OPINION AND ORDER

GERARD LYNCH, District Judge

In this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., plaintiffs seek compensation for the time they spend carrying job-related materials between their homes and their places of work, and for time they spend maintaining them while at home. Both plaintiffs and defendant move for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part, and plaintiffs' motion is denied in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are forty-eight present or former inspectors for the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, a department of the defendant City of New York (the "City"). (Pl. Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 1-3.) Their job is to make periodic inspections of various food manufacturing, wholesale, and retail establishments, to ensure compliance with rules governing sanitation, safety, and health. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs are not assigned particular offices or workspaces, and their workday normally begins when they arrive at their first inspection location, and normally ends when they leave their last inspection location. (Id. ¶¶ 9-12.) On Fridays, however, plaintiffs spend at least part of the day at a central office, where they file reports on their work for the week, plan their work assignments for the upcoming week, restock supplies, speak with supervisors, and complete necessary paperwork. (Branch Dep. 37-39; Faizi Dep. 45-47; Lewin Dep. 37-38; Smith Dep. 43-44.) Calculated from the time they arrive at their first inspection site each day to the time they leave their last, plaintiffs work a total of forty hours per week. (Id. ¶ 8.)

Plaintiffs spend a significant amount of time commuting, during which they are required to carry with them the equipment they need to conduct their inspections. (Id. ¶ 13.) This equipment includes a laptop, a printer, a telephone, specialized inspection equipment, backup batteries, pamphlets, forms, and code books, all of which fits in a backpack or rolling bag. Among the four exemplary plaintiffs whose testimony is stipulated to be "representative of all claims raised by all plaintiffs" for the purposes of this motion (Stip. of Jan. 14, 2008), estimates of the total weight of the equipment vary widely: one plaintiff puts the weight at thirteen to fifteen pounds (Faizi Dep. 42); another at twenty to twenty-five pounds (Branch Dep. 51); a third at twenty-five pounds (Lewin Dep. 46); and a fourth at forty pounds (Smith Dep. 59).

Whatever the weight, the equipment appears to add less than five minutes to plaintiffs' commutes, mostly on account of the longer amount of time it takes them to walk to their subways or bus stops. (Branch Dep. 54-55; Lewin Dep. 62; Smith Dep. 67.) For those who drive, the equipment adds only the time it takes to place their equipment in the trunk or on the seat next to them. (Faizi Dep. 62; Smith Dep. 71.) Beyond the additional time the equipment adds to their commute, plaintiffs must spend additional effort in lifting the equipment into and out of their cars, lugging it up and down subway stairs, carrying it onto buses, and rolling or carrying it wherever they walk. (Branch Dep. 55; Faizi Dep. 71-72; Lewin Dep. 61; Smith Dep. 58-59, 66-67.) For significant periods during the commute, however, the equipment just sits at their feet on the subway, or on car seats next to them, or in the trunks of their cars. (Branch Dep. 55-56; Faizi Dep. 62-63; Lewin Dep. 55, 59; Smith Dep. 68.)

Plaintiffs are also responsible for the equipment at all times, and consequently they avoid leaving it unattended as they travel to and from their homes. (Faizi Dep. 88-89; Lewin Dep. 91; Branch Dep. 64.) This can cause plaintiffs to curtail after-work leisure activities, such as going to movies or bars, or visiting friends, because they are burdened by the equipment and do not want to risk losing it. (Smith Dep. 99; Lewin Dep. 65-67.)

Moreover, while at home, plaintiffs spend time charging their computers, printers, telephones, and backup batteries, and plotting out the routes to and between the next day's inspection sites. (Pl. R. 56.1 Statement ¶ 17.) The process of unpacking and charging batteries takes plaintiffs between fifteen and twenty-five minutes. (Def. R. 56.1 Statement ¶ 19.) Plotting out their next day's routes takes between fifteen and thirty minutes. (Def. R. 56.1 Statement ¶ 20.)

Plaintiffs complain that the time spent commuting with their equipment, recharging batteries, and planning their next day's routes constitutes work in excess of their 40-hour workweek, for which they should be compensated. The Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") requires employers to pay employees one and one-half times an employee's hourly rate for all "employment in excess of [forty] hours" in one week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). However, a later amendment to the FLSA, the Portal-to-Portal Act, explicitly excludes from compensable time "walking, riding, or traveling" to the place where one performs one's "principal activity or activities," as well as any "activities which are preliminary or postliminary to said principal activity or activities." 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). The City contends that the commuting time and the time spent recharging batteries and planning the next day's route fall within these exclusions, and that plaintiffs therefore are not entitled to overtime compensation for it.

