Before McEWEN, President Judge, CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, President Judges Emeritus, and DEL SOLE, BECK, POPOVICH, FORD ELLIOTT, SAYLOR and EAKIN, JJ.

CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus:

In this appeal we are asked to determine the adequacy of limited tort waiver forms issued pursuant to Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701 et seq. The two consolidated cases before us are representative cases from a group of fifty-seven. In those fifty-seven cases, plaintiffs filed motions in limine seeking to preclude defendants from raising the limited tort waiver defense. In signing the limited tort waiver documents, plaintiffs restricted their rights to financial compensation for non-economic damages as a result of injuries caused by other drivers.

The Honorable Eugene E.J. Maier presided over these cases. Judge Maier granted the plaintiffs' motions and precluded defendants from raising the limited tort waiver defense. Defendants appealed. Two representative cases were certified by the trial court for interlocutory review. This court granted permission to appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 313, 1311, and consolidated the two cases herein for en banc review. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.

Appellants raise the following issues for our review:

1. When a personal injury claimant in an automobile accident case voluntarily selected the limited tort option by signing a notice form when he first applied for a new policy after July 1, 1990, and benefited from the lower limited tort premium, is the individual defendant in a subsequent automobile accident case precluded from raising the limited tort defense merely because the form did not state the premium differential between the full and limited tort options?

2. Where a personal injury claimant in an automobile

accident case voluntarily selected the limited tort option by signing an Assigned Risk Plan Form PA-1000 when he applied for a new automobile insurance policy after July 1, 1990, and benefited from the lower limited tort premium, is the defendant in an automobile accident case precluded from raising the limited tort defense merely because Form PA-1000 did not state the premium differential between the full and limited tort options?

3. Did the lower court have jurisdiction over motions to invalidate tort selections forms approved by the Insurance Department and Commonwealth Court, when claimants failed to seek relief in the agency or in Commonwealth Court, and the insurer and Assigned Risk Plan were not parties?

In enacting the 1990 amendments to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1701 et seq., [hereinafter Act 6], the General Assembly sought to temper the rising cost of automobile insurance. As part of this plan, the legislature established rate reductions linked to the election of tort options. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705 and 1799.7(b)(1).

Under Act 6, an insured must choose either the full tort option or the limited tort option. Under the limited tort option, an insured remains eligible to seek compensation for economic loss as a result of a motor vehicle accident, but is restricted in his or her right to recovery of non-monetary damages. Election of this option carries a lower premium.

The legislature recognized the proliferation of lawsuits as a major cause of escalating automobile insurance rates. Seeking to attack the root of the problem, the legislature provided insureds with a limited tort option. In return for relinquishing the right to seek recovery for non-monetary damages in certain cases, an insured who chose the limited tort option would pay a lower premium. The insured would benefit and, if the legislature's objectives for control over litigation carried through, the benefit would reach all Pennsylvania insureds in the form of reduced insurance rates. Under this theory, the legislators could institute a plan of rate reductions, rate freezes, and lowered minimum coverage offerings, paid for, ultimately, by the restricted coverage in the limited tort option. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1799.7(b), (d) and (e), 1711, and 1731.

The legislature sought to implement the rate reductions in two tiers: first, under section 1705 of the Vehicle Code, insurers were required to introduce the plan to existing policy holders, to notify them of the available tort options and inform them of the annual premium for each option; second, insurers were required under section 1791.1 to notify new policy holders (those applying for original coverage on or after July 1, 1990) of the available tort options. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1791. 1.

Section 1705, the first tier, pertains to policies in existence with first renewals due on or before July 1, 1990; the required section 1705 form provides a space for the insurer to indicate the comparative premiums for the limited and full tort options. Section 1791.1(b), the second tier, refers to original applications for new insurance; the required form provides no space for cost comparisons. This variance in notice requirements is the heart of this dispute.

Section 1705 reads as follows:

§ 1705. Election of tort options.

