ORDER

PHILIP P. SIMON, District Judge

Plaintiff Zena Crenshaw brought this action alleging violations of federal law by fifteen defendants: Spangler, Jennings Dougherty P.C. ("Spangler") and Rehana Adat (collectively, "the Spangler defendants"); Joan Antokol, Ralph Cohen, Bonnie Gallivan, Anita Hodgson, Ice Miller Donadio Ryan ("Ice Miller"), Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. ("Hoffman-LaRoche"), Julie McMurray, William Wooden and Wooden McLaughlin (collectively, "the Lawyer Defendants"); James Martin; Mary Paschen; and Bank One Trust Company, N.A. ("Bank One"). Crenshaw brings § 1983 and abuse of process claims. Before the Court are Defendants' Motions to Dismiss filed by all defendants except Mary Paschen and Robert Parker. For the following reasons, the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss are granted.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because this case, and cases related to it, have a convoluted history, a brief recounting of that history is necessary to fully appreciate the pending motions. Crenshaw was admitted to practice law in the State of Indiana. On November 8, 2002, Crenshaw filed her first complaint in this case in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the fifteen defendants listed above as well as nine members of the Disciplinary Commission for the Supreme Court of Indiana. One of the purposes of the complaint was to enjoin the Disciplinary Commission from proceeding with a disciplinary hearing against Ms. Crenshaw. The district court in Washington determined that Crenshaw failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits given that venue was uncertain, and it denied her request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against the Disciplinary Commission. See Crenshaw v. Antokol et. al., 238 F.Supp.2d 107 (D.D.C. 2002). She later dismissed her claims against the Disciplinary Commission.

The defendants then filed motions to dismiss before the judge in Washington. In Crenshaw v. Antokol, 298 F.Supp.2d 37, 45 (D.D.C. 2003) the court considered several of the motions, but ultimately concluded that Washington, D.C., was not the proper venue for this litigation and ordered the case transferred to this Court. Once here, because many of the circumstances had changed that directly impacted several of the arguments made in the original motions to dismiss, it was necessary to deny the motions to dismiss and give the defendants leave to re-file so that this Court could consider the motions from a clean slate.

Thereafter, in three separate motions, eleven of the fifteen Defendants moved to dismiss. In response, Plaintiff moved to amend her Complaint, and that motion was granted, so the motions to dismiss were denied as moot. Thirteen of the Defendants then filed motions to dismiss the First Amended Complaint, and those motions are now before the Court. At the hearing on the pending motions to dismiss, the Plaintiff again tried to amend her complaint, but the Court orally denied the motion at the hearing.

II. FACTS

The plaintiff is an African-American woman who was admitted to the practice of law in Indiana. . . . [T]he plaintiff's . . . complaint outlines a complicated series of interlocking events and lawsuits. These events fall into two categories: those relating to a state products-liability suit and those relating to the management of the plaintiff's mother's estate.

1. The Sanchez Litigation

2. The Estate of Nina M. Crenshaw

In 1993, on behalf of minor client Sylvia Sanchez, the plaintiff brought suit in Indiana state court against drug manufacturer Hoffmann-LaRoche, two doctors, and a pharmacy and another individual. The Sanchez complaint alleged a civil conspiracy that resulted in injury to the plaintiff's client from an adverse drug reaction. Representing Hoffman-LaRoche in this litigation were defendants Cohen, Gallivan, and Hodgson of Ice Miller, assisted by Hoffman-LaRoche in-house counsel defendants McMurray and Antokol. Id. Defendant Spangler represented the pharmacy and the individual.

The trial judge granted Hoffman-LaRoche's motion to dismiss. Subsequently, the plaintiff successfully moved to amend her client's complaint. After some discussion between the plaintiff and defendant Hodgson, Hoffmann-LaRoche moved to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint and requested attorney's fees based on the plaintiff's "frivolous" action. The trial judge again granted Hoffmann-LaRoche's motion to dismiss but reserved ruling on attorney's fees until the plaintiff's appeal of the dismissal was resolved. The state court of appeals affirmed the trial judge's dismissal, and the Indiana Supreme Court refused review. Hoffman-LaRoche promptly renewed its request for attorney's fees, which the trial judge granted in 1997. The state court of appeals later reversed the trial judge on the issue of attorney's fees, however, with the Indiana Supreme Court again declining review.

