JUSTICE KIRSHBAUM delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Appellants, employees of the State of Colorado (employees), filed a declaratory judgment action in the District Court in and for the City and County of Denver against appellees, Roy Romer, the Governor of Colorado, and Jo Ann Soker, the Executive Director (the director) of the Colorado Department of Personnel (the Department). The complaint alleged, inter alia, that section 24-50-104(6), 10B C.R.S. (1988), establishing a maximum monthly salary level payable to the employees, violates article XII, sections 13, 14, and 15 of the Colorado Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Rejecting the employees' claims, the trial court entered summary judgment on behalf of the appellees, and the employees have appealed that judgment. We affirm.

I A

In this appeal the employees assert that section 24-50-104(6), 10B C.R.S. (1988), violates article XII, section 13(8), of the Colorado Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They also contend that article XII, sections 13 and 14, of the Colorado Constitution in essence grant exclusive authority to the director to establish the levels of compensation payable to persons employed in the state personnel system (hereafter referred to as state employees) commensurate with job classifications and grades certified by the director. The employees finally suggest that the current statutory scheme authorizing the director to establish pay plans justified by salary surveys prohibits the General Assembly from establishing specific salary limitations applicable to particular grades. Prior to resolving these significant questions concerning the constitutional and statutory authority of the director and of the General Assembly to establish levels of compensation of state employees, it is appropriate to consider in general the evolution of this state's institutional responses to issues associated with hiring, retaining and compensating state employees.

Until 1919 the General Assembly controlled the employment and compensation of state employees by enacting special legislation establishing positions, pay grades and compensation levels. See, e.g., ch. 24, sec. 1, 1903 Colo. Sess. Laws 58-64; ch. 157, sec. 3, 1915 Colo. Sess. Laws 448, 449; ch. 45, sec. 21, 1917 Colo. Sess. Laws 136, 137. However, in 1918 the electorate approved an initiative amending the Colorado Constitution to ensure the creation of an executive agency with constitutional authority to develop and administer a merit-based system of state employment. Colorado Ass'n of Pub. Employees v. Department of Highways, 809 P.2d 988, 991 (Colo. 1991); Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 446, 448 P.2d 624, 628 (1968). The initiative called for the creation of a Civil Service Commission with authority to appoint, promote, discipline and discharge state employees "according to merit and fitness, to be ascertained by competitive tests of competence." Ch. 102, 1919 Colo. Sess. Laws 341, 342-43. It further provided that state employees "shall be graded and compensated according to standards of efficient service which shall be the same for all persons having like duties"; that "[l]aws shall be made to enforce the provisions of [the amendment]"; and that "[a]dequate appropriations shall be made to carry out the purposes of [the amendment] . . . ." Id.

Upon its adoption, the initiative was designated as article XII, sections 13 and 14, of the Colorado Constitution. These constitutional provisions remained in effect until 1970, when the current provisions of article XII, sections 13, 14 and 15 were adopted by the electorate, effective 1971.

In response to the 1918 initiative, the General Assembly enacted legislation establishing a Civil Service Commission and granting it broad authority to classify positions and establish pay grades for state employees. 1921 Compiled Laws of Colorado, ch. 9, sec. 131. From 1919 to 1947, the General Assembly periodically established levels of compensation for identified positions within the civil service system. In 1947, it adopted a compensation plan for all classified civil service positions that contained twenty-four salary grades with corresponding salaries ranging from $130 to $625 per month. Ch. 189, secs. 1-2, 1947 Colo. Sess. Laws 453-54. Statutes altering the number of grades, increasing the salary level for each grade, and ultimately establishing different steps with corresponding pay levels were adopted in 1949, 1953, 1957, 1959 and 1967. Ch. 162 secs. 1-10, 1949 Colo. Sess. Laws 409-10; ch. 103, secs. 1-2, 1953 Colo. Sess. Laws 289-90; ch. 97 sec. 1, § 26-2-3, 1957 Colo. Sess. Laws 292; ch. 80, secs. 1-2, § 26-2-3, 1959 Colo. Sess. Laws 309-310; ch. 124, sec. 1, § 26-1-2, 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 154, 155.