(a) Financial responsibility requirements. —

(1) Each insurer, not less than 45 days prior to the first renewal of a private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance policy on and after July 1, 1990, shall notify in writing each named insured of the availability of two alternatives of full tort insurance and limited tort insurance described in subsection (c) and (d). The notice shall be a standardized form adopted by the commissioner and shall include the following language:

NOTICE TO NAMED INSUREDS

A. "Limited Tort" Option — The laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania give you the right to choose a form of insurance that limits your right and the right of members of your household to seek financial compensation for injuries caused by other drivers. Under this form of insurance, you and other household members covered under this policy may seek recovery for all medical and other out-of-pocket expenses, but not for pain and suffering or other nonmonetary damages as set forth in the policy or unless one of several other exceptions noted in the policy applies. The annual premium for basic coverage as required by law under this "limited tort" option is $ ___.

B. "Full Tort" Option — The laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania also give you the right to choose a form of insurance under which you maintain an unrestricted right for you and the members of your household to seek financial compensation for injuries caused by other drivers. Under this form of insurance, you and other household members covered under this policy may seek recovery for all medical and other out-of-pocket expenses and may also seek financial compensation for pain and suffering and other non-monetary damages as a result of injuries caused by other drivers. The annual premium for basic coverage as required by law under this "full tort" option is $ ___.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(1) (emphasis added).

Section 1791.1(b) reads similarly, but does not include any language pertaining to a first renewal on or after July 1, 1990, and it does not include a space to indicate the premium differential. Section 1791.1(b) provides:

§ 1791.1. Disclosure of premium charge and tort options.

(b) Notice of tort options. — In addition to the invoice required under subsection (a), an insurer must, at the time of application for original coverage for private passenger motor vehicle insurance and every renewal thereafter, provide to an insured the following notice of the availability of two alternatives of full tort insurance and limited tort insurance described in section 1705(c) and (d) (relating to election of tort options):

The laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania give you the right to choose either of the following two tort options:

A. "Limited Tort" Option — This form of insurance limits your right and the right of members of your household to seek financial compensation for injuries caused by other drivers. Under this form of insurance, you and other household members covered under this policy may seek recovery for all medical and other out-of-pocket expenses, but not for pain and suffering or other nonmonetary damages unless the injuries suffered fall within the definition of "serious injury," as set forth in the policy, or unless one of several other exceptions noted in the policy applies.

B. "Full Tort" Option — This form of insurance allows you to maintain an unrestricted right for yourself and other members of your household to seek financial compensation for injuries caused by other drivers. Under this form of insurance, you and other household members covered under this policy may seek recovery for all medical and other out-of-pocket expenses and may also seek financial compensation for pain and suffering and other non-monetary damages as a result of injuries caused by other drivers.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1791.1(b).

For existing policy holders with renewal on or after July 1, 1990, full tort election reduced the total premium by 10%; limited tort election reduced the total premium by 22%. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705, 1799.7(a). In return for the greater reduction in premium, an additional 12%, the insured limited his or her tort recovery for non-monetary damages. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1799. 7(b)(1) and (b)(2). The rate reductions, 10% for full tort and 22% for limited tort, reduced the "total premium for the same selection of coverages and coverage limits in effect on December 1, 1989." Id.

Section 1799.7 of the Vehicle Code provides:

§ 1799.7. Rates.

(a) Rate filing. — All insurers and the Assigned Risk Plan must file for new private passenger motor vehicle rates on or before May 1, 1990. These rates shall apply to all policies issued or renewed on and after July 1, 1990.

(b) Rate reductions. — The rates charged by insurers under the filing required by subsection (a) shall be reduced from current rates as follows:

(1) For an insured electing the limited tort option under section 1705 (relating to election of tort options), the total premium charged for any selection of coverages and coverage limits shall be reduced by at least 22% from the total premium for the same selection of coverages and coverage limits in effect on December 1, 1989.

(2) For an insured bound by the full tort option under section 1705, the total premium charged for any selection of coverages and coverage limits shall be reduced by at least 10% from the total premium for the same selection of coverages and coverage limits in effect on December 1, 1989.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1799.7.

