B. J. Boyd, Ashland City, for plaintiff in error.

        H. Francis Stewart and Watkinss&sMcGugin, Nashville, for defendants in error.

         WELDON B. WHITE, Special Justice.

        A petition to rehear has been filed by the defendants in error, complaining that the Court erred in holding that Chapter 34 of the Public Acts of 1953 was applicable to causes of action 'which were in esse at the time of the effective date of this act'. It is stated there is nothing in the act 'either plainly expressed or necessarily implied' which gives to the Court the power to hold that said act applies to substantive causes of action in existence at the time of the passage of the act.

        In the case of Collins v. East Tennessee, V.s&sG. Railroad Co., 56 Tenn. 841, a parallel situation occurred. This case was fully discussed in the original opinion.

        The effective date of the act referred to in that case was December 11, 1871, from and after its passage. The Court construed said act as conferring upon a widow the right to bring a suit for the wrongful death of her husband. Said husband had lost his life two months and twelve days prior to the passage of said act. Upon his death the law provided that the action for his death could be prosecuted by the personal representative of the deceased only. Out of deference to the earnest petition to rehear, the language of the Court in holding that the widow had the right to maintain an action is quoted again:

'The State has complete control over the remedies of its citizens in the Courts. It may give a new and additional remedy for a right already in existence--or may abolish old and substitute new remedies. It may modify an existing remedy--or remove an impediment in the way of judicial proceedings. Thus it is said by this Court that retrospective laws may be made when they do not impair the obligation of contracts, or divest or impair vested rights; such as, laws providing new and additional remedies for a just right already in being, laws modifying or changing remedies, and all other strictly remedial laws; and there are many other laws that are retrospective according to the letter, yet not prohibited by the Bill of Rights.'

        We set out in the original opinion that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy. We held then, and we reaffirm, that the defendants had no vested right in the remedy provided by Section 8640 of the Code of Tennessee. By the passage of Chapter 34 of the Public Acts of 1953 the Legislature merely conferred an additional remedy by providing 'the action may be brought in the county in which the cause of action arose, and process may be sent to another county as in local actions.'

        Certainly, this act of the Legislature did not have the effect of repealing Section 8640, supra. Its sole purpose and effect was to enlarge the remedy, and it is therefore prospective in that from the date of the enactment thereof persons having tort actions at that time or in the future could bring such actions in the county in which the cause of action arose.

        The petition complains that the holding of the Court will result in a hardship upon numerous defendants who have been involved in automobile accidents in Tennessee occurring prior to the passage of said act. With this reasoning we do not agree. The application of the act to causes of action pending at the time of its passage will work no greater hardship than the application of the act to causes of action arising after the passage of the act. It is stated in the petition that the Legislature realized the wisdom and perhaps the vital necessity of adding this additional venue. If it is wise and vital to apply it to future causes of action, then it is equally wise and vital to apply the act to existing causes of action. If the Legislature had not intended that this act apply to existing causes of action it could have said so.

        Therefore, let the petition to rehear be denied.