OLSON, J.

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 18, 2018 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004160-2017

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

OPINION

OLSON, J.

Appellant, David Simmons, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on July 18, 2018. We vacate Appellant's judgment of sentence and remand.

Appellant pleaded guilty to firearms not to be carried without a license and carrying firearms on the public streets of Philadelphia. On December 18, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of six to 23 months in jail, followed by three years of probation, for his convictions. Sentencing Order, 12/18/17, at 1.

On February 19, 2018, Appellant was arrested and charged, at a separate docket number, with firearms not to be carried without a license and possession of a controlled substance. See Docket Number: CP-51-CR-0003561-2018 ("3561-2018"). The arrest occurred while Appellant was on parole in this case and before the term of probation in this case had begun. See N.T. Resentencing Hearing, 7/18/18, at 27.

On July 18, 2018, Appellant pleaded guilty to firearms not to be carried without a license and possession of a controlled substance at docket number 3561-2018 and the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve six to 23 months in jail, followed by three years of probation, for those convictions. N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 7/18/18, at 24.

As a result of Appellant's convictions at docket number 3561-2018, the trial court in the case at bar revoked Appellant's parole, anticipatorily revoked Appellant's probation, and resentenced Appellant to serve a term of two and one-half to five years in prison. N.T. Resentencing Hearing, 7/18/18, at 27 and 35; Sentencing Order, 7/18/18, at 1. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and, after we initially affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence, Appellant filed an application for reargument en banc. We granted Appellant's application, withdrew the prior panel decision, and listed the case for en banc consideration. Appellant now raises the following claim to this Court:

When the [trial] court revoked parole for a violation [resulting from new convictions, ] did not the court lack authority under Pennsylvania law to also revoke a consecutive sentence of probation that [Appellant] had not yet begun to serve?

Appellant's Brief at 4.

"[I]n an appeal from a sentence imposed after the court has revoked probation, we can review the validity of the revocation proceedings, the legality of the sentence imposed following revocation, and any challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed." Commonwealth v. Wright, 116 A.3d 133, 136 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court erred when it found he violated a condition of an order of probation that, by its terms, had not yet commenced. Intertwined with this claim, Appellant also argues that, to the extent the trial court amended his original order of probation to run concurrently, rather than consecutively, the trial court illegally modified his sentence, as the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify his sentence more than 30 days after imposition. Appellant's Brief at 10-25; see also Commonwealth v. Bischof, 616 A.2d 6, 10 (Pa. Super. 1992) ("a modification of a sentence imposed on a criminal defendant which increases the punishment constitutes further or double jeopardy") (quotations and citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Everett, 419 A.2d 793, 794 (Pa. Super. 1980) ("[s]ince the original [order of] probation was illegal, the sentence of imprisonment imposed for violation of that probation was illegal"). Appellant's claims fall within our scope of review, as they contend that the trial court lacked statutory authority to revoke his probation, that the trial court illegally modified his underlying sentence, and that his resulting sentence is illegal. We may thus consider the merits of Appellant's claims.

Resolution of Appellant's claims require that we interpret various statutes. "Statutory interpretation is a question of law and therefore our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Commonwealth v. Peck, 242 A.3d 1274, 1278 (Pa. 2020). Regarding our principles of statutory interpretation, our Supreme Court has explained:

Our task is guided by the sound and settled principles set forth in the Statutory Construction Act, including the primary maxim that the object of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). In pursuing that end, we are mindful that "[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Indeed, as a general rule, the best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of a statute. In reading the plain language, "[w]ords and phrases

shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage," while any words or phrases that have acquired a "peculiar and appropriate meaning" must be construed according to that meaning. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). However, when interpreting non-explicit statutory text, legislative intent may be gleaned from a variety of factors, including, inter alia: the occasion and necessity for the statute; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be attained; the consequences of a particular interpretation; and the contemporaneous legislative history. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). Moreover, while statutes generally should be construed liberally, penal statutes are always to be construed strictly, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1), and any ambiguity in a penal statute should be interpreted in favor of the defendant.

Notwithstanding the primacy of the plain meaning doctrine as best [representation] of legislative intent, the rules of construction offer several important qualifying precepts. For instance, the Statutory Construction Act also states that, in ascertaining legislative intent, courts may apply, inter alia, the following presumptions: that the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable; and that the legislature intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1), (2). Most importantly, the General Assembly has made clear that the rules of construction are not to be applied where they would result in a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1901.

The statutes that govern the imposition and revocation of an order of probation are penal in nature and, as such, "must be strictly construed." 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1); see also Commonwealth v. Hudson, 231 A.3d 974, 978 (Pa. Super. 2020) ("[s]ince [the statute governing imposition of an order of probation] is a penal statute, we must strictly construe this provision"); Commonwealth v. Harner, 617 A.2d 702, 704 (Pa. 1992) ("an order placing a defendant on probation must be regarded as punishment for double jeopardy purposes"); Commonwealth v. Nicely, 638 A.2d 213, 217 (Pa. 1994) ("[i]f there is a judicial determination that a probation violation has occurred, a sentence may be imposed and judgment at that point becomes final"); see also Nesbit v. Clark, 116 A. 404, 407 (Pa. 1922) ("[a] penal statute is one which imposes a penalty or forfeiture for transgressing its provisions, or for doing a thing prohibited, and it is none the less a penal statute [even though] it is also remedial") (quotations and citations omitted).

As our Supreme Court has explained, the principle of strict construction "does not require that [we] give the words of a statute their 'narrowest possible meaning,' nor does it override the general principle that the words of a statute must be construed according to their common and approved usage." Commonwealth v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898, 908 (Pa. 2011) (some quotations and citations omitted). "Rather, where doubt exists concerning the proper scope of a penal statute, it is the accused who should receive the benefit of such doubt." Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

We initially set forth the statutes governing the imposition and revocation of an order of probation, as those statutes existed at the time Appellant's probation was imposed and revoked. To this end, we recite the relevant portions of Sections 9721, 9754, and 9771 of the Sentencing Code, prior to their amendments in December 2019.

Section 9721 of the Sentencing Code is entitled "[s]entencing generally." Section 9721(a) declares:

(a) General rule.--In determining the sentence to be imposed the court shall . . . consider and select one or more of the following alternatives, and may impose them consecutively or concurrently:

(1) An order of probation.

(2) A determination of guilt without further penalty.

(3) Partial confinement.

(4) Total confinement.

(5) A fine. . . .

Section 9754, entitled "[o]rder of probation," goes on to declare that, "[i]n imposing an order of probation the court shall specify at the time of sentencing the length of any term during which the defendant is to be supervised, which term may not exceed the maximum term for which the defendant could be confined, and the authority that shall conduct the supervision." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(a) (effective to December 17, 2019). Regarding the conditions of probation, Section 9754(b) and (c) declare:

(b) Conditions generally.-The court shall attach such of the reasonable conditions authorized by subsection (c) of this section as it deems necessary to insure or assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life.

