory Justifications

Defendant responds with two alternative non-discriminatory reasons for its decision not to promote Ellenbogen. Projection's first proffered non-discriminatory reason for not naming Ellenbogen an Operations Manager relates to job classifications. Plaintiff apparently sought to remain a union employee; however, Projection considered the Operations Manager positions to be exempt from the collective bargaining agreement. Under that agreement, Projection had the latitude to classify the position of Operations Manager as one suitable for either union or non-union employees. See Capasso, 33-34. Projection argues that it did not hire Ellenbogen, a union member, to fill the Operations Manager positions because it sought to retain greater flexibility for those positions, a flexibility that would be available only if they remained non-union positions. See id. Christopher Cusak, a union official, confirmed in his deposition testimony that defendant had hired no union-represented operations managers at any Projection work sites. See Cusak, at 16.

Projection's second proffered business justification for not promoting plaintiff is that both Reese and Santiago were more qualified applicants than plaintiff, and that she was not in any event suitable for a supervisory position. Loftus testified, for example, that although he believed Ellenbogen to be a "good technician," he did not think she would be a "good manager of people." Loftus, at 66-72. Even plaintiff's supervisor, Gaston, who at one time considered writing a letter of recommendation on plaintiff's behalf, was equivocal about her performance and her potential as a manager. See Gaston, at 111-12.

C. Evidence of Pretext

Since Defendant has stated two business reasons for not promoting Ellenbogen, we turn now to examine what, if any, evidence Ellenbogen puts forward that these explanations are pretextual. This third step of the analysis was recently revisited by the Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 530 U.S. 133(2000), in which the Court held that if a plaintiff has pled a prima facie case, and introduced "sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation," a plaintiff is not always required to "introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination." Id. at 149. Therefore, in a case where plaintiff's prima facie case is particularly strong, Reeves teaches that summary judgmentmay be inappropriate even if a plaintiff does not introduce evidence to rebut the employer's proffered non-discriminatory justification. However, as the following review of the evidence will demonstrate, this is far from such a case.

Here, plaintiff presents little, if any, independent evidence supporting the inference that these explanations are pretextual. As the Second Circuit's initial gloss on Reeves makes abundantly clear, in a case where a plaintiff does not credibly call into question an employer's non-discriminatory explanation for its motives, summary judgment for the defendant continues to be appropriate. See Schnabel v. Legal Aid Soc'y., 232 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that Reeves "clearly mandates a case-by-case approach" to pretext allegations, focusing on the 'ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.'" (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143)).

1. Evidence Concerning Defendant's First Business Justification

First, in contesting defendant's explanation that it does not hire any union employees for Operations Managers positions, plaintiff makes much of the fact that at two other Projection work sites, male union members carry out supervisory duties tantamount to those of an Operations Manager. This allegation, however, does not raise a material question of fact about the veracity of Projection's stated non-discriminatory motivation. At one hotel, the male union employees were placed in their supervisory positions by another company, and Projection subsequently assumed the contract. See Madho, at 5-6. The collective bargaining agreement provided that if one A/V company took over a contract at a facility from another company, then the new company would be required to maintain the responsibilities and job titles of the unionrepresented employees already working at that facility. See Stiebel, at 7-8. Accordingly, the two male union Operations Managers at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel were held over from another company's contract.See Loftus, at 75 ("When we took over the Waldorf as we did at the New York Hilton, the structure of our union employees were already set for us and we inherited that title and that structure, so there is a union supervisor, a.m. and p.m. there.") Thus, the Waldorf-Astoria situation does not cast any doubt on Projection's assertion that it maintains a policy of otherwise not hiring union Operations Managers.

The other employment decision that Ellenbogen points to as evidence of disparate treatment is the hire of Sanjeev Choudhry, a male "Union Supervisor" at the Parker Meridian Hotel. However, the position of "Union Supervisor" is different from that of "Operations Manager". An Operations Manager, in Projection's management structure, is an intermediate management position in between the line-level technicians and the site Director. The Operations Manager is responsible for the day-to-day details of running a specific facility's A/V services. A Union Supervisor, however, is appointed at smaller properties where less management assistance is necessary. Thus, as an initial matter, Choudhry's hire as a Union Supervisor does not cast doubt upon defendant's assertion that it did not, as a rule, hire union-represented Operations Managers.

