ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON FEDERAL CLAIMS

ROBERT HINKLE, District Judge

This case arises from actions taken by two county sheriff's departments upon receipt of information suggesting plaintiff might commit suicide. Deputies in the county where plaintiff lived entered her home through an unlocked door and conducted a sweep to determine whether plaintiff was in the home (dead or alive). Finding nobody, the deputies left. They determined that plaintiff was employed as a dental hygienist in the second county and solicited the assistance of deputies in that county. Deputies from both counties went to plaintiff's workplace, where plaintiff was interviewed. Still believing plaintiff might commit suicide, the deputies took plaintiff into custody and delivered her to a public mental health facility for an involuntary examination. Plaintiff was held two days and released. Asserting the search of her home and seizure of her person violated the Fourth Amendment, plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two deputies in their individual capacities. Plaintiff seeks relief under § 1983 and state law against the county sheriffs in their official capacities.

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on the federal claims. I grant the motion, concluding (1) the search of plaintiff's home was permissible under the emergency doctrine, (2) I need not decide whether seizing plaintiff was lawful, (3) the individual deputies have qualified immunity because seizing plaintiff did not violate clearly established, and (4) the sheriffs are not liable because the deputies' decision to seize plaintiff did not result from a custom or policy of the sheriffs, from a decision of one whose acts or edicts could fairly be attributed to the sheriffs, or from any failure to provide adequate training.

Background

On January 8, 2003, plaintiff wrote an e-mail to a fellow member of an exotic bird club. The e-mail referred to plaintiff's birds Gemma, Merlin, Louie, Dino, and Spike. The full text of the e-mail was as follows:

Did you reply to my e-mail regarding Gemma and her egg and Merlin and the mouse? I have not gotten it if you did. Would you take Merlin and Gemma for me if I could not go on? You are the only person that I would entrust them to. Gemma is pretty independent, but Merlin is so bonded to me. He would need alot of attention. I have a home for Louie and Dino. That just leaves Spike, and he has such special needs. I have to find the perfect home for him. I can't endure much longer and want to be sure that my little flock is okay. I know that Merlin and Gemma would be okay with you. I need some peace of mind about something. Please advise so I can make other arrangements if necessary. Merlin wants you to whisper to him every night that "he is sooooooooooooo sweet!" They are all so precious. I love them so much.

(Emphasis added; spelling and grammatical errors in original.)

The recipient (in Canada) believed the e-mail suggested plaintiff intended to commit suicide. The recipient forwarded the e-mail to yet another member of the bird club (in Wisconsin), who was a mental health professional. She in turn forwarded the e-mail to the Wakulla County, Florida, sheriff's department.

Beyond any question, plaintiff's e-mail was sufficient to warrant further inquiry by the sheriff's department. Indeed, it would have been a dereliction not to investigate further. The issue, however, is not whether the deputies should have investigated, but whether, as part of the investigation they properly commenced, the deputies were entitled to enter plaintiff's home and ultimately to seize her for purposes of an involuntary examination.

I Search of the Home

As the Eleventh Circuit has said:

A warrantless entry of a person's home is presumptively unreasonable. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980). However, warrantless searches and seizures of evidence in residences are permitted when both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1525 (11th Cir. 1983). The government has the burden of proof of showing exigent circumstances. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971).

These standards are most often applied in the context of criminal investigations, in which "probable cause" means probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found at the place to be searched. But under what has sometimes been called the "emergency doctrine," law enforcement officers and other officials may enter premises to protect or preserve life. See, e.g., Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1245 (7th Cir. 1994). As the Supreme Court has said, the Fourth Amendment does not "bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe a person within is in need of immediate aid." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978).

In the case at bar, Wakulla County deputies entered plaintiff's home in the reasonable belief she might be there either contemplating, having attempted, or having committed suicide. The evidence of that was not overwhelming — a single apparently (but not necessarily) authentic e-mail seemingly (but not conclusively) suggesting plaintiff's intent to commit suicide before "much longer." This would not have sufficed to prove suicidal intent beyond a reasonable doubt or perhaps even by the preponderance of the evidence, but that is not the standard. This was sufficient to provide probable cause. And while the deputies might well have done more investigation before entering — checking, for example, on the absence of a car or on plaintiff's employment in an effort to locate her elsewhere — the law did not require the officers to proceed in the most efficient or least intrusive manner possible. Officers attempting to prevent an apparently imminent suicide need not delay for more sober reflection nor await the outcome of a further investigation that might or might not bear fruit. Instead, all the law requires is probable cause and exigent circumstances, both of which were present here.

The entry into plaintiff's home was lawful. Summary judgment will be entered for defendants on this claim.