Following discovery, the City moved for summary judgment on all claims, and plaintiffs cross-moved for partial summary judgment as to liability on all claims.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where the "pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of explaining the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which it believes "demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986).

A court's responsibility is to determine if there is a genuine issue to be tried and not to resolve disputed issues of fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). A court must draw all "justifiable inferences" in the nonmovant's favor, and construe all of the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. at 255. However, the "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient" to withstand a motion for summary judgment.Id. at 252.

II. Commuting Time

Whether plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the time spent commuting turns on whether carrying their inspection equipment makes that time "work" under the FLSA. The Portal-to-Portal Act expressly excludes from "work" time spent "walking, riding, or traveling" to an employee's place of work, but this exclusion is not so broad as to make an employer "exempt from payment for actual work required to be done during such travel." Reich v. New York City Transit Auth., 45 F.3d 646, 651 (2d Cir. 1995). Rather, "[a]ny work which an employee is required to perform while traveling must, of course, be counted as hours worked." 29 C.F.R. § 785.41 (Department of Labor regulation interpreting FLSA).

The FLSA does not define "work," but the Supreme Court has interpreted that word to mean "physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business." Tennessee Coal. Iron R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944). It is also work for an employee "to stand by and wait for the employer's benefit," so "loss of time" is work as much as physical or mental exertion is. Reich, 45 F.3d at 651 (citing cases).

Work that is in theory covered by the FLSA may not be compensable when it is "de minimis," that is, when it involves "only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours." Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 692 (1946). A court considers three factors in determining whether otherwise compensable time is de minimis: "(1) the practical administrative difficulty of recording additional time; (2) the size of the claim in the aggregate; and (3) whether the claimants performed the work on a regular basis." Singh v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 361, 371 (2d Cir. 2008).

The Second Circuit has twice addressed the question of whether transporting work-related items during one's commute is "work." In Reich, the court considered whether police officers responsible for the 24-hour care of the police dogs they worked with were entitled to overtime compensation for their commutes. 45 F.3d at 647-48. The police officers commuted by car, with their dogs in the back seat, and as here, the presence of the dogs did not substantially lengthen their commutes. Id. at 648. However, from time to time the dogs required care when they became unruly or sick. Id. Moreover, as here, the dogs were a constant responsibility, and "restrict[ed] the personal activity" of the police officers. Id.

The court rejected the argument that these circumstances made the entire commute compensable. The mere fact that the police officers had responsibility for the dogs during their commutes did not make their commutes work because it "involved neither exertion nor loss of time." Id. at 651. "[T]he only compensable portion of the commute is the time spent by the [police officers] actively caring for their dogs." Id. at 648 (emphasis in original). "[T]he vast majority of the time, while the [police officer] is driving and the dog is quietly occupying the back of the car, is not compensable work under the FLSA." Id. While the portion of the commute spent caring and cleaning up after the dogs was covered by the FLSA, such time was "neither substantial, nor regularly occurring," and therefore was de minimis. Id. at 652-53. Accordingly, the police officers were not entitled to any relief under the FLSA for their commuting time. Id. at 653.

The second relevant case, Singh, was decided by the Second Circuit after this motion was fully briefed, and dealt with facts very similar to those here. In Singh, fire alarm inspectors sought compensation for their commuting time because they were required to carry with them and keep safe a briefcase full of inspection documents. 524 F.3d at 364. As here, plaintiffs contended that the briefcase, which weighed "between fifteen and twenty pounds," lengthened their commute, by causing them "occasionally to miss a bus or train," or by "slow[ing] down their walk to the subway station." Id. at 365. One plaintiff estimated that, in total, his briefcase slowed his commute by "give or take ten minutes." Id. Plaintiffs also contended that being responsible for the documents after work was "inconvenient," because it prevented them from "attending social events because they had to go directly home in order to ensure the safety of the documents." Id.