Moreover, the hire of Choudhry as a Union Supervisor cannot be evidence of an impermissible failure to promote Ellenbogen, because nowhere in her complaint or deposition does Ellenbogen ever indicate that she sought to be hired as a Union Supervisor. Second Circuit law is clear that a failure to promote claim is only cognizable if a plaintiff applies for — and is rejected from — a specific position. See Brown v. Coach Stores, 163 F.3d 706, 710 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[A] plaintiff [must] allege that she or he applied for a specific position or positions, and was rejected therefrom, rather than merely asserting that on several occasions she or he generally requested promotion."). The hire of an apparently highly-qualified male at another facility in a position for which plaintiff did not apply is simply not probative of any discriminatory animus by Projection.

2. Evidence Concerning Defendant's Second Business Justification

Second, Ellenbogen also contests Projection's defense that Santiago and Reese were better qualified for the position of Operations Manager. This record does not support an inference of pretext based on the relative qualifications of plaintiff and Messrs. Santiago and Reese. Simply put, no reasonable jury could infer from the alleged difference in qualifications between Ellenbogen and Santiago and Reese were such that their hire was the result of gender discrimination.

To rebut a non-discriminatory justification for an alleged failure to promote, a plaintiff must show not only that she was minimally qualified for a position, but also that she was the best qualified for that position using the employer's stated hiring criteria. See Wolf v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, No. 93 Civ. 6059 (WHP), 2001 WL 336832, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 2001); Naftchi v. New York Univ., 14 F. Supp.2d 473, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Kaplan, J.). We are guided by Judge Friendly's statement of the law in this regard:

Title VII does not require that the candidate whom a court considers the most qualified for a particular position be awarded that position; it requires only that the decision among candidates not be discriminatory. When a decision to hire, promote, or grant tenure to one person rather than another is reasonably attributable to an honest even though partially subjective evaluation of their qualifications, no inference of discrimination can be drawn.

A review of Santiago's credentials reveals that there is no objectively unreasonable disparity between his candidacy and that of Ellenbogen. Santiago majored in communication arts in college, took approximately three-quarters of his coursework in the A/V field, and subsequently worked for nine months as a freelance technician. See Santiago, at 8-9. Santiago's education was both more recent and more in-depth than plaintiff's, in a field in which technology undoubtedly changes with rapidity; her education, which was completed some twenty years earlier, focused on hotel and restaurant management. Ellenbogen's experience, however, was clearly more extensive; she had been working as a technician for four or five years. See Ellenbogen, 15-16. Even taking all inferences in her favor, as we must, and assuming she was better qualified, we cannot say as an objective matter that the disparity rises to such a level that it gives rise to an inference of pretext. See Byrnie, 243 F.3d 102-07; Denny v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1178 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Our precedent, however, requires a strong showing of a disparity in qualifications in order for an inference of discrimination to arise.")

Moreover, plaintiff has submitted not one piece of evidence regarding Del Reese, the other Operations Manager whose hiring was allegedly an act of gender bias. Defendant's justification that he was a more appropriate candidate for the position than Ellenbogen remains unrebutted, and therefore no inference of discrimination is permissible.

The second facet of Ellenbogen's disparate treatment allegations are assertions that she was "underpaid . . . in light of her duties, responsibilities, and exemplary work performance," when compared to similarly-situated male employees. However, other than the allegations discussed, supra, regarding the union supervisors at two other locations, it does not appear that this claim is supported by any other independent record evidence.

