Opinion of the Court by Justice VENTERS.

Appellant, Fred Colvard, was convicted by a Jefferson Circuit Court jury of one count of first-degree sodomy, two counts of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree burglary, and of being a second-degree persistent felony offender (PFO II). For these crimes, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant now appeals to this Court as a matter of right. Ky. Const. § 110.

Among other things, Appellant argues on appeal that certain testimony from medical personnel was improperly admitted through the hearsay exception under KRE 803(4). Because we find that our previous interpretation of the hearsay exception for "statements for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis" was too broad, we find that the testimony was inappropriate. In addition, several other hearsay statements from other witnesses were improperly admitted. Because, in combination, the errors were not harmless, we reverse Appellant's conviction and remand this matter for a new trial. We will address Appellant's other arguments which may arise in his new trial to provide guidance to the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 2, 2006, Appellant allegedly sexually assaulted two girls, D.J. and D.Y., in their bedroom. D.J. and D.Y. were six and seven years old, respectively, at the time of the events. Appellant knew the children because not only did he live in the same apartment complex as them, but just a few months before, he was engaged to marry their grandmother. The grandmother ended the engagement when she learned that Appellant was convicted of attempting to rape a ten-year-old girl in 1994.

When D.J. and D.Y. told their mother that they had just been sexually assaulted by Appellant, she immediately reported it to the authorities. The girls were then medically examined and interviewed by several medical professionals. The medical examinations turned up no DNA or other physical evidence connecting Appellant to the crime. However, the examinations were not inconsistent with the girls' allegation of sexual assault.

A jury trial was conducted and the jury found Appellant guilty of two counts of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree sodomy, and one count of first-degree burglary. He was also convicted of PFO II and the jury recommended sentences of twenty years for the burglary and life on each of the sex offenses. Those sentences were all enhanced to life imprisonment as a result of the PFO II conviction. Additional facts will be developed further below, as needed.

I. HEARSAY TESTIMONY WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED UNDER KRE 803(4); EDWARDS V. COMMONWEALTH IS OVERRULED

Jennifer Polk, Dr. Cole Condra, and Dr. Lisa Pfitzer are medical personnel who testified at trial that the victims identified Colvard as the perpetrator of the crimes committed against them. Because the testimony of each of these medical personnel implicates KRE 803(4) and the ongoing viability of the extension of that rule created in Edwards v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1992) (overruled on other grounds by B.B. v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 47 (Ky. 2007)), we consider Colvard's allegations of error as it relates to these medical witnesses together.

A. Jennifer Polk

Polk, an EMT who responded to the emergency call, was called by the Commonwealth to testify about the events of March 2, 2006. Over Colvard's objection, Polk was allowed to testify that the first child to whom she spoke said that "Fred from number seven [Appellant] . . . stuck his `dick' in her." Polk also testified that the second child to whom she spoke told her, in substance, that Appellant had "hurt" her anus. Appellant timely objected to the testimony, but the trial court overruled the objection upon the basis that it was admissible under KRE 803(4).

B. Dr. Condra

Appellant argues that Dr. Condra improperly gave testimony about statements DJ made to the triage nurse at the hospital. Dr. Condra testified from notes made by the nurse on March 2, 2006, when the children were initially admitted into the hospital for evaluation. Among other things, Dr. Condra testified that D.J. told the triage nurse that Appellant sexually abused her. He also testified that D.J. told the nurse that "Fred has been f* * *ing her, putting his weenie in her private parts."

Dr. Condra also testified that D.J. and D.Y. informed him that they were sexually assaulted that day "and over the past months." C. Dr. Pfitzer

Appellant argues that Dr. Pfitzer, a treating pediatrician providing follow-up examination and treatment to D.Y. and D.J., should not have been permitted to testify as to the medical history provided by G.W., the girls' mother. Appellant timely objected to the evidence, but his objection was overruled.

Dr. Pfitzer testified that she saw the children as a result of sexual abuse allegations made against "a neighbor" named "Fred" and that the allegations involved vaginal and anal penetration. Dr. Pfitzer also testified that D.J.'s mother reported that D.J. told her that "Fred was f* * *ing us."