As in Reich, the court rejected plaintiffs' claims that these circumstances made their entire commuting time compensable. Even while recognizing that "exertion is not necessarily required for an activity to be compensable because 'an employer, if he chooses, may hire a man to do nothing, or to do nothing but wait for something to happen,'" such non-action constitutes "work" only if "the time is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit [rather than] the employee's." Id. at 367, quoting Armour Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944). The employer is the "predominant beneficiary" of such time if the requirements imposed "substantially hinder an employee's ability to use the time freely." Singh, 524 F.3d at 368. By contrast, the employee is the "predominant beneficiary" when the requirements "place only a minimal burden on the employee's use of time." Id.

In the case of the fire inspectors, the court held that "[c]arrying a briefcase during a commute presents only a minimal burden on the inspectors." Id. Because the inspectors could "use their commuting time as they otherwise would have had there been no work-related restrictions," such as by "reading, listening to music, running errands, or whatever else the plaintiffs choose to do," they, not their employer, are the predominant beneficiaries of that time. Id. at 368-69. Accordingly, the commuting time as a whole was not compensable. Id. at 369. The court also held that any extension of inspectors' commuting time due to their briefcases was "de minimis," amounting to "only a few minutes on occasional days." Id. at 371.

The holdings in Reich and Singh make two things clear with respect to plaintiffs' claims here. First, to the extent the bags lengthen plaintiffs' commutes, the additional time is de minimis. As in both Reich and Singh, the amount of time at issue is a matter of a few minutes. Further, the amount of time varies among plaintiffs, depending on whether they commute by car or by public transit, how far they live from a subway, and whether they walk or take a bus to their subway stop. And the amount of time varies even for the same plaintiff, who may travel by car on one day and by public transit on another, depending on the location of his first inspection site. (See Faizi Dep. 54; Lewin Dep. 51; Smith Dep. 50, 52.) An application of the three-factor test set forth in Singh shows this time to be de minimis, because it would be administratively impractical to account for, would not amount to a significant amount of time overall, and would not compensate plaintiffs for work performed on a regular basis. Accordingly, the amount of time by which plaintiffs' commutes are lengthened is not compensable.

Second, plaintiffs' responsibility for the equipment does not, by itself, make their commuting time compensable. Even though plaintiffs are responsible for the equipment for the entire length of their commutes, and their leisure time is thereby restricted to some extent, Reich and Singh hold that such an inconvenience is a "minor burden" on their ability otherwise to use their commuting time as they wish. The mere presence of the equipment does not make the City the "predominant beneficiary" of the commuting time.

However, plaintiffs' claim for compensation is based on more than just the impact of the bags on their commuting time and their opportunities for after-work leisure. In addition, plaintiffs claim that "the equipment is heavy and bulky and requires significant exertion on the part of plaintiffs," such that the burden the City imposes on them "should be measured not in minutes or miles, but in musclepower." (Pl. Reply Mem. 2.) This distinguishes their argument from those considered in Reich, where the dogs sat "quietly occupying the back of the car" during the police officers' commutes, 45 F.3d at 648, and Singh, where plaintiffs did "not seek compensation for the physical exertion of carrying a briefcase," 524 F.3d at 369 n. 6.

Department of Labor regulations indicate that requiring employees to carry equipment that is significantly heavier than that which an ordinary commuter carries transforms commuting time into compensable work. The relevant regulation states that the Portal-to-Portal Act does not preclude FLSA coverage for an "employee who walks, rides or otherwise travels while performing active duties." 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(d). In illustrating what it means to "perform active duties" while walking, riding or traveling, the regulation distinguishes between time spent by a logger carrying a "portable power saw or other heavy equipment . . . on his trip into the woods to the cutting area," which is compensable, and time spent by a logger carrying only "ordinary hand tools," which is not compensable. Id. The clear implication is that carrying heavy equipment during one's commute is work, while carrying light equipment is not.

This finds support in Singh, even though the argument about the weight of the briefcase was not specifically raised there. TheSingh Court indicated that commuting time was not compensable just because employees must travel with a "briefcase or a small toolbox or a handheld device." 524 F.3d at 370. And yet, it found that plaintiffs' rather heavy briefcases — weighing between fifteen and twenty pounds, id. at 365 — "push[ed] the limits on the burdens [the City] may impose on its employees during a commute before it must pay them for such time." Id. at 370.

