WESTHUES, Commissioner.

This is a suit for damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff in a collision of the defendant's tractor-trailer and a car in which plaintiff was riding. A trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $20,000. The trial court overruled defendant's motion for new trial on condition that plaintiff enter a remittitur in the sum of $11,000. Plaintiff complied with the order and a judgment was entered for plaintiff in the sum of $9,000. Defendant appealed.

Defendant has briefed four points. The first three points pertain to instructions numbered 1, 2, and 9. No complaint is made as to the wording of the instructions but defendant states that there was no basis under the evidence to authorize the giving of instructions 1 and 2, and that instruction 9 should not have been given because plaintiff and the driver of the car in which she was riding were on a joint enterprise and the driver's negligence was imputable to plaintiff. In the fourth point defendant claims that the verdict of the jury was so grossly excessive as to establish passion and prejudice against the defendant; also, that the verdict as reduced by order of the trial court is grossly excessive.

It was agreed that defendant's tractor-trailer came into collision with the car in which plaintiff was riding near the intersection of Highway 50, known as St. Clair Avenue in the area, and 44th Street, in St. Clair County, Illinois. Highway 50 was an east-west four-lane highway with a concrete abutment in the center separating the eastbound lanes from those westbound. At the intersection in question, 44th Street, a two-lane roadway, ran in a north-south direction. There was no stop sign at the intersection against traffic on Highway 50 but there was a stop sign on 44th Street.

There was a sharp dispute as to who was at fault in the collision. Plaintiff's evidence justifies the following statement as to how the collision occurred: Thomas Vincent Noska testified plaintiff asked him to take her in East St. Louis, Illinois, for the purpose of buying some paint for a tavern owned and operated by plaintiff in St. Louis, Missouri. He stated that on March 15, 1951, he took plaintiff to East St. Louis in his 1941 Mercury; that as he was driving westwardly on Highway 50 (on the return trip) in Illinois toward the MacArthur Bridge, he noticed a tractor-trailer on 44th Street approaching St. Clair Avenue from the north; that the tractor-trailer was then about the same distance from the intersection as the Mercury; the distance was estimated to be about a block and a half. Noska's testimony was that when his car was about 30 or 40 feet from the intersection, plaintiff screamed; that he turned his car to the left in an attempt to avoid a collision but that the tractor-trailer struck the rear portion of the right rear fender of the Mercury and pushed the car into the concrete abutment in the center of the four-lane pavement on Highway 50. Noska and plaintiff were thrown from the car by the impact. Plaintiff's injuries will be reviewed when we consider the question of the amount of the verdict being excessive.

Plaintiff testified that as they neared 44th Street, she saw the tractor-trailer and it did not look like the truck was going to stop and she screamed; that two impacts followed, first, when the truck hit the car and then, when they swerved into the abutment. The driver of the tractor-trailer testified that he stopped at the stop sign on 44th Street at Highway 50, looked both directions, saw no cars coming, and then made a wide swing into Highway 50; that he was driving about 5 miles per hour; that about the time he had straightened out his equipment on Highway 50, he felt a slight impact at the back of his trailer; that looking in his mirror, he saw the Mercury and a man and a woman lying on the pavement. There was evidence that the Mercury was struck at the rear of the right rear fender. Photographs of the Mercury introduced in evidence disclosed considerable damage to the Mercury at that point. No other damage to the Mercury was visible. The point at which the Mercury was struck supports plaintiff's theory as to how the collision occurred. The driver of the tractor-trailer testified he could have stopped within a few feet as he was driving into the intersection.

Defendant's first two points, that the court erred in giving instructions 1 and 2, may be treated together. These instructions submitted plaintiff's case to the jury under humanitarian negligence. Defendant's position as stated in its brief is as follows:

"The trial court erred in giving and reading instruction 2 for the reason that there was no basis for it under the evidence.

"This instruction authorizes verdict for plaintiff upon a finding that the driver of the truck with which the automobile came into collision caused the same to enter the highway when the automobile with plaintiff therein was in close and dangerous proximity and that the driver knew that a collision would likely result if he proceeded into the intersection.

"The very same situation applies to this instruction as to instruction 1. There was an utter failure of proof of the necessary elements to justify such a submission. It was incumbent on plaintiff to establish that when the truck entered the intersection the automobile was in close and dangerous proximity. What was said in Point I as to `imminent peril' applies with like force and effect to `close and dangerous proximity.' Surely nothing but speculation and conjecture, in view of the testimony of plaintiff and her driver, could have permitted a verdict. And nothing in the testimony of the truck driver aided plaintiff in any way."

