JUSTICE KOONTZ delivered the opinion of the Court.

In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals of Virginia vacated Rebecca Scarlett Cary's convictions in a jury trial for the first-degree murder of Mark Beekman, Code § 18.2-32, and the use of a firearm in the commission of that crime, Code § 18.2-53.1. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions on the ground that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence against Cary and in failing to grant her proffered jury instructions on self-defense, right-to-arm, and voluntary manslaughter based upon a "heat of passion" theory. Cary v. Commonwealth, Record No. 2031-03-1, slip op. at 1-2 (December 21, 2004). We awarded the Commonwealth an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Code §§ 17.1-411 and 19.2-317(C).

BACKGROUND

Because the principal issue we consider in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a proper instruction of law proffered by the accused, we view the facts relevant to the determination of that issue in the light most favorable to Cary. Commonwealth v. Sands, 262 Va. 724, 729, 553 S.E.2d 733, 736 (2001); see also Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 263 Va. 31, 33, 557 S.E.2d 220, 221 (2002); Commonwealth v. Alexander, 260 Va. 238, 240, 531 S.E.2d 567, 568 (2000). When so viewed, the evidence at trial showed that Cary and Beekman were involved in a tumultuous relationship for more than 15 years during which time Beekman fathered three of Cary's four children. Although the two had cohabited in the past, they were not living together in 2002. They habitually argued violently regarding Beekman's failure to provide child support for his children.

On May 23, 2002, Cary purchased a handgun "to protect me and my children and our home" because she lived in a "bad neighborhood." In August 2002, Cary allegedly told Beekman's sister that she had purchased the handgun and threatened to kill Beekman because he continued to fail to provide child support. Cary allegedly made a similar statement to Tracy Tabron the day before Beekman was killed. Cary denied making these statements.

On the evening of September 6, 2002, Beekman went to Cary's apartment in the City of Norfolk. Cary detected the odor of alcohol on Beekman's person and knew from past experience that Beekman became violent when intoxicated. Post-mortem tests subsequently confirmed that Beekman had a highly-elevated blood alcohol level and also that he had recently used cocaine. The couple immediately began to quarrel over Beekman's failure to provide Cary with child support, and Beekman called Cary vulgar names and attacked her, grabbing her by the hair and hitting her in the "face and sides." Beekman refused to leave the apartment despite Cary's request that he do so.

Cary testified that when Beekman went to use the bathroom in the apartment, she decided to retrieve the handgun from where she kept it, but found that Darron, her teenage son, had already done so. Cary took the handgun from Darron and removed its ammunition clip, intending to use the apparently unloaded weapon to frighten Beekman into leaving the apartment.

When Beekman came out of the bathroom, Cary was sitting on a couch in the living room. Beekman again refused to leave the home and "was still verbally assaulting" Cary, threatening that he would "smack" her, "`F' [her] up," and "break [her] up." As Beekman "was getting ready to come into the living room," Cary pointed the handgun at Beekman, and it discharged. The bullet struck Beekman in the chest. Cary could not "remember doing anything [to make the handgun] go off" and "believe[d] it was on safety" and unloaded. Cary subsequently testified that she thought Beekman intended to resume his physical assault on her.

Cary instructed her son to call 911 and proceeded to apply pressure to the wound in Beekman's chest. Cary pulled Beekman's body outside of the home, later explaining that she did so because "the ambulance could get to him a whole lot faster . . . instead of them having to come all through the house." Emergency medical technicians arrived and attempted to revive Beekman, but were unsuccessful.

When police arrived following the shooting, Cary first claimed that an unknown assailant had shot Beekman outside the home and that Beekman had come to the home's door "holding his chest and gasping for air." Cary repeated versions of this fabrication to the police several times that night.

When the police subsequently interviewed Cary two days after the shooting, she claimed to be unable to remember what had happened but that her memory "was starting to come back." However, she denied having a handgun in the home and when asked if she had shot Beekman, Cary responded, "I don't think so." As the interview progressed, Cary ultimately admitted to police that she had shot Beekman, but maintained that she had only intended to frighten him into leaving the home and that the handgun had discharged accidentally. Cary also told police that after the shooting, she gave the handgun to her son to give to his uncle, who disposed of it. The handgun was never recovered.