The 1970 constitutional revisions were designed to delineate the ministerial and policy-making functions incident to the administration of the state personnel system. Colorado Ass'n of Pub. Employees v. Board of Regents, 804 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1990). They called for the creation of a new executive agency, the Department, headed by a director responsible for administering the state personnel system and for the creation of a five-person State Personnel Board functioning primarily as a policy-making and appeals entity. See "Legislative Council of the General Assembly Analysis of 1970 Ballot Proposals," Research Publication No. 151 (1970). The 1970 constitutional amendments also provided that "[a]dequate appropriations shall be made to carry out the purposes of [article XII, §§ 13, 14]." Colo. Const. art. XII, § 14(5).

In 1972, pursuant to the revised constitutional amendments, the General Assembly adopted legislation reorganizing all salary grades, establishing a chart of minimum and maximum salaries for all such grades, and establishing a maximum salary level. Ch. 38, sec. 1, § 26-1-4, 1972 Colo. Sess. Laws 158, 161-68. In 1973, legislation was adopted deleting the chart of minimum and maximum salaries, authorizing the director to establish pay plans for state employees under certain policy criteria, and establishing a "maximum monthly salary" of $3,227 for state employees. Ch. 119, secs. 1 2, § 26-1-4(1)-(5), 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 421, 423; ch. 119, sec. 3, § 26-1-4(6), 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 421, 423, § 24-50-104(1)-(6), 10 C.R.S. (1973). All subsequent legislation authorizing the director to develop pay plans has contained a maximum monthly salary provision. In 1980, the maximum monthly salary level was set at $4,872. Ch. 116, sec. 1, § 24-50-104(6), 1980 Colo. Sess. Laws 600.

The statutory scheme applicable here requires the director to establish classifications of different positions within the state personnel system. § 24-50-104(3)(a), 10B C.R.S. (1988). A position consists of particularly defined duties and responsibilities. A class consists of one or more positions sufficiently similar in duties, responsibilities, complexity of tasks and required skill, knowledge and ability to justify the establishment of identical requirements of education and experience and the administration of identical competitive tests. Each class and each position within a class is accorded a different grade of pay as established by the director pursuant to a pay plan for state employees. § 24-50-104(6), 10B C.R.S. (1988).

In developing compensation policies, the director is required to utilize the results of annual salary surveys to determine pay grades, salary rates and salary ranges for classified positions comparable to levels of compensation prevailing for similar positions in public and private employment. §§ 24-50-104(2)(a) and -104(3)(e), 10B C.R.S. (1988). The director is also required to recommend salary adjustments to the Governor "by pay plans developed in accordance with [section 24-50-104(6)]." § 24-50-104(5)(d), 10B C.R.S. (1988). The Governor is required to submit the director's report, together with estimated costs of salary adjustments, to the Joint Budget Committee of the General Assembly. § 24-50-104(5)(g)(I), 10B C.R.S. (1988).

At the time this civil action was initiated, the state personnel system recognized 1,559 separate job classifications and, effective January 1, 1990, sixty-one salary grades numbered 39 through 99. Employees compensated at grade 99, the highest authorized pay grade, received a salary of $4,872 per month, the maximum salary permitted by section 24-50-104(6), 10B C.R.S. (1988). According to the parties, a pay plan based on the results of the 1989-90 salary survey utilized by the director would have included several additional job classifications and new salary grades, the implementation of which would have required payment of salaries in excess of $4,872 per month to the employees.

B

In their complaint, the employees alleged that article XII, section 13(8), of the Colorado Constitution not only prohibits payment of different compensation to persons having similar duties but also prohibits payment of identical compensation to persons having dissimilar duties. They further asserted that article XII, section 13(8), requires the General Assembly to appropriate sufficient sums to compensate state employees at the salary levels justified by the results of the annual salary surveys utilized by the director and that section 24-50-104(6), 10B C.R.S. (1988), violates that requirement of Colorado's Constitution as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The employees sought injunctive relief requiring the General Assembly to appropriate funds in an amount sufficient to implement fully the salary levels justified by the results of the director's 1989-90 salary survey.

The appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the General Assembly possesses ultimate constitutional authority to adopt legislation establishing maximum salary levels for state employees and that section 24-50-104(6), 10B C.R.S. (1988), does not violate state or federal constitutional provisions. The employees filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on their claims. The trial court ultimately entered an order granting the appellees' motion and denying the employees' motion. The trial court concluded that the General Assembly possesses constitutional authority to appropriate funds for the purpose of compensating state employees, that article XII, section 13(8), of the Colorado Constitution does not prohibit payment of identical compensation to state employees performing dissimilar duties, and that section 24-50-104(6), 10B C.R.S. (1988), does not violate equal protection standards.

II

The employees assert that insofar as section 24-50-104(6), 10B C.R.S. (1988), purports to establish a maximum monthly salary level, it violates the provisions of article XII, section 13(8), of the Colorado Constitution requiring that state employees "shall be graded and compensated according to standards of efficient service which shall be the same for all persons having like duties." Colo. Const. art. XII, § 13(8). They contend that this constitutional language in effect prohibits payment of identical salaries to persons performing dissimilar duties. We reject this argument.

The General Assembly enjoys broad legislative responsibility under our constitution to raise and spend funds for governmental purposes. Colorado Ass'n of Pub. Employees v. Lamm, 677 P.2d 1350, 1353 (Colo. 1984); Groditsky v. Pinckney, 661 P.2d 279, 282 (Colo. 1983); Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 447, 448 P.2d 624, 628 (Colo. 1968). Of course, this general authority must be exercised in conformity with express or implied restraints imposed thereon by specific constitutional provisions. Colorado Ass'n of Pub. Employees v. Lamm, 677 P.2d at 1353; People v. Y.D.M., 197 Colo. 403, 593 P.2d 1356 (1979). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and a party asserting that a particular statute violates constitutional provisions assumes the burden of establishing such assertion beyond a reasonable doubt. Anderson v. State Dep't of Personnel, 756 P.2d 969, 975 (Colo. 1988). Furthermore, if language of a constitutional provision conveys a clear and definite meaning involving no absurdity or internal contradiction, any construction of such language must give full effect to that meaning. Colorado State Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n v. Love, 167 Colo. 436, 445, 448 P.2d 624, 627 (1968).

Article XII, section 13(8), of the Colorado Constitution provides that state employees performing "like" or similar services must be graded and compensated according to the same standards. It thus prohibits preferential compensation treatment for persons equally qualified who perform substantially similar services. The provision neither expressly nor by necessary implication prohibits payment of identical compensation to state employees performing unlike or dissimilar services. This construction is consistent with the conclusion this court reached in Vivian v. Bloom, 115 Colo. 579, 587, 177 P.2d 541, 545 (1947), wherein we rejected an argument similar to the employees' assertion here in construing the predecessor of article XII, section 13(8). We find the rationale of Vivian persuasive with respect to the construction of the current constitutional language.

III

The employees next contend that article XII, sections 13 and 14, of the Colorado Constitution in essence grant the director authority to establish the levels of compensation payable to state employees by virtue of the director's authority to certify classifications and grades, therefore prohibiting the General Assembly from establishing maximum monthly salary levels for particular pay grades. They also suggest that the current statutory scheme authorizing the director to establish pay plans justified by salary surveys prohibits the General Assembly from establishing specific salary limitations applicable to particular grades. We disagree.

A

The argument that the director is constitutionally vested with authority to establish levels of compensation payable to state employees in a particular fiscal year by virtue of the authority to establish classifications and grades is similar to an argument presented to this court in the context of the predecessor to article XII, section 13(8), in Vivian v. Bloom, 115 Colo. 579, 177 P.2d 541 (1947). We rejected the argument then, and find no basis in the slightly different language of the present constitutional provision to alter that view.