In the argument, defendant assumes as true much of the evidence given by the truck driver. For example: That at the time of the impact, the truck had proceeded 100 to 150 feet on Highway 50 west of 44th Street. That is contrary to plaintiff's evidence. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider plaintiff's evidence as true and also defendant's evidence wherein it aids plaintiff's case. Defendant says it was incumbent on plaintiff to show that the Mercury was in close and dangerous proximity when the truck entered the intersection. The fact that the Mercury was struck was evidence that it was in such close proximity. Plaintiff's evidence that the truck did not stop at the intersection and that therefore she screamed was further evidence of the danger to the Mercury and its occupants. The fact that the truck driver did not see the Mercury is evidence in plaintiff's favor and supports plaintiff's theory that the truck driver was negligent. Certainly, the Mercury was there to be seen. The evidence was that each driver had a clear view. Defendant makes much of the fact that plaintiff and Noska testified that the truck was about the same distance as they from the intersection when the truck was first seen; that the distance was a block and a half; that the truck was traveling at the same speed as the Mercury which was about 35 miles per hour. Defendant contends that if the truck had been going at that speed, it could not have been safely turned westerly at the intersection. The evidence as to speed and distances must be considered as estimates. The evidence justifies a finding that the truck struck the Mercury.

We have examined the cases of Yeaman v. Storms, 358 Mo. 774, 217 S.W.2d 495, and Claridge v. Anzolone, 359 Mo. 65, 220 S.W.2d 33, and other cases cited by the defendant. In the Claridge case, this court en banc said, 220 S.W.2d loc. cit. 34, "a defendant is liable for injuring a plaintiff if he sees him (or, where defendant is under a duty to keep a vigilant watch, should see him) in a position of imminent peril, in time, by the exercise of due care and with safety to himself and others, to avert the injury."

In this case, the defendant was under a duty to keep a vigilant watch and should have discovered the Mercury approaching the intersection. Since there was no stop sign on Highway 50 against the Mercury, and there was a stop sign on 44th Street against the truck, a jury could well conclude that the truck driver had no right to assume that cars on Highway 50 would stop at 44th Street; also, that the driver of the Mercury had the right to assume that the truck driver would obey the stop sign. The truck driver testified he could have stopped his truck within a distance of 5 feet. A jury was authorized to find that he could have averted a collision. We rule that the trial court was justified in submitting the case to a jury.

Instruction 9 authorized a verdict for plaintiff even though the jury found from the evidence that the driver of the Mercury might have been guilty of negligence contributing to the collision. Defendant says this instruction should not have been given for the reason that Noska and plaintiff were engaged in a joint enterprise. To the contrary the evidence showed that Noska and plaintiff were not on a joint enterprise. Noska had no interest in plaintiff's tavern nor did he have any interest in the paint which plaintiff sought to purchase in East St. Louis, Illinois. The point must be ruled against defendant.

The final point that the verdict was so excessive as to show passion and prejudice on the part of the jury must be ruled against the defendant. The trial court considered this question and did not grant a new trial. It is evident that the trial court gave this question careful consideration. A remittitur of $11,000 was ordered. There was an abundance of evidence concerning the extent of plaintiff's injuries. Doctors testifying for the defendant disagreed in many respects with those testifying for plaintiff. Aside from the expert evidence as given by the doctors, it was shown that prior to March 15, 1951, plaintiff was able to be about, doing her work of operating a neighborhood tavern. She was in fairly good health. Since her injuries, she has been unable to do her work and has been forced to employ extra help to perform the labor that she is now unable to do.

Dr. F. M. Barnes, Jr., testified plaintiff suffered from a brain injury and was highly nervous. His opinion as to the permanency of her injury was as follows:

"Well more than a year has elapsed since the beginning of these things, the headache and so forth and also I thought that she was less nervous when I saw her the second time, she still has plenty of it left and the ultimate outcome cannot be predicted after it has gone this long without a great deal of benefit it becomes very seriously doubtful of a complete recovery."

Dr. S. H. Pranger testified plaintiff has a defect between the fourth and fifth lumbar vertebrae known as a ruptured disc.

Dr. J. C. Peden, witness for the defendant, testified he examined plaintiff on April 15, 1952, and among other things found that plaintiff had a narrowing "between the bones of the back of the fourth and fifth lumbar."

Dr. John J. Hammond, a witness for the defendant, testified he examined plaintiff and found that she favored the right leg slightly on walking; that there was a "marked restriction of all movements of the right hip" and a tenderness of the coccyx.

Plaintiff testified that she was 41 years old and lived with her father and her son; that she had been operating a neighborhood tavern for seven years: that before her injury she was in good health; that her injuries received in the collision were many. We shall mention a few of them: an injury to her head, causing bleeding from the ears and a large knot being formed on her head; injuries to her knee, hip, and back; in fact, plaintiff stated, "The whole half side of me" was injured. She testified that because of her injuries she has been compelled to employ extra help at a salary of $50 to $60 per week plus board.

All parties agreed that plaintiff was at the time of the trial extremely nervous. There was a sharp dispute in the evidence of the doctors whether many of these injuries were the result of the collision of March 15, 1951.

We have a situation before us in which if the trial court had not ordered a remittitur, it is doubtful that this court would have disturbed the verdict. We do not mean to say that the trial court was not justified in doing so. In fact, we desire to commend him for giving the question serious consideration. A trial court is in a better position to understand and to know the true situation than an appellate court.

The injuries plaintiff complained of were supported by evidence and were serious enough to justify the judgment of $9,000. We have not found anything in the record that would indicate passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. The trial court ruled the question and we are not in a position to disturb the judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.

BOHLING and BARRETT, CC., concur.

[26] PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion by WESTHUES, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.

All concur.