Summary
granting a Rule 12(e) motion where "the plaintiff's complaint pleads nothing but conclusions and provides no guidance to the defendants as to how to respond"
Summary of this case from Michael v. McIntoshOpinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 02-845, SECTION "R" (4)
July 18, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant Chris McGarity's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can be Granted, or, in the Alternative Motion For a More Definite statement. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendant's Motion For a More Definite Statement.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Gunnar Ekberg filed suit in state court against the City of New Orleans, Police Superintendent Richard Pennington, and police officers Chris McGarity, Vincent George and Saunders Craine. Plaintiff alleges that he was physically abused and injured by the police officers named in this suit while stopped for a traffic violation during Mardi Gras. Plaintiff further alleges that the City of New Orleans and its police department failed to train police officers concerning the rights of citizens, thereby creating a permissive environment for such abuses.
In addition to state-law claims, plaintiff brought federal claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 183. Plaintiff's complaint was removed to this Court on March 21, 2002. Defendant Chris McGarity has filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or, in the alternative, a motion for a more definite statement. For the following reasons, the Court grants the latter.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard for Dismissal
A defendant may move for dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996); American Waste Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384, 1386 (5th Cir. 1991). Dismissal is warranted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of its claim that would entitle it to relief. Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1994)). Here, the complaint is highly conclusory, the Court will not dismiss it under Rule 12(b)(6) at this time. Rather, for reasons stated below, the Court grants defendant's motion for a more definite statement.
B. Rule 12(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement
A district court will grant a motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) when the pleading at issue "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). The motion must state the defects in the pleading and the details desired. See id. A party, however, may not use a Rule 12(e) motion as a substitute for discovery. Mitchell v. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126, 132 (5th Cir. 1959). Given the liberal pleading standard set forth in Rule 8, Rule 12(e) motions are disfavored. See Mitchell, 269 F.2d at 132; Gibson v. Deep Delta Contractors, Inc., 2000 WL 28174, *6 (E.D. La. 2000). At the same time, the Supreme Court recently noted that "[i]f a pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice," then a Rule 12(e) motion may be appropriate. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998 (2002). In deciding whether to grant a Rule 12(e) motion, the trial judge is given considerable discretion. Newcourt Leasing Corp. v. Regional Bio-Clinical Lab, Inc., 2000 WL 134700, *1 (E.D. La. 2000).
Moreover, to the extent plaintiff is asserting Section 1983 claims against McGarity in his individual capacity, defendant states in his motion that he intends to assert a qualified immunity defense. When plaintiffs sue government officials in their individual capacities under § 1983, the Fifth Circuit has held that plaintiffs must allege specific conduct giving rise to a constitutional violation of their civil rights. Anderson v. Pasadena Independent School District, 184 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing to Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995). Mere conclusory allegations will not suffice. This heightened pleading requirement does not compel a plaintiff to fully anticipate a defense of partial immunity. Rather, "the court may, in its discretion, insist that a plaintiff file a reply tailored to an answer pleading the defense of qualified immunity." Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1433-34. In contrast, "no heightened pleading is required in actions against individual defendants in their official capacities, because `official — capacity lawsuits are typically an alternative means of pleading an action against the governmental entity involved.'" Anderson, 184 F.3d at 443 (quoting Baker, 75 F.3d at 195).
Defendant also asserts that "insofar as he is sued in his official capacity as an officer of the State," he is immune from damages under Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304 (1989). Defendant, however, never states as a matter of fact that he is a state official. The complaint, which the Court must at present accept as true, alleges that the defendants were New Orleans policemen or working under the direction of the City of New Orleans.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges only that he is entitled to relief under § 1983 because he was physically abused and injured by defendants Vincent George, Chris McGarity and Saunders Craine while they arrested him for a traffic violation. Plaintiff's complaint pleads nothing but conclusions and provides no guidance to defendants as to how to respond. Plaintiff fails, for example, to identify any constitutional right that was violated. He does not state whether he is suing these defendants in their individual or official capacities. He does not identify specific actions taken by any defendant that violate his rights. When a complaint is "so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading," the Court may, upon motion, require plaintiff to make a more definite statement. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Plaintiff has essentially conceded that this is necessary. In his opposition to defendant's motion, plaintiff fails to argue that the complaint is sufficient, stating instead that a "motion for a more definite statement may be more appropriate [than a motion to dismiss]." P.'s Opp. Mot. to Dismiss at 1.
Accordingly, the Court finds the complaint insufficient under both the standards of Rule 8(a) and the Fifth Circuit's § 1983 jurisprudence because it rests only on conclusions. The Court therefore orders plaintiff to amend the complaint to provide a more definite statement of his claims for relief including an identification of the constitutional rights allegedly violated, a nonconclusory statement of the conduct the defendant engaged in to violate his rights, and whether he is suing defendant in his individual or official capacity. The Court may order a Rule 7(a) reply, if necessary, at a later time.
The Supreme Court recently rejected a heightened pleading standard in the context of Title VII discrimination cases as not required by Rule 9(b). Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. at 998. It has also, for similar reasons, rejected a heightened pleading standard for § 1983 cases against municipalities. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993). The Fifth Circuit explained, however, that its § 1983 pleading requirements do not derive from Rule 9(b), which deals with matters that must be pleaded with particularity, and that Leatherman did not invalidate heightened pleading in cases involving government officials sued in their individual capacities.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendant's Motion for a More Definite Statement.