In Vivian, we distinguished the constitutional authority of the Civil Service Commission to classify employment positions and recommend salary increases from the authority of the General Assembly to appropriate funds for and thereby ultimately establish levels of compensation for state employees. Vivian, 115 Colo. at 586, 177 P.2d at 543-44. We enumerated the powers of the Commission, concluded that no express or implied provision of the constitutional amendment granted unilateral authority to the Commission to establish the salary levels of state employees, and determined that the only reference to compensation contained in the amendment was a requirement that persons should hold their positions "during efficient service and shall be graded and compensated according to standards of efficient service." 115 Colo. at 585, 177 P.2d at 543-44. We then concluded that the amendment did not deprive the General Assembly of ultimate authority to fix levels of compensation for the classifications and grades established by the Commission. Id.

The employees in essence assert that article XII, sections 13 and 14, establish an executive agency with exclusive authority to establish compensation levels payable to positions, classes and grades as well as exclusive authority to establish positions, classes and grades on the basis of merit. An identical assertion was expressly rejected by this court in Vivian. In that case, plaintiff state employees filed a declaratory judgment action seeking judicial answers to the following four questions:

"(a) Whether or not the Governor, the General Assembly or either of them has any right, power or duty to fix, approve, or disapprove salaries for persons within the classified civil service?

"(b) Whether the General Assembly has authority to classify state employees within the classified civil service and to discriminate with regard to their salaries so that persons performing the same or similar duties are unequally paid?

"(c) Whether or not the State Treasurer shall pay the salaries within the classified civil service as fixed by the Civil Service Commission, or as determined by the Governor, or by the General Assembly?

"(d) Whether salaries, by whomsoever fixed, which compensate like service unequally, are valid?"

Vivian v. Bloom, 115 Colo. at 581, 177 P.2d at 542. In reversing the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, we answered those four questions as follows:

"(a) That the Assembly has the power and duty to fix the salaries for classes and grades set up by the Commission subject to right of veto by the Governor as in case of other legislation; that it has no power to fix the salaries of individuals other than by class and grade; that in any case where the legislature has delegated such authority to the Governor, the authority of the latter is equally limited to the fixing, approval or disapproval of salaries only by class and grade.

"(b) That the Assembly has no authority to discriminate in regard to salaries between members of any class and grade as established by the Commission.

"(c) That the state treasurer is required to pay salaries as fixed by legislative enactment or by any agency duly authorized by such enactment as to class and grade as set up by the Commission upon certification by the Commission of appointment pursuant to law as required by the amendment.

"(d) That salaries must be fixed according to class and grade as established by the Commission and the determination of equality of service rests in its discretion."

Vivian v. Bloom, 115 Colo. at 588, 177 P.2d at 545. In so doing, we rejected the argument that under our constitutional scheme the Commission's power to classify included the power to compensate. 115 Colo. at 585, 177 P.2d at 544. We pointed out that although civil service systems in other jurisdictions were characterized by an executive agency combining the power of compensation with the power of classification, the electorate of this state rejected such model in favor of a system that separated the legislative power of appropriation from the executive power of classification. 115 Colo. at 585, 586, 177 P.2d at 544. This fundamental distinction was not altered by the 1970 initiative. We also recognized that the Commission was granted exclusive constitutional authority to establish positions, classes and grades, which recognition led to our observation that the constitutional provisions establishing the Commission were not an empty shell, but did in fact restrict the General Assembly's authority of appropriation by prohibiting the exercise of such authority "to fix the salary of an individual employee." 115 Colo. at 587, 177 P.2d at 545. We concluded, however, that the General Assembly retained the authority to "fix the salary of each class and grade as established by the Commission, and the performance of its obligations so to fix salaries is necessary for the proper establishment of civil service in Colorado in accordance with that amendment." Id., 177 P.2d at 545. The distinction was drawn between the authority to fix compensation levels of individuals, the exercise of which would necessarily undermine the Commission's obligation to employ persons according to merit-based criteria, and the authority to fix compensation levels for particular classifications and grades, the exercise of which would not necessarily undermine the Commission's responsibility to establish and implement merit-based personnel criteria.

