DECISION AND ORDER

DAVID LARIMER, Chief Judge, District

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections, commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pro se against the Wayne County Jail and several of its corrections officers, supervisors, and civilian employees. Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments during his pretrial detention. Plaintiff claims that he was assaulted, abused, and subjected to intolerable conditions of confinement.

Currently pending before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. (Dkt. #9). For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 16, 2002, plaintiff reported that he had smashed his fist into a wall at the Jail and suffered self-inflicted injuries. He was transported to the Newark-Wayne Hospital and treated for his injuries. In the early morning hours of June 17, 2002, while being escorted back to the Jail from the hospital, plaintiff attacked and injured Officer Kozlowski during an unsuccessful attempt to escape custody again. Plaintiff disputes this fact, and claims that Kozlowski assaulted him when he complained about being placed in restraints. Plaintiff was later charged with the crimes of assaulting a corrections officer and attempted escape.

Plaintiff was returned to the Jail in the earlier morning hours of June 17. At that time, Sgt. Fosdick, the highest ranking officer on duty, made a determination that plaintiff presented a danger to himself or others, and placed plaintiff on administrative segregation under "constant watch" (meaning that an officer sat outside his cell without interruption) until such time as he could be examined by medical personnel and until Sgt. Fosdick's commanding officers, Chief Virts and Lt. Carr, arrived at the Jail to assess the situation.

Plaintiff was dressed in a behavior modification suit or safety smock, which is routinely used to clothe inmates who may be suicidal or violent. Plaintiff was also placed in a restraint chair with padded leather straps used to constrain inmates and prevent them from harming themselves or others. Plaintiff's upper and lower body were strapped to the chair and he was handcuffed by the wrists. Plaintiff was housed under these conditions for approximately nine hours, from 1:25 a.m. to 10:15 a.m.

Defendants Chief Virts and Lt. Carr thereafter decided to place plaintiff on administrative segregation in the medical wing of the facility, pending the results of a disciplinary hearing, because they believed that he was capable of harming himself or others and that he was an escape risk. They made this decision based on the fact that during a previous 1999 incarceration at the Jail, plaintiff had attempted suicide. Also, he had escaped police custody at the time of his initial arrest on the pending charges and had recently attacked and injured Officer Kozlowski during another attempted escape. (Virts Aff., ¶ 6).

In administrative segregation, plaintiff was housed alone in a cell. His meals were brought to him. He was not permitted to have an exercise period, could not receive commissary privileges, could not make personal phone calls, could not attend any programs, and was permitted only non-contact visits and legal phone calls. He ate his meals in his cell and could shower only when other inmates were already in lockdown in their cells. Any time he left his cell, he was placed in handcuffs and shackled and escorted by two officers. (Dkt. #9, Exs. S, W).

Plaintiff also remained on "constant watch" from June 17 through June 26 because of his alleged suicidal tendencies, violent behavior, and attempts to escape. During this period, plaintiff was not permitted to have a writing instrument for fear that it could be used to harm himself or others. From June 26 through June 28, plaintiff was checked by an officer every five minutes, and from June 28 onward, he was placed on normal watch, but continued in administrative segregation.

On July 3, 2002, an internal disciplinary hearing was held on the charges that plaintiff assaulted Officer Kozlowski and attempted to escape. He was found guilty and sentenced to 360 days administrative segregation, with credit for 17 days for time served. No administrative appeal was filed from that determination. (Dkt. #9, Ex. T).

At all relevant times, plaintiff was represented by Wayne County Assistant Public Defender, Andrew D. Correia, in connection with the criminal charges against him. Correia visited plaintiff several times at the Jail during his detention. On September 6, 2002, after several court appearances plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to several of the charges, including rape, escape, and the assault of defendant Kozlowski. During his plea allocution, plaintiff stated that his guilty pleas were voluntary, that he had fully discussed his decision to plead guilty with Correia, and that he was pleading guilty free from any coercion or threats. (Dkt. #9, Ex. F). He was sentenced to a term of twelve years and was transferred from the Jail to state prison on September 30, 2002.