Not satisfied with the state appellate process, the plaintiff took two additional steps. First, she filed a complaint in state court (later removed to federal court) against the Sanchez trial judge and defendant Hodgson alleging violations of the United States Constitution, federal civil rights law, state conspiracy and declaratory judgment law. See Crenshaw v. Dywan, 34 F.Supp.2d 707 (N.D.Ind. 1999). Defendant Wooden McLaughlin represented defendant Hodgson in this proceeding. The federal judge presiding over the case recused himself in the interests of justice after the plaintiff, citing alleged improper conduct by that judge in a previous case, twice moved to disqualify him. see Crenshaw v. Hodgson, 24 Fed.Appx. 619, 620 (7th Cir. Dec. 20, 2001). Because the federal judge found her allegations to be categorically false, however, he referred the matter to the Disciplinary Commission for the Supreme Court of Indiana ("the Commission").

Second, the plaintiff met with several African American attorneys in Lake County, Indiana and concluded that her treatment by the Sanchez trial judge was typical for minority attorneys prosecuting complex personal injury claims. At a June 1997 press conference held by a coalition of politicians, activists, churches, and citizens, she stated that the trial judge had taken action against her based on her race, and announced that she would be forwarding charges to the Indiana civil rights and judicial qualifications commissions — a step she took within a few days. In response to a query from the judicial qualifications commission, the plaintiff wrote a letter stating that the Sanchez trial judge's ruling was consistent with the pattern of bias emanating from the state's courts of general jurisdiction. The plaintiff later sent a copy of the letter to the state civil rights commission and circulated the letter among members of the primarily African-American James Kimbrough Bar Association and the Lake County Bar Association ("LCBA").

Within a few weeks, both the judicial qualifications commission and the civil rights commission dismissed the matter. Shortly thereafter, the LCBA board considered but eventually decided against filing a disciplinary complaint against the plaintiff. Notwithstanding the LCBA board's decision, in December 1997 LCBA member Robert F. Parker filed a grievance with the Commission against the plaintiff.

Nina M. Crenshaw, mother to the plaintiff, passed away in January 1996. Defendant Bank One served as the personal representative of her estate ("the Crenshaw estate"). In October 1996, defendant Martin became the attorney for Bank One. In May 1997, the plaintiff received notice that the former personal representative of the estate had filed a grievance questioning the plaintiff's use of certain cash assets of the estate. Defendant Martin petitioned the plaintiff for authority to hire an attorney to recover certain estate assets from the plaintiff, but the plaintiff refused.

In July 1997, after receiving a copy of the Martin petition, the Commission subpoenaed the plaintiff for information about the estate. Believing that she was facing heightened Commission scrutiny prompted by her charges against Sanchez trial judge, the plaintiff "forwarded a complaint" to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. In April 1999, after the plaintiff failed to furnish the subpoenaed documents, the Commission suspended the plaintiff from the practice of law. Two years later, in May 2001, the Commission dismissed the grievance stemming from the Crenshaw estate for lack of reasonable cause for misconduct.

In August 2001, defendant Paschen, a Bank One assistant vice president, petitioned the state probate court to allow Bank One to resign as the personal representative of the Crenshaw estate. Bank One argued that its resignation was in the estate's best interest given that the plaintiff had filed a civil complaint against Bank One regarding its administration of the Crenshaw estate. Despite the plaintiff's objections, the court approved the petition in November 2001. Representing Bank One in various suits brought by the plaintiff concerning the Crenshaw estate were defendant Martin and defendant Adat, an attorney at Spangler.

As was alluded to by the court in Washington, the underlying Sanchez litigation discussed above has spawned a lot of other litigation. First, Plaintiff sued the members of Indiana Civil Rights Commission claiming that the members of that Commission violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by not investigating her complaints of racial discrimination leveled against Judge Dywan of the Lake Superior Court, the trial judge in the Sanchez case. Crenshaw v. Baynerd, 180 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 1999). Crenshaw then sued Judge Dywan and several of the lawyers involved in the Sanchez case. See Crenshaw v. Dywan, 34 F.Supp.2d 707 (N.D. Ind. 1999). The case was originally assigned to Judge Lozano, but he recused himself and the case was reassigned to Judge Moody, who later granted summary judgment.

On appeal, Crenshaw argued that Judge Moody was biased. Crenshaw v. Hodgson, 24 Fed.Appx. 619, 621 (7th Cir. 2001). She claimed that Judge Lozano and Magistrate Springmann were biased against her, and that their bias must have influenced Judge Moody. In affirming the decision of the district court, the Seventh Circuit found that there were "no nonfrivolous allegations of bias." Id. The Seventh Circuit also affirmed the merits of the district court's opinion, which included claims brought pursuant to §§ 1983 and 1985 as well as a state law abuse of process claim. Id. Those claims were undertaken against the state court judge in the Sanchez litigation, the attorneys and law firm who represented Hoffman-LaRoche in that case, and Hoffman-LaRoche. Although that case involved similar allegations brought by Crenshaw against some of the same defendants named here, no one has moved to dismiss this case on grounds of either issue or claim preclusion.