(c) Specific conditions.-The court may as a condition of its order require the defendant:

(1) To meet his family responsibilities.

(2) To devote himself to a specific occupation or employment.

(2.1) To participate in a public or nonprofit community service program unless the defendant was convicted of murder, rape, aggravated assault, arson, theft by extortion, terroristic threats, robbery or kidnapping.

(3) To undergo available medical or psychiatric treatment and to enter and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose.

(4) To pursue a prescribed secular course of study or vocational training.

(5) To attend or reside in a facility established for the instruction, recreation, or residence of persons on probation.

(6) To refrain from frequenting unlawful or disreputable places or consorting with disreputable persons.

(7) To have in his possession no firearm or other dangerous weapon unless granted written permission.

(8) To make restitution of the fruits of his crime or to make reparations, in an amount he can afford to pay, for the loss or damage caused thereby.

(9) To remain within the jurisdiction of the court and to notify the court or the probation officer of any change in his address or his employment.

(10) To report as directed to the court or the probation officer and to permit the probation officer to visit his home.

(11) To pay such fine as has been imposed.

(12) To participate in drug or alcohol treatment programs.

(13) To satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of conscience.

(14) To remain within the premises of his residence during the hours designated by the court.

Finally, Section 9771 sets forth the rules for "[m]odification or revocation of [an] order of probation." It declares:

(a) General rule.--The court may at any time terminate continued supervision or lessen or increase the conditions upon which an order of probation has been imposed.

(b) Revocation.--The court may revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation. Upon revocation the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.

(c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement.-The court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon revocation unless it finds that:

(1) the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or

(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or

(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court.

(d) Hearing required.-There shall be no revocation or increase of conditions of sentence under this section except after a hearing at which the court shall consider the record of the sentencing proceeding together with evidence of the conduct of the defendant while on probation. Probation may be eliminated or the term decreased without a hearing.

As is relevant to the current appeal, the following principles may be gleaned from both the plain language of the above statutes and from our Supreme Court's interpretation of the statutes. First, when sentencing a defendant, the trial court is authorized to enter an "order of probation" and the court may impose this order of probation "consecutively or concurrently." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a).

Second, the trial court "may as a condition of its order" require the defendant to comply with certain, specific conditions of probation. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754. Further, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a "general condition" of any order of probation is "that the defendant lead a law-abiding life, i.e., that the defendant refrain from committing another crime." Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240, 1250 (Pa. 2019) (quotations and citations omitted).

Third, the trial court "may at any time terminate continued supervision or lessen or increase the conditions upon which an order of probation has been imposed." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(a). However, the trial court may only "revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(b). Thus, as our Supreme Court has explained, under the plain language of the statute:

[o]nly upon the violation of any of the 'specified conditions' in the probation order (general or specific) may a court revoke the defendant's probation. In other words, a court may find a defendant in violation of probation only if the defendant has violated one of the 'specific conditions' of probation included in the probation order or has committed a new crime.

The question in this case concerns when "the 'specified conditions' in the probation order" become active and enforceable against the defendant.

For over forty years, three-judge panels of this Court have held that a defendant may prospectively violate the conditions of a probationary order by committing a new crime after sentencing, but before the commencement of their probationary period. This line of precedent began with Commonwealth v. Wendowski, 420 A.2d 628 (Pa. Super. 1980).

In Wendowski, Mr. Wendowski was convicted of a variety of crimes and sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment, followed by a term of probation. When Mr. Wendowski was on parole, he pleaded guilty to a new offense. As a result, the trial court revoked Mr. Wendowski's probation, even though his probationary term had not yet begun. Id. at 629. Mr. Wendowski appealed to this Court and claimed that, "since he was not actually serving the probation ... on the day it was revoked, the revocation was an unconstitutional augmentation of [his] sentence." Id. We held that Mr. Wendowski's claim failed.

In analyzing Mr. Wendowski's claim, we held that, "for revocation purposes," the phrase "term of probation" must "include[e] the term beginning at the time probation is granted." Id. at 630, quoting Wright v. United States, 315 A.2d 839, 841-842 (D.C.App. 1974). The Wendowski Court did not cite any statutory language to support this proposition. Instead, we held that public policy required this broad definition because, "[o]therwise, having been granted probation a defendant could commit criminal acts with impunity - as far as revocation of probation is concerned - until he commenced actual service of the probationary period." Wendowski, 420 A.2d at 630, quoting Wright, 315 A.2d at 841-842.

The Wendowski Court then quoted a concurring opinion from Judge Curtis Waller, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and held:

If, at any time before the defendant has completed the maximum period of probation, or before he has begun service of his probation, he should commit offenses of such nature as to demonstrate to the court that he is unworthy of probation and that the granting of the same would not be in subservience to the ends of justice and the best interests of the public, or the defendant, the court could revoke or change the order of probation. A defendant on probation has no contract with the court. He is still a person convicted of crime, and the expressed intent of the Court to have him under probation beginning at a future time does not change his position from the possession of a privilege to the enjoyment of a right.

The Wendowski Court thus held that the trial court properly revoked Mr. Wendowski's probation for committing a new crime, even though Mr. Wendowski's probationary period had not yet commenced at the time he committed the crime. Wendowski, 420 A.2d at 630.

This Court followed Wendowski's holding in the intervening years. See Commonwealth v. Dickins, 475 A.2d 141, 144 (Pa. Super. 1984) (following Wendowski and holding that "[t]he fact that appellant had not commenced serving probation when the new [criminal] offense occurred did not prevent the court from revoking its prior order placing appellant on probation. ... If the new offense is committed at any time before the maximum period of probation has been completed, probation may be revoked"); Commonwealth v. Miller, 516 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Pa. Super. 1986) (holding that Wendowski and Dickens were correctly decided because "[t]o suggest, as appellant does, that a defendant is free to commit unlimited additional crimes without in any way impairing or endangering a previously imposed sentence of probation merely because the probationary period has not commenced is to suggest an absurdity in the statute which this Court is not prepared to create"), appeal denied, 528 A.2d 956 (Pa. 1987); Commonwealth v. Ware, 737 A.2d 251, 253 (Pa. Super. 1999) (following Wendowski and Dickens and holding "the court had the authority to revoke appellant's probation despite the fact that, at the time of revocation of probation, appellant had not yet begun to serve the probationary portion of her split sentence and even though the [criminal] offense upon which revocation of probation was based occurred during the parole period and not the probationary period"), appeal denied, 747 A.2d 900 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth v. Castro, 856 A.2d 178, 180 n.l (Pa. Super. 2004) ("[the defendant] was found in violation of his parole, which he was serving at the time of his arrest, and in anticipatory violation of his probation, which had not yet begun to run. Such a finding is proper"); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 955 A.2d 433, 435 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2008) ("[u]nder Pennsylvania law, an order of probation can be changed or revoked if, at any time before the defendant has completed the maximum period of probation, or before he has begun service of his probation the defendant commits offenses or otherwise demonstrates he is unworthy of probation. . . . Here, [the defendant] had not yet begun to serve his probationary sentence when he committed new criminal offenses. Nevertheless, these new offenses rendered [the defendant] subject to revocation of probation and re-sentencing"), appeal denied, 964 A.2d 894 (Pa. 2009).

