OPINION

RABINOWITZ, Justice.

Karl Johnstone was appointed by the governor on October 8, 1979, to fill a vacant superior court seat in the Third Judicial District. Judge Johnstone assumed office on December 13, 1979.

The primary issue in this appeal is: Given the above dates, when was Judge Johnstone required to run for retention under Alaska law? The Alaska Court System and the Alaska Judicial Council, later joined by Judge Johnstone, filed suit in the superior court on October 4, 1982, seeking a declaratory judgment that Johnstone was not required to run in his first retention election until 1984. The Division of Elections of the State of Alaska opposed the claim, and argued before the trial court that Johnstone was required to stand for retention in 1982. Daniel R. DeNardo, a private citizen, was joined as an intervening plaintiff in the above action. The superior court granted summary judgment on behalf of Johnstone on October 20, 1982. Although Johnstone's name had already been printed on the 1982 ballot, the court ruled that the votes cast were not to be counted, and that Johnstone was not required under the Alaska Constitution to stand for retention until 1984. An immediate appeal was taken by the Division of Elections.

In an expedited proceeding, we heard oral argument and issued an order on October 29, 1982, reversing the superior court, and requiring Judge Johnstone "to stand for retention in the forthcoming general election." We set forth today the full opinion of the court in explication of that decision.

I. THE LAW OF APPOINTMENT.

Article IV, section 6 of the Alaska Constitution provides:

Approval or Rejection. Each supreme court justice and superior court judge shall, in the manner provided by law, be subject to approval or rejection on a nonpartisan ballot at the first general election held more than three years after his appointment. Thereafter, each supreme court justice shall be subject to approval or rejection in a like manner every tenth year, and each superior court judge, every sixth year.

The central question presented in this appeal is: When does appointment take place within the meaning of the above section? The superior court ruled that the date of appointment is "the date upon which a judge assumed office." The superior court concluded that it was the constitutional framers' intent that the three-year clock for retention elections not start running until the judge actually has taken office, that this is the operative date in the beliefs of "a majority of the persons who have given any thought to the subject," and that it was "likely" that a majority of the Alaskan voters would have expected "that time in office was the relevant time frame." We disagree with the conclusion of the superior court, and reverse.

Examination of the bases of the parties' arguments is an appropriate starting point for our analysis. The first level of dispute is one of category. Appellees urge us to find that the word "appointment" has a variety of meanings. They suggest that an appointment becomes "effective" only upon actual installation in office, at which point starts the three-year clock for retention elections. The Division of Elections disagrees with this reasoning, and asserts that the common usage of the word "appointment" encompasses only "the act of designation by the governor."

We find the plain meaning argument advanced by the Division persuasive. Black's Law Dictionary 128 (4th ed. 1968), defines "appointment" as follows:

The selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same.

Similarly, Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) 105 (1961), defines appointment as "designation of a person to hold a nonelective office or perform a function. . . ."

As a general rule, we have held that, "[u]nless words have acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction, they are to be construed in accordance with their common usage." State v. Debenham Electric Supply Co., 612 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Alaska 1980); Lynch v. McCann, 478 P.2d 835, 837 (Alaska 1970). Adherence to the common understanding of words is especially important in construing provisions of the Alaska Constitution, because the court must "look to the meaning that the voters would have placed on its provisions." State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 637-38 (Alaska), appeal dismissed, 432 U.S. 901, 97 S.Ct. 2943, 53 L.Ed.2d 1073-74 (1977). See also Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1, 4 n. 15 (Alaska 1979); Plumley v. Hale, 594 P.2d 497, 500 n. 6 (Alaska 1979).

Significantly, the Alaska Constitution contains a juxtaposition of provisions both employing the word "appointment." Article IV, section 5, states that:

The governor shall fill any vacancy in an office of supreme court justice or superior court judge by appointing one of two or more persons nominated by the judicial council.