III. DISCUSSION

Unfortunately, the first step in analyzing this case is the rather difficult question of deciphering exactly what claims Crenshaw is bringing. The First Amended Complaint is rife with references that one could easily conclude to mean that she is bringing RICO and negligence claims. Thankfully, at oral argument Crenshaw cleared up this confusion by stating plainly that she is bringing neither RICO nor negligence claims. Thus, what appears to be left is her § 1983 claims and her abuse of process claims.

A. Rule 8 Violations

Simply because, after considerable exertion, the Court is able to divine what causes of action Crenshaw is bringing, does not mean that her pleadings satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rather, the Court finds that Crenshaw's Complaint violates Rule 8(a) and (e). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In addition, Rule 8(e)(1) states that "[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1). An overly verbose and confusing complaint makes it difficult for the defendant to file a responsive pleading and makes it difficult for the district court to conduct orderly litigation. Vicom v. Harbridge Merchant Services, 20 F.3d 771, 775-76 (7th Cir. 1994). "[C]ourts should not allow plaintiffs to 'plead by means of obfuscation.'" Id. (quoting Jennings v. Emry, 910 F.2d 1434, 1436 (7th Cir. 1990)).

Crenshaw's First Amended Complaint suffers from a number of flaws that make dismissing the complaint on Rule 8 grounds appropriate. For starters, it is 32 pages long, has 135 numbered paragraphs, and even includes 7 endnotes. Much of this length is due to the fact that the writing is replete with redundant, often irrelevant assertions. Her claims are not set forth in counts, which is particularly vexing because the confusing nature of the writing itself makes it hard enough to figure out what claims are being asserted against which defendants. For example, as mentioned above, the First Amended Complaint contains many references to violations of the RICO statute, yet Crenshaw stated clearly at oral argument that she was not bringing a RICO claim.

Crenshaw was on notice about these problems with her pleadings, as the Defendants moved to dismiss her original complaint on Rule 8 grounds, yet her First Amended Complaint did little to rectify them except to reduce its length. After the next round of motions to dismiss were filed, Crenshaw submitted a proposed Second Amended Complaint, but the Court refused to allow her to amend her Complaint again. Looking at the proposed Second Amended Complaint, it is clear that allowing such amendment would have been futile anyways. It does little, if anything, to rectify the Rule 8 deficiencies in her pleadings. In light of this, Plaintiff has had one, and arguably two chances to fix the problems in her complaint that were pointed out to her by opposing counsel. Despite such opportunity, Crenshaw has not complied with the dictates of Rule 8, and her First Amended Complaint can be dismissed with prejudice on those grounds. The Defendants have also moved to dismiss Crenshaw's claims under Rule 12(b)(6), so the Court will examine those grounds for dismissal as well.

B. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for individuals whose constitutional rights are denied to them "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a valid cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant(s) deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or any law of the United States; and (2) the deprivation of that right resulted from the defendant(s) acting under color of law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970); Starnes v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 39 F.3d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1994). For an individual to act under color of law, there must be evidence of a concerted effort between a state actor and that individual. Id. at 152,; Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1352 (7th Cir. 1985). Put another way, to state a § 1983 claim against a private actor, a plaintiff must show that the defendant invoked state authority in such a way that the defendant should be considered a state actor. Davis v. Union Nat. Bank, 46 F.3d 24, 25 (7th Cir. 1994).

Crenshaw's claim against the Defendants fail because she has not alleged state action by any of them. She attempts to do so by alleging a conspiracy. To establish § 1983 state action through a conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a state official and private individual(s) reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, Starnes, 39 F.3d at 1397; and (2) those individual(s) were "'willful participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its agents.'" Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). But "merely . . . being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge." Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980). Further, "mere allegations of joint action or a conspiracy do not demonstrate that the defendants acted under color of state law and are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 458 (7th Cir. 1998). While there is no requirement in federal cases to plead the facts or elements of a claim, when pleading conspiracy, a plaintiff must still "indicate the parties, general purpose, and approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with." Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002).