To the extent any of the above cases cited to the relevant statutes, the statutory discussion and interpretation was minimal - which is, obviously, understandable, given that Wendowski constituted clear, binding precedent for all of the petite panels adjudicating the foregoing appeals. Commonwealth v. Taggert, 997 A.2d 1189, 1201 n.16 (Pa. Super. 2010) ("one three-judge panel of [the Superior] Court cannot overrule another" three-judge panel).

We further note that, in Commonwealth v. Hoover, 909 A.2d 321 (Pa. Super. 2006), this Court expanded Wendowski's holding to cover a situation where the trial court prospectively revoked the defendant's probation for "a violation of a work release rule" - and not for the commission of a new crime. Hoover, 909 A.2d at 324. Hoover held that the trial court acted properly because:

[a]lthough [the defendant] herein did not, strictly speaking, violate the law by becoming intoxicated, he clearly violated the terms of his work release and "demonstrate[d] to the court that he is unworthy of probation and that the granting of the same would not be in subservience to the ends of justice [or] the best interests of the public."

On appeal, Appellant asks this Court to overrule Wendowski and its progeny, as those cases "cannot bear scrutiny when examined in light of the relevant statutes that are controlling on the issue of whether a consecutively imposed term of probation may be revoked for conduct while the defendant is not on probation." Appellant's Brief at 11. Of note, Appellant argues that, at sentencing, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a) authorized the trial court to enter an order of probation and to impose that order "consecutively or concurrently." See Appellant's Brief at 16. Appellant points out, however, "[t]here is no authority to impose a sentence that is both concurrent and consecutive to another sentence." Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted).

In this case, the trial court specifically imposed Appellant's order of probation consecutive to a term of imprisonment. Further, Appellant committed new criminal offenses, and was convicted of the new criminal charges, while he was on parole in this case and before his term of probation commenced. Appellant argues that, under the plain language of our statutes, he could not have violated a "specified condition" of his probation before his probationary period actually began. For this reason, Appellant asserts that the trial court lacked statutory authority to revoke his probation. Appellant also argues that, to the extent the trial court amended his original order of probation to run concurrently, rather than consecutively, his resulting sentence is illegal, as the trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify his sentence beyond 30 days after imposition. Id. at 24-25.

The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argues that Wendowski was properly decided. Specifically, the Commonwealth argues, Wendowski correctly concluded that the term "probation," as used in the revocation statute, was ambiguous and that, "for revocation purposes, 'probation' had been defined through practice and persuasive authority as beginning when the probationary term is imposed, not when it begins to run." Commonwealth's Brief at 12.

The Commonwealth also argues that the doctrine of stare decisis and the presumption of legislative acquiescence support upholding Wendowski. With respect to the doctrine of stare decisis, the Commonwealth notes that this Court has followed Wendowski for over forty years and we should, obviously, "hesitate to overturn forty years of settled case law." Id. at 18. Further, as to the presumption of legislative acquiescence, the Commonwealth notes that, during the forty years following Wendowski, the General Assembly has amended the probation revocation statute twice, "with no rejection of [Wendowski's] interpretation" of the statute. Thus, the Commonwealth claims, there is a statutory presumption that Wendowski's interpretation "was in accordance with the legislative intent; otherwise the General Assembly would have changed the law in a subsequent amendment." Id. at 16 (quotations and citations omitted).

We conclude that the holding of Wendowski and its progeny contravene the plain language of the relevant statutes. As such, Wendowski and its progeny are overruled.

As noted above, when sentencing a defendant, Section 9721(a) authorizes a trial court to enter an "order of probation;" the section declares that the court may impose this order of probation "consecutively or concurrently." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a). During sentencing in the case at bar, the trial court entered an order of probation and imposed that order consecutively to a term of total confinement. See Sentencing Order, 12/18/17, at 1-2. The word "consecutive" plainly means "one after the other." See 6 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 26.3(f). Thus, under the plain language of the sentencing order, Appellant was required to serve his entire term of total confinement before he began to serve his probationary term. Yet, when Appellant committed the new crimes that served as the basis for his probation revocation, he was still on parole and had not yet begun to serve his period of probation. See Hudson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 204 A.3d 392, 396 (Pa. 2019) ("the actual sentence of a prisoner subject to total confinement is his maximum sentence, and his minimum sentence merely sets the time after which he is eligible to serve the remainder of his sentence on parole").

Section 9771(b) permits revocation of an order of probation "upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9771(b). However, the "specified conditions" of Appellant's probation did not commence before Appellant began to serve his probationary sentence.

With respect to the conditions of probation, Section 9754 declares that the trial court "may as a condition of its order" of probation require the defendant to comply with certain, specific conditions of probation. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754. Under our Supreme Court's precedent, a "general condition" of any order of probation is "that the defendant lead a law-abiding life, i.e., that the defendant refrain from committing another crime." Foster, 214 A.3d at 1250 (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, under Section 9754, every condition of probation - whether "specific" or "general" - attaches to, or is a part of, the order of probation. See id. ("[o]nly upon the violation of any of the 'specified conditions' in the probation order (general or specific) may a court revoke the defendant's probation") (emphasis added). And, if the "order of probation" is imposed "consecutively" to a term of imprisonment, the "order of probation" and the conditions of that order cannot take effect until the term of imprisonment ends. This view is mandated by the plain language of the statutes. Indeed, any other view is statutorily untenable.

First, it cannot be argued that the "specified conditions" in an order of probation attach to a term of imprisonment. To be sure, the plain terms of Section 9754 only permit the trial court to attach "conditions of probation" to an "order of probation." See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(c) ("[t]he court may as a condition of its order require the defendant . . .") (emphasis added). Nothing in the Sentencing Code permits a trial court to attach conditions of probation to a term of total confinement. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756 (imposition of a sentence of total confinement); see also Commonwealth v. Thier, 663 A.2d 225 (Pa. Super. 1995) (holding that the trial court could not impose a condition of probation upon the defendant, as "[n]o probationary sentence was imposed in the present case"). Further, as to the "general condition" that the defendant "refrain from committing another crime," our Supreme Court has declared that this, too, is a part of the order of probation. Foster, 214 A.3d at 1250 ("[o]nly upon the violation of any of the 'specified conditions' in the probation order (general or specific) may a court revoke the defendant's probation") (emphasis added).

Second, under our statutes, no part of the trial court's order of probation could have commenced during Appellant's term of imprisonment or parole. Certainly, Section 9721(a) declares that a trial court may enter an "order of probation" at sentencing and may impose this "order of probation" "consecutively or concurrently." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a). Under the plain language of Section 9721(a), when the trial court imposed Appellant's order of probation consecutively, the entirety of Appellant's order of probation was imposed consecutively.