On December 4, 2002, a grand jury indicted Cary for the first-degree murder of Beekman and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. On April 7, 2003, a jury trial commenced in the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk (trial court) with the Commonwealth presenting evidence in accord with the above-recited facts.

Relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, during her direct testimony in her defense Cary sought to introduce evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence against her. The Commonwealth objected to the introduction of such evidence, contending that "a defendant cannot introduce evidence of a victim's reputation for violence or evidence of specific facts of violence unless the defendant first adduces evidence of self-defense." The Commonwealth asserted that because Cary was claiming the shooting occurred accidentally, she could not also claim self-defense. The Commonwealth asserted further that, in any case, there had been no evidence of any overt act by Beekman at the time of the shooting that would have placed Cary in reasonable fear for her life or safety. The Commonwealth contended that, when Beekman went to the bathroom, he had effectively ended his assault on Cary and did nothing afterwards to place her in fear.

Cary responded that she was entitled to assert concurrent claims of accident and self-defense and that these claims were not mutually exclusive. Cary contended that the evidence did show an overt act sufficient to put Cary in fear for her life or safety. Cary maintained that Beekman's uninvited presence in the home, his verbal and physical abuse of her, and his refusal to leave after repeated requests, were part of a pattern of behavior that she could have reasonably believed would continue when Beekman returned from the bathroom, given his continued verbal abuse and refusal to leave the home. Moreover, Cary maintained that the space of time between the actual assault on her and the shooting was sufficient to permit the jury to find that Cary remained in imminent danger. At this point in the proceeding, however, Cary did not assert the argument that Beekman was actually advancing toward her when the gun discharged.

Before ruling on the admissibility of the anticipated evidence of Beekman's prior acts of violence, the trial court asked Cary's counsel if she had "presented all the evidence that . . . supports the establishment of [a] prima facie case [for] self-defense . . . including overt acts in support of that particular defense." Counsel responded that the series of actions by Beekman that preceded the shooting constituted the overt act necessary to establish an apprehension of imminent harm and that it was for the jury to determine whether Cary's fear was reasonable.

The trial court then ruled that Beekman's assault on Cary prior to the shooting was not an overt act sufficient to support a claim of self-defense, agreeing with the Commonwealth that when Beekman stopped the attack to go to the bathroom, Cary was no longer in imminent danger. The trial court reasoned that Cary's presence of mind in retrieving the handgun and of removing the ammunition clip showed that she was no longer in fear. The trial court further reasoned that at the time of the shooting, Cary did not claim that she was "using that weapon to repel any act or prevent any act by [Beekman] at that moment in time." Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Cary would not be entitled to present evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence against her and that she could not assert a defense of self-defense.

After the trial court made this ruling, Cary continued her testimony. During redirect examination, Cary testified that immediately prior to shooting Beekman, "[h]e was coming back. I am not sure whether he was walking or running." After this evidence was received, Cary did not request the trial court to reconsider its prior ruling that there was no evidence of an overt act by Beekman after he returned from the bathroom that would have caused Cary to be in reasonable fear for her life or safety.

Outside the presence of the jury, however, the trial court permitted Cary to proffer evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence against her. That evidence, presented by Cary and her son, established that Beekman had raped Cary when they first met and that he had physically abused her and her children throughout their relationship. On one occasion, Beekman cut her face with a glass, allegedly resulting in "75 stitches," and on another he broke her jaw. Beekman was particularly prone to violence when he was intoxicated.

Cary proffered instructions on the defenses of self-defense and heat of passion and further requested that the jury be instructed on the right-to-arm. Cary also sought an instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court refused these instructions.

The jury convicted Cary of both charged offenses and sentenced her to 20 years imprisonment for the first-degree murder of Beekman and three years imprisonment for the firearm offense. In an order dated September 17, 2003, the trial court imposed sentence in accord with the jury's verdicts.