In the two cases before us, Havel v. McCarry [hereinafter Havel] and Donnelly v. Bauer [hereinafter Donnelly], plaintiffs/insureds are personal injury claimants in automobile accident cases. The insureds applied for new policies, which were issued after July 1, 1990; both insureds elected the limited tort option. In both Havel and Donnelly, the plaintiffs had been sent section 1791.1 notice, with no premium or cost comparison.

In Donnelly, the insured's policy was issued through Pennsylvania's Assigned Risk Plan; in his original application, Donnelly signed a limited tort election in a standardized form used by the Assigned Risk Plan, Form PA-1000. The risk was assigned to State Farm Insurance Company. In Havel, the insured signed a limited tort election in his original application for insurance with Allstate Insurance Company. Both notices in the two original applications complied with section 1791.1(b). See Lucas v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 451 Pa. Super. 492, 680 A.2d 873 (1996) (conclusive presumption that appellants waived their uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage did not apply where insurer failed to comply with the mandates of section 1731 of the MVFRL).

The legislature has delegated to the Insurance Department of Pennsylvania the duty of administering and interpreting insurance matters under the Vehicle Code. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1704 (b). Section 1704(b) of the Vehicle Code states:

The Insurance Department shall administer and enforce those provisions of this chapter as to matters under its jurisdiction as determined by this chapter or other statute and may make rules and regulations necessary for the administration and enforcement of those provisions.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1704(b). In this regard, the Insurance Department, through its Office of Rate and Policy Regulation, issued various statements of policy in Pennsylvania's Administrative Code to guide insurers in implementing the tort option notice. Section 68.102 of the Code described the form utilized in section 1705, which includes the premium differential, as follows:

The form requires an indication for the dollar amount of savings that will be realized by the choice of the full tort or limited tort option. The dollar savings notification will offer an insured a way to compare the price of his current in-force policy with the same policy enjoying either the minimum 10% full tort or 22% limited tort cost savings mandated by the act of February 7, 1990 (P.L. 11, No. 6) (Act 6). The term "basic coverage," as used in this notice, means the coverages that the insured has in force at the time the notice is sent.

31 Pa. Code § 68.102.

Section 68.107 of the Code, which describes the form required for new business under section 1791.1(b), provides:

§ 68.107. Section 1791.1(b) — notice of tort options.

Notices for limited and full tort options are mandated for insureds. These forms are required for new business on or after July 1, 1990, and for renewal policies issued after the first renewal cycle following the initial notices required in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705 (relating to election of tort options). The use of statutory language is required.

31 Pa. Code § 68.107 (emphasis added).

In a challenge to a regulation promulgated by the administrative agency, which is entrusted with enforcement and administration of the statute, great weight is given to the agency's interpretation. Feingold v. Bell of Pennsylvania, 477 Pa. 1, 383 A.2d 791 (1977). Unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the statute under which regulations were promulgated, an administrative agency's interpretation of its regulations is of controlling weight. See Fair Winds Manor v. Department of Public Welfare, 517 Pa. 106, 111, 535 A.2d 42, 44 (1987); see also Alpha Auto Sales, Inc. v. Dept. of State, Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, 537 Pa. 353, 644 A.2d 153 (1994); Concerned Residents of the Yough, Inc., v. Department of Environmental Resources, 540 Pa. 605, 670 A.2d 1120 (1995); Mathies Coal Co. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 522 Pa. 7, 18, 559 A.2d 506, 512 (1989). This deference acknowledges the agency's command and ability to address problems specific to its area of specialized knowledge and expertise. Feingold, supra; see also Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Foster, 143 Pa. Commw. 433, 599 A.2d 267 (1991) (an agency's interpretation of statute is entitled to "great judicial deference")

Here, the trial court determined that the Insurance Department's position and interpretation of its regulations under the statute was clearly erroneous. The court determined that the insureds had not made valid elections and, therefore, the full tort election applied. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(3). The trial court based its finding of clear error on public policy concerns, stating, generally, that as a matter of course consumers demand notice of the cost of goods or services, and sellers routinely provide this information. The trial court reasoned:

No one can deny the plethora of activity on behalf of consumers, generally as well as in the insurance industry, . . . Despite the outpouring of consumer notice and protection legislation and governmental policies assuring consumer notice, the Insurance Department would have us deny to the consumer the most important information necessary in making an informed auto insurance benefit selection, that is, the cost of limited tort as opposed to full tort coverage.