D. KRE 803(4) and Edwards v. Commonwealth

As previously noted, the testimony of these medical personnel implicates KRE 803(4), the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule. KRE 803(4) provides that "[s]tatements made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis" are not excluded by the hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a witness. However, the general rule is that the identity of the perpetrator is not relevant to treatment or diagnosis. Souder v. Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 730, 735 (Ky. 1986) (overruled on other grounds by B.B., 226 S.W.3d at 47).

However, in Edwards, this Court recognized an exception to the identification rule in cases where a family or household member is the perpetrator of sexual abuse against a minor of that household. See also J.M.R. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 239 S.W.3d 116 (Ky.App. 2007) (applying exception). In Edwards, we relied on United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985), as persuasive authority for the family, or household member, exception to the general rule. Therein, we acknowledged:

In Renville, the Court made this exception to the general rule that physicians rarely have reason to rely on statements of identity because of two important aspects involved in the case: (1) the physician was not merely diagnosing and treating the child/patient for physical injuries but psychological injuries as well, and (2) the abuser was a family, house-hold member.

The physician in that case testified that he was treating the child for her emotional and physical trauma. He also said that the identity of the abuser was extremely important to him in helping the child work through her problems. The identity was also particularly important if the abuser lived with the child, because the abuse would likely continue as long as the child remained in the household with the abuser.

Edwards, 833 S.W.2d at 844 (citing Renville, 779 F.2d at 438).

The Commonwealth, citing the Court of Appeals' unpublished opinion Plotnick v. Commonwealth, No. 2007-CA-000160-MR, 2008 WL 162881 (Ky.App. Jan.18, 2008), argues that this exception applies since the children may have considered Appellant a member of the family or household, as Appellant had only recently ended his relationship with their grandmother. Therefore, if Appellant is treated as a family or household member, and the perpetrator's identity is necessary for purposes of medical treatment, then the Edwards exception to the general rule would apply, allowing Polk's testimony about the origin of the children's injuries to be properly admitted under KRE 803(4) as statements reasonably pertinent to D.J.'s and D.Y.'s treatment or diagnosis.

Upon reconsideration of the plain language of KRE 803(4) and its underlying purpose, we have come to the view that the identification exception we adopted in Edwards and the Court of Appeals applied in J.M.R. were based upon an ill-advised and unsound extension of a traditional exception to the hearsay rule. We accordingly overrule Edwards and J.M.R.

The hearsay rule developed over hundreds of years of Anglo-American experience in jury trials. That jurisprudential experience taught that statements of witnesses repeating what they had heard from others out of court was inherently unreliable and unworthy of belief. To protect the integrity of the trial and its truth — finding mission, such out-of-court statements were forbidden. We also learned, however, that certain kinds of out-of-court statements, because of the circumstances in which they were uttered, were highly reliable.

[Hearsay evidence] was later excluded for lack of oath and cross-examination, two devices for assuring trustworthiness, of which the latter is primary and came finally to be controlling. Therefore, the hearsay rule and its exceptions in outline, though not in detail, form a logically coherent whole. Each exception is justified, for the hearsay received thereunder was uttered with attendant conditions which furnish a sufficient guaranty of its trustworthiness to enable the jury to value it.

See Edmund M. Morgan and John MacArthur Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 920-921 (1937).

Among the several exceptions to the hearsay rule that developed is the one now codified as KRE 803(4), "statements for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis."

We know that an ill or injured person seeking to be healed or cured is ordinarily highly motivated to give truthful information to the physician or medical provider treating that illness or injury. The essential element that lends credence to the statement is that the patient, the "declarant" in hearsay law parlance, believes that the doctor must have that information to render effective treatment. The doctor's actual need, use, or reliance upon the declarant's information is less meaningful than the declarant's belief that the information is essential to effective treatment. The declarant's belief makes the out-of-court statement inherently trustworthy.

