Summary
reviewing de novo grant of plea to the jurisdiction based on failure to substantially comply with section 42.08
Summary of this case from U. Lawrence Boze's & Associates, P.C. v. Harris County Appraisal DistrictOpinion
No. 05-09-00779-CV
Opinion issued April 29, 2010.
On Appeal from the 116th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 08-09530.
Before Justices MOSELEY, BRIDGES and FILLMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Dallas Central Appraisal District ("DCAD") appeals the trial court's order denying its plea to the jurisdiction. We affirm.
Background
Appellee 717 S. Good Latimer, Ltd. ("Good Latimer") complains of DCAD's appraisal of certain commercial property for ad valorem taxation purposes for tax year 2008. After receiving its 2008 valuation notice, Good Latimer filed an administrative protest disputing the appraisal. DCAD's Appraisal Review Board held a hearing on Good Latimer's protest and issued its order determining protest. Having exhausted its administrative remedies, Good Latimer filed a petition against DCAD in the 116th Judicial District Court, seeking judicial review of the Appraisal Review Board's determination.
Good Latimer then filed its motion to determine substantial compliance with section 42.08 and oath of inability to pay property taxes. Shortly thereafter, DCAD filed its plea to the jurisdiction, alleging the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction since Good Latimer failed to pay the county tax-assessor collector any of the taxes assessed against the property for the year 2008. The trial court held a hearing on Good Latimer's motion to determine substantial compliance with section 42.08 and oath of inability to pay and DCAD's plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court ruled that Good Latimer substantially complied with the statute and denied DCAD's plea to the jurisdiction. This appeal ensued.
Analysis
In a single issue, DCAD alleges the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction because Good Latimer's failure to pay any taxes before the delinquency date deprived the trial court of jurisdiction, despite Good Latimer's oath of inability to pay filed three months later.
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case is a legal question and, therefore, we review a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review. See Tex. Dept. of Parks Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). The record reflects that Good Latimer filed its original petition on August 15, 2008, that its deadline to pay taxes on the subject property was February 1, 2009 and that it filed its oath of inability to pay on May 6, 2009.
In its brief on appeal, DCAD cites us to section 42.08(b) of the tax code in support of its argument that a taxpayer who fails to pay any property taxes prior to the delinquency date forfeits the right to proceed to a final determination of the appeal. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.08(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (stating "a property owner who appeals as provided by this chapter must pay taxes on the property subject to the appeal in the amount required by this subsection before the delinquency date or the property owner forfeits the right to proceed to a final determination of the appeal").
We note, and DCAD acknowledges, that an exception applies to this provision. Section 42.08(d) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
After filing an oath of inability to pay the taxes at issue, a party may be excused from the requirement of prepayment of tax as a prerequisite to appeal if the court, after notice and hearing, finds that such prepayment would constitute an unreasonable restraint on the party's right of access to the courts. . . . If the court determines that the property owner has not substantially complied with this section, the court shall dismiss the pending action. If the court determines that the property owner has substantially but not fully complied with this section, the court shall dismiss the pending action unless the property owner fully complies with the court's determination within 30 days of the determination.
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.08(d) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
Thus, a property owner may avoid the forfeiture provision of the tax code by substantially complying with section 42.08(b) or (d), or a combination of the two. J.C. Evans Constr. Co. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 4 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.). Substantial compliance means one has performed the "essential requirements" of a statute. Id. at 451; Optovision Techs., Inc. v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 2005 WL 1524637, *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 29, 2005, pet. denied). DCAD contends that because Good Latimer failed to file its oath of inability to pay until approximately three months after the delinquency date, its oath was not timely filed and did not give DCAD proper notice. Thus, DCAD argues Good Latimer failed to substantially comply with the statute. We disagree.
We are required to construe the taxing statute strictly against the taxing authority. Wilson Communications, Inc. v. Calvert, 450 S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. 1970); Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Tech Data, 930 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1996, writ denied). The statute does not provide a deadline for filing an oath of inability to pay and we are not inclined to create one by judicial mandate. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.08 (Vernon Supp. 2009); Id.
DCAD also acknowledges "the statute provides no explicit deadline for filing the oath. . . ."
Under the record before us, we conclude Good Latimer substantially complied with section 42.08(d) and has not forfeited its right to proceed to a final determination of its appeal. In light of this determination, we conclude the trial court properly denied DCAD's plea to jurisdiction.
We overrule DCAD's sole issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.