We note, in conclusion, that in the failure to promote context the Second Circuit has quite clearly instructed that a District Court is to consider the sum of the evidence in its totality, rather than examining specific aspects of evidence in isolation:

[T]he court should not consider the record in piecemeal fashion, giving credence to innocent explanations for individual strands of evidence, for a jury, in assessing whether there was impermissible discrimination and whether the defendant's proffered explanation is a pretext for such discrimination, would be entitled to view the evidence as a whole.

2. Wrongful Termination

Plaintiff alleges that her termination was improperly motivated by gender discrimination. Specifically, she alleges that the decision by Gaston to search employees' belongings on November 18, 1998, was motivated by a desire to frame her as possessing drugs that were not in fact hers. Thus, Ellenbogen also alleges that the marijuana found in her backpack was planted there by someone seeking to jeopardize her employment with Projection, as part of a larger campaign of gender-based harassment.

As an initial matter, we observe little, if any, credible evidence in this record supporting Ellenbogen's characterization of these events as a "set-up". It is undisputed that the possessions of all employees, including management employees, were searched by Gaston. It is additionally undisputed that all employees were on notice that such a search might occur at any time. The principal record evidence supporting the assertion that the search was improperly motivated is Ellenbogen's own otherwise-unsupported allegation to that effect.

Ellenbogen does cite to two other pieces of evidence that she alleges support her allegation that the search was a product of discriminatory animus. First, she contends that the fact that her bag was left in an unsecured area where someone could have access to it supports an inference that someone planted the marijuana in the bag. Although this fact does not make it any less likely that the marijuana discovered was planted there, it is not affirmative evidence of discriminatory motivation that would cast doubt on the otherwise neutral aspects of the search.

Second, she alleges that the search was the product of bias because it is improbable in the extreme that Gerald Gaston could have smelled the unlit marijuana in her bag, despite his testimony that the scent of marijuana was the impetus for this search. We agree that this statement by Gaston is curious, and strains credulity; however, we do not believe that it creates a material question of fact in light of both the evenhanded manner in which the search was conducted, and more importantly, Projection's actions after the marijuana was found.

Indeed, plaintiff's desired inference — that the search was part of some larger gender-based conspiracy — is flatly contradicted by Projection's actions after the discovery of the marijuana, no matter what the source of those drugs. Ellenbogen was given the option of staying in Projection's employment regardless of whether she used illicit drugs, and despite the fact that it was well within Projection's discretion under the collective bargaining agreement to terminate Ellenbogen for drug possession in the workplace. Even Ellenbogen's own union representative, who accompanied her to the meeting where the offer was made, acknowledged that this was an offer Projection was not obligated to make. See Stiebel, at 49. It is difficult to comprehend how an offer of reinstatement, conditional only on submitting a hair for a drug test, can support an inference of discrimination. Indeed, the terms of the offer — which included possible drug treatment at Projection's expense — are simply inconsistent with the motive of a company attempting to drive Ellenbogen out on trumped-up charges.

Plaintiff attempts to minimize the significance of this offer, and the consequences of her refusal to take the drug test, by asserting that union policy precluded her from taking the test in the first instance. Because of her claim that she was prohibited from taking the test at all, plaintiff argues, the offer was impracticable and just part of the larger discriminatory set-up to bring about her termination. This argument is entirely without merit, as there is no evidence of a union policy, let alone one that was binding on Ellenbogen in the unique and job-threatening situation that she faced. The deposition testimony by a number of individuals confirms this.

For example, union official Christopher Cusak testified that although the union preferred that its members not submit to drug tests, and would so advise them, that it was ultimately an employee's personal decision whether or not to take a drug test. See Cusak, at 29-30. Additionally, Ellenbogen's own union representative, Philip Stiebel, who accompanied her to the meeting where the drug test offer was made, testified that he never told Ellenbogen that she should not take a drug test. See Stiebel, 41-44. Indeed, Stiebel testified that he never gave her any advice at all about taking the drug test. See id. at 48-49. Thus, the uncontested testimony reveals that Projection's offer to reinstate plaintiff regardless of the drug test's results was clearly one she was free to accept, and is hardly evidence of a discriminatory termination. Summary judgment for the defendant is awarded on this claim as well.