Cary noted an appeal in the trial court and filed a petition for appeal in the Court of Appeals. In opposing Cary's petition, relevant to her claim that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on self-defense, the Commonwealth did not assert a procedural bar with respect to this issue. Instead, the Commonwealth argued that the trial court correctly found that the record did not support a finding that Cary was acting in self-defense.

After Cary's petition for appeal was granted in part by the Court of Appeals, the Commonwealth raised for the first time the issue whether Cary's assertion that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on self-defense was procedurally barred. The Commonwealth asserted that Cary had not expressly "argued to the trial court that Beekman was advancing on Cary at the time she shot him" when the self-defense instruction was proffered. The Commonwealth further maintained that Cary's assertion that she should have been permitted to introduce evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence against her was also procedurally barred because at the time she sought to introduce such evidence she had not yet testified that Beekman was either "walking or running" toward her when the gun discharged and did not reassert the issue once that evidence was presented.

In reversing Cary's convictions, the Court of Appeals did not expressly address the Commonwealth's assertion of a procedural bar. However, the Court of Appeals expressly found that with regard to Beekman's actions immediately prior to the shooting, Cary "testified without equivocation that `he was coming back' and she was `not sure whether he was walking or running.'" Cary, Record No. 2031-03-1, slip op. at 7-8. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that "[t]his evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [Cary], established an overt act of sufficient imminence to entitle her to a self-defense instruction because it supported a finding that the victim, although still over ten feet away, was advancing toward her in a threatening fashion to resume the attack he had stopped only moments earlier." Id. at 8.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals distinguished Sands, the principal case relied upon by the Commonwealth, stating that facts in the present case stood "in marked contrast to those in Sands, in which the victim had at least temporarily ceased his repeated attacks on the defendant and was watching television in another room when she retrieved a gun and `shot him five times while he reclined on the bed.'" Id. (quoting Sands, 262 Va. at 730, 553 S.E.2d at 737). The Court of Appeals further held that although Beekman, like the victim in Sands, "appeared [to be] unarmed [that fact] does not defeat the threat. The victim had beaten [Cary] with his fists on numerous prior occasions and, on one occasion, broke a glass in her face. [Cary] testified that, prior to the night on which she shot the victim, he had beaten her as recently as the previous weekend." Id.

The Court of Appeals further noted that Cary's claim that the killing "was an accident does not prevent her from asserting a legal claim of self-defense." Id. (citing Valentine v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 946, 953, 48 S.E.2d 264, 268 (1948)); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 10, 14-15, 82 S.E.2d 482, 484-85 (1954). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense. Cary, Record No. 2031-03-1, slip op. at 1-2.

The Court of Appeals reasoned that because the record would have supported giving an instruction on self-defense, "at least some of [Cary's] evidence about the victim's prior threats and abuse was admissible to show `the reasonable apprehensions of [appellant] for [her] life and safety,' immediately prior to the shooting." Id., slip op. at 6 (quoting Canipe v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 629, 640-41, 491 S.E.2d 747, 752 (1997)); see also Randolph v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 256, 265, 56 S.E.2d 226, 230 (1949). The Court did not address the Commonwealth's assertion that at the time she first sought to introduce the evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence she had not yet introduced evidence that Beekman was advancing on her when the gun discharged.

The Court of Appeals further held that because Cary's claim of right-to-arm would have been supported by the evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence and, thus, would potentially rebut the Commonwealth's assertion that her purchase of the handgun showed premeditation, the trial court erred in refusing Cary's instruction on right-to-arm. Cary, Record No. 2031-03-1, slip op. at 10-13. Addressing Cary's assertion that she was entitled to a heat of passion instruction and further that this would have warranted the trial court instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter, the Court of Appeals held that Cary's "testimony of the victim's prior conduct that evening and her testimony that he was coming back into the living room, where she feared he would assault her further and perhaps kill her, created a jury issue on whether there had been a cooling off period sufficient to preclude a finding that [Cary] acted in the heat of passion." Id. at 14.

