PER CURIAM

On Appeal from the 328th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 16-DCV-236244

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Khistina Caldwell Dejean, proceeding pro se, attempts to appeal from the docket entry by the trial court on December 11, 2017, denying her divorce petition. We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments or final orders. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 192-93 (Tex. 2001). To be final, a judgment or order must "actually dispose[] of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or [] state[] with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties." Id. at 204.

We are authorized by statute to consider an appeal from a "final order" rendered under Title 5 of the Family Code, unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(b) (West 2014) ("An appeal may be taken by any party to a suit from a final order rendered under this title."); see, e.g., Brejon v. Johnson, 314 S.W.3d 26, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). To be a "final order" under Title 5 of the Family Code, other than in a termination case under Chapter 161 or an adoption case under Chapter 162, the order must contain the items listed under Section 105.006. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.006(a), (d), (e) (West 2014) (listing contents of final order under Title 5 of Family Code not involving Chapters 161 or 162).

Here, the clerk's record reflects that appellant's notice of appeal lists the order on appeal as the trial court's December 11, 2017 docket entry, following a trial that day, denying her divorce petition. This docket entry states:

Record made. Both sworn. Both put on their evidence. Mrs. (Petitioner) has filed stating the parties are married. Mr. has denied the

existence of a marriage. At the conclusion of the evidence, there is no proof that the parties are or have ever been married. The petition for divorce is denied[.] The court finds the parties are not married and have never been married. So ordered. []

However, this docket entry neither was memorialized as a signed order, nor is it a "final order" under Title 5 of the Family Code because it does not contain the items required under Section 105.006 and it does not state that it disposes of all parties and claims. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.006(a), (d), (e); see also Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 204. Thus, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because a docket entry is not an appealable final order and the clerk's record does not indicate that any appealable order has been signed. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(b); see, e.g., Smith v. Robertson, No. 01-15-00538-CV, 2015 WL 9311431, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 22, 2015, no pet.) (dismissing for want of jurisdiction appeal of refusal to sign order in suit affecting the parent-child relationship because records did not include final order) (citations omitted); Ford v. State, No. 13-14-00466-CV, 2014 WL 6602307, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Nov. 20, 2014, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (noting that "[a] docket sheet entry is a memorandum made for the convenience of the trial court and the court clerk" and "may not take the place of a separate order, and a trial court's oral pronouncement is not appealable until a written order is signed.") (citations omitted).

This Court's December 28, 2017 Order and Notice of Intent to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction ordered the district clerk to mail the appellate records to the pro se appellant and warned appellant that this appeal was subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction unless she timely responded within sixty days of that order to show how this Court had jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c). This Court's March 1, 2018 Order granted appellant's letter-motion to extend the time to file her response until April 2, 2018, but warned appellant that, if she failed to timely file a response, this appeal might be dismissed for want of jurisdiction without further notice. See id. Appellant failed to timely file a response.

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c); 43.2(f).

PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Higley.