3. Hostile Working Environment

Ellenbogen's third claim is that she was subjected to a sexually hostile work environment while employed at Projection. Title VII's guarantees against discrimination are "not limited to economic or tangible discrimination," but rather extend to "the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment," including a work environment rendered hostile because of the employee's sex. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64(1986) (citation omitted). Evaluating whether a claim of hostile working environment harassment is supported by sufficient evidence requires examining the totality of the alleged harassing conduct; there is no rigid or precise formula that defines an unlawfully hostile environment. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88(1998) (Workplace harassment must be judged "by 'looking at all the circumstances,' including the 'frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'" (quotingHarris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 517 U.S. 17, 23(1993)).

In general, though, the harassing conduct must be sufficiently "severe" or "pervasive" that it changes the conditions of the victim's employment. See Cruz v. Coach Stores, 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000). Isolated instances of harassment rarely rise to this level. See Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 1510(2001); Kotcher v. Rosa Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992). Rather, a plaintiff must either demonstrate that "a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were 'sufficiently continuous and concerted' to have altered the conditions of her working environment." Cruz, 202 F.3d at 570 (quoting Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff's allegations here, even when examined collectively, do not paint the portrait of a hostile workplace environment that rises to the legal standard articulated above. We will examine each of the allegations in turn, as they are not numerous. Plaintiff first alleges that Gil Osle cursed at her and used profanity when she requested time off. See Ellenbogen, at 93-96. However, after she complained about Osle, a meeting was promptly convened and Osle was reprimanded. Most importantly, there is no evidence that Osle's harassment was "on the basis of sex." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80(1998). In order to create a hostile working environment for the purposes of Title VII, there must be at least some circumstantial connection to the plaintiff's status as a member of a protected class. See Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 617 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing treatises).

The next allegation of the hostile environment claim is that there were adult magazines that belonged to male technicians present in the Projection offices. See Ellenbogen, 96-99. However, Ellenbogen testified: (1) that she never saw those magazines open, and therefore only knew from the covers that they contained adult material, see id., at 99, 224; (2) that this occurred only once or twice; see id., and (3) that when she complained to Gaston he instructed the workers to cease bringing the inappropriate material into the workplace. See id. ("I know Gerald . . . told them to get rid of it."); id. at 97.

Plaintiff's opposition papers additionally claim that "the male employees watch[ed] pornographic videos" in the Projection offices. Plaintiff's Mem., at 13. If true, such highly inappropriate workplace behavior would almost certainly sustain a claim of hostile work environment harassment. However, a careful review of the evidence reveals that these allegations are totally unsupported by plaintiff's own testimony. This statement by counsel could only refer to one event, in which some male technicians were watching a non-work-related videotape in the offices. See Ellenbogen, at 97-98. However, in direct contradiction to her counsel's submission, plaintiff herself states "it was not a nude video, but some kind of a, you know, the island's [sic] kind of video,"id., at 97. Her version of events is supported by union delegate Kendall Pollidore's deposition testimony, which states that the tape in question was a videotape from a hotel employee's vacation, which contained no nudity. See Pollidore, at 43. A careful review of plaintiff's testimony reveals that the offending conduct at this incident, construed most liberally, was that as plaintiff entered the room where the video was being watched, a technician was making an inappropriately suggestive comment about the body of a woman in the video. See Ellenbogen, at 98-99; Pollidore, at 43-44.

The final, and by far the most serious, allegations of harassment involve Ellenbogen's supervisor, Gerald Gaston. Ellenbogen alleges that he, on several different occasions, told her that he was sexually aroused by her, and graphically described the ways in which he was aroused. She further alleges that on one or two occasions he grabbed her and pulled her onto his lap, and touched her breast. See Ellenbogen, at 108-09. Gaston denies this behavior entirely. See Gaston, at 32-34.

However, Ellenbogen failed to complain to anyone at Projection about this behavior. See Ellenbogen, at 109. Projection claims that under the affirmative defense established in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763-65(1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775(1998), her failure to complain was unreasonable and that Projection should not be held liable for Gaston's alleged behavior, even if true.