(Emphasis supplied.) Here, the verb "to appoint" is used quite clearly within the constitutional text to mean "to designate for office." Article IV, section 6, it will be remembered, provides that a new judge will stand for retention "at the first general election held more than three years after his appointment." We think that absent some conclusion that the same word is used in a different context warranting a divergent construction, the word "appointment" has the same meaning in article IV, sections 5 and 6. See Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723, 725-26 (9th Cir. 1978).

Finally, we note that our interpretation of article IV, section 6, is consistent with our earlier decision of Delahay v. State, 476 P.2d 908 (Alaska 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 901, 91 S.Ct. 1381, 28 L.Ed.2d 642 (1971). Our ruling comports also with a long line of case law, dating back to Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), holding that an appointment is effective when the "last act" required of the appointing authority has been completed.

II. APPROPRIATE REMEDY.

Having determined that the date of Judge Johnstone's appointment was October 8, 1979, the date of his designation for office by the governor, we conclude that article IV, section 6, of the Alaska Constitution requires Johnstone to run for retention in November 1982, the first general election held more than three years after his appointment. This holding raises additional questions.

Johnstone's name appeared on the 1982 ballot because he filed his candidacy shortly before the ballots were sent to the printer. Despite meeting this practical deadline, however, the filing was approximately two months late under AS 15.35.070. Because of this delay, the judicial council was unable to conduct an evaluation of Judge Johnstone as required by AS 22.10.150.

The parties proffer three potential remedies before this court. Intervenor DeNardo asserts that Johnstone's lateness in filing made him ineligible for retention in 1982. Because the constitution required Johnstone to run in 1982 or forfeit his seat, DeNardo argues that Johnstone's term of office must be held to expire ninety days after the general election of November 2, 1982, in accordance with article IV, section 7, of the Alaska Constitution. The Division of Elections suggests that such a harsh remedy would be inappropriate in this case, and puts forth two alternatives. First, the Division suggests that this court could invoke the doctrine of "excuse" to waive compliance with the statutory election procedures in this case, and allow Johnstone to run in 1982 despite his failure to comply with AS 15.35.070. Second, the Division suggests that Johnstone could be exempted from the command of article IV, section 6, and not be required to run for retention until 1984.

The Division places heavy reliance upon the factual background of this case in support of its position that it would be unduly harsh to hold that Johnstone's seat on the superior court should be forfeited because of his failure to anticipate our ruling in this case. There was no evidence that Johnstone's failure to file his candidacy in a timely manner was a deliberate attempt to circumvent the requirements of the constitution, or even that it had been the result of carelessness. The record demonstrates that Johnstone had made inquiry into the requirements of article IV, section 6, and had been informed by several state officials that he was not required, and indeed was not eligible, to run for retention until 1984.

In late June or early July of 1982, Johnstone was informed by Frank Raye, Personnel Director for the Alaska Court System, that he was not "eligible" for retention election until 1984. Judge Johnstone also received a courtesy copy of a letter from Mr. Raye to Marcy Rehfeld of the Division of Elections dated July 6, 1982. In that letter Mr. Raye purported to repeat representations made by Ms. Rehfeld to the effect that Judge Johnstone would not be on the 1982 ballot. Johnstone was twice told by an unidentified judicial council employee that he would not have to run for retention in 1982. At the request of Mr. Raye, court system counsel Karla Forsythe prepared a legal memorandum on the question. It was her opinion that "appointment" refers to the time when one starts work. In 1981, Johnstone contacted Al Szal, Area Court Administrator of the Third Judicial District, who repeated the Court System view that appointment occurred when a judge started working. Judge Johnstone also contacted Penelope Burke, the Third Judicial District Election Supervisor for the Division of Elections, sometime in 1982. Ms. Burke told him that his name would not appear on the ballot until 1984 because he had not started work until December 1979, and that this was consistent with past practice.