Decisions from other circuits have drawn a similar line. "[T]he Portal Act deems normal commuting time noncompensable . . . [but] employee commutes entailing substantial work differ from normal commutes." Bobo v. U.S., 37 Fed. Cl. 690, 695 n. 7 (1997) (finding work performed in transporting police dogs to be de minimis). Where employees have been required to carry heavy or otherwise burdensome equipment, their commuting time has been held to be compensable. See, e.g., Baker v. Barnard Const. Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 1998) (transport of "welding rigs" for use in oil and gas pipeline repair compensable because it amounts to something more than "ordinary home-to-work travel"). By contrast, where employees have been required to carry items that are lightweight or typical of a worker's commute, their commuting times have been held to be non-compensable. See, e.g., Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc., 331 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2003) (transport of "ordinary safety gear" not compensable); Dooley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 234, 247 (D. Mass. 2004) (transport of "light equipment" not compensable). In reaching its decision, theDooley court reviewed a number of cases involving the transport of equipment during home-work commutes, and concluded from them that "travel time is compensable if employees are transporting equipment without which their jobs could not be done . . . [and if] the transportation involves some degree of effort." Doolev, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 248-49.

Put differently, whether the commuting time "is spent predominantly for the employer's benefit or for the employee's" depends on the degree to which the bag is a "burden on the employee's use of time." Singh, 524 F.3d at 367-68. If the bag is lightweight and small, then the commuting time still predominantly benefits the employee, as the effort he or she expends is devoted mostly to getting to or from work, and only incidentally to transporting the equipment. On the other hand, if the bag is heavy and large, then the time primarily benefits the employer, as the effort the employee expends is devoted mostly to transporting the equipment, and only incidentally to getting to or from work. The Department of Labor regulation and the cases cited above make clear that carrying items typical of an ordinary commute — a "briefcase," a "small toolbox," or "a handheld device" — is not compensable; a particularly heavy briefcase is close to the line; and carrying something atypically onerous — like a "portable power saw or other heavy equipment" — is so burdensome that it transforms what would otherwise be an ordinary commute into compensable work.

Thus, an employee is entitled to relief under the FLSA for his commuting time to the extent that he is required to carry equipment that is significantly more burdensome than that typically carried in an ordinary commute. The record before the Court does not conclusively demonstrate that plaintiffs meet this standard. First, there is nothing to suggest that plaintiffs who drive to work are burdened substantially by the presence of the bags of equipment, as they do not need to carry their bags of equipment at all. For these plaintiffs, the only effort they must undertake is to set the bags on a car seat or to place them in the trunk. Plaintiffs offer no evidence that the presence of this equipment makes their commute significantly more onerous than a typical car commute, or certainly than the transport of the dogs held non-compensable in Reich. Accordingly, the City is entitled to summary judgment with respect to the claims for compensation for time spent commuting by car.

Second, with respect to commutes by public transit, there is conflicting evidence of just how onerous the bags are that plaintiffs are required to carry. Estimates of their weight range widely, between thirteen and forty pounds. The lower estimate may well approximate what many commuters, shoppers, and sight-seers carry around on a daily basis. The higher estimate is more likely so onerous as to make at least part of a plaintiff's commuting time compensable, as it would require significant effort to carry that much weight while walking on flat ground, even with a rolling suitcase, let alone to lug it up and down subway stairs and onto and off of city buses.

The testimony of those plaintiffs estimating a higher weight is supported by evidence that two of the four exemplary plaintiffs experience nagging physical pain that they attribute to carrying their bags of equipment. (See Lewin Dep. 87-88; Faizi Dep. 89.) On the other hand, the lower estimates are supported by plaintiffs' testimony that they are able to carry their equipment in an ordinary backpack or rolling bag, and are only delayed a few minutes each day because of the bag. A bag weighing forty pounds would be likely to delay the walk to the bus stop or the subway longer than a few minutes. Because genuine issues of material fact remain with regard to how burdensome the bag is, summary judgment must be denied to both parties. A trial can readily resolve the credibility issues underlying the plaintiffs' contradictory estimates by permitting actual weighing of the materials in question, and observation of the plaintiffs carrying their burdens.