The Court of Appeals recognized that "[w]hen a jury is instructed on first-degree murder and second-degree murder and convicts the defendant of first-degree murder, such a verdict `compels the conclusion that [the jury] would never have reached a voluntary manslaughter verdict.'" Id. (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 270, 277, 476 S.E.2d 504, 507 (1996), aff'd, 255 Va. 1, 492 S.E.2d 447 (1997)). However, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on self-defense and right-to-arm might have impacted the jury's consideration of the evidence in favor of finding first-degree murder and, thus, it was not clear that a properly instructed jury would not have considered the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter in the heat of passion. Id. at 14-15. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on that offense. Id. at 1-2.

Although the Court of Appeals vacated Cary's convictions, it nonetheless found the evidence sufficient to sustain those convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 17. The Commonwealth filed a petition for rehearing en banc, asserting, among other arguments, that the Court had erred in failing to address the assertion of a procedural bar to the self-defense issue. By order entered February 8, 2005, the Court of Appeals refused the petition for rehearing en banc.

DISCUSSION

Before addressing the merits of the substantive issues raised in this appeal, we first address the Commonwealth's second assignment of error that "[t]he Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that Cary's argument on appeal on the issue of self-defense was procedurally defaulted." In briefing this assignment of error, the Commonwealth argued this issue in conjunction with its first assignment of error asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence against Cary. The Commonwealth contends that the procedural default applies both to Cary's assertion that the trial court erred in denying her an instruction on self-defense and her assertion that the trial court erred in refusing to admit that evidence. However, because the Commonwealth's assignment of error asserts only that the default related to "the issue of self-defense," we will confine our consideration of the alleged procedural default to the failure to grant a self-defense instruction.

The Commonwealth maintains that in offering the self-defense instruction, Cary "never articulated for the court what overt act the victim had committed." Thus, the Commonwealth contends that Cary's argument made in the Court of Appeals, and reiterated here, that the evidence supports, directly or by inference, that Beekman was advancing upon her at the time of the killing, is procedurally barred. We disagree.

[4-5] When a trial court refuses to give an instruction proffered by a party that is a correct statement of law and which is supported by adequate evidence in the record, this action, without more, is sufficient to preserve for appeal the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing the instruction. Cf. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 160, 178 n. 9, 510 S.E.2d 445, 456 n. 9 (1999) (failure to raise "a precise objection to the Commonwealth's proposed verdict form" did not bar consideration of issue on appeal when defendant had proffered a correct verdict form); see also Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Karcher, 217 Va. 497, 498, 229 S.E.2d 884, 885 (1976). This is so because when an instruction is proffered on "a principle of law [that] is vital to a defendant in a criminal case, a trial court has an affirmative duty properly to instruct a jury about the matter." Jimenez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 244, 250, 402 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1991). Indeed, in Jimenez, we held the failure of the trial court to properly instruct the jury was so serious as to warrant invoking the "ends of justice" exception of Rules 5A:18 and 5:25 despite the defendant's failure to object to the improper instruction actually given. Id. at 251, 402 S.E.2d at 681-82.

Thus, we hold that Cary's proffer of a correct instruction on the defense of self-defense is sufficient to preserve for appeal the question whether the trial court erred in refusing that instruction. It was not necessary for Cary to expressly articulate each element necessary to her defense, because the trial court heard the evidence and could evaluate its application to the proffered instruction, which unquestionably was vital to Cary's case.

We now consider whether the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury being instructed on the defense of self-defense. The Commonwealth contends that in determining that the trial court erred in failing to grant Cary's self-defense instruction, "[t]he Court of Appeals . . . stitch[ed] together unconnected threads from various portions of Cary's testimony to create the impression of an overt act." The Commonwealth further contends that although these "unconnected threads" of evidence were before the trial court when it rejected Cary's proffered self-defense instruction, the evidence was not unequivocal, and when viewed in the context of Cary's full testimony established nothing more than that Beekman was returning to the living room from the bathroom, and not that he was advancing upon Cary in a threatening manner.