Plaintiff, represented by new counsel, filed an appeal with the New York State Appellate Division in 2003. The only ground for appeal was that his sentence was harsh and excessive. In August 2003, before the Appellate Division issued its decision on the appeal, plaintiff filed a motion in county court to vacate the judgment of conviction upon his guilty plea pursuant to N.Y.C.P.L. § 440.10. (Dkt. #9, Ex. M). Attached to his motion is the same "Statement of Facts Procedural History" portion of his federal court complaint (filed in this action just two months earlier), except that the legal caption and certain headings are crossed out. In it, plaintiff alleges that he was under duress at the time of his plea, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that he pleaded guilty only to escape abuse and intolerable conditions of confinement at the Jail (including beatings and abuse), which he details in fifteen causes of action against various defendants. The county court denied the motion on September 4, 2003 pursuant to N.Y.C.P.L. § 440.10(3)(a). (Dkt. #9, Ex. P).

On December 31, 2003, the Appellate Division denied plaintiff's appeal and affirmed his conviction and sentence. People v. Dye, 2 A.D.3d 1490 (4th Dept. 2003) (Table). The New York State Court of Appeals denied plaintiff's subsequent application for leave to appeal on March 3, 2004. People v. Dye, 2 N.Y.3d 739 (2004).

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

Plaintiff's complaint asserts fifteen constitutional claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against various defendants which stem from plaintiff's encounter with defendant Kozlowski on June 17, 2002 and plaintiff's continued detention at the Jail until his September 30, 2002 transfer to state prison. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Kozlowski assaulted him on June 17, 2002 in the parking lot of the Newark hospital. He also alleges that, upon his return to Jail, Officer Rease escorted him out of the police car by his hair, stripped him, threatened him with a gun, and placed him in a restraint chair with excessively tight metal shackles, causing him physical injury, including a dislocated thumb. Later that night, plaintiff claims that defendants Rease, Fosdick, and Donahue returned to his cell and, while he was restrained, threw a towel over his head and beat him to unconsciousness. Plaintiff asserts that other employees of the Jail witnessed the beating, but failed to intervene or to report it, and then exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by failing to get him medical treatment.

Plaintiff also asserts that during his detention, Officer Napp verbally and physically abused plaintiff by threatening him, spitting in his food tray, withholding his food tray altogether, and throwing a table at him. Plaintiff claims that he was not allowed to write or receive any mail during the last sixty days he was detained and that his attorney was compelled to hand deliver any and all legal mail to him. He also claims that the last ten days he was detained at the Jail, he was strip searched three times a day. Lastly, plaintiff alleges claims for supervisory liability against Chief Deputy Virts, Lt. Carr, Sgt. Horton, and the Jail itself for allowing these practices to go unremedied. For all his claims, plaintiff asserts that defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights, and he seeks monetary damages and declaratory relief.

DISCUSSION

Defendants advance several grounds in support of their motion for summary judgment. They contend that plaintiff's action is barred in its entirety by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) because a successful § 1983 claim would imply the invalidity of plaintiff's assault conviction. Furthermore, defendants contend that the Court's jurisdiction is lacking under the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that his claims are barred by res judicata and/or collateral and judicial estoppel, and that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (" PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

1. Heck, Estoppel, and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

I agree with defendants that some of plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck. For his first and second claims, plaintiff alleges that defendant Kozlowski assaulted him in the parking lot of the Newark hospital on June 17, 2002. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that in order for plaintiff to state a claim for monetary damages pursuant to § 1983 based on factual allegations which would, if proven, render plaintiff's previous criminal conviction or resulting sentence invalid, he must demonstrate that the previous conviction or sentence was reversed or invalidated by a state or federal court, or expunged by executive branch action. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.