Acknowledging the significance of consumer protection concerns, we cannot consider this public policy issue to the exclusion of the General Assembly's explicit purpose and language, or without due deference to the Insurance Department's interpretation of the statute and its regulations. Notably, the trial court disregarded the public policy concerns Act 6 sought to promote. See Paylor v. Hartford Ins. Co., 536 Pa. 583, 640 A.2d 1234, 1235 (1994) ("The legislative concern for the increasing cost of insurance is the public policy that is to be advanced by statutory interpretation of the MVFRL."). The court focused, instead, on consumer protection, concerns this court finds not so significantly affected by the legislation as to call for nullification.

It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of the community in so declaring. There must be a positive, well-defined, universal public sentiment, deeply integrated in the customs and beliefs of the people and in their convictions of what is just and right and in the interest of the public weal. . . . Only in the clearest cases, therefore, may a court make an alleged public policy the basis of judicial decision.

Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 325, 17 A.2d 407, 409 (1941). See also Hall v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co., 538 Pa. 337, 648 A.2d 755 (1994).

Our rules of statutory construction require that in interpreting statutes we must at all times seek to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). "Where the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity the legislative intent is to be gleaned from those very words." Pennsylvania Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 541 Pa. 424, 429-31, 664 A.2d 84, 87 (1995). In interpreting statutes, a court should not assign a contrived meaning to clear language. Crosby by Crosby v. Sultz, 405 Pa. Super. 527, 592 A.2d 1337 (1991). Further, the legislature is presumed to have had no intention of adopting conflicting provisions in the same statute. In re Borough of Lemoyne, 176 Pa. Super. 38, 107 A.2d 149 (1954).

Despite imperfections acknowledged during legislative debate, the purpose and the language of the statute are clear. We dispel at once the supposition that the failure to include premium differentials in section 1791.1 notice forms was legislative oversight or that the statute is ambiguous. Reading the statute and the Code together, it is apparent to this court that the statutory provisions and the Code are consistent; both acknowledge distinctions in notice for new business on or after July, 1990 and renewal policies following initial section 1705 notice, and in notice for existing policy holders and first renewals occurring on or before July 1, 1990. See Fair Winds Manor, supra. In other words, existing policy holders and first renewals occurring on or after July 1, 1990 received section 1705 notice; thereafter, original applicants received section 1791.1 notice, and received that notice again upon renewal.

To reason, as the trial court did, that the Insurance Department's position was "clearly erroneous," begs the question of whether the agency properly interpreted the statute and the regulations. Additionally, the court's argument is founded upon an incorrect premise. The new applicants were not denied basic information in the insurance transaction; this vital information was readily available to them. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1791.1(d).

As evidenced by the statutory scheme, the legislature envisioned two classes: existing policy holders and new policy applicants. The statutes, the code, and the legislative history suggest that existing policyholders, having a contract in place, required immediate information because their premiums would be altered; new policy applicants, on the other hand, required only notice of the tort options. The limited tort option description required for new applications under section 1791.1 clearly explains the rights that are restricted, and the legal effect of each option. Furthermore, the limited tort option requires an affirmative selection by the applicant/insured. See Dodson v. Elvey, 445 Pa. Super. 479, 492, 665 A.2d 1223, 1230 (1995) (a limited tort elector affirmatively agrees, in exchange for a lower premium rate, that any potential tort action for noneconomic damages is precluded where his injuries are not serious). If no selection is made, the full tort option is deemed to apply. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(a)(3); see also Dodson, 445 Pa. Super. at 486, n. 2, 665 A.2d at 1227 n. 3; cf. Botsko v. Donegal Mutual Insurance Co., 423 Pa. Super. 41, 620 A.2d 30, alloc. denied, 536 Pa. 624, 637 A.2d 284 (1993) (if insurer does not follow statute governing notice of available benefits and limits respecting uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, statutory mandate regarding such coverage may be complied with only by including coverage or by obtaining affirmatively expressed rejection in writing from insured).