III. At-home Tasks

In addition to compensation for their commuting time, plaintiffs seek compensation for time spent at home charging their batteries and planning their next day's routes. Here, the relevant provision of the Portal-to-Portal Act excludes from compensable time "activities which are preliminary or postliminary" to an employee's "principal activity or activities." 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). The exclusion "was intended to relieve employers from liability for preliminaries, most of them relatively effortless, that were thought to fall outside the conventional expectations and customs of compensation." Reich, 45 F.3d at 649. In general, the Act precludes overtime compensation for activities performed before or after an employee's regular work shift. However, the Supreme Court has long held that activities that are an "integral and indispensable part of the principal activities" for which an employee is employed are compensable, regardless of when they are performed. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956). Whether an activity is "integral and indispensable" is a highly fact-dependent inquiry, but based on a review of a number of cases, the Second Circuit has identified six relevant factors: (1) the degree to which the activity is "undertaken for the employer's benefit"; (2) the degree to which the activity is indispensable to the "primary goal" of the employee's work; (3) the degree to which the employee lacks choice in whether to perform the activity; (4) whether the activity involves something other than traveling to and from work; (5) the ease with which the employer could "maintain records of [the] time expended" on the activity; and (6) whether the amount of work involved is something more than "truly minimal." Reich, 45 F.3d at 650.

So for example, the time spent by butchers sharpening their knives after a shift was compensable because it was an "integral part" of the butchering activities for which the employees were "principally employed." Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S. 260, 263 (1956). By contrast, the time spent by nuclear plant workers clearing security checkpoints on their way into the plant was not compensable because it was a part of employees' travel to the work site, which "while arguably indispensable, [is] not integral to their principal activities." Gorman v. Consol. Edison Corp., 488 F.3d 586, 593 (2d Cir. 2007). Similarly, a lab technician arriving early to turn on x-ray machines was entitled to compensation because it benefitted the radiological lab, which was able to serve customers who arrived right when the lab opened. Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assoc., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 718 (2d Cir. 2001). By contrast, employees arriving early for a shift "for their own convenience" to do work that they "could have performed . . . during regular hours" were not entitled to compensation. Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 1984).

Several of the Reich factors suggest that charging laptop and printer batteries is a compensable activity. Plaintiffs use their laptops extensively in conducting inspections: accessing protocols detailing how to conduct inspections (Smith Dep. 30-31), verifying the permits and certificates of the establishments they are inspecting (id. 19-20), inputting information about the establishment and any violations they find during their inspections (id. 25-26; Faizi Dep. 33-34; Branch Dep. 47-48), and printing out violation reports for the establishment (Smith Dep. 25-26; Faizi Dep. 33-34; Branch Dep. 47-48). The laptops also record when plaintiffs start and stop their inspections, allowing management to verify the hours plaintiffs work. (Lichten Reply Decl. Ex. D (Reid Dep.) 58-59.) These are core aspects of plaintiffs' jobs that benefit the City, and they would not be possible without adequately charged laptop and printer batteries. Like the time spent by the butcher sharpening his knives in Mitchell, the time plaintiffs spend charging their batteries is essential to readying a piece of equipment that is integral to their duties.

Moreover, plaintiffs do not have any choice about whether to charge their batteries. As the City concedes, they are "required to appear at work with their computers, printers, extra batteries, and cellular phones all charged." (Def. R. 56.1 Statement ¶ 17.) Nor is charging the batteries an aspect of plaintiffs' travel to and from home, as was the time spent clearing security checkpoints in Gorman. And it is not apparent that compensating plaintiffs for the time spent charging batteries would present a record-keeping challenge, as the evidence indicates that the amount of time plaintiffs spend on it is consistent from day to day and from plaintiff to plaintiff.

The final factor, whether the amount of work involved is something more than "truly minimal," overlaps with the question of whether the time spent charging the batteries is de minimis. Here, the evidence is more ambiguous. Plaintiffs contend that they spend between fifteen and twenty-five minutes setting their batteries to charge. (Def. R. 56.1 Statement ¶ 19.) This purportedly includes only the time "actively" spent on the task — removing the batteries from plaintiffs' bags, plugging the batteries into a charger, and switching the batteries after one set of batteries has charged — and not the time during which the batteries are actually charging, when plaintiffs are free to attend to other things. (Id.) Undertaken every day, this amount of time is more than de minimis. But fifteen to twenty-five minutes to take some batteries out of a bag and plug them into a charger is frankly hard to believe, and even though defendant does not dispute the estimate, a reasonable fact-finder might still reject it as not credible without more explanation or evidence to substantiate the estimate.

Even were the Court to accept this estimate for purposes of this motion, plaintiffs would be required to offer evidence at trial about the amount of time spent charging the batteries in order to prove damages, at which point the Court would necessarily revisit the question. Consequently, the Court declines to decide on summary judgment whether the time spent charging batteries is more than de minimis, and instead leaves the question to be decided at trial.

