STEADMAN, Associate Judge:

At issue in this appeal and cross-appeal is the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs in actions filed against the District of Columbia invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought to recover property seized by the District pursuant to statutes authorizing the forfeiture of property used in connection with certain drug activities. The actions, inter alia, challenged the constitutionality of the statutes under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Collectively, the actions set forth thirteen different alleged constitutional violations presented by the statutory scheme both on its face and as applied.

Only one of these constitutional claims was sustained by the trial court. The sustained claim was that the claimants had a post-seizure right to a probable cause determination on request. However, only one of the claimants, Patterson, requested such a hearing, at which the court found that in fact probable cause existed for the seizure.

The District on the direct appeal argues that the trial court erred, first, when it found appellant Patterson to be a prevailing party, because she had only received an interim ruling entitling her to a hearing at which she ultimately lost on the merits, and, second, when it enhanced the attorney's fee award based on the contingency fee arrangement between plaintiffs and their attorneys. We agree with the District on these two issues.

Plaintiffs in the cross-appeal first argue that the trial court erred when it assumed that the plaintiffs had prevailed only on their Fourth Amendment claims. Second, plaintiffs argue that even if they had not prevailed on their other constitutional claims, such claims were "related to" the successful claims and therefore the trial court erred in reducing the fee award to exclude hours spent on the unsuccessful claims. Third, plaintiffs argue that they were entitled to an enhancement for the extended delay in payment. The second and third arguments were not properly preserved below for appeal. With respect to the first argument, we are unable to determine the degree, if any, to which the trial court's award of fees encompassed not only the Fourth Amendment claims, on which the trial court erroneously concluded plaintiffs had prevailed, but also other constitutional claims on which the plaintiffs claim to have prevailed.

We remand for a redetermination of an award of attorney's fees consistent with this opinion.

I.

In 1987, Terrie Patterson filed a complaint which, after several amendments, challenged the constitutionality of D.C. Code § 33-552. In particular, the complaint, based in this regard on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that the statute violated the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments. She sought to recover possession of her seized car pursuant to the terms of the statute barring such seizures as against innocent owners, and to recover damages for loss of use, property damages and consequential damages.

Patterson later moved for a class certification, which was denied. Several consolidated claims and parties were added to this action; they involved individual claims on behalf of the other plaintiffs regarding seizures of their cars under D.C. Code § 33-552(a)(4), or seizures of cash under D.C. Code § 33-552(a)(6).

In an amended order dated January 6, 1989, Patterson v. District of Columbia, 117 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. 741 (D.C.Super.Ct. 1989), the trial court held that § 33-552 did not, on its face, violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause or the Sixth or Eighth Amendments. The court noted, however, that the statute did not provide for a prompt post-seizure procedure. In particular, once the property was seized, no process was issued or filed during the time that Corporation Counsel decided whether to institute a forfeiture proceeding. If Corporation Counsel decided to pursue forfeiture, a libel of information was filed in Superior Court, and the case proceeded under the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Hence, property could possibly be held for up to two years without a judicial hearing in which an owner could present defenses, such as a lack of knowledge of the use of the property for an illegal purpose. See D.C. Code § 33-552(a)(4). Accordingly, the trial court held that under the Fourth Amendment, "claimants from whom property has been seized have a right to a probable cause determination, post-seizure at their request." On May 12, 1989, Patterson moved for such a hearing. A hearing was held on December 21, 1989, at which the court found that there was indeed probable cause for the seizure.

The court order of January 6, 1989, however, did not address the claims that the procedures employed did not provide adequate pre- and post-seizure notices assertedly required by the Fifth Amendment. These claims had been the subject of a summary judgment motion filed by plaintiffs Morris Hinton and Lennox Layne, which was never acted upon. In the spring of 1992, a settlement was reached respecting these claims of inadequate notice.