As expressed in Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 561-562 (4th Cir. 2005):

Rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence [the federal counterpart of KRE 803(4)] allows the admission of hearsay statements "made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing . . . present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." This exception to the hearsay rule is premised on the notion that a declarant seeking treatment "has a selfish motive to be truthful" because "the effectiveness of medical treatment depends upon the accuracy of the information provided." 5 Jack B. Weinstein Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 803.06[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 2004); see Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 949 (4th Cir. 1988). Admissibility of a statement pursuant to Rule 803(4) is governed by a two-part test: "(1) the declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment; and, (2) the content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or diagnosis." Morgan, 846 F.2d at 949.

(internal quotation marks footnote omitted).

Hence, we except from the hearsay rule statements made by a patient to medical personnel for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis. In the Edwards case, we enlarged that exception to include statements of a patient identifying the perpetrator of sexual abuse when that perpetrator is a member of the family or household of the victim, not because the utterance of the; statement was motivated by the victim's desire for effective treatment, but because the medical professional might use that information to protect the victim from further abuse by a member of the victims family or household. Edwards, 833 S.W.2d at 844. In so doing, we failed to recognize that it is the patient's desire for treatment, not the doctor's duty to treat, that gives credibility to the patient's out-of-court statement. There is no inherent trustworthiness to be found in a hearsay statement identifying the perpetrator when that statement did not arise from the patient's desire for effective medical treatment. As Professor Lawson notes,' in Section 8.55(6) of the Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook (4th ed. 2003) (quoting Mueller Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, § 442 (2d ed. 1994)): "(T)his expansion [the Edwards/Renville decisions] of the exception is troubling . . . admitting such statements because doctors rely on them in diagnosis is highly questionable."

The Renville rule has also received other scholarly criticism. State v. Jones, 625 So.2d 821, 825 (Fla. 1993), for example, sets forth learned authorities which criticize the rule and the reasonings therefor:

However, the trend to adopt a Renville — type analysis also has been harshly criticized. As the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted in a scholarly opinion:

In stretching outward their list of a physician's responsibilities and in pushing forward with their definition of "medical treatment and diagnosis," the expansionists have left behind, abandoned and forgotten, the state of mind of the declarant. . . . Physical self-survival dictates revealing even embarrassing truth to avoid the risk of the wrong medicine or the needless operation. Presupposing a declarant conscious of the probable consequences of his assertions, the imperative to speak truthfully is not nearly so strong when the anticipated result is a social disposition. The temptation to influence the result may, indeed, run in quite the opposite direction. Truthful answers as to the identity of its abuser may well wrench a child from the reassuring presence of its mother or father or both. It is highly unlikely that there operates in an infant declarant a compelling desire to bring about such a result. Cassidy v. State, 74 Md.App. 1, 536 A.2d 666, 684 (1988), cert. denied, 312 Md. 602, 541 A.2d 965 (1988).

Moreover, many commentators have expressed concern that in the course of laudable efforts to combat child abuse, prosecutors, courts, and others have occasionally overreached. See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 523, 529 n. 26 (1988) ("The successful prosecution of child sexual abuse cases should not be permitted to distort the hearsay exception for statements for medical diagnosis or treatment. Almost anything is relevant to the diagnosis or treatment of psychological well being, and far too many untrustworthy statements are relevant to preventing repetition of the abuse."); Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 257, 258 (1989) (Applications of medical diagnosis or treatment exception in child abuse cases "have tended to expose the thinness of the justification for extending the exception to statements made without any view toward treatment.")

As reflected by the foregoing discussion, we have carefully considered the Renville rule, its merits and de merits, and now conclude that our adoption of the rule was an unwise departure from the traditional hearsay rule that has served our system of justice well for many generations. One cannot reasonably conclude that the statements identifying the perpetrator, such as those at issue in this case, were made by young children "for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis." The Renville rule is inconsistent with the plain language of KRE 803(4), and, as the above authorities explain, the reliability of a child's identification of the perpetrator of the abuse to a medical professional contains the same tangible risks of unreliability generally inherent in all hearsay testimony. Accordingly, Edwards, J.M.R., and other cases applying the exception to the hearsay rule are overruled. In so deciding, we do not hold that statements of a child victim to medical personnel identifying an abuser are always inadmissible. There may be circumstances in which such statements will be found to comport with the requirements of KRE 803(4) or other exceptions to the hearsay rule. This, however, is not such a case.