Frankly, Crenshaw's entire case is made up of nothing more than being on the losing end of several lawsuits and bare allegations of joint action and conspiracy. Nothing in the complaint demonstrates the existence of even a general understanding between the defendants to conspire to do anything against Crenshaw. Crenshaw does not attempt to connect the various adverse rulings she received with any specific conduct by the Defendants, and it is even difficult to make out what the broad contours of this alleged conspiracy are or its general purpose. In short, Crenshaw's First Amended Complaint utterly fails to notify the defendants in this case what they are being charged with.

A few demonstrative examples will suffice to show the insufficiency of her pleadings. It appears that substantially all of Crenshaw's claims against the Spangler Defendants are contained in paragraphs 57-73. None of these paragraphs does anything more than recite the procedures taken in the administration of her mother's estate and make bare accusations of impropriety. At oral argument, when the Court asked Crenshaw to point to the paragraphs in her complaint that alleged the conspiracy, she pointed to paragraphs 67 and 68. Paragraph 67 states, "When the related accounting was approved in virtually every respect, an explicit or implicit agreement was consummated between them and the presiding fact finder to deny the plaintiff due process and equal protection in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and her constitutional rights." If this is not a "mere allegation" of a conspiracy, it is hard to imagine what is.

Paragraph 68 is similarly unpersuasive. It states, "At that time or such earlier time to be determined by discovery, Magistrate Ivancevich joined said defendants in the de facto enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), to circumvent and retaliate for any challenge the plaintiff waged outside Indiana's state appellate process of the judgment entered against her in Sanchez and insulate from corresponding liability any person within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3), conducting or participating in such enterprise's affairs." Neither of these paragraphs "demonstrates the existence of any joint action, concerted effort, or even a general understanding" between the Defendants and the judges. Fries, 146 F.3d at 458.

Similarly, with respect to the Lawyer Defendants (Joan Antokol, Ralph Cohen, Bonnie Gallivan, Anita Hodgson, Ice Miller Donadio Ryan, Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., Julie McMurray, William Wooden and Wooden McLaughlin), Crenshaw has failed to allege a conspiracy to tie them to a state action. Her allegations against the lawyer defendants consist of the supposedly unlawful handling of her mother's estate, the disciplinary actions taken against her, and the Lawyer Defendants' defense of the lawsuit Crenshaw filed against them. There is nothing in the First Amended Complaint that even remotely connects the Lawyer Defendants to any activity other than the normal conduct any lawyer would pursue in defending their client, conduct which is not actionable. Starnes v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 39 F.3d 1394 (7th Cir. 1994).

Crenshaw filed a lawsuit against Hoffman-Laroche, and they hired lawyers who successfully defended them. She does not explain how this behavior is in any way connected to the disciplinary action taken against her or the handling of her mother's estate. Again, simply being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make one a co-conspirator or a joint actor with a judge. Fries, 146 F.3d at 458 (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28). Other than bare allegations of conspiracy, Crenshaw does nothing to tie these defendants to the actions of the judges, and as such, she has no tenable claim for state action by them.

This lack of any state action "hook" holds true for all of the Defendants who moved to dismiss. It is necessary to Crenshaw's § 1983 charge that the "public and private actors share a common and unconstitutional goal." Cunningham v. Southlake Center for Mental Health, 924 F.2d 106, 107 (7th Cir. 1991). To maintain a valid § 1983 claim against these private defendants, Crenshaw must allege the existence of some concerted effort between the judges and them. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1353 (7th Cir. 1985). The absence of such assertions — beyond conclusory allegations — means that she has not alleged any state action and is fatal to her claim. To put it differently, there is no indication of the nature of this alleged agreement, there is only a bare allegation of conspiracy. It is not enough to enable the defendants to prepare a defense or for this Court to determine whether the claim is within the ballpark of possibly valid conspiracy claims, the two functions of notice pleading under the federal civil rules. Ryan v. Mary Immaculate Queen Center, 188 F.3d 857, 860 (7th Cir. 1999). As such, her § 1983 claims against the moving defendants must be dismissed.

C. Abuse of Process

In order to establish an abuse of process claim, a plaintiff must prove: "1) An ulterior purpose; and 2) a willful act in the use of process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding." Reichart v. City of New Haven, Inc., 674 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996) (citing Broadhurst v. Moenning, 633 N.E.2d 326 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994)). In other words, "an abuse of process claim contains two distinct elements, and a party must first establish that the defendant employed improper 'process' before the court proceeds to an examination of the defendant's motivation." Reichart, 674 N.E.2d at 31 (citing Comfax Corp. v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 476 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994). "[T]here is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions." Re ichart, 674 N.E.2d at 31 (quoting Groen v. Elkins, 551 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990)).