In November of 1992, the trial court issued its first order relating to attorney's fees. The order held that the plaintiffs were prevailing parties in the litigation, and thus entitled to fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 Supp. V 1993). The court held that the plaintiffs had prevailed on their Fourth Amendment claims because the "declaratory judgment requiring a probable cause hearing prior to forfeiture was a judgment in petitioners' favor and affected the conduct between these parties." Furthermore, the court, citing District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 580 A.2d 1270 (D.C. 1990), held that the parties who had settled their claims were also prevailing parties. Therefore, counsel were ordered to submit the fees and costs "incurred as a result of litigating the constitutional portions of plaintiffs' cases." The plaintiffs' subsequent submission of attorney's fees sought $76,290 for Brenda Grantland (610.3 hours at $125 per hour), and $22,540 for Landon Dowdey (128.8 hours at $175 per hour).

In an order dated May 19, 1993, the trial court awarded Grantland $26,623.03 and Dowdey $7,513 in fees. The court began with the total number of hours claimed for each attorney and then reduced that figure by one-half "to more accurately reflect the hours spent on the Fourth Amendment issues," and to exclude those hours spent on other aspects of the litigation. The court recited the experience of each of the attorneys, and found their rates "to be within the range charged by others performing similar services." Therefore, the court arrived at "lodestar" figures by multiplying half of the hours claimed by the hourly rate: $38,145 for Grantland and $11,270 for Dowdey.

The court noted that the hourly rates in the fee petition were the attorneys' rates for non-contingent matters; however, "[b]oth fee arrangements were in fact contingent [and] this is a factor to consider in raising or lowering the lodestar factor." The court held that a "pro rata reduction [based on the ratio of one successful claim to the total thirteen claims brought] of the lodestar [would be] wholly inappropriate" in light of the "uncertainty of compensation" because of the contingency arrangement. The court then found that "a partial reduction to reflect the proportion of favorable outcome of the total litigation is justified, and the court determines that factor to be one-third." The court also allowed all the claimed expenses of Grantland, which totalled $1,193.03. Accordingly, the court ordered an award of $25,623.03 to Grantland and $7,513 to Dowdey.

II.

We first review the federal statutory scheme at issue here, upon which any right to attorney's fees must be based. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 257, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1621, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) ("absent statute or enforceable contract, litigants pay their own attorneys' fees"). Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section . . . 1983 . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 Supp. V 1993). In awarding the fee, the trial court must first determine whether the claimant is a "prevailing party" within the meaning of the statute. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 2675, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987). If the claimant qualifies as a "prevailing party," the trial court must next arrive at a "reasonable fee." Henderson v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d 982, 999 (D.C. 1985). "The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). This amount is often referred to as the "lodestar" amount. Henderson, supra,493 A.2d at 999.

In arriving at the total hours reasonably expended, "hours that are 'excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary' must be excluded." Id. at 999 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1939). The reasonable rate is "to be calculated according to the prevailing rates in the relevant community." Id. Once the court calculates the lodestar, this sum is " 'presumed to be the reasonable fee' to which counsel is entitled." Delaware Valley, supra note 14, 478 U.S. at 564, 106 S.Ct. at 3097 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1548, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984)) (emphasis omitted). Upward adjustments to the lodestar are permissible "only in certain 'rare' and 'exceptional' cases, supported by both 'specific evidence' on the record and detailed findings by the lower courts," id. at 565, 106 S.Ct. at 3098 (quoting Blum 465 U.S. at 898-901, 104 S.Ct. at 1548-50), and only to the extent that these factors were not already considered in calculating the lodestar amount, see Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-900, 104 S.Ct. at 1548-49. We turn now to the application of these principles to the case before us.

III.

We turn first to the two principal arguments of the District addressing alleged trial court errors that caused the fee award to be too high.

A.

