In Prescott v. Duncan, 126 Tenn. 106, 148 S.W. 229 [1912], this Court upheld the validity of the Shelby County statute and in the course of its opinion said: "* * * [I]t is manifest that the Legislature may take from the county court all power not conferred upon it by the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication."

In Prescott v. Duncan, 126 Tenn. 106, 148 S.W. 299, we said that the object of construction of a written constitution is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it, but this intent is to be found in the instrument itself; and it is to be presumed, unless an examination of the instrument demonstrates otherwise, that language has been employed with sufficient precision to convey the meaning intended; and the ascertained intent must be enforced.

In Prescott v. Duncan, supra, it was held "that the Legislature may take from the county court all power not conferred upon it by the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication" (126 Tenn. at page 129, 130, 148 S.W. at page 234) and that "whether the Quarterly County Court in respect of the matters contained in the act in question shall remain the agency of local government is a matter for the exclusive determination of the Legislature" (126 Tenn. at page 134, 148 S.W. at page 236.

In Prescott v. Duncan, 126 Tenn. 106, 145, it was said by this Court that this provision of the constitution was designed to insure against a repetition of conditions existing at the time of its adoption, when "the counties had been afflicted with an orgy of commissions appointed from Nashville, many of them hostile in sentiment and conduct to the people over whom they were set, and most of them appointed because of this hostility."