The current constitutional provisions establishing the authority of the Department and the director do not differ materially from the former constitutional provisions establishing the Commission. Article XII, section 13(8), provides, as did its predecessor, that a person shall be graded and compensated according to standards of efficient service which shall be the same for all persons having like duties. The provisions of article XII, section 14, defining the administrative authority of the director and describing the rule-making authority of the Board do not differ substantially from the provisions of the prior amendment defining the powers of the Commission. Neither the prior nor the current constitutional amendments contain express limitations on the authority of the General Assembly to appropriate funds for the purpose of compensating state employees other than the prohibition recognized by this court in Vivian.

The conclusion that the provisions of article XII, sections 13 and 14, do not require the General Assembly to adopt the levels of compensation for classifications and grades recommended by the director is supported by the conduct of the General Assembly subsequent to the adoption of our constitutional amendments. As previously noted, the General Assembly fixed the salaries of state employees by specific legislation from 1919 until 1972, under both constitutional schemes. Since 1972, all legislation authorizing the director to classify positions and to develop pay plans has expressly excepted from such authority the ability to establish maximum levels of compensation. While not conclusive, the fact that the General Assembly has consistently exercised legislative authority to establish maximum levels of compensation for pay grades suggests that the 1970 amendment, initiated by the legislative department itself, was not designed to transfer to the director the authority to establish such compensation levels. Cf. People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1990); Rauschenberger v. Radetsky, 745 P.2d 640 (Colo. 1987); People v. Green, 734 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1987).

B

The employees alternatively suggest that the statutory scheme adopted by the General Assembly authorizes the director to establish specific levels of compensation to be paid to state employees. They suggest that as a result of this statutory scheme the General Assembly may either appropriate a sum sufficient to implement the pay plan developed by the director or appropriate a sum less than that amount, but may not rely upon section 24-50-104(6), 10B C.R.S. (1988), to establish specific monthly salary levels for specific salary grades. We disagree.

It must first be observed that any effort by the General Assembly to transfer the legislative authority of appropriation to an officer in the executive department of government might raise serious constitutional separation of powers questions. See Colo. Const. art. III; Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 704 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1985); Anderson v. Lamm, 195 Colo. 437, 579 P.2d 620 (1978). In our view, the current statutory scheme accomplishes no such transfer of the authority of appropriation.

In construing a comprehensive legislative scheme promulgated by the General Assembly, we must consider all of the provisions together, in harmony, to give effect to the overall legislative intent. City of Florence v. Board of Waterworks, 793 P.2d 148 (Colo. 1990); Martinez v. Continental Enters., 730 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1986). Our review of the pertinent statutory provisions must be guided by this principle.

Section 24-50-101 articulates the general purposes of the state personnel system and the duties of the director, as follows:

"It is the purpose of the state personnel system, as a merit system, to assure that a well-qualified work force is serving the residents of Colorado, that all segments of its population have an equal opportunity for entry into state employment, that recruitment be from qualified individuals from appropriate sources, and that, after fair and open competition, selection be on the basis of job-related ability and quality of performance. . . ."

§ 24-50-101(3)(a), 10B C.R.S. (1988).

"It is the duty of the state personnel director to establish the general criteria for adherence to the merit principles and for fair treatment of individuals within the state personnel system. . . ."

§ 24-50-101(3)(c), 10B C.R.S. (1988).

"It is also the policy of the state to base employee advancement and compensation on demonstrated ability and quality of performance in order to encourage and achieve high levels of performance and productivity by state employees."

§ 24-50-101(4), 10B C.R.S. (1988). These provisions emphasize the constitutionally based policy of ensuring that employment within the state personnel system will be based on job-related abilities and quality of performance. The language neither states nor implies that the director's responsibility to establish "general" criteria to ensure adherence to merit principles includes authority to ignore other specific statutory provisions addressing issues of compensation.