First, the District argues that Patterson was not a "prevailing party" within the meaning of section 1988, and thus was not entitled to an award of any attorney's fees at all under that provision. The Supreme Court has, in several cases, defined who qualifies as a "prevailing party" under § 1988. In Hanrahan v. Hampton, the Court reviewed the history, of § 1988, and noted that Congress contemplated that success on some kinds of interim relief might warrant an award of fees. 446 U.S. 754, 756-57, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1988-89, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980) (per curiam) ("a person may in some circumstances be a 'prevailing party' without having obtained a favorable 'final judgment following a full trial on the merits.' " (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 7 (1976))). However, the Court cautioned that fees for interlocutory relief was limited: "it seems clearly to have been the intent of Congress to permit such an interlocutory award only to a party who has established his entitlement to some relief on the merits of his claims, either in the trial court or on appeal." Id. at 757, 100 S.Ct. at 1989.

Accordingly, in Hewitt, supra, the Court held that an interlocutory ruling holding that the plaintiff's complaint should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim was not a sufficient legal victory to establish prevailing party status for the plaintiff. 482 U.S. at 760, 107 S.Ct. at 2675. The Court explained:

In all civil litigation, the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant that the judgment produces — the payment of damages, or some specific performance, or the termination of some conduct. Redress is sought through the court, but from the defendant. This is no less true of a declaratory judgment suit than of any other action. The real value of the judicial pronouncement — what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a "case or controversy" rather than an advisory opinion — is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff.

Id. at 761, 107 S.Ct. at 2676 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, a mere "favorable judicial statement of law in the course of litigation" does not render a plaintiff a prevailing party in an action which is otherwise decided against him. Id. at 763, 107 S.Ct. at 2677. The Court held that the plaintiff could not be a prevailing party even if voluntary changes in prison regulations made by the defendant had been a result of the lawsuit, because the plaintiff had been released from prison by the time the changes were made, even though the plaintiff had subsequently been once again imprisoned. Id. at 763-64, 107 S.Ct. at 2677 ("Although he has subsequently been returned to prison, and is presumably now benefiting from the new procedures . . . that fortuity can hardly render him, retroactively, a 'prevailing party' in this lawsuit"); see also Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4, 109 S.Ct. 202, 203, 102 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (per curiam) (Court denied an award of attorney's fees in a suit brought by two prisoners alleging the unconstitutionality of a prison regulation prohibiting prisoners from subscribing to magazines when one prisoner had died and the other had been released before the district court had ruled in their favor).

In Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., the Court once again emphasized that "[a] prevailing party must be one who has succeeded on any significant claim affording it some of the relief sought, either pendente lite or at the conclusion of the litigation." 489 U.S. 782, 791, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1493, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989). The Court noted that "[i]f the plaintiff has succeeded on 'any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit,' the plaintiff has crossed the threshold to a fee award of some kind." Id. at 791-92, 109 S.Ct. at 1493 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978)). With respect to a partial success, the court held that where the party had obtained a "material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties," the "degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award . . . not to the availability of a fee award vel non." Id. at 792-93, 109 S.Ct. at 1493-94.

More recently, in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), the Supreme Court summarized:

[T]o qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. . . . In short, a plaintiff "prevails" when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.

Id. at 111-12, 113 S.Ct. at 573.

This court has also addressed the prevailing party issue. In Henderson, supra, this court held that a party is prevailing "if he has succeeded on any of the significant issues in the litigation which achieved some of the benefits sought by bringing the suit." 493 A.2d at 999. In District of Columbia v. Jerry M., this court noted that a party is prevailing "if he or she succeeds in obtaining relief by way of a settlement agreement or consent decree." 580 A.2d 1270, 1274 (D.C. 1990); see also Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2574, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980).

In analyzing the situation here, it is important to bear in mind what Patterson's law suit ultimately sought; viz., the return of the car that had been seized under the authority of D.C. Code § 33-552 and damages for its detention. The constitutional claims were only mechanisms to that end. To be a prevailing party, Patterson had to demonstrate that the constitutional infirmity that she established resulted in some tangible benefit to her with respect to the litigation. The only constitutional infirmity that the trial court found was the District's failure to provide her a post-seizure hearing to establish probable cause. The fatal flaw in her argument, we think, is that when she got the hearing she sought, the trial court found that probable cause indeed did exist, and thus she obtained no benefit whatever from her proof of a constitutional violation.