Moreover, nothing in the Sentencing Code permits a consecutive order of probation to be aggregated with a sentence of total confinement. Rather, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9757 - regarding aggregation of sentences - only applies to "consecutive sentences of total confinement." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9757 (emphasis added). An order of probation is, obviously, not a sentence of "total confinement." See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a) (distinguishing between "[a]n order of probation" and "[t]otal confinement"); see also Commonwealth v. Kates, 305 A.2d 701, 708 (Pa. 1973) ("the basic objective of probation is to provide a means to achieve rehabilitation without resorting to incarceration"); Commonwealth v. Ostrosky, 866 A.2d 423, 430 (Pa. Super. 2005) ("[t]he maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, establishes the inference that, where certain things are designated in a statute, all omissions should be understood as exclusions") (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, under the Sentencing Code, a sentence of total confinement and a consecutive order of probation may not be aggregated and viewed as one.

Simply stated, Wendowski was incorrect in holding that a trial court may anticipatorily revoke an order of probation and in reasoning that "a term of probation may and should be construed for revocation purposes as including the term beginning at the time probation is granted." Wendowski, 420 A.2d at 630 (quotations omitted). No statutory authority exists to support this understanding. Rather, the plain language of the relevant statutes provides that: a trial court may only revoke an order of probation "upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation;" the "specified conditions" of an order of probation are attached to, or are a part of, the order of probation; and, when the trial court imposes an "order of probation" consecutively to another term, the entirety of the "order of probation" - including the "specified conditions" - do not begin to commence until the prior term ends.

Notwithstanding the plain language of the statutes, the Commonwealth argues that the statutory presumption of legislative acquiescence favors upholding Wendowski. According to the Commonwealth:

The General Assembly has been on notice of this Court's interpretation of § 9771 for decades and, despite amending the statute twice in that time, has never changed the operative language of the statute. It is well-established that "[t]he failure of the General Assembly to change the law which has been interpreted by the courts creates a presumption that the interpretation was in accordance with the legislative intent; otherwise the General Assembly would have changed the law in a subsequent amendment." Fonner v. Shandon, Inc., 724 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. 1999).

Commonwealth's Brief at 16.

The Commonwealth's argument fails. As explained above, "[t]he object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly." 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). "[A]s a general rule, the best indication of legislative intent is the plain language of a statute." Shiffler, 879 A.2d at 189 (quotations and citations omitted). Nevertheless, the rules of construction list certain, non-exclusive presumptions that "may be used" to ascertain legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922. One of these presumptions is legislative acquiescence. The statute declares:

In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute the following presumptions, among others, may be used:

(4) That when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language.

Wendowski was issued by a three-judge panel of this Court - not "a court of last resort." Nevertheless, in In re Estate of Lock, 244 A.2d 677 (Pa. 1968), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended the presumption of legislative acquiescence to certain opinions from this Court. The Supreme Court declared:

where a decision of the Superior Court construing a statute was never modified by the Supreme Court, the presumption was that when the legislature subsequently enacted a similar statute dealing with the same subject matter, the legislature intended the same construction to be placed on the language of the subsequent statute.

Even though the presumption of legislative acquiescence extends to Superior Court opinions, "[application of [the] presumption is discretionary, not mandatory." Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1285 (Pa. 2020); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922 ("[i]n ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute the following presumptions . . . may be used") (emphasis added). Further, our Supreme Court has explained that the underlying rationale for applying the presumption of legislative acquiescence is far weaker when dealing with Superior Court precedent, as the presumption rests upon a rather dubious supposition. The Supreme Court explained:

This extension of § 1922(4) beyond its terms to encompass lines of Superior Court precedent [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] has yet to disturb would seem to hinge at least in part on the idea that [the Supreme Court's] decision not to review such cases is, itself, a form of acquiescence. But as [the Supreme Court's] then-Justice Samuel J. Roberts once observed, "A denial [of allocatur] may merely reflect that the particular controversy was not the proper vehicle for deciding a question of law or that it was not presented in the proper posture." Hon. Samuel J. Roberts, Foreword, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1980, 54 TEMPLE L.Q. 403, 407 (1981); cf. Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 673 A.2d 898, 904 (Pa. 1996) ("[A] dismissal [of a petition for allowance of appeal] as being improvidently granted has the exact same effect as if [the Supreme Court] had denied the petition for allowance of appeal (allocatur) in the first place. Where [the Supreme Court dismisses] an appeal as improvidently granted, the lower tribunal's opinion and order stand as a decision of that court and [the Supreme Court's] order has no precedential value").

Wendowski held that a court may anticipatorily revoke an order of probation when the defendant commits a new crime after sentencing, but before the period of probation has begun. As explained above, this holding finds no support in our statutes and is contrary to the plain language of Sections 9721, 9754, and 9771 of the Sentencing Code. Thus, to paraphrase our Supreme Court in Dickson: "[t]hat we have declined, until now, to address [Wendowski and its progeny] on this issue, while perhaps regrettable, cannot be used as a brickbat to prevent us from bringing the decisional law of this Commonwealth into line with the plain language of" the statutes. Dickson, 918 A.2d at 108. Here, since Wendowski and its progeny are contrary to the plain language of the statutes, we follow Dickson and decline to apply the discretionary presumption of legislative acquiescence. Moreover, since Wendowski and its progeny are contrary to the plain language of the relevant statutes, we overrule Wendowski and its progeny.

We, thus, vacate Appellant's judgment of sentence and remand this case "with instructions to reinstate the original order of probation." Commonwealth v. Griggs, 461 A.2d 221, 225 (Pa. Super. 1983). As a final matter, with respect to the revocation of Appellant's parole, since the trial court revoked Appellant's parole and illegally resentenced Appellant to serve a new term of incarceration, we must also remand for resentencing. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 632 A.2d 934, 936 (Pa. Super. 1993) ("the order revoking parole does not impose a new sentence; it requires appellant, rather, to serve the balance of a valid sentence previously imposed. Moreover, such a recommittal is just that - a recommittal and not a sentence. Further, at a Violation of parole' hearing, the court is not free to give a new sentence") (citations and some capitalization omitted).

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded with instructions to reinstate the original order of probation and for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.

President Judge Emeritus Bender, Judge Lazarus, Judge Dubow and Judge McCaffery join this Opinion.

Judge Kunselman files a Concurring Opinion in which Judge Lazarus, Judge Dubow and Judge McCaffery join.

Judge Bowes files a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in which Judge Murray joins. Judge Shogan did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

Judgment Entered.

CONCURRING OPINION

KUNSELMAN, J.:

I fully join in the Majority Opinion but write separately to note additional statutory authority relevant to "split sentences" and the history of parole, which buttress the Majority's conclusions. I also provide additional analysis to support overruling Commonwealth v. Wendowski, 420 A.2d 628 (Pa. Super. 1980).

While trial courts have the inherent authority and discretion to impose a sentence, the legislature dictates which actions constitute crimes and sets the possible penalties for such actions. Quite simply, "[i]f no statutory authorization exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated." Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 850 A.2d 1268, 1271 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (emphasis added); see also Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 889-90 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 221 A.3d 644 (Pa. 2019).