Section 24-50-102 requires the director to transmit an annual report to the Governor and to the General Assembly accounting for the director's discharge of the responsibilities "assigned by law or directive to the [Department]," § 24-50-102(3), 10B C.R.S. (1988), and to transmit to the General Assembly recommendations concerning compensation of state employees serving in the military concurrently with their status as state employees and concerning the feasibility of providing state employees with long-term disability insurance. § 24-50-102(5), 10B C.R.S. (1988). The provision requiring an accounting for the exercise of responsibilities assigned "by law" to the director reflects the fact that the director's authority is defined and thus limited by several statutes. The provision requiring transmittal of recommendations with regard to special compensation programs recognizes the General Assembly's ultimate authority to determine the amount of state funds to be appropriated for state programs, including programs for compensation of state employees. Anderson v. State Dep't of Personnel, 756 P.2d 969 (Colo. 1988). See Vivian v. Bloom, 115 Colo. 579, 177 P.2d 541 (1947).

Section 24-50-104 contains provisions respecting classification and compensation of state employees. The director is required to establish pay plans "based on demonstrated ability and quality of performance," § 24-50-104(2)(b), 10B C.R.S. (1988), and to prepare, maintain and revise classification systems for all non-exempt positions in state government. § 24-50-104(3)(a), 10B C.R.S. (1988). However, the authority of the director to develop pay plans is circumscribed by subsections 24-50-104(3)(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), which set forth specific criteria which must be utilized by the director in creating such plans. These provisions support the view that the authority of the director to design pay plans is limited by policy determinations established by the General Assembly in various sections of the entire statutory scheme.

Sections 24-50-104(4) and -104(5) describe the director's responsibilities for revising and maintaining the classification system and for conducting salary and fringe benefit surveys. When revising the classification system, the director must "assign the class to an appropriate pay grade, salary rate, or salary range." § 24-50-104(4)(b), 10B C.R.S. (1988). Section 24-50-104(4)(d)(II) contains the following pertinent provisions respecting the fiscal impact of revisions of the classification system:

"Any assignments or reassignments of classes to pay grades, salary ranges, or classification relationships required by the creation of new positions or any duly authorized reorganization of change in work method which have a fiscal impact shall be made effective, with the approval of the governor, on the ensuing July 1 . . . . In order for the fiscal impact of any such classification study to be included in the annual general appropriation bill, the results of such study shall be submitted to the general assembly no later than February 15 of each year. Each study shall contain a detailed fiscal impact calculation by agency and department. Other than as provided in section 24-50-109.5 or in paragraph (g) of subsection (5) of this section, the only exception to the July 1 date regarding any assignment or reassignment of classes to pay grades, salary rates, or salary ranges, including those resulting from special salary surveys, shall be made in . . . urgent situations . . . . In such urgent situations, upon approval of the governor and the state personnel director, such changes shall be effective on the first day of the month following such approval."

§ 24-50-104(4)(d)(II), 10B C.R.S. (1988).

Criteria for the director's conduct of salary and fringe benefit surveys are established by section 24-50-104(5). The director is required to recommend to the Governor "salary adjustments by pay plans developed in accordance with [§ 24-50-104(6)]," § 24-50-104(5)(d), 10B C.R.S. (1988), and the salary survey data "shall be presented on the basis of recommended grades for all classes effective on the ensuing July 1." § 24-50-104(5)(f), 10B C.R.S. (1988). Finally, the director is required to report compensation recommendations to the Governor in time for ultimate consideration by the General Assembly. § 24-50-104(5)(g)(I), 10B C.R.S. (1988).

When construed together, subsections 24-50-104(4) and (5) establish a comprehensive scheme authorizing the director to develop pay plans establishing classes, positions and grades of pay based upon salary and benefit surveys; to revise such pay plans under specific criteria; and to submit the results of the exercise of such authority in the form of recommendations to the Governor and, ultimately, the General Assembly. The director's authority to develop pay plans, as established by section 24-50-104(6), is expressly limited with respect to the establishment of maximum monthly salary levels. When construed as a whole, this statutory scheme clearly prohibits the director from developing pay plans containing monthly salary levels in excess of the levels established by the General Assembly.