Plaintiffs invoke the trial court's view expressed in the order allowing attorney's fees that the "declaratory judgment requiring a probable cause hearing prior to forfeiture was a judgment in petitioners' favor and affected the conduct between these parties." But that order was an interim legal ruling that Patterson, like other claimants, had a constitutional right to a probable cause determination post-seizure on request. Each party still had to pursue its own further specific challenge because of "the particular nature of the determination in each case." Class certification was expressly denied. See Rhodes, supra, 488 U.S. at 4, 109 S.Ct. at 203 ("The lawsuit was not brought as a class action, but by two plaintiffs.") No injunction was issued. See Hewitt, supra, 482 U.S. at 760, 107 S.Ct. at 2675.

Patterson argues that in any event, the trial court ruling "affect[ed] the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff" and constituted a "material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties," in that she obtained the probable cause hearing that she wished. We think this misconstrues the meaning of those phrases in Hewitt and Texas State Teachers. What plaintiff obtained was specific action with respect to this particular litigation, a normal outcome of an interim trial court ruling. To constitute the change of behavior or legal relationship necessary to make plaintiff a prevailing party, the litigation would have to effect a future course of conduct toward the particular plaintiff apart from the litigation itself. As the Court explained in Farrar, what is required is an outcome that "directly benefits the plaintiff." The possibility that a plaintiff's property might once again be impounded cannot suffice any more than it did in Hewitt.

In sum, we think that Patterson's failure to achieve any tangible benefit as a result of the trial court's ruling on the constitutional issue negates the status of "prevailing party" for purposes of an attorney's fee award.

B.

Second, the District argues that, in any event, the trial court improperly enhanced the award based on the contingent fee arrangement under which the attorneys represented the plaintiffs. The District relies on City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992), for the proposition that an enhancement for a contingency arrangement is not permitted in an attorney's fees award under section 1988. In Burlington, the Court addressed the issue of the propriety of an enhancement of the lodestar amount to reflect a contingent fee arrangement. The Court first noted "[w]e have established a 'strong presumption' that the lodestar represents the 'reasonable fee.' " Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2641. Accordingly, "the fee applicant who seeks more than that [has] the burden of showing that 'such adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee.' " Id. (quoting Blum, supra, 465 U.S. at 898, 104 S.Ct. at 1548) (emphasis added in Burlington).

The Court held that the contingent nature of a fee arrangement was an improper consideration in determining the lodestar amount:

The risk of loss in a particular case (and, therefore, the attorney's contingent risk) is the product of two factors: (1) the legal and factual merits of the claim, and (2) the difficulty of establishing those merits. The second factor, however, is ordinarily reflected in the lodestar — either in the higher number of hours expended to overcome the difficulty, or in the higher hourly rate of the attorney skilled and experienced enough to do so. . . . The first factor . . . is not reflected in the lodestar, but there are good reasons why it should play no part in the calculation of the award. It is, of course, a factor that always exists (no claim has a 100% chance of success), so that computation of the lodestar would never end the court's inquiry in contingent-fee cases.

Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. at 2641.

Accordingly, the Court held "that enhancement for contingency is not permitted under the fee-shifting statutes at issue." Id. at 565-67, 112 S.Ct. at 2643-44. Because we are interpreting a federal statute, Burlington is controlling.

In the case sub judice, the trial court reasoned that the contingency nature of the fee agreement was "a factor to consider in raising or lowering the lodestar [amount], but [wa]s not a basis for setting the rate." Because of the contingency arrangement, the trial court found that a pro rata reduction was inappropriate, and instead reduced the fee by one-third. Plaintiffs therefore argue that the trial court did not in fact award any enhancement, but rather declined to further reduce the award because of the contingency arrangement. We discern no difference between awarding an enhancement and declining to further decrease an award if such a reduction would otherwise be warranted; in either case, the contingent nature of the fee arrangement is treated as a factor, now barred by Burlington.