Based upon the above discussion, we conclude that it was error for the trial court to have permitted Polk, Dr. Condra, and Dr. Pfitzer to testify under the Renville construction of the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule. Moreover, because the testimony served to bolster the children's testimony and the Commonwealth's theory of the case, the testimony was highly prejudicial. As further discussed below, in combination with other inadmissible hearsay statements let into trial, reversible error occurred.

This opinion does not alter or limit the traditional hearsay exception allowing medical providers to testify to a patient's out-of-court statements as to what was done to the patient and how he or she was injured. Nor, as the dissent implies, does this opinion impede or limit the ability of medical personal to report suspected child abuse, including information regarding the identity of a suspected abuser to the appropriate authorities. We simply state that we no longer recognize a special exception to the hearsay rule which allows medical providers to testify in court to the hearsay statements of a victim of sexual offenses which identify the alleged perpetrator because that identification is not pertinent to the medical treatment being provided.

II. OTHER HEARSAY TESTIMONY

In addition to the medical testimony hearsay discussed above, Appellant also complains of hearsay statements introduced at trial through J.W., the victims' uncle; G.W., the victims' mother; and Valleri Mason, a children's forensic interviewer. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that each of these witnesses was permitted to repeat statements made by the children identifying Appellant as the perpetrator, and that the statements were not subject to any hearsay exception.

A. J.W. — (Victims' Uncle)

Appellant argues the trial court erred by permitting testimony from the victims' uncle, J.W. The uncle, a prosecution witness, testified that he asked D.Y. "what happened, who touched her," and D.Y. pointed to Appellant. Appellant objected, claiming the testimony was hearsay, but the trial court determined the uncle was being asked about what he said and saw, not what a third-party said, and allowed him to testify to his recollection.

KRE 801 defines a statement as: "(1) An oral or written assertion; or (2) Non-verbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion." (Emphasis added). We have no difficulty in concluding that D.Y.'s nonverbal conduct pointing at Appellant following J.W.'s question was the equivalent of a verbal assertion by D.Y. that "Fred Colvard touched me." Thus, the nonverbal assertion falls under the normal hearsay rules for the admission of evidence.

In support of the statement's admission, the Commonwealth cites us to KRE 801A(a)(3), Preston v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 398, 403 (Ky. 1966), and our previous ruling in Owens v. Commonwealth, 950 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Ky. 1997), to the effect that "once a witness is allowed to testify that he made an identifying statement, further proof by other witnesses that he did in fact make it is just as relevant and competent as would be defensive proof to the effect that he did not make it." (internal citations omitted).

KRE 801A(a)(3) provides as follows: Prior statements of witnesses. A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is examined concerning the statement, with a foundation laid as required by KRE 613 , and the statement is: . . . (3) One of identification of a person made after perceiving the person.

(emphasis added).

While D.Y. did testify at trial, the Commonwealth fails to cite us to D.Y.'s testimony wherein she was "examined concerning the statement" she made to her uncle, and our review of the testimony discloses no such examination of the child. Nor do we find compliance with the foundation requirements contained in KRE 613. Further, the uncle testified prior to D.Y. Accordingly, the elements for admissibility under the rule are not met, and the uncle's testimony relating the statement was admitted in error.

B. G. W. — (Victims' Mother)

At trial, Appellant asked the children's mother on cross-examination whether she had asked the children "Did he put his dick in you?" The apparent purpose of the question was to impeach the mother by portraying her as vulgar. Appellant then had the mother read a report prepared by Polk that stated that the mother had, in fact, asked the children that question.

On redirect, the Commonwealth attempted to ask the mother about a statement made by D.Y. to Polk to the effect that Appellant "took his weenie out of his zipper and put it in her, but not all the way." The Commonwealth first attempted to argue that the statement was admissible as a statement made for medical diagnosis under KRE 804(a) as extended under Edwards. The trial court ultimately ruled that the question and answer could come in for the purpose of showing that the children used "children's" terminology as opposed to the vulgar terminology allegedly used by the mother.