Sound policy considerations support this construction of the statutory scheme. Although the constitutional provisions and their attendant legislation are designed in part to encourage career service for and to benefit employees, see § 24-50-104(2), 10B C.R.S. (1988), the primary objective of the system is promotion of the best interests of the public as a whole. Turner v. Denver, 146 Colo. 336, 361 P.2d 631 (1961). Promotion of confidence in the state personnel system as a whole requires the General Assembly to ensure fiscal integrity in the overall compensation scheme. By maintaining a salary cap in pay plans, the General Assembly fosters public confidence in the fiscal integrity of the entire personnel system.

Furthermore, it is well settled that our constitution grants the General Assembly primary responsibility for determining the amount of revenue to be expended in carrying out the public policies of the state. Colo. Const. art. V, § 1; Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1985); Anderson v. Lamm, 195 Colo. 437, 579 P.2d 620 (1978); Vivian v. Bloom, 115 Colo. 579, 177 P.2d 541 (1947). The responsible exercise of this power of the purse requires the legislative branch to assume ultimate accountability for the appropriation process. Vivian, 115 Colo. 579, 177 P.2d 541. The personnel budget of the state constitutes a significant category of each annual budget. To construe the statutory scheme establishing the state personnel system as authorizing an appointed executive officer to control the appropriations process as it is impacted by classification and reclassification decisions would represent a major alteration of the system of checks and balances prevailing in the arena of governmental fiscal responsibility. See H. Eliot Kaplan, The Law of Civil Service, at 122-23 (1958).

The employees suggest that to the extent the statutory scheme does not authorize the director to establish unilaterally the amount to be appropriated annually for compensation of state employees, that scheme does authorize the director to establish all specific levels of compensation. Thus, according to the employees, the General Assembly, in response to the salary recommendations contained in a pay plan developed by the director, may either appropriate a sum sufficient to accomplish those recommendations, or appropriate some lesser overall sum, but may not alter the specific salary recommendations contained in such pay plan. These arguments ignore the express language limiting the contents of pay plans contained in section 24-50-104(6), 10B C.R.S. (1988). They also overlook the consistent practice of the General Assembly since 1919 of establishing discrete salary levels by specific legislation. While the General Assembly is required to appropriate funds adequate to carry out the purposes of article XII, sections 13, 14 and 15, those purposes include the requirement that the director adhere to relevant legislative criteria in exercising the authority of that office. Those criteria include the salary level limitations contained in section 24-50-104(6).

IV

The employees assert that section 24-50-104(6) violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They assert that the provisions of section 24-50-104(6) establishing maximum monthly salary levels bear no reasonable relationship to any legitimate governmental purpose and thus unfairly discriminate between state employees classified at grade 99 and all other state employees. We disagree.

The standards applicable to equal protection clause challenges to legislative classifications are well established. In the absence of an infringement of a fundamental right or the creation of a suspect class, legislative classifications do not contravene equal protection standards if the statutory scheme has a reasonable basis in fact and bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc., 735 P.2d 168, 174 (Colo. 1987); Lee v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 718 P.2d 221, 227 (Colo. 1986). A party challenging a statutory classification bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the classification is unreasonable or, if reasonable, is unrelated to any legitimate governmental purpose. Lee, 718 P.2d at 227.

In view of its decision in 1973 to authorize the director to develop merit-based pay plans that include salary rates and ranges, retention by the General Assembly of ultimate fiscal control over the personnel budget of the state by establishing some limitations on the contents of pay plans recommended by the director represents a reasonable exercise of legislative responsibility for maintaining the fiscal integrity of the state personnel system. See Vivian v. Bloom, 115 Colo. 579, 586, 177 P.2d 541, 544 (1947). The determination to establish the maximum monthly salary that may be earned by state employees bears a reasonable relationship to that governmental interest. Furthermore, the maximum monthly salary level limitation contained in section 24-50-104(6) does not discriminate between members of a given class or grade. The statute furthers a legitimate governmental purpose, and the distinctions contained therein are reasonably related to that purpose.

V

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JUSTICE VOLLACK does not participate.

JUSTICE MULLARKEY dissents and JUSTICE QUINN joins the dissent.