IV.

We turn next to the principal arguments of the plaintiffs addressing alleged trial court errors that caused the fee award to be too low. As will be seen, we conclude that notwithstanding the plaintiffs' failure to establish that they were "prevailing parties" with respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, we must remand for further consideration of the possibility that plaintiffs could establish such status with respect to certain other of their constitutional claims.

A.

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in assuming that the Fourth Amendment issue, that of a right to a post-seizure probable cause hearing, was the only claim on which plaintiffs prevailed. They direct our attention to two other areas.

First, they assert that they were prevailing parties on claims decided in 1987 under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They cite to two places in the record as support for this assertion. However, at these cites we can find no mention of a takings issue, much less an indication of a successful Fifth Amendment claim. The first cite is an order consolidating several cases, granting the District's motion for an enlargement of time, and scheduling oral arguments. The second cite is to the second page of an order granting an enlargement of time.

The District noticed this problem, and argued that this argument must therefore fail under Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., 453 A.2d 110, 111 (D.C. 1982), placing responsibility upon the party claiming trial court error to provide an adequate record on appeal to demonstrate error. Plaintiffs ignored this issue in their reply brief, which was filed about two months after the District's. We agree with the District that under Cobb, this argument cannot be further considered on appeal. "Appellate review is limited to matters appearing in the record before us, and we cannot base our review of errors upon statements of counsel which are unsupported by that record." D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. Milton, 250 A.2d 549, 550 (D.C. 1969); see also D.C.App.R. 28(e) (references in brief to parts of record must refer to pages where such parts appear).

Second, plaintiffs argue that they are prevailing parties with respect to the Fifth Amendment claims that were settled in the spring of 1992, and therefore are entitled to attorney's fees at least for those claims. As we noted in Jerry M., supra, a plaintiff who "succeeds in obtaining relief by way of a settlement agreement or consent decree" may be a prevailing party. 580 A.2d at 1274; see also Maher, supra, 448 U.S. at 129, 100 S.Ct. at 2574. The fee petition for Grantland specifically mentions the clients who settled their Fifth Amendment claims. In the order awarding fees, the trial court rejected a claim by the District that the parties who settled their claims were not prevailing parties. However, in the very next sentence, the court makes the contradictory statement that fees are recoverable only with respect to the efforts to obtain a probable cause hearing, which would exclude recovery for any of the settled claims. We are thus unable to tell from the record whether the fees were in fact awarded in part for the settled claims and if so, how much of the fees should be allocated to those claims. We must remand to allow the trial court to address this matter further.

B.

Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court erred in denying fees on the unsuccessful constitutional claims, because these claims were related to the successful claims, and that any fee awarded should be enhanced because of the delay in payment. However, these arguments were never raised before the trial court. In the petition for fees, plaintiffs stated that they sought an award for time spent on the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment settled claims only. Nor did the plaintiffs make any argument in their fee petition to the trial court regarding an enhancement for a delay in payment. This litigation commenced in 1987 and the fee petition was filed in late 1992. Therefore, the plaintiffs had an opportunity to raise any arguments about a delay in payment to the trial court. Following standard appellate practice, we decline to address either of these issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Hessey v. Burden, 615 A.2d 562, 581 (D.C. 1992).

V.

In sum, we hold on the District's appeal that the trial court erred when it found plaintiffs to be prevailing parties and when it awarded an enhancement for contingency. The attorney's fee award is thus vacated to the extent that it awards attorney's fees for efforts expended on the Fourth Amendment claim. We reject plaintiffs' arguments on the cross-appeal with the exception of a possible award of attorney's fees to cover the settled claims. We remand for further consideration of the attorney's fee award in that respect.

So ordered.