Here, plaintiff pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree pursuant to N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05(3) for causing physical injury to defendant Kozlowski in order to prevent him from performing a lawful duty on June 17, 2002. (Dkt. #9, Ex. F, p. 6). That conviction has been affirmed, and his 440.10 motion was denied.

Should plaintiff prevail here on his claims against Kozlowski, it would necessarily negate elements of the offense for which he was convicted. If, as plaintiff claims, Kozlowski assaulted him and plaintiff merely defended himself, Kozlowski would not have been performing a lawful duty. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 n. 6 ("In order to prevail in this § 1983 action, [the plaintiff] would have to negate an element of the offense of which he has been convicted. Regardless of the state law of res judicata, the § 1983 action will not lie."); Nuno v. County of San Bernardino, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (plaintiff's § 1983 action based on alleged excessive force barred by Heck because, if proven, would necessarily imply that plaintiff's conviction for obstructing a peace officer, which was based on a nolo contendere plea, was invalid and that defendant had not been engaged in the performance of a lawful duty).

Therefore, if plaintiff were to prevail in this action on his first or second claims, that outcome would imply that his criminal conviction based upon his guilty plea for assaulting defendant Kozlowski was invalid. As such, plaintiff must prove that his previous conviction or sentence was reversed or invalidated before he can bring a claim § 1983 for damages. Here, he cannot make that showing. In fact, his convictions have been affirmed throughout the appellate process. Therefore, defendant Kozlowski is entitled to summary judgment.

As for the remainder of his complaint, I do not believe that Heck prevents plaintiff from pursuing those claims. Nor do I find that estoppel or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies here. I am unpersuaded that a finding in plaintiff's favor on any one or all of his claims alleging that he was assaulted at the Jail or that the conditions of his confinement were inhumane would necessarily imply that his guilty plea was involuntary and that his conviction, therefore, was invalid. Moreover, such claims are not so "inextricably intertwined" with the state court decision denying his 440.10 motion, nor were the factual issues presented by these claims decided against plaintiff by the county court. Wayne County Court Judge Stephen R. Sirkin denied plaintiff's motion pursuant to N.Y.C.P.L. § 440.10(3)(a) for failing to raise the issues related to his treatment at the Jail at the time of his plea, so that the allegations could have been address by the county court at that time, or on appeal. (Dkt. #9, Ex. P). The court, however, did not find that plaintiff was not assaulted or that plaintiff did not suffer unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Thus, those issues were not decided by the court against plaintiff on the merits. Clearly, plaintiff is precluded from contesting that he assaulted Officer Kozlowski. In addition, to the extent that this lawsuit challenges the voluntary nature of his plea, it fails to state a claim under § 1983. See Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing differences of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2254). However, plaintiff is not barred by Heck, Rooker-Feldman, or estoppel from seeking monetary damages as compensation for allegedly being assaulted by Jail staff or for being confined in unconstitutional conditions at the Jail.

2. Exhaustion of Available Administrative Remedies

Defendants next argue that summary judgment is warranted because plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the PLRA. I agree.

Initially, I note that the PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies equally to actions brought by pretrial detainees. See Baez v. Parks, No. 02 Civ. 5821, 2004 WL 1052779 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2004) (holding that PLRA's exhaustion requirement applied to pretrial detainee's § 1983 claims); U.S. v. Al-Marri, 239 F. Supp. 2d 366, 367-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same). In addition, in accordance with the provisions of the New York State Commission of Correction's Grievance Program, set forth in 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7032.1 et seq., the Jail has established an inmate grievance program. (Dkt. #17, Ex. DD).

Detainees exhaust their administrative remedies by completing a three-step review process. The first step requires inmates to file a written grievance on an Inmate Common Form within five days of the date of the act about which the inmate complains. He must then complete a two-step appeal process. Grievances must be filed regarding "written or unwritten facility policies, procedures, rules, practices, programs or the action or inaction of any person within the facility." Therefore, administrative remedies related to claims of improper conduct by Jail officials must be exhausted.