Additionally, the legislature has given trial courts the authority to issue a "split sentence" which includes both incarceration and probation. The Sentencing Code provides:

(a) General rule.--In determining the sentence to be imposed the court shall, except as provided in subsection (a.l), consider and select one or more of the following alternatives, and may impose them consecutively or concurrently:

(1) An order of probation.

(2) A determination of guilt without further penalty.

(3) Partial confinement.

(4)Total confinement.

(5) A fine. . . .

As the Majority observed, the trial court here imposed a split sentence of 6-23 months of incarceration with 3 years of probation, and it ordered that the probation was consecutive to the confinement.¹

To determine whether the trial court could revoke the probation portion of this sentence, based on a parole violation, requires us to consider and interpret sections of Title 42 (the Sentencing Code) and Title 61 (Prisons and Parole). In these statutes, the legislature has established separate rules for confinement and for orders of probation. Compare 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9756 (Sentence of total confinement) with 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9754 (Order of probation). First, I discuss statutes relevant to confinement and parole and then statutes relevant to probation.

For a sentence of total confinement, the legislature created an indeterminate sentencing scheme.² Under such a scheme, the sentencing court generally must announce a sentence that includes both a minimum and a maximum term. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9756. "In imposing a sentence of total confinement the court shall at the time of sentencing specify any maximum period up to the limit authorized by law. . . ." 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9756(a). Thus, while the trial court has some discretion on the length and type of the sentence, the legislature determines the highest possible maximum term for each offense. See, e.g., 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 1103-1105 (setting maximum terms for felony, misdemeanor, and summary offenses). Also, according to our statutes, the minimum period of confinement must not exceed one-half the maximum. 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9756(b), 9757. "[T]he maximum term represents the sentence imposed for a criminal offense, with the minimum term merely setting the date after which a prisoner may be paroled." Commonwealth v. Blount, 207 A.3d 925, 939, (Pa. Super. 2019J appeal denied, 218 A.3d 1198 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

The legislature also established where a confinement sentence shall be served and who determines if, and when, an inmate is eligible for parole. For confinement, a maximum term of five years or more, shall be served in a state prison; a maximum term of two but less than five years, may be served in either the state prison or the county jail, and a maximum of less than two years shall be served in county jail. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9762(b). If confinement is served in a state prison, then the State Board of Probation and Parole has the exclusive authority to determine if, and when, the inmate may be granted parole.³ 61 Pa. C.S.A. § 6132. For these inmates, the trial court may give only a recommendation regarding parole to the State Parole Board. Id. at § 6134 (b). If the sentence is served in county jail, however, the trial court has the authority to determine if, and when, the inmate may be granted parole. ⁴ Id. at § 6134.1; 42 Pa. C.S.A § 9775; Commonwealth v. McDermott, 547 A.2d 1236, (Pa. Super. 1988) (common pleas court retains authority to grant and revoke parole for offender sentenced to maximum term of imprisonment of less than two years).

Notably, parole is a legislative creation. Sentencing courts have no inherent authority to grant parole; the court's authority must come from the General Assembly. Presly v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole, 748 A.2d 791, 793 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). When the founders first adopted the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, parole, as a penological expedient, did not exist. Com. ex rel. Banks v. Cain, 28 A.2d 897, 899 (Pa. 1942). The system of parole initially appeared in America in the Elmira Reformatory, opened in 1876. Id. at 900, n.2. "It was first adopted in an American prison in 1884 in Ohio. It did not come into general use in the American prison system until the [1890s]. Parole made its initial entrance into Pennsylvania when the Huntingdon Reformatory was organized in 1887, and it was not adopted in our state penitentiaries until 1909 or in our county jails until 1911." Id.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania previously discussed the history of parole and the separation of powers between the courts and the legislature as follows:

The power to grant paroles is not inherent in courts; Pennsylvania courts never had such power until it was given to them [by the legislature] by the Act of June 19, 1911, P.L. 1059, 61 P.S. § 314, and then only with respect to prisoners in county jails and workhouses. What the legislature thus gave it can take away again in whole or in part and vest in some other agency of government.

The legislature has exclusive power to determine the penological system of the Commonwealth. It alone can prescribe the punishments to be meted out for crime. It can provide for fixed penalties or grant to the courts such measure of discretion in the imposition of sentences as it may see fit. It may enact that prison confinement shall be the punishment for crime or may abolish prisons altogether and adopt some other method of enforcing the criminal law. It may therefore establish a parole system by which prisoners shall, under certain conditions, be allowed to re-enter society through a gradual amelioration of their restraint and a substitution of controlled freedom for continued incarceration.

The granting of parole and the supervision of parolees are purely administrative functions, and accordingly may be entrusted by the legislature to non-judicial agencies. What parole statutes give to the paroling authorities - in the present instance to the State Board of Parole - is in effect nothing more than the factfinding duty of determining in each case when the conditions prescribed by the legislature for provisional release from confinement have been complied with, and that duty may properly be placed in charge of an administrative tribunal as is so commonly done in other fields of governmental administration.

The High Court further elaborated that parole was not:

an interference with judicial authority, nor an assumption of judicial power, for the supervisors of penal institutions to administer the very conditions of punishment or clemency which the law prescribed and itself wrote into the judge's sentence. Where conditions of punishment are before-hand prescribed, and form constituent parts of the sentence of conviction, it is not an assumption of judicial power for an administrative officer, acting within the law and the terms of the sentence, to take upon himself the task of ascertaining whether the conditions have been complied with.

Thus, "while the court determines the guilt or innocence of the accused and pronounces upon the guilty the penalty provided by law, ⁵ the manner of executing the sentence is prescribed by the legislature. . . ." Id. at 901. Additionally, while an inmate is on parole, he is still considered to be incarcerated:

The parolee is not discharged, but merely serves the remainder of his sentence by having his liberty restrained in a manner analogous to that employed in the 'trusty' or 'honor' system of prison discipline. 'The parole authorized by the statute does not suspend service or operate to shorten the term. While on parole the convict is bound to remain in the legal custody and under the control of the warden until the expiration of the term. While this is an amelioration of punishment, it is in legal effect imprisonment'.

Importantly, as part of establishing the rules for parole, the legislature also set forth the penalty for a parole violation. If a parolee violates his state parole by committing a new crime, the legislature authorized the State Parole Board to revoke parole and recommit the parolee to the prison; if recommitted, the parolee shall serve the remainder of the term which the parolee would have been compelled to serve had parole not been granted. 61 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 6137(h), 6138(a). Similarly, if the parolee violates his county parole by committing a new crime, as was the case here, the legislature provided that the trial court may "on cause shown by the probation officer that the inmate has violated his parole, recommit and reparole the inmate in the same manner and by the same procedure as in the case of the original parole. . . ." 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9776(e). Thus, whether the State Parole Board or the sentencing court supervises the parolee, the statutory sanction for a parole violation is recommitment.

