ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART UPS'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; SCHEDULING ORDER FOR UPS'S MOTION TO STRIKE

THELTON HENDERSON, Senior District Judge

This matter came before the Court on Monday, October 4, 2004, on Defendant UPS's motion for summary judgment. In that motion, UPS argued that all of Plaintiffs' claims are preempted under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and that two of Plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the federal Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 31502 et seq. For the reasons stated on the record immediately following the hearing, the Court GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART UPS's motion. This order provides a brief written summary of the Court's oral ruling.

As an initial matter, the Court disagrees with Plaintiffs' contention that a claim based on a nonnegotiable state-law right can never be preempted. The Supreme Court has already rejected that proposition, noting that "[i]t is conceivable that a State could create a remedy that, although nonnegotiable, nonetheless turned on the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement for its application. Such a remedy would be pre-empted by § 301." Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 n. 7 (1988). Thus, the same general rule applies, regardless of whether the right at issue is nonnegotiable:

If the plaintiff's claim cannot be resolved without interpreting the applicable CBA [collective bargaining agreement] . . . it is preempted. Alternatively, if the claim may be litigated without reference to the rights and duties established in a CBA . . . it is not preempted. The plaintiff's claim is the touchstone for this analysis; the need to interpret the CBA must inhere in the nature of the plaintiff's claim. If the claim is plainly based on state law, § 301 preemption is not mandated simply because the defendant refers to the CBA in mounting a defense.

Given this framework, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' first claim requires interpretation of a CBA and is therefore preempted under § 301 of the LMRA. The Court cannot determine whether UPS complied with its statutory obligations to pay Plaintiffs' wages without interpreting the CBAs to determine what was actually agreed upon. Plaintiffs claim a nonnegotiable right, independent of the CBAs, to be paid for all work performed, but the code sections they rely on to establish that right only require an employer to pay an employee all wages as agreed upon. See, e.g., Cal. Labor Code § 222 (making it unlawful to withhold from an employee "any part of the wage agreed upon" (emphasis added)); Cal. Labor Code § 223 (making it unlawful to "secretly pay a lower wage while purporting to pay the wage designated by statute or by contract" (emphasis added)); see also Cal. Labor Code § 200 (defining "wages" to include "all amounts for labor performed," and defining "labor" to include "labor, work, or service whether rendered or performed under contract, subcontract, partnership, station plan, or other agreement if the labor to be paid for is performed personally by the person demanding payment" (emphasis added)). The level of interpretation required to resolve Plaintiffs' first claim goes beyond the need to refer to the CBA to determine the appropriate wage rate or damages. In addition to determining the wage rate, the Court would have to interpret the CBA — including the "fair day's work for a fair day's pay" provision — to determine the scope of work and other terms and conditions of employment agreed upon by Plaintiffs and UPS. As a result, Plaintiffs' first claim is preempted by the LMRA.

However, UPS's arguments regarding Plaintiffs' other claims are unpersuasive. The company has failed to persuade the Court that it would be necessary to interpret the CBAs to adjudicate Plaintiffs' independent statutory claims regarding an itemized statement of deductions or meal and rest periods. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' second through fourth claims are not preempted by the LMRA.

Nor has UPS demonstrated that preemption applies to Plaintiffs' fifth claim, for violation of California Business and Professions code section 17200. UPS hinged its argument on the Court's finding that all of Plaintiffs' other claims were preempted. However, as just discussed, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs' second through fourth claims are preempted.

The Court further finds that exemption under the federal Motor Act has no impact on this case. Plaintiffs do not claim overtime pay, and UPS has failed to establish that exemption from overtime laws means that an employee cannot make other claims for unpaid wages.

In sum, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART UPS's motion for summary judgment. As discussed at the hearing and in this order, the motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' first claim but DENIED as to all other claims.

After the hearing on UPS's summary judgment motion, the Court also discussed a briefing schedule for UPS's intended motion to strike declarations filed in conjunction with Plaintiffs' reply to their class certification motion. As agreed at the hearing, UPS shall file its motion on or before October 18, 2004. Plaintiffs shall file their opposition on or before November 1, 2004, and UPS shall file its reply on or before November 8, 2004. To accommodate the Court's calendar, the hearing will take place on Monday, November 29, at 10:00 AM, rather than on November 22, as discussed at the hearing. If the parties are unavailable on this new date, they shall meet and confer and call the Court's deputy clerk with proposed alternative dates.

IT IS SO ORDERED.