LOGUE, J.

Victoria Mendez, City Attorney, and Kerri L. McNulty, Sr. Appellate Counsel, and Kevin R. Jones, Assistant City Attorney, and Stephanie K. Panoff, Assistant City Attorney, and Forrest L. Andrews, Assistant City Attorney, for appellants.

The Cunill Law Firm and Andrea S. Cunill, for appellee.

Before LOGUE , SCALES , and LINDSEY, JJ.

LOGUE, J.

The City of Miami appeals the trial court's order which temporarily (1) stayed the City from proceeding with a certain internal administrative hearing, and (2) directed the City to allow Appellee to bring multiple attorneys to the hearing in contravention of the City's procedures. Because the order constitutes a temporary injunction, but the requirements for entering a temporary injunction were not met, we reverse.

Appellee was an officer of the City of Miami Police Department. The City fired him for possession and use of a controlled substance while off duty. In contesting his termination, Appellee has challenged the legality of the drug, blood, and urine tests involved. On December 15, 2017, Appellee was served with a formal reprimand. On January 8, 2018, the State arrested and charged Appellee with drug possession. On January 10, 2018, the City terminated Appellee's employment.

Appellee has filed various administrative and legal challenges to his termination. He filed a grievance under the controlling Collective Bargaining Agreement wherein, if successful, he can receive the remedies of back pay and reinstatement. He has filed a complaint in circuit court for declaratory and injunctive relief under Florida Statutes sections 112.532 and 112.534, which provide more limited remedies. Fraternal Order of Police, Gator Lodge 67 v. City of Gainesville, 148 So. 3d 798, 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). He also requested a Departmental Disciplinary Review Board hearing.

A Departmental Disciplinary Review Board hearing is an administrative proceeding within the Police Department that is voluntary, non-binding, and intended to be non-legal in nature. It allows a panel within the department to review the reprimand and make a recommendation to the Police Chief. The City's rules governing such hearings provide that the disciplined employee is entitled, but not required, to have a union representative present, but that "private attorneys, private investigators, or any other person shall not represent the disciplined employee." Appellee requested the hearing be deferred until after his criminal prosecution was resolved. That request was apparently denied, and the hearing was scheduled for January 9, 2018.

At this point, the record takes an unconventional turn. The record consists of a court reporter's transcript of various conversations which appear to take place that morning in the downstairs lobby of the police building and a telephone conference with the trial court's judicial assistant. As we interpret the transcript, the trial court was not present for any of these conversations.

On the morning of his Departmental Disciplinary Review Board hearing, the Appellee arrived at the first floor of the police building. He was accompanied by three attorneys and a court reporter. Appellee, however, refused to proceed to the hearing room on the second floor. He gave two reasons: (1) the City failed to provide him with a wheelchair; and (2) he insisted on bringing three attorneys, while the City would allow only one. It appears the chairman of the Board offered to consider a request for a short-term continuance, but Appellee made no response. Apparently, the hearing took place in his absence.

Ultimately, the Appellee's attorneys initiated a telephone conference with the Judicial Assistant to the judge presiding over the Appellee's complaint for relief under section 112.534. The attorney for the City joined the conference after it began. The Appellee made a verbal "emergency motion" to the Judicial Assistant to stay the administrative hearing for the two reasons previously stated. Appellee argued "the city is divested of jurisdiction until the Court rules on the injunction [requested in Appellee's complaint]."

Without waiting for the City's response, the Judicial Assistant left the conference call (presumably to consult the court) and returned to announce that the court decided to stay the Departmental Disciplinary Review Board hearing and ordered that Appellee be allowed to bring all counsel to the hearing. The City requested an opportunity to be heard and objected based on the lack of notice for the emergency hearing, the treatment of a purely voluntary administrative matter as a legal hearing, and to the entry of an injunction after the hearing was completed. The Judicial Assistant then again left the conference call presumably to consult the court, and returned to inform the parties that the court maintained its prior ruling.

As mentioned before, the City formally terminated Appellee's employment on January 10, 2018. The trial court rendered the order under review on January 19, 2018. The City timely appealed.

The crucial issue in this case is whether the order under review constitutes an injunction. We find it does. The order did not simply schedule hearings in the case before the court: the order purported to stay the internal administrative proceedings of the Police Department. The trial court has no intrinsic supervisory authority over the administration of a local police department. See generally Detournay v. City of Coral Gables, 127 So. 3d 869, 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (noting the executive functions of a city cannot be supervised by the courts, absent the violation of a specific constitutional provision or law); Armor Corr. Health Servs., Inc. v. Ault, 942 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("Operation of the county jail is within the province of the executive and legislative branches of government, not the judicial branch."). Any powers the trial court might exercise in this regard can only stem from its judicial power to issue writs or injunctions. Similarly, the part of the order that directed the City to allow private attorneys to attend inter-departmental hearings contrary to the City's procedures amounts to an injunction.

Because temporary injunctions are extraordinary remedies, strict requirements govern their issuance. Mercado Oriental, Inc. v. Marin, 725 So. 2d 468, 469 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). These strict requirements were not met by the remarkably informal procedures utilized by Appellee and adopted by the trial court. In violation of the governing rule, for example, the movant provided no adequate notice; no written motion; no specific supporting facts; and no verified pleading, affidavit, or evidentiary basis. See, e.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610 ; City of Ormond Beach v. City of Daytona Beach, 794 So. 2d 660, 663 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) ("A telephone call from the court requesting a party's immediate presence to defend a motion for an injunction does not constitute reasonable notice.").

Moreover, nothing in the record (such as a pleading, memorandum of law, transcript of hearing, or judicial finding) indicates the court was presented with or independently considered the four necessary elements of a temporary injunction. See, e.g., Biscayne Park, LLC v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 34 So. 3d 24, 26 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) ("The well-established requirements for the issuance of a temporary injunction are: (1) the likelihood of irreparable harm and the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law; (2) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (3) that the threatened injury to the petitioner outweighs any possible harm to the respondent; and, (4) the entry of the injunction will not disserve the public interest."). Finally, the order lacks the required findings of facts and statement of legal reasons. See, e.g., Wade v. Brown, 928 So. 2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("Clear, definite, and unequivocally sufficient factual findings must support each of these four criteria before the court may enter the injunction.") (Citations and quotations omitted). We have considered the other arguments raised by the Appellee and find them without merit.

Reversed.