Here, the Majority and the Concurring/Dissenting Opinion (hereafter Dissent) agree that the only remedy for a parole violation provided in our statutes is recommitment of the parolee for the remainder of the term. Majority at 30, Concurring/Dissenting at 1. Because Simmons violated his parole, trial court can revoke parole and recommit Simmons to serve the balance of his 23-month term.⁶ Upon remand, if the court orders recommitment, it may also reparole him at any time during that term. 61 Pa. C.S.A. § 6134.1; 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9776(e).

As mentioned, the legislature has established separate rules if the trial court chooses to enter an order of probation. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9754. "[T]he court shall specify the length of any term during which the defendant is to be supervised, which term may not exceed the maximum term for which the defendant could be confined, and the authority that shall conduct the supervision." Id. at § 9754(a). The court is permitted to attach reasonable conditions to probation. Id. at § 9754(b). Additionally, "the sentence to be imposed in the event of a violation of a condition shall not be fixed prior to a finding on the record that a violation has occurred." Id. at § 9754(d).

Section 9771 sets forth when a trial court may modify or revoke an order of probation. The Majority aptly discusses the interplay of subsections (a) and (b) under that section, so I will not repeat that analysis here. However, as Simmons argues in his brief, subsection (d) of section 9771 also supports the Majority's interpretation. That subsection provides: "(d) Hearing required. -There shall be no revocation or increase of conditions of sentence under this section except after a hearing at which the court shall consider the record of the sentencing proceeding together with evidence of the conduct of the defendant while on probation. . . ." 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9771(d).

Here, there is no doubt that Simmons was not "on probation" at the time of his new crime. Thus, the court could not have considered any evidence of his conduct "while on probation" as a basis to revoke its order of probation. Instead, Simmons was on parole; his new crime constituted a violation of the conditions of his parole, for which there is a separate remedy, i.e., recommitment. Under this subsection, the trial court could not consider Simmons actions on parole as the basis to revoke his probation.

The Dissent maintains that the conditions of Simmons' probation attached at sentencing. "By imposing the conditions of a defendant's probation at the original sentencing, a defendant is put on notice as to what the specific conditions of his probation are and that if he fails to lead a 'law abiding life' from that day forward, he faces possible parole and probation revocation." Concurring/Dissenting at 6 (emphasis added). I disagree.

Under the Dissent's view, the term of Simmons' probation was actually 4 years and 11 months, not 3 years.⁷ This view also places Simmons on parole and probation concurrently, which was not the split sentence that the trial court ordered.⁸

Although the Dissent would choose to treat the incarceration and probation parts of Simmons' split sentence as intertwined, our legislature has chosen to treat them separately. If the legislature intended for a new crime while on parole to serve as a basis to revoke probation, it could have drafted section 9771 (d) to provide: "There shall be no revocation or increase of conditions of sentence under this section except after a hearing at which the court shall consider the record of the sentencing proceeding together with evidence of the conduct of the defendant while on probation or parole...." ⁹ It did not.

In short, the legislature treats parole and probation separately. Indeed, the penalties for technical violations of parole are dramatically different than the technical violations of probation. Compare 61 Pa. C.S.A. § 6138(d)(3)-(5) (setting forth defined maximum sentences of six months, nine months and one year of recommitment for first, second, and third technical parole violations, respectively) with 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9771 (b)-(c) (making all sentencing alternatives available to the court that were available at the time of initial sentencing, with due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation). Whether intentional or not, the legislature has authorized much broader and potentially more severe sanctions for probation violations than for parole violations.

To be sure, the trial court must be aware of these distinctions, and should consider them before choosing which sentencing alternatives to impose during its original sentence, and whether to impose those sentence options concurrently or consecutively. Also, as our decision today makes clear, the trial court must question whether the "VOP" hearing is for an alleged violation of parole or violation of probation, as the court's possible sanctions are very different.

As a final matter, like the Majority, I believe Wendowski should be overruled. In Wendowski, a three-judge panel of this court relied on cases readily distinguishable from the instant matter.

First, the Wendowski court relied on a decision from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Wright v. United States, 315 A.2d 839 (D.C. App. 1974), which affirmed the revocation of a consecutive term of probation while a defendant was serving a term of work release. The D.C. trial court revoked Wright's work release and probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his original one-year sentence. The appeals court affirmed, because if it reversed, a defendant who was previously granted probation "could commit criminal acts with impunity - as far as revocation of probation is concerned -- until he commenced actual service of the probationary period." Id. at 841-42.

That logic does not apply here, as Simmons did not commit new criminal acts with impunity. He was on parole and was subject to recommitment for the balance of his term. Thus, his new crimes did affect his prior sentence. Revoking his consecutive probation, however, was an additional sanction, which the General Assembly of Pennsylvania has not authorized.

Moreover, the Wright Court acknowledged that the outcome we reach today - concluding the court lacked authority to revoke a probation sentence that had not yet started -- "may occasionally happen" due to "legislative oversight" where the statutes fairly leave "no room for construction to avoid such a result." Id. at 841.

The Wendowski Court also relied on a concurring opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in James v. United States, 140 F.2d 392, 394 (5^th Cir. 1944) (Waller, J, concurring), which lacks statutory support. There, the James Court concluded that, because a future date was not clearly fixed for the commencement of probation, the original judgment placed the defendant on probation at the time the sentence was rendered. As such, he was on probation when he committed the acts for which revocation of probation was sought and obtained. Thus, the majority determined that the district court was acting within its power and discretion under a federal statute when it revoked James' probation. Id. at 393.

The concurrence disagreed that James was on probation at the time of his new crime. Nonetheless, it would have found that the trial court was authorized to revoke James' probation. The concurrence cites no relevant statutory authority for this conclusion, only the general notion that, "A defendant on probation has no contract with the court. He is still a person convicted of crime, and the expressed intent of the Court to have him under probation beginning at a future time does not 'change his position from the possession of a privilege to the enjoyment of a right.'" Id. at 394 (citing Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932)).

However, a closer reading of Burns indicates that the district court that revoked Burns' probation was interpreting a federal probation statute. That statute expressly gave district courts very broad discretion to revoke probation at any time. Burns, 287 U.S. at 221. The Burns Court observed that the statute broadly conferred discretion to grant probation, as well as to modify or revoke it. Id.

There, the relevant federal statute generally provided that "The court may revoke or modify any condition of probation, or may change the period of probation." Id. As the Burns Court observed, "There [were] no limiting requirements as to the formulation of charges, notice of charges, or manner of hearing or determination. No criteria for modification or revocation [were] suggested which [were] in addition to, or different from, those which pertain to the original grant [of probation]. The question in both cases was whether the court [was] satisfied that its action would subserve the ends of justice and the best interests of both the public and the defendant. The only limitation, and this applie[d] to both the grant and any modification of it, [was] that the total period of probation shall not exceed five years." Id., (citing Act of March 4, 1925, § 1 (18 USCA § 724)). Thus, Burns interpreted a completely different, and much less restricting, statute regarding probation revocation than the one the Pennsylvania legislature has created.

