TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.

Victoria Brown ("defendant") appeals from the order finding her in breach of contract and allowing Dishner Developers, Inc. ("plaintiff") to retain $6,500 in earnest money. The facts in this case are uncontroverted. Defendant entered into a contract to purchase certain realty from plaintiff on 25 June 1997. The contract included a thirty-day cure provision after written notice of any title defect. The contract also provided that buyer's breach would result in the forfeiture of all earnest money to the seller. The agreement further provided that closing would "occur on or before August 1[,] 1997."

Closing was subsequently held on 28 July 1997. At closing, defendant learned that there were three outstanding deeds of trust encumbering the property. One of the deeds of trust had been paid in full, but not recorded as such. In addition, plaintiff received oral agreements to release the two others. Defendant was unwilling to close under those circumstances. Defendant returned to her home state, Florida, but left, with her attorney in Moore County, documents and funds necessary to complete the transaction at a later date. Thereafter, plaintiff's attorney informed defendant's closing attorney that the deeds of trust would be canceled and that plaintiff was ready to proceed. When the Moore County attorney related this information to defendant's realtor, the realtor informed counsel that defendant wanted to void the contract and requested the return of all earnest money paid. Upon learning of defendant's position, plaintiff's attorney took no further actions to prepare releases since no closing was scheduled. The three deeds of trust were ultimately released in January 1998 and April 1999.

Plaintiff filed suit to retain the earnest money paid by defendant, alleging that as the breaching party to the contract, defendant was not entitled to recover any earnest money. This matter was heard during a non-jury trial, whereupon the court found and concluded that defendant had breached the 25 June 1997 contract and forfeited all earnest money paid. The trial court made some thirteen findings of fact. Pertinently, the court found:

6. At closing it was noted that there were three deeds of trust outstanding, which included as security, the property to be demised.

7. Plaintiff immediately took steps to obtain releases on the subject property and on Monday, August 11th, 1997, notified Defendant[']s attorney . . . that Plaintiff was ready and able to deliver title to Defendant free and clear of any encumbrances.

8. Defendant on or about August 4, 1997, notified her real estate agent that she declared the contract "null and void", ordered the agent to "halt the deal completely" and requested the return of her down payment. The agent passed this information to Defendant's attorney, who informed Plaintiff's attorney.

9. As a result, Plaintiff's attorney took no further actions to prepare releases since no closing was scheduled.

10. At no time did Defendant seek to arrange a subsequent closing.

11. Defendant at no time made written objection to Plaintiff regarding defects in the title to subject property proffered Defendant by Plaintiff, as required by [section 6(c)] of the real estate contract.

. . . .

13. Agreement provision Nine provides that in the event of breach by buyer, earnest money shall be forfeited and paid to seller.

The trial court made five conclusions of law, but defendant only takes issue with the following:

2. Defendant unilaterally breached the real estate contract by declaring it to be null and void and ordering her attorney through her real estate agent to halt the deal.

3. Defendant failed to comply with the provisions of the contract which required written notice to the seller of all title defects and exceptions and to allow thirty days for the seller to cure said noticed defects.

. . . .

5. The actions of the defendant in this breach dictate the forfeiture of $6,500 as the specified earnest money to be paid to Plaintiff.

Defendant appeals.

We must first determine whether the findings of fact challenged by defendant are supported by the evidence. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 291 S.E.2d 618 (1982). With the exception of finding number eight, defendant fails to argue in her brief that the trial court's factual findings are not supported by the evidence. Defendant further fails to list any assignments of error concerning the trial court's findings in her brief. It follows that assignments of error relating to the trial court's factual findings are deemed abandoned , see N.C.R. App. P. 28(b) (5), and those findings are accordingly conclusive on appeal, see In re Appeal of CAMA Permit, 82 N.C. App. 32, 40, 345 S.E.2d 699, 704 (1986). We note that even if defendant's reference to finding number eight properly preserves it for appellate review, we find that it is supported by competent evidence, and it is, therefore, also binding on appeal. Our inquiry is, then, whether the trial court's findings support its conclusions of law and, in turn, whether those conclusions are legally proper. See id.

In general, a buyer's obligation to pay the purchase price for a piece of realty and the seller's obligation to convey title to that realty are deemed concurrent conditions — meaning, that neither party is in breach of the contract until the other party tenders his/her performance, even if the date designated for the closing is passed. Fletcher v. Jones, 314 N.C. 389, 395, 333 S.E.2d 731, 735-36 (1985). It is well settled that absent a time-is-of-the-essence clause, North Carolina law "generally allows the parties [to a realty purchase agreement] a reasonable time after the date set for closing to complete performance." Id. at 393, 333 S.E.2d at 734 (citing Scarborough v. Adams, 264 N.C. 631, 142 S.E.2d 608 (1965)). In Fletcher, our Supreme Court quoted, "when time is not of the essence, the date selected for closing can be viewed as `an approximation of what the parties regard as a reasonable time under the circumstance of the sale.'" Id. at 393-94, 333 S.E.2d at 735 (quoting Drazin v. American Oil Company, 395 A.2d 32, 34 (D.C.Ct.App. 1978)). Significantly, the parties may waive or excuse non-occurrence of or delay in the performance of a contractual duty. See id. at 394-95, 333 S.E.2d at 735-36.

Here, the purchase agreement did not provide a time-is-of-the-essence clause. Accordingly, under existing case law, plaintiff is allowed a reasonable time to perform. More significantly, the contract provided a thirty-day period, after written notice, in which the seller could cure any title defect. Plaintiff received oral notice of defendant's unwillingness to close because of the title defect at closing. Defendant did not provide written notice of the defect. Further, she failed to give plaintiff the thirty-days provided under the contract, or "reasonable time" provided by existing case law, to cure the defect. Therefore, when defendant declared the contract null and void on 4 August 1997 — just a week after the failed closing — she breached the contract. Furthermore, we note, that upon defendant's breach, plaintiff was relieved of its duty to perform. See Mizell v. Greensboro Jaycees, 105 N.C. App. 284, 289, 412 S.E.2d 904, 908 (1992) (stating that "[p]laintiff's offer to perform does not have to be shown where defendant [has] refused to honor or repudiates the contract"). Because of defendant's breach, in accordance with Section 9 of the purchase agreement, she forfeited the $6,500 earnest money paid to plaintiff. See also Star Fin. Corp. v. Howard Nance Co., 131 N.C. App. 674, 676, 508 S.E.2d 534, 535 (1998) (noting that "North Carolina follows the common law rule, which is the majority American view, that a defaulting buyer may not recover any portion of consideration paid prior to his breach"), aff'd per curiam, 350 N.C. 589, 516 S.E.2d 381 (1999).

We, then, conclude that the trial court's conclusions are supported by its findings and that those conclusions are legally proper. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Judge GREENE concurs.

Judge TYSON dissents with separate opinion.