Cary responds that the Commonwealth's argument fails to apply the proper standard for reviewing the refusal of a correct instruction of law. Because that standard requires that the evidence be viewed in the light favorable to Cary, as the proponent of the instruction, Cary contends that the Court of Appeals properly focused its attention on those elements of her testimony that the jury could have found supported her claim of self-defense.

[7-9] Both parties rely extensively upon the rationale underlying the holding in Sands to support their respective positions. Certainly, that case provides the most recent, succinct, and comprehensive survey of the law of self-defense as it has developed in this Commonwealth:

The principles governing a plea of self-defense are well-established. Self-defense is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder, and in making such a plea, a "defendant implicitly admits the killing was intentional and assumes the burden of introducing evidence of justification or excuse that raises a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors." McGhee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 560, 562, 248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1978). The "bare fear" of serious bodily injury, or even death, however well-grounded, will not justify the taking of human life. Stoneman v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. 887, 900 (1874). "There must [also] be some overt act indicative of imminent danger at the time." Vlastaris v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 647, 652, 178 S.E. 775, 776 (1935). See also Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 971, 975, 234 S.E.2d 286, 290 (1977); Mercer v. Commonwealth, 150 Va. 588, 597, 142 S.E. 369, 371 (1928). In other words, a defendant "must wait till some overt act is done[,] . . . till the danger becomes imminent." Vlastaris, 164 Va. at 652, 178 S.E. at 777. In the context of a self-defense plea, "imminent danger" is defined as "an immediate, real threat to one's safety. . . ." Black's Law Dictionary 399 (7th ed. 1999). "There must be . . . some act menacing present peril . . . [and] the act . . . must be of such a character as to afford a reasonable ground for believing there is a design . . . to do some serious bodily harm, and imminent danger of carrying such design into immediate execution." Byrd v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 536, 539, 16 S.E. 727, 729 (1893).

Sands, 262 Va. at 729, 553 S.E.2d at 736.

Moreover, in Sands, this Court reiterated the well-established rule that, as with any proffered instruction that is otherwise a correct statement of law, an instruction on the defense of self-defense "is proper only if supported by more than a scintilla of evidence" and "it is not error to refuse an instruction when there is no evidence to support it." Id. (emphasis added).

Except that the victim and the defendant in Sands were married, the underlying history of their relationship is materially indistinguishable from that of the tumultuous relationship between Beekman and Cary. In both instances, the couples had a long history of acts of violence committed by the male upon the female that were frequently occasioned by the excessive use by the male of alcohol and illicit drugs. In both instances, the male had made repeated threats to kill the female, and the female had a subjective belief that the male would eventually carry out that threat. See id. at 725-27, 553 S.E.2d at 734-35.

In Sands, on the evening of the killing, the victim had savagely beaten the defendant. However, the evidence showed that subsequent to that assault, the defendant's sister-in-law had arrived at the couple's home and offered assistance to the defendant. Id. at 727-28, 553 S.E.2d at 735. Meanwhile, the victim "was lying in bed, watching television." Id. at 728, 553 S.E.2d at 735. The defendant, who was in the bathroom with her sister-in-law, suddenly became frantic, went to the kitchen where she retrieved a gun, and then went to the bedroom. The victim merely asked the defendant what she was "doing," and then the defendant shot the victim five times, killing him. Id. at 728, 533 S.E.2d at 735-36.

This Court concluded that there was no evidence to support the defendant's proffered self-defense instruction because the record did not "reveal any overt act by her husband that presented an imminent danger at the time of the shooting." Id. at 730, 533 S.E.2d at 737. This Court specifically noted that while less than an hour had elapsed between the victim ending his assault on the defendant and the shooting, id. at 730 n. 2, 553 S.E.2d at 737 n. 2, "sufficient time elapsed for [the sister-in-law] to arrive at the couple's home, and for the defendant to view the extent of her injuries while in the bathroom with [the sister-in-law], walk from the bathroom to the living room door, turn around and proceed back into the kitchen, retrieve a gun from a cabinet, and walk back into the bedroom where her husband was reclining on the bed, watching television." Id. at 730, 553 S.E.2d at 737.