Appellant now claims that allowing the mother to so testify improperly bolstered the victims' testimony. We agree.

While Appellant's inquiry of the mother about her question to the children opened the door to further inquiry regarding that event, and perhaps other conversations she had with the children, we fail to perceive how that would have opened the door for the mother to repeat D.Y.'s statement to Polk. Because D.Y. used children's terminology does not impeach the mother's denial that she asked the children a question using vulgar terminology. Moreover, the purported impeachment was impeachment on a collateral matter that permitted a hearsay statement not subject to an exception implicating Appellant as guilty of the charges to be heard by the jury.

The mother's questioning of the children is too attenuated from D.Y.'s statement to Polk for questioning concerning the former to have opened the door to the latter. We discern no other hearsay exception which would have permitted the statement to be admitted, and accordingly conclude that it was admitted in error.

C. Valleri Mason

Lastly, Appellant objects to various statements made by Valleri Mason, a forensic interviewer for Family and Children First. Mason, a self-described child interview specialist, interviewed D.Y. and D.J. the day after the reported assault and testified about that interview at trial. She testified that D.Y. and D.J. made disclosures of sexual abuse and that they circled anatomically correct drawings indicating where they had been violated. In addition, she testified to the following discussion she had with D.J.:

You told me that Fred, that he put his peanuts [D.J.'s term for penis] in you. She said, "Yeah." I said, well can you show me on here. Does this boy, does lie have peanuts? She said, "yes". . . . I asked her to circle where the peanuts are on that boy and she circled the penis.

Though Mason's title is that of a "forensic interviewer," she is, in effect, a social worker. "It is well-settled that `[t]here is no recognized exception to the hearsay rule for social workers or the results of their investigations.'" B.B., 226 S.W.3d at 51. It follows that there is no hearsay exception which would allow Mason to testify to the children's identification of Appellant as having sexually assaulted them.

As with the medical testimony, the above hearsay was prejudicial because the testimony served to bolster the children's testimony and the Commonwealth's theory of the case. As further discussed below, in combination with the medical hearsay statements admitted into evidence at trial, reversible error occurred.

III. THE HEARSAY ERRORS WERE NOT HARMLESS

RCr 9.24 requires us to disregard an error if it is harmless. A non-constitutional evidentiary error may be deemed harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). The inquiry is not simply "whether there was enough [evidence] to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand." Id. at 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239; Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 688-89 (Ky. 2009).

In light of the lack of DNA or other physical evidence linking Appellant to the crimes, the multiple instances of hearsay testimony described above which bolster the Commonwealth's theory was of sufficient consequence such that we cannot say with fair assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. The improper hearsay evidence vouching that the children had previously identified Appellant as the perpetrator multiplied the bolstering effect and resulted in a parade of witnesses vouching for the Commonwealth's theory of the case.

In sum, we are persuaded that the multiple instances of hearsay evidence bolstering the Commonwealth's case were not harmless error. We accordingly are constrained to vacate the trial court's judgment of conviction, and remand for a new trial.

IV. EVIDENCE REGARDING APPELLANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION IS ADMISSIBLE

Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that he was convicted of attempting to rape a ten-year old child in 1994. Because the issue is likely to arise again upon retrial, we address the argument on the merits.

At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that Appellant was convicted of attempting to rape a ten-year old girl in 1994. The victim, who is now twenty-three years old, testified at trial. Appellant argues that this testimony was error per KRE 404(b) because the circumstances surrounding the 1994 conviction were too dissimilar to the instant case. Generally, a defendant's prior bad acts are inadmissible. However, KRE 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of prior crimes or wrongs is admissible if offered for "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." As recognized in Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 29 (Ky. 1998), this list of exceptions is illustrative, not exclusive. "Among the non-enumerated exceptions we have recognized to KRE 404(b)'s general prohibition on the introduction of prior bad acts evidence is . . . modus operandi" Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 95 (Ky. 2007). The modus operandi exception requires that:

[t]he facts surrounding the prior misconduct must be so strikingly similar to the charged offense as to create a reasonable probability that (1) the acts were committed by the same person, and/or (2) the acts were accompanied by the same mens rea. If not, then the evidence of prior misconduct proves only a criminal disposition and is inadmissible.