Of the remaining thirteen causes of action, all allege improper conduct by Jail officials, or their failure to intervene to stop the conduct, and are therefore grievable offenses. Therefore, plaintiff must establish that he exhausted all available administrative remedies prior to commencing this action in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Plaintiff was familiar with the grievance process at the Jail. In fact, plaintiff filed grievances during his detainment regarding relatively minor incidents, including one claiming that he should be allowed to post more than three pictures in his cell and another requesting that he be allowed to send funds to his grandmother. In addition, just one day before he was transferred out of the Jail, he filed a grievance objecting upon procedural grounds to a disciplinary write-up that was pending. (Dkt. #9, Ex. K). Nevertheless, defendants have no record that plaintiff or his attorney, Correia, filed any written grievances about the incidents described in the complaint.

Plaintiff advances several different excuses for his failure to grieve the incidents alleged in the complaint. None provide sufficient excuse for plaintiff's failure to comply with the requirements of the Jail's grievance program so as to defeat summary judgment.

In his complaint and opposition to summary judgment, plaintiff claims that he grieved these incidents by complaining to his attorney and family members that he was being beaten and abused. He claims that they in turn complained to the Jail about his mistreatment. (Dkt. #15, p. 2 at ¶ 1). However, complaining to family members and friends is not a proper way to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Jail's grievance policy. (Dkt. #17, Ex. DD).

First of all, there is no procedure in the grievance process for an inmate to make an "informal" complaint to Jail officials through third parties. In any event, neither plaintiff's friends nor family members state that they lodged a formal complaint to a Jail official that plaintiff had been beaten, or was the victim of the other conduct described in his complaint.

In addition, plaintiff claims that Attorney Correia observed him with cuts and bruises. Plaintiff claims that Correia thought that the abuse was bad enough to ask Chief Virts to move plaintiff to another jail. (Dkt.#21, ¶ 5). Defendants admit that, sometime in late July or early August 2002, Correia asked Chief Virts whether plaintiff could be transferred from the Jail because plaintiff did not like being housed in segregation in the medical wing. However, Chief Virts states clearly that Correia did not complain that plaintiff was being abused, beaten or otherwise treated unlawfully or unfairly at the Jail. (Dkt. #9, Virts Aff., ¶ 13).

Whether Correia failed to pursue written grievances on plaintiff's behalf at the Jail, however, is not the issue. As the Second Circuit recently made clear, the PLRA's administrative exhaustion requirement is "mandatory" and subject to only limited exceptions, none of which apply here. See Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2004). Plaintiff does not assert, and the record does not otherwise indicate, that plaintiff lacked "available" administrative remedies, that prison officials somehow inhibited his ability to utilize the grievance procedures, or that Jail officials failed to timely advance his grievances. See id.; see also Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 2004). There is no indication that defendants engaged in conduct that should estop them from raising the defense at this time. Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691 (2d Cir. 2004). Moreover, there are no "special circumstances" presented in this case to justify plaintiff's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Nothing in the case law suggests that the exhaustion requirement should be excused because of the failure of a court-appointed criminal attorney to pursue administrative remedies on plaintiff's behalf.

Finally, in his most recent court filing, plaintiff claims for the first time that he "did file grievances of abuse," but he "suspect[s] (sic) it was trashed in attempts to silence" him. (Dkt. #22, ¶ 8). Plaintiff makes this claim in conclusory fashion. He does not state when, where, or with whom he allegedly filed these grievances. This one-sentence assertion, raised for the first time in his fourth court filing addressing these issues, cannot defeat summary judgment.

Therefore, the remainder of plaintiff's claims (the third through the fifteenth causes of action alleged in the complaint) are dismissed because plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Bryant v. Hernandez, No. 00 Civ. 3728, 2004 WL 1933571 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2004) (plaintiff's complaint dismissed for failing to exhaust administrative remedies where plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence that remedies were not available to him or that defendants impeded his ability to file a grievance).

CONCLUSION

Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #9) is granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.