With regard to their right to compensation for plotting the next day's route, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Three of the four exemplary plaintiffs testify that they spend time most nights plotting the next day's route. (Branch Dep. 70; Faizi Dep. 81; Smith Dep. 103-04.) However, plaintiffs have not offered sufficient evidence that this time is "integral and indispensable" to their inspections. First, for those plaintiffs who drive to work, or to the extent that plaintiffs' bags are not so heavy as to make their commutes work, the time spent plotting course to the first inspection site is not "integral and indispensable" to work, since the commute to the first inspection site is not itself work. To the extent that plaintiffs are able to plot a more efficient route, and cut the length of their commute, they, not the City, are the primary beneficiaries of that effort, since the effort allows plaintiffs to leave their homes later in the morning and arrive home earlier in the evening.

There is some reason to think, moreover, that plotting course to plaintiffs' first destinations is more time-consuming than plotting course to the intermediate sites. Plaintiffs testify that each Friday — when they are working at the central office rather than in the field — they receive their assignments for the following week, and after they do, they order and group the inspection sites so that they are in the same approximate geographic area each day. (See Branch Dep. 38-39, 70; Faizi Dep. 46-47; Lewin Dep. 37-38; Smith Dep. 43-44.) Thus, plaintiffs' longest trips of the day, and the ones likely to require the most planning, are those from their homes to their first inspection sites. After that, the inspection sites tend to be "in the same location, more or less." (Lewin Dep. 38.) A fact-finder could reasonably conclude that most of the route-planning time is spent planning for plaintiffs' trips to their first inspection sites, and that the time spent planning the remaining routes is de minimis.

Second, there is insufficient evidence that the City requires plaintiffs to plot these routes while at home. In order for an employee's efforts to be work, they must be "controlled or required by the employer." Tennessee Coal, 321 U.S. at 598. To be sure, "[w]ork not requested" by an employer may nonetheless be work if it is "suffered or permitted" by the employer, 29 C.F.R. § 785.11, or if the work is necessary to the "proper performance of [the] job," Kosakow, 274 F.3d at 718. But plaintiffs have not shown that the City required, suffered, or permitted plaintiffs to plot their route courses from home the night before, or that it was otherwise required for the "proper performance" of their jobs. To the extent that plaintiffs are not familiar with an area of the city, they would need to take time at some point to plot their courses between intermediate inspection sites. However, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the plaintiffs could plot their routes on Fridays when they are at the central office, at the same time that they are grouping their inspection sites into close geographic proximity, and determining the order in which they will be visiting their sites. Alternatively, a reasonable fact-finder could find that the plaintiffs could plot the routes to their next inspection sites after they finish each inspection. Plaintiffs carry maps of the city with them (see,e.g., Branch Dep. 71), and one plaintiff testified that while he usually tries to plot out his course the night before, "if I couldn't do [it] for some reason, then I do it on my way" (Faizi Dep. 81). A reasonable fact-finder could conclude that plotting routes on Friday or during the course of the day is practicable, and that therefore plaintiffs are not required or expected by the City to perform such work from home. Summary judgment is not warranted for plaintiffs on this issue.

On the other hand, summary judgment is also not warranted for the City. Plaintiffs have offered evidence that they spend a significant amount of time plotting routes for the next day. Clearly, plotting an efficient route between inspection locations redounds to the benefit of the City, as it allows inspectors to conduct more inspections per day than they would otherwise be able to do. One plaintiff has testified that Fridays are chaotic, and that he sometimes does not have time to accomplish everything he is supposed to do (see Smith Dep. 43-44), so it is possible that plaintiffs do not have enough time on Fridays to plot their routes. While there is some evidence that plaintiffs have some opportunity to plot their routes during their workdays, a reasonable fact-finder could nevertheless conclude from the fact that plaintiffs choose to spend time at home plotting their next day's routes either that it is generally impracticable to plot routes during the course of the day, or that for some other reason it was expected by the City that they would spend time at home plotting their routes. Whether plotting the next day's routes at home in advance is "integral and indispensable" to the performance of plaintiffs' jobs presents a genuine issue of material fact for resolution at trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to time spent commuting by car, and denied in all other respects. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied in all respects.

SO ORDERED.