We have held that, in an appropriate case, this court may exercise its "unfettered discretion" to apply a particular ruling in a purely prospective manner. Warwick v. State ex rel. Chance, 548 P.2d 384, 393 (Alaska 1976). Warwick set forth a detailed test for determining when the balancing of equities in a given case justified restricting the court's decision to prospective application. In Warwick we held that the appointment of a former state legislator to executive office was invalid under article II, section 5 of the Alaska Constitution. We further held that the decision would be given full retroactive application. 548 P.2d at 396. If, however, we had reached an opposite conclusion with respect to retroactivity, we would have held that our decision "should not be applied to any appointments . . . prior to our decision." Id. at 393.

Drawing a direct analogy to the instant case, it is evident that Judge Johnstone's situation presents a variation upon the circumstances of Warwick. Our equitable concern here is not focused upon the direct force of the ruling that Judge Johnstone was required to stand for retention in 1982. That he is able to do. Rather, we must confront the indirect consequence of the decision, namely that it operates to place Judge Johnstone in noncompliance with AS 15.35.070, which in turn renders impossible compliance by the judicial council with AS 22.10.150. The question presented is not whether justice requires that Johnstone be excused from the primary effect of our decision, but whether it requires that he be excused from the residual, secondary effects of the decision.

Our analysis in Warwick rested in part upon the principle that injustices stemming from the pronouncement of new law should be avoided. Occasionally, a situation will be presented in which it is necessary to lay down a rule for the direction of future actions, but where all attempts to apply the new rule to past conduct results in disarray. Former actors, uninformed of the rule of conduct, failed to behave as they rationally would have behaved if they had anticipated the new law. The doctrine of prospectivity, when properly invoked, attempts as best it can to repair the situation created by such incongruous past behavior. In this regard, we think that there is no distinction to be made between the immediate effects attending the creation of a new law, and the secondary breaches of existing law that sometimes can be created by the announcement of a new legal principle. In resolving the present case, we conclude that where a new decision has been rendered on an issue of constitutional law, and where the effect of that decision is to place a litigant in violation of related statutory provisions, application of those statutes may be waived if circumstances exist which would otherwise justify a purely prospective ruling regarding the constitutional issue.

It remains to be determined whether, under the standards set forth in Warwick, Judge Johnstone should have been excused from his noncompliance with the filing requirements of AS 15.35.070. The United States Supreme Court, in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56, 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 306 (1971), set forth three types of considerations to be weighed in determining whether a new ruling of civil law should be given prospective or retroactive force:

In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally considered three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. Second, it has been stressed that "we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the `injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity".

(Citations omitted.) Accord, Warwick, 548 P.2d at 394; Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462, 466-67 (Alaska 1974). We must determine which of the proffered remedies should be selected in light of the three considerations set forth in Chevron.

Treating the Chevron factors in turn, we conclude that interpretation of article IV, section 6 is "an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." No prior Alaska case has attempted to construe the meaning of the word "appointment" in terms of its function of starting the clock on the first pre-retention term for a new judge. The collection of opinions Judge Johnstone received to the effect that his appointment for this purpose was the day he took office, although in conflict with our resolution of this question, indicated the presence of real uncertainty. The decision of the superior court in this case, while it was rendered too late to have influenced Johnstone's actions, is further support for the proposition that article IV, section 6 was subject to varying constructions.

We therefore conclude that the first of the considerations from the Chevron case militates against an unjust retroactive application of our holding. While we believe this conclusion weighs in the direction of allowing Judge Johnstone to run in a retention election at some time (rather than requiring his retirement from the bench), this factor alone does not provide a basis for selecting either 1982 or 1984 as the appropriate election year for Judge Johnstone.