Here, the behavior Crenshaw alleges was not procedurally or substantially improper. Both the First Amended Complaint and her responses to the pending motions to dismiss are devoid of any allegation suggesting that the Defendants used legal processes for anything but their intended uses. It is difficult to tell from her filings what legal processes she claims were abused (in fact, it is not even clear that she is still maintaining an abuse of process claim, as her briefs only make passing references to it), but she does not allege that any of the legal processes were used for anything not warranted by their terms, or anything in excess of what was warranted. For example, there is no allegation in the First Amended Complaint that the Lawyer Defendants filed their summary judgment motion for anything other than the end that such motions were designed to accomplish — obtaining summary judgment. In all of her filings, Crenshaw has, at most, alleged only an ulterior purpose. She has not met the second prong of the test set forth in cases like Reichart. That is, she has not alleged that the Defendants used legal process in a way that was not proper in the normal prosecution of the case. As such, her claims for abuse of process must be dismissed.

D. Rule 11 Sanctions

Also pending before the Court are motions for sanctions under Rule 11. The Defendants move for sanctions under a number of theories. All of these theories revolve around one principal reason for sanctioning Crenshaw: she knew, or should have known, that her conclusory allegations of conspiracy were insufficient to make the Defendants state actors for purposes of § 1983.

"Rule 11 seeks generally to curtail the filing of actions and pleadings of two distinct types: those that are frivolous, and those that are brought for an improper purpose." Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 760 F. Supp. 1349, 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1991). Rule 11(b) requires an attorney or party to certify to the best of her "knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," that any pleading filed with the court is not presented for an improper purpose, and that all claims have legal and evidentiary support. Jimenez v. Madison Area Technical College, 321 F.3d 652, 656 (7th Cir. 2003); Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Barosh, 22 F.3d 113, 118 (7th Cir. 1994).

The lynchpin of Crenshaw's strategy in this case is her allegation of a wide-ranging § 1983 conspiracy involving state and federal judges. As discussed above, in order to maintain this conspiracy, there must be state action. Crenshaw's § 1983 claims are frivolous in light of the fact that even cursory research into this area of law would reveal that bare allegations of conspiracy are not enough to establish the necessary state action, see, e.g., Fries, 146 F.3d at 458, and that being on the winning end of a lawsuit is not enough to establish conspiracy with a judge, see, e.g., Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28. In fact, some of the cases Crenshaw cites stand for these very points of law, so it is difficult to believe that she was unaware of them.

Based on this frivolous claim of conspiracy, Crenshaw made a number of procedural moves that prejudiced the Defendants and led to substantial judicial waste. Because she believed that the conspiracy would prevent her from getting a fair shake in the Indiana courts, both state and federal, she sought to have the case heard in the District of Columbia. Similarly, because she thought that this conspiracy against her spilled into claims she made on behalf of children allegedly harmed by a pharmaceutical company, she sought to have those claims joined with hers in a class action. Thus, her unfounded assertion of a conspiracy undoubtedly added to the Defendants' costs and fees.

This Court has no doubt that Ms. Crenshaw's behavior is sanctionable. But the Court is not convinced that the actions she took were taken to harass the Defendants or were otherwise done in bad faith. Rather, it appears that Crenshaw has been blinded by her passionate, if mistaken, belief that the system is arrayed against her. Inasmuch as the purpose of Rule 11 is "to deter rather than to compensate," Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's notes, the Court feels that the appropriate sanction in this case is a written reprimand, and this Order will serve as such. But the Court reiterates that this relatively lenient sanction is meant to deter this type of behavior, and if it does not prove to be the proper deterrent, harsher sanctions will be forthcoming, including the imposition of monetary fines.

E. Remaining Defendants

After granting the pending Motions to Dismiss, two Defendants remain, Mary Paschen and Robert Parker. An examination of the docket sheet indicates that Crenshaw has not properly served Paschen. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), Crenshaw is given until April 15, 2005, to effectuate service upon Paschen. As for Parker, he indicated at oral argument that he intended to file a motion to dismiss, but he has not done so. Thus, he remains in this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motions to Dismiss [Docket Nos. 91, 95, and 99] are hereby GRANTED. Defendants' Motions for Sanctions against Zena Crenshaw [Docket Nos. 97 and 125] are also GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to File [Docket No. 119] is DENIED AS MOOT. The only Defendants remaining in this case are Mary Paschen and Robert Parker.

SO ORDERED.