The Supreme Court in Burlington and Faragher established an affirmative defense in harassment cases for employers who maintained effective anti-harassment policies. This defense has two necessary elements:

(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.

Additionally, Ellenbogen's failure to complain about Gaston's alleged harassment is unreasonable under the second prong of Burlington andFaragher. This is principally so because Projection demonstrated that on the occasions when Ellenbogen did complain to her managers about situations she found offensive, they were responsive. For example, shortly after Projection assumed the Hilton contract, plaintiff complained about Osle's use of profanity. See Ellenbogen, at 92-94. It is undisputed that as a result, Loftus instructed that Osle receive a written warning. See SOUDF, ¶ 11. Additionally, Loftus convened a meeting thereafter to discuss her complaints about her fellow technicians and the failure to promote her to Operations Manager. Moreover, Ellenbogen had also complained to Loftus about the presence of adult magazines and the use of profanity in the workplace. It is undisputed that Lofuts directed Gaston to rectify the situation, and that the magazines were in fact removed. See SOUDF, ¶ 13.

Thus, under the Faragher/Burlington rule, plaintiff did not "make reasonable efforts to seek redress for any perceived harassment before initiating a lawsuit in federal court" regarding her alleged harassment by Gaston. Fierro v. Saks Fifth Avenue, 13 F. Supp.2d 481, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Defendant therefore has an affirmative defense to those claims.

Once the allegations against Gaston are removed from the case, three allegations remain: the presence of the magazines, the comment while watching the video, and the profanity by Osle. This does not approach even the lowest threshold of a hostile working environment claim. None of the incidents individually are even close in severity to the kind of individual incident that might sustain a harassment claim.Cf. Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 439 (2d Cir. 1999) (Noting that the use of a highly charged and offensive racial epithet by a supervisor would create a racially hostile environment). Plaintiff argues that the recent decision inRaniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 2001) mandates the dismissal of the motion. However, the facts in that case, when compared to the instant one, clearly indicate that summary judgment is appropriate. Raniola contains the kind of allegations — lasting over a two-year time period and including highly abusive language directed at the plaintiff as well as evidence of workplace sabotage — that are lacking here. Once the Gaston allegations are removed from the analysis due to plaintiff's failure to avail herself of the internal complaint process, the remaining claims, viewed singularly or in combination, are neither severe nor pervasive.

Moreover, in each instance — the magazine, video, and profanity episodes — it is undisputed that Projection took prompt and effective corrective action. Under the principle ofBurlington/Faragher, an employer cannot be held liable for allegedly harassing behavior when it takes prompt and effective remedial steps after the behavior is brought to its attention. See also Perry v. Ethan Allen, 115 F.3d 143, 153 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[T]hose findings [that plaintiff had not proven a hostile working environment], even if clearly erroneous, are irrelevant in light of the court's additional finding that the company took prompt and appropriate steps in response to Perry's complaint to management. The latter finding alone required the dismissal of the Title VII claim.").

Accordingly, summary judgment for the defendant on this claim is appropriate as well.

C. Sexual Orientation Claims

Plaintiff, who is a lesbian, alleges that animus towards her sexual orientation also contributed to her non-promotion, hostile work environment, and unlawful termination. These claims are only cognizable under New York City ordinances. "Because the term "sex" in Title VII refers only to membership in a class delineated by gender, and not to sexual affiliation, Title VII does not proscribe discrimination because of sexual orientation." Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2000).

These claims, brought under New York City law, are thus only before the Court pursuant to our supplemental jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Having dismissed all of plaintiff's federal claims, our jurisdiction over the supplemental state and city claims is discretionary. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1994) ("District courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim [if] . . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.");Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1994); In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. Partnerships Litig., 7 F. Supp.2d 256, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). We decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's New York state and city claims. Accordingly, they are dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in all respects, and plaintiff's claims are dismissed. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to close this case.

SO ORDERED.