Id. (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).

"It is not the commonality of the crimes but the commonality of the facts constituting the crimes that demonstrates modus operandi So, as a prerequisite to the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence, we now require that the proponent of the evidence to `demonstrate that there is a factual commonality between the prior bad act and the charged conduct that is simultaneously similar and so peculiar or distinct that there is a reasonable probability that the two crimes were committed by the same individual.' Thus, `[a]lthough it is not required that the facts be identical in all respects, `evidence of other acts of sexual deviance . . . must be so similar to the crime on trial as to constitute a so-called signature crime.'"

Id. at 97.

The circumstances of the present offenses are sufficiently similar to the 1994 crime to satisfy the standard we have established for admission under KRE 404(b). The prior offense indicated a sexual interest in prepubescent girls, such as the victims here. In both the prior crime and the current offenses, Appellant knew the victims and gained access to their homes by his involvement in a romantic relationship with an adult female in the household. All of the victims had second floor bedrooms and were quietly assaulted while others were in the home. The nature of the sexual act itself was similar in that each incident was of brief duration, the perpetrator said nothing to the victim during the assault, the perpetrator did not ejaculate, and avoided vaginal or anal tearing of the victims by penetrating only partially.

Faced with those striking similarities between Appellant's prior conviction and the current alleged crimes, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting under KRE 404(b) the evidence of Appellants prior conviction for attempted rape. At retrial, should the same facts be developed, the trial court will be well within its discretion to admit evidence regarding Appellant's prior conviction.

V. THE BURGLARY INSTRUCTION GIVEN TO THE JURY WAS ERRONEOUS

Finally Appellant argues that the jury instruction given on the burglary charge was improper because it allowed the jury to convict him of that crime if they believed he either caused physical injury to the girls, a violation of KRS 511.020(1)(b), or threatened the girls with harm to their mother if they told anyone about what he did. KRS 511.020(1)(c). We address the issue because it may arise upon retrial.

Appellant argues that the instruction as written presented alternate theories of guilt, violating his right to a unanimous verdict. A jury instruction which presents an alternative theory of guilt is proper and does not violate the requirement of unanimity found in Section 7 of the Kentucky Constitution, if every alternate theory contained in the instruction was reasonably supported by evidence presented at trial. Hayes v. Commonwealth 625 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 1981).

While alternative theories of criminal liability may properly be combined in a single instruction, the instruction must accurately present the elements of each alternative theory. Guilt under KRS 511.020(1)(c) requires that one "uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument against any person who is not a participant in the crime." The corresponding instruction given by the trial court stated that Appellant could be found guilty of first degree burglary if, among the other elements, he "threatened to kill the victim's mother, [G.W.]." It is clear that the instruction does not accurately reflect the requirement of the statute. If upon retrial, the Commonwealth pursues a conviction on the alternate theories of liability under KRS 511.020(1)(b) and (1)(c), and appropriate evidence is offered to support same, the instruction must correspond to the statutory element by requiring the jury to find, not simply a threat to kill another, but a threat to use a deadly weapon against another person.

VI. OTHER ISSUES

Appellant also argues that prejudicial error occurred by the trial court's failure to strike two jurors for cause. Because the case is reversed on other grounds and the issue is unlikely to recur upon retrial, we decline to address it.

Appellant also argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the convictions. We disagree. The testimony of D.J. and D.Y. describing the events of March 2, 2006, and identifying Appellant as the perpetrator was sufficient to defeat his motion for a directed verdict. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991). The trial court did not err in overruling Appellant's motions for directed verdicts.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.

All sitting. CUNNINGHAM, NOBLE, and SCHRODER, JJ., concur.

MINTON, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part and would not allow introduction of 1994 attempted rape conviction because the facts of the current case are not sufficiently similar to satisfy KRE 404(b). He concurs in all other respects.

SCOTT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in which ABRAMSON, J., joins.