Unlike the existing policyholders, the applicant is shopping for insurance, dealing face-to-face with an agent, and exploring coverage options and prices. The agent provides premium quotes for any combination of coverages. The existing policy-holders, on the other hand, must be informed of the premium differential so they may determine the alteration in their total premium. As pointed out in the affidavit of Gregory S. Martino, Deputy Commissioner for the Office of Rate and Policy Regulation of the Insurance Department of Pennsylvania, "insurers could assess their insureds' current coverages, the cost thereof, and calculate the revised premiums under Act 6." (emphasis added).

Furthermore, we emphasize Deputy Commissioner Martino's following explanation of the practical application and enforcement of section 1791.1 notice; we believe it is central to an understanding of the issue here:

For subsequent renewals and new applicants, insurers are not required to provide . . . written premium differentials under Section 1705(a), as found in the 1705 Form. In fact it would be practically impossible to do so for new applicants; there can be no comparison between the applicant's previous and current premiums, because he had no previous policy or premiums due. Additionally, if the insured had previous coverage, the agent and company would not be aware of the cost and benefit levels. Nevertheless, upon request, the insurer must disclose to a new applicant (or during a subsequent renewal) the premium differential for full versus limited tort for minimum mandated coverages, under Section 1791.1(d). Section 1705(a)'s written notice was intended to advise Pennsylvania's approximately five million existing policy-holders by mail (ie., during renewals) of the Act 6 changes and the potential options and cost savings from their current policies. In contract, Section 1791.1 notice anticipated that new applicants would meet with their agents and discuss various types and levels of coverages and the costs thereof. It would be impractical and unnecessary to require agents to fill out a 1705 Form for new applicants and provide written premium comparison for full versus limited tort costs for any permutation of coverages and amounts of coverages. Under these circumstances, the agent could speak with the applicant and provide cost comparisons immediately, responding to the applicant directly and tailoring the coverage to meet the applicant's needs and financial situation.

Here, plaintiffs elected the limited tort option, were on notice of what full tort and limited coverage entailed, and were on notice that their rights to recovery were restricted under the limited tort option. Plaintiffs chose to limit their right to recovery, placing their signatures under the limited tort option and paying a lower premium. See Tukovits v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 448 Pa. Super. 540, 672 A.2d 786 (1996) (if the insurer provides notice pursuant to statutory form, the insured is presumed to have been advised of the benefits and limits available); see also Motorists Ins. Co. v. Emig, 444 Pa. Super. 524, , 664 A.2d 559, 561-62 (1995); Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania v. Miller, 426 Pa. Super. 519, , 627 A.2d 797, 798-99 (1993); Botsko, 423 Pa. Super. at ___, 620 A.2d at ___. Only now, in hindsight, do plaintiffs decide that this may not have been the best choice. Nonetheless, plaintiffs have received the benefit of their bargain; they have paid lower premiums, received the coverage correlating to that premium, and cannot now claim that they should receive the benefit of a choice they did not make. We will not endorse such a casual approach to personal business. See Jeffrey v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 423 Pa. Super. 483, 501-02, 621 A.2d 635, 645 (1993), alloc. denied, 537 Pa. 651, 644 A.2d 736 (1994) ("[T]here is a correlation between the premiums paid by the insured and the coverage a claimant could reasonably expect to receive.").

Notwithstanding the force of sentiment behind the consumer protection arguments, the trial court's findings dismantle the legislative design and neglect basic principles of administrative law. "[C]onstitut[ing] itself the voice of the community" in circumstances unwarranted, Mamlin, supra, the trial court declared the Insurance Department's interpretation clear error. In so doing, the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason and authority. We conclude, therefore, that the court erred in overturning this administrative determination. Fair Winds Manor, supra.

Reversed.

DEL SOLE, J., files a dissenting opinion in which BECK and ELLIOTT, JJ., join.