Turning to the second factor under Chevron, we look to the purpose of the rule created in order to ascertain whether its operation would be retarded or advanced by affording it retrospective effect. The purpose of article IV, section 6 was to set a length of time for the first term of a superior court judge, after which the electorate would be given an opportunity to pass upon his or her judicial performance. We conclude that the primary purpose of article IV, section 6, to give the electorate the right to pass judgment upon the performance of judicial officers, would not be served by according our holding a mechanistic application. Adoption of the intervenor's position would result in the removal of Judge Johnstone from the bench with no input whatever from the voters, who under the scheme of article IV, section 6 were given ultimate authority to retain or reject a superior court judge.

In addition, the effect of article IV, section 6 is to set a specific date for the first retention election of each newly-appointed judge. In accordance with our holding, that date for Judge Johnstone is November 2, 1982. It is thus within the literal purpose of article IV, section 6 to require that Johnstone stand for retention in 1982 rather than 1984.

Finally, the framers of article IV, section 6 intended it to operate as a compromise between the lifetime tenure system of the federal judiciary and the desire to make state court judges accountable to the populace. In particular, the intention was expressed at the Constitutional Convention that article IV, section 6 should offer potential judges a reasonably long first term in order to provide a measure of job security sufficient to attract meritorious candidates to the bench.

In accomplishing their objective, however, the framers created an imprecise vehicle. No matter how it is construed, article IV, section 6 can operate in the particular case to authorize a first term for a superior court judge of anywhere from three to five years. This wide disparity in application is not affected by our decision in the instant case. Because of the broadness of the provision, we find that the general policies and compromises that went into its inclusion in Alaska's constitution are neither served nor disserved by choosing one date as opposed to the other for Johnstone's retention election. If we require Johnstone to run in 1982, his first term will be approximately three years in length; if he does not run until 1984, he will serve approximately five years. Neither result would contravene the intent underlying article IV, section 6.

In applying the second Chevron factor we are therefore left with the firm conviction that Johnstone should be permitted to run for retention at some point, and that the literal intent, if not the broad purpose, of article IV, section 6 suggests that he should be required to run in the 1982 election.

The third and final inquiry under Chevron is "whether a holding of retroactivity would cause substantial inequitable results, injustice or harm." Warwick, 548 P.2d at 395 (footnote omitted). A holding resulting in the ouster of Judge Johnstone from office would work an extreme hardship. Such a result would have been significantly out of line with any "fault" on the part of Johnstone in failing correctly to predict our ruling. In this regard, the Division of Elections suggests that this court should find that Judge Johnstone reasonably relied upon the statements of various state officials in reaching his determination that he was not eligible for candidacy in 1982. We do not consider it necessary to pass formally upon the reasonableness of Judge Johnstone's reliance. We do, however, conclude that Judge Johnstone's reliance, even if misplaced, was not so serious an error of judgment as to warrant an effective forfeiture of his office.

There are equitable considerations, however, other than those pertaining to Judge Johnstone himself. The voters of the Third Judicial District have an interest in the constitutional and statutory procedures that have been created for retention elections. We previously discussed one aspect of this interest in observing that the electorate has a constitutionally created interest in periodically passing upon the retention of judicial officers. We believe that this interest can only be served by affording the voters at some point the opportunity to cast their ballots for or against Judge Johnstone. In light of this conclusion, the question becomes one of timing. Given the choice of two imperfect outcomes, should Judge Johnstone be required to run in 1982 or in 1984?

We conclude that 1982 is the year that Judge Johnstone should stand for retention election, since it is the year he is required to run under the constitution. Selection of 1984 as the appropriate year would result in the suspension of the operation of a constitutional mandate, and a denial of the voters' opportunity to retain or reject Judge Johnstone at the precise time prescribed by the constitution.

We prefaced our discussion in this section with the observation that no solution reached in this case would be wholly satisfactory. While we recognize the defects inherent in short-circuiting the statutory procedures for retention elections, we conclude that, based upon the three areas of consideration outlined in the Warwick case, it is preferable to require Johnstone to run in 1982 than to delay his retention election until 1984 in contravention of the constitution.

Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court is REVERSED.