As the Majority noted, the Wendowski Court did not examine the relevant Pennsylvania statutes as we have done here, because the issue of whether the trial court could revoke a probation sentence that had not yet started was not before that court. Because Wendowski conflicts with those statutes, despite its lengthy history in our precedent, it must be overruled. "While stare decisis serves invaluable and salutary principles, it is not an inexorable command to be followed blindly when such adherence leads to perpetuating error." Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267, 1285 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted).

Obviously, the legislature has the power to modify the sanctions for parole and probation violations to make them consistent if it chooses. Or, it may grant sentencing courts the authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of parole, as Congress did in Burns, supra. However, under the present statutes, the Majority correctly holds that the trial court could not revoke Simmons' probation and resentence him for a probation violation that occurred prior to the start of his probation. For the additional reasons stated here, I join the Majority in finding that Simmons' sentence is illegal and must be vacated. The trial court may recommit him to the balance of his incarceration sentence for his parole violation, but it must reinstate the probation from its original, split sentence.

Judge Lazarus, Judge Dubow and Judge McCaffery join this Concurring Opinion.

Judge Shogan did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

BOWES, J.

I agree with the learned Majority that the parole portion of Appellant's sentence must be vacated and remanded so that Appellant can be recommitted to serve parole back-time.¹ However, I respectfully disagree that the probation should be reimposed. The Majority's interpretation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771 upends forty years of unchallenged precedent permitting the anticipatory revocation of an order of probation when a defendant commits a new crime. Starting with Commonwealth v. Wendowski, 420 A.2d 628 (Pa.Super. 1980), our courts have repeatedly construed § 9771 as providing that a defendant may violate the conditions of a probationary order by committing a new crime any time between sentencing and the completion of the maximum period of probation. To my mind, the doctrine of stare decisis and the presumption of legislative acquiescence warrant maintaining this longstanding interpretation of Pennsylvania law. Accordingly, I dissent.

As the Majority explains, statutory construction is a pure question of law, which we review de novo. Commonwealth v. Cousins, 212 A.3d 34, 38 (Pa. 2019). "The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions." 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). We first look to the plain language of the statute, construing the words according to their common usage to discern the legislature's intent. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a), (b); Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240, 1247 (Pa. 2019). Importantly, the plain meaning of a word "does not depend upon its form, but upon the intention of the Legislature, to be ascertained from a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object, and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other." MERSCORP, Inc. v. Del. Cty., 207 A.3d 855, 866 (Pa. 2019) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

We look beyond the plain meaning of the statute only where the words of the statute are ambiguous or not explicit. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). A statutory text is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations. See Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717, 734 (Pa. 2020). Once a court concludes that the statutory language is ambiguous, it turns to the canons of statutory construction to determine the intended meaning of the relevant language. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922.

Section 9771 addresses the termination, modification, and revocation of probation and it provides as follows:

(a) General rule. - The court may at any time terminate continued supervision or lessen or increase the conditions upon which an order of probation has been imposed.

(b) Revocation. - The court may revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation. Upon revocation the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of initial sentencing, due consideration being given to the time spent serving the order of probation.

(c) Limitation on sentence of total confinement. - The court shall not impose a sentence of total confinement upon revocation unless it finds that:

(1) the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or

(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that he will commit another crime if he is not imprisoned; or

(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the court.

(d) Hearing required. - There shall be no revocation or increase of conditions of sentence under this section except after a hearing at which the court shall consider the record of the sentencing proceeding together with evidence of the conduct of the defendant while on probation. Probation may be eliminated or the term decreased without a hearing.

The Majority concludes that the plain meaning of § 9771 permits revocation of probation only after a defendant has begun serving the probationary portion of his sentence. Specifically, the Majority focuses upon § 9771(b), which states that "[t]he court may revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation." The Majority reads § 9771(b) in tandem with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a), which authorizes a trial court to impose probation "consecutively or concurrently." Since probation can only be imposed "consecutively or concurrently" pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(a), the Majority concludes that the "specified conditions" of a probation order set to run consecutively to a separate term of incarceration cannot take effect until the defendant begins serving the probationary portion of his sentence. The Majority found that "[t]his view is mandated by the plain language of the statutes. Indeed, any other view is statutorily untenable." Majority Opinion at 19. I must respectfully disagree with this proffered statutory interpretation.

From the outset, I emphasize that the Majority's analysis overlooks an unbroken line of Pennsylvania precedent interpreting the phrase "order of probation" under § 9771 much differently in the revocation context. This Court has consistently held that the order of probation itself may be revoked at any time after sentencing and before the maximum period of probation has elapsed. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 516 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Pa.Super. 1986) ("To suggest. . . that a defendant is free to commit unlimited additional crimes without in any way impairing or endangering a previously imposed sentence of probation merely because the probationary period is not commenced is to suggest an absurdity in the statute which this Court is not prepared to create."). Accordingly, our case law treats the probationary and incarceration aspects of a defendant's sentence as intertwined parts of the same sentencing scheme. Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 365 (Pa.Super. 2013) ("[U]pon revocation, the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as the alternatives available at the time of initial sentencing .... the trial court is limited only by the maximum sentence that it could have imposed originally"); see also Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 517 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa. 1986) ("When a defendant challenges one of several interdependent sentences, he, in effect, challenges the entire sentencing plan.").

This long-standing interpretation jettisoned by the Majority³ is also supported by the language of § 9771(b) when viewed in tandem with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9754(b) ⁴, which states that the sentencing alternatives available to the revocation court are the same that were available to the initial sentencing court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b). By imposing the conditions of a defendant's probation at the original sentencing, a defendant is put on notice as to what the specific conditions of his probation are and that, if he fails to lead a "law-abiding life" from that day forward, he faces possible parole and probation revocation. See Commonwealth v. Shires, 240 A.3d 974, 977-80 (Pa.Super. 2020) (examining the interplay between the crimes code and prisons and parole code, before holding that the only pertinent conditions of a defendant's probation for revocation purposes were the conditions imposed as part of his original sentence).

I also disagree with the Majority's overly-strict interpretation of § 9771(b) to the effect that revocation is sanctioned only "upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of probation," which are enumerated in § 9754(c) and listed in the Majority Opinion. Since specified conditions of probation run coextensively with the term of probation, the Majority posits that the plain-meaning of "order of probation" cannot become effective for revocation purposes until a defendant begins serving probation. See Majority at 22-24. However, this view ignores 42 Pa.C.S. § 9754(b), which our Supreme Court has held provides additional grounds for revoking a defendant's probation. See Foster, supra at 1250.

