Summary
declining to consider claimant's request for sanctions, raised for the first time in her reply brief
Summary of this case from Daniel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.Opinion
19-16577
10-13-2021
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 4:18-cv-00715-YGR for the Northern District of California Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge; HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Allison Valdez Delacruz appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgement remanding her disability action to the agency for further proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in remanding Delacruz's proceeding to the agency for further proceedings because the administrative law judge failed to explain his analysis at Step Three, and because the record includes conflicting objective medical evidence concerning the severity of Delacruz's condition. See id. at 1101 ("Where there is conflicting evidence, and not all essential factual issues have been resolved, a remand for an award of benefits is inappropriate."); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176-77 (9th Cir. 1990) (remanding to the agency for proper consideration of Step Three equivalence because it is in a better position to evaluate the medical evidence).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Delacruz's motion to alter or amend the judgment. See Sch. Distr. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)).
We decline to consider Delacruz's arguments that the agency has violated her Eighth Amendment rights, or the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, because they are outside the scope of this court's subject matter jurisdiction on appeal. See 42 U.S.C § 405(g).
Delacruz's request for monetary sanctions, raised for the first time in her reply brief, is denied. See, e.g., Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing the types of conduct that can provide a basis for "bad faith").
AFFIRMED.