In the present case, when considered in the light most favorable to Cary, the evidence is sufficient to establish Cary's genuine fear for her life in view of the atrocities inflicted upon her by Beekman. Thus, as before, we are concerned only with whether the record would provide the trier-of-fact with more than a scintilla of evidence to support a finding that there was an overt act of sufficient imminence on the part of Beekman that would warrant Cary to act upon that genuine fear to use deadly force in self-defense.

The Commonwealth asserts, and we agree, that Cary cannot rely solely on the initial assault upon her as the "overt act" that occasioned her resort to self-defense. However, contrary to the apparent view of the Commonwealth, neither may we disregard that evidence entirely, merely because "Beekman retired to the bathroom" for approximately five minutes. Rather, we consider Beekman's subsequent actions in light of that assault.

Contrary to the assertion made by the Commonwealth, the evidence in this case, again viewed in the light most favorable to Cary, does not "simply indicate that Beekman walked back into the living room after using the bathroom." Nor is it necessary for us to "stitch together unconnected threads from various portions of Cary's testimony to create the impression of an overt act."

According to Cary's testimony, Beekman did not simply emerge from the bathroom and make his way to the living room. Rather, she confronted Beekman as he returned to the living room and repeated her demand that he leave the home. Beekman refused this demand and threatened to "smack" her and commit other acts of violence upon her. It was in this context that Cary testified that Beekman was "walking or running" toward her. And that fact must be viewed in the context that Beekman's assault on Cary, which had ended only five minutes before, had been occasioned by the same demand that he leave the home, his refusal, and a vile verbal assault. When so viewed, the trier-of-fact could reasonably conclude that Beekman, although 11 to 18 feet away from Cary at the time of the shooting, was nonetheless advancing toward her with the intent to resume his physical assault upon her. Such act constituted an overt act of sufficient imminence on the part of Beekman to warrant Cary to respond in her defense. Accordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to warrant the trial court instructing the jury on Cary's claim of self-defense and, thus, that the trial court erred in not giving the proffered self-defense instruction.

The Commonwealth also contends that even if the evidence in its entirety entitled Cary to have the jury instructed on self-defense, the Court of Appeals nonetheless erred in finding that the trial court improperly refused to admit Cary's proffered testimony concerning Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence against her. As it did in the Court of Appeals, the Commonwealth contends that at the time Cary sought to introduce this evidence during her direct testimony, she had not yet presented the evidence she now relies upon to establish the overt act necessary for a claim of self-defense, and she did not request that the trial court revisit its decision once that evidence had been presented during her re-direct testimony.

We agree with the Commonwealth that at the time Cary sought to introduce the evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence, in response to the trial court's express inquiry, her counsel relied only on the evidence as it existed at that point in the trial as the basis for establishing a claim of self-defense. Thus, the trial court correctly excluded the proffered evidence because at that time evidence of an overt act sufficiently imminent to support a claim of self-defense by Cary had not been presented.

However, the issue is mooted by our holding that the evidence ultimately supported the assertion of an overt act warranting a self-defense instruction. Because the case will be remanded and the evidence well may be presented differently upon a new trial, we will not give an advisory opinion regarding whether evidence of Beekman's prior threats and acts of violence would be admissible if proffered again. Kanter v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 524, 532-33, 199 S.E. 477, 481 (1938); see also Cantrell v. Crews, 259 Va. 47, 52, 523 S.E.2d 502, 504 (2000).

For the same reason, we do not consider the Commonwealth's remaining assignments of error concerning the judgments of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court on the right-to-arm, heat of passion, and voluntary manslaughter issues. While we do not discount the Commonwealth's assertions on these issues and recognize that they may likely recur in the event of a new trial, it is also likely that the presentation of evidence will be sufficiently different that any expression by this Court as to the correctness of the rulings of the trial court in the former trial, or of the Court of Appeals in reversing those rulings, would not be relevant and advisory only.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals vacating Cary's convictions and remanding the case to the trial court for a new trial, if the Commonwealth be so advised.

Affirmed.