In Foster, our Supreme Court applied the canons of statutory construction to § 9771 to discern whether acts not specified in § 9754(c) could still constitute a probation violation. Id. Our High Court found that, when read together, § 9771(b) and § 9754(b) create a construct so that probation revocation can take place after a violation of a "specific condition" or the commission of a new crime. Id. at 1250 ("In other words, a court may find a defendant in violation of probation only if the defendant has violated one of the 'specific conditions' of probation included in the probation order or has committed a new crime."). Thus, the specific conditions of probation flow from the general condition of probation that a defendant leads "a law-abiding life." Id. at 1250; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9754(b). The Foster Court imported the general condition of law-abidingness into the same sentence of the section at issue here, even though that condition was not specified in the actual sentencing order, which, under the Majority's approach, § 9771(b) plainly requires. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b) ("The court may revoke an order of probation upon proof of the violation of specified conditions of the probation."). Notably, Foster clarified that "specified conditions" includes the general condition of law-abidingness. Accordingly, Foster serves as a prime example that the language of § 9771(b) need not be construed as strictly as the Majority view would impose.

Concededly, the question of anticipatory revocation was not before the Foster Court. However, a defendant can commit a new crime at any time after a split sentence is imposed, regardless of which portion of that sentence he is then serving. Since the general and specific conditions are included in the probation order, a defendant is placed on notice at the sentencing hearing of the penalties associated with committing a new crime. Thus, the Foster Court's interpretation of § 9771(b) plainly supports Wendowski's construction of § 9771: commission of a new crime any time after imposition of sentence may serve as the basis for revocation of probation.

Given the existence of these cases that espouse an equally reasonable statutory interpretation compared to the majority view, I would find that § 9771 is ambiguous, at best, on this point. Therefore, I would turn to additional tools of statutory construction, which overwhelmingly support the affirmation of established case law interpreting § 9771. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c).⁵

First, pursuant to 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(c)(1) we are permitted to examine the statutory consequences of a particular interpretation. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(c)(1) (presuming that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result, we are permitted to examine the practical consequences of a particular interpretation). Moreover, in accordance with 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(c)(5), we presume that the general assembly intended to favor the public interest over any private interest. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(c)(5) ("[T]he General Assembly [presumptively] intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest.").

Here, an examination of the consequences of the Majority's approach highlights its practical unworkability and inconsistency with important public policy interests. The Wendowski court aptly addressed the implicated public policy concerns, explaining:

If, at any time before the defendant has completed the maximum period of probation, or before he has begun service of his probation, he should commit offenses of such nature as to demonstrate to the court that he is unworthy of probation and that the granting of the same would not be in subservience to the ends of justice and the best interests of the public, or the defendant, the court could revoke or change the order of probation. A defendant on probation has no contract with the court. He is still a person convicted of [a] crime, and the expressed intent of the court to have him under probation beginning at a future time does not 'change his position from the possession of a privilege to the enjoyment of a right.'

Indeed, probation is a "privilege" not a "right." Id. Interpreting the statute as the Majority suggests would be turn this notion on its head, changing probation from a "privilege" to a "right" that must be honored no matter how many additional crimes the defendant commits between the imposition of his sentence and the commencement of the probationary term. For example, a parolee who commits a crime on the last day of his term of incarceration could never face any probationary consequences for that crime, since it was committed outside of the probationary portion of his sentence. In other words, once the amount of back time left on his sentence neared completion, the defendant would have license to break the law while resting assured of an irrevocable entitlement to probation. Although the defendant had unequivocally demonstrated the continuing inability to abide by the law, the probation revocation court would have to grant him the opportunity to commit yet another crime during the probationary portion of his split sentence before the court could act. This result topples the long-standing recognition of probation as a "privilege" and discourages courts' utilization of it as an important deterrent and rehabilitative tool, which, when used in combination with parole revocation, protects the public.⁶

Second, the doctrines of stare decisis and legislative acquiescence support upholding Wendowski and its progeny. For over forty years, we have explicitly authorized revocation courts to anticipatorily revoke probation based on our interpretation of § 9771. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Allhouse, 33 A.3d 39 (Pa.Super. 2011); Commonwealth v. Hoover, 909 A.2d 321, 323-24 (Pa.Super. 2006); Commonwealth v. Ware, 737 A.2d 251, 253-54 (Pa.Super. 1999); Miller, supra at 1265-66; Commonwealth v. Dickens, 475 A.2d 141, 152-53 (Pa.Super. 1984); Wendowski, supra at 630. Thus, it has been clearly established through precedent that "a court may revoke a probationary sentence at any time prior to its completion if the defendant demonstrates to the court that he is unworthy of probation." Wendowski Bit 630. This precedent provided the legal landscape upon which trial courts chose probationary tails from among the sentencing options available to them. I think it is beyond cavil that knowledge that the probation could be revoked at any time upon a defendant's commission of a new crime informed some of these courts' decisions, and that sentencing schemes may well have been structured quite differently had the courts been aware of the constraint that the Majority now imposes.

Furthermore, since Wendowski, the legislature has amended § 9771 twice. See Commonwealth's brief at 16. However, neither amendment has addressed the operative language at issue here. Therefore, the legislature appears to have acquiesced in the long line of precedent borne of the Wendowski holding that the conditions of probation begin at the time sentence is imposed. See Commonwealth's brief at 16; see also, e.g. Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 459-60 (Pa. 2017) (Batts II) (Finding legislative acquiescence to the Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 295 (Pa. 2013) (Batts I) Court's interpretation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102, since "[d]espite the passage of four years since we issued Batts I, the General Assembly has not passed a statute addressing the sentencing of juveniles convicted of first-degree murder pre-Miller [v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)], nor has it amended the pertinent provisions that were severed in Battsl."); seealso, e.g. Commonwealth v. Bradley, 834 A.2d 1127, 1133 (Pa. 2003) (considering the "three strikes" provision of the sentencing code and finding the fact that "several versions of the [sentencing] Guidelines adopted the same definition of 'transaction'" as "at least some evidence of legislative acquiescence in the definition.").

The Majority discusses the Commonwealth's stare decisis and legislative arguments, acknowledging that the Superior Court has reaffirmed Wendowski many times and conceding that the doctrine of stare decisis can still apply in situations, such as here, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue. See Majority at 24-25. Nevertheless, the Majority gives short shrift to the Commonwealth's position, dismissing and departing from established precedent because it finds that precedent relied on an erroneous interpretation of § 9771 which ran "contrary to the plain language of the statutes" for decades. Id. at 27.

While I do not deem our Court's repeatedly consistent interpretation of § 9771 and the legislature's acquiescence to that interpretation as dispositive of the question of statutory interpretation, neither would I deem it insignificant as the Majority suggests. Legal precedent exists to ensure "the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). Section 9771 is not obscure or rarely applied, and the General Assembly has had forty years to undo the holding in Wendowski if it thought the holding incorrect or that defendants who commit new crimes while serving parole deserved more lenient treatment. In circumstances such as here, where the legislature has declined the opportunity to clarify an ambiguous text, adherence to our precedent promotes notions of fairness and stability. Accordingly, I would not unsettle forty years of established jurisprudence. Instead, I would leave any amendment of § 9771 to the General Assembly.

Therefore, while I agree that the parole portion of Appellant's sentence was imposed illegally, I respectfully dissent from the Majority's decision to vacate Appellant's entire judgment of sentence on the grounds that the court did not possess the authority to anticipatorily revoke Appellant's probation.

Judge Murray joins this dissenting opinion.

Judge Shogan did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.