II Seizure of Plaintiff

The standards governing whether a person may be taken for an involuntary mental examination in Florida are established by statute:

(1) CRITERIA. — A person may be taken to a receiving facility for involuntary examination if there is reason to believe that the person has a mental illness and because of his or her mental illness:

(a)1. The person has refused voluntary examination after conscientious explanation and disclosure of the purpose of the examination; or

2. The person is unable to determine for himself or herself whether examination is necessary; and

(b)1. Without care or treatment, the person is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself; such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his or her well-being; and it is not apparent that such harm may be avoided through the help of willing family members or friends or the provision of other services; or

2. There is a substantial likelihood that without care or treatment the person will cause serious bodily harm to himself or herself or others in the near future, as evidenced by recent behavior. § 394.463, Fla. Stat. These are the standards that govern the issue of whether plaintiff's commitment in the case at bar was lawful.

To be sure, the Fourth Amendment also applies to the seizure of a person for the purpose of such an examination. But at least in respects relevant to the case at bar, the Fourth Amendment neither adds to nor detracts from the Florida statutory standards. First, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit such a seizure based on probable cause to believe the criteria set forth in § 394.463(1) have been met. And conversely, the Fourth Amendment does prohibit such a seizure in Florida if there is not probable cause to believe these criteria have been met. This is so because Florida law recognizes no extra-statutory basis for such a seizure, and the Fourth Amendment prohibits a seizure absent probable cause to believe the governing substantive standards have been met. Thus the Fourth Amendment was violated by plaintiff's seizure if and only if the statute was violated.

For purposes of defendants' motion for summary judgment, I do not reach the question of whether the statute was violated, because defendants are entitled to summary judgment on other grounds.

III Qualified Immunity

Whether plaintiff's seizure was lawful depends upon whether the deputies had probable cause to believe plaintiff was subject to an involuntary examination under the statutory standards set forth above. To prevail on the issue of qualified immunity, however, defendants need only establish that there was "arguable probable cause." See, e.g., Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001) ("all that is required for qualified immunity to be applicable to an arresting officer is ` arguable probable cause. . . .'"), quoting Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378, 1384 (11th Cir. 1998).

One could reasonably argue both sides of the question whether the deputies had probable cause for this seizure. Despite plaintiff's assertion now that she was not suicidal, a reasonable person could construe her e-mail, which she acknowledged having written, to the contrary. And a reasonable person could question her explanation that when she said she could not endure much longer, she was speaking only of her financial ability to keep her residence. The deputies were required to consider, but not necessarily to accept, that explanation. The deputies could have done more — calling plaintiff's own mental health professional, for example — but whether they were obligated to do so, as part of a reasonable investigation, is not clear. In short, this is precisely the type situation for which the qualified immunity doctrine was developed. A deputy in so murky a setting ought not be required to act at his or her personal financial peril. The deputies had, at least, arguable probable cause.

Summary judgment will be entered in favor of the individual defendants based on qualified immunity.

IV Official Capacity Liability

A county sheriff in his or her official capacity, like a municipality, may be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations committed by a final decision maker whose acts or edicts may fairly be said to be those of the sheriff himself and for constitutional violations that result from a policy or custom of the sheriff. See generally Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978) (setting forth standards for municipal liability for acts of employees). Plaintiff's seizure, if it was unconstitutional, was nonetheless not one for which the sheriffs may be held liable under these standards. The deputies were not final decision makers. There had been no history, at least so far as reflected by this record, of improper seizures for purposes of involuntary examinations. And this seizure resulted not from any policy or custom supporting seizures in circumstances like these, but simply from a decision in the field of one or more deputies that this plaintiff, under these specific circumstances, met the requirements of the applicable Florida statute. This is precisely the type of one-time decision by subordinate employees for which, under Monell, a public entity is not liable.

V Failure To Train

A county sheriff also may be held liable for a failure to provide adequate training to subordinate employees that results in deprivation of a person's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that failure to train may give rise to liability where a city "inadequately trains or supervises its employees, this failure to train or supervise is a city policy, and that city policy causes the employees to violate a citizen's constitutional rights.").

In the case at bar, plaintiff has presented no evidence that would support a finding that any constitutional violation resulted from inadequate training. It is undisputed that the deputies were trained to take a person for an involuntary mental examination only in accordance with the governing Florida statute. The difficulty here was not that the deputies did not know what the statute required; the difficulty was simply in analyzing the factual setting and making the judgment whether the statute authorized a seizure in these circumstances. No amount of training can anticipate every factual situation a deputy might encounter, nor can any amount of training obviate the need for nice judgments in the field. The issue in this case ultimately will be not whether these deputies were adequately trained, but whether they were correct in determining that the statute authorized this seizure, and whether, if they were not correct, their actions were sufficient to impose liability under § 394.459(10), Florida Statutes.

Conclusion

SO ORDERED.