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Caldwell v. Spicer McEvoy

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville. December Term, 1928
Jul 20, 1929
19 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1929)

Summary

holding that injunctions cannot be used to prevent criminal acts

Summary of this case from State ex Rel. Dean v. VanHorn

Opinion

Opinion filed July 20, 1929.

1. SUPREME COURT. Jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction by writs of certiorari and supersedeas to supersede a writ of injunction from the Chancery Court which restrains the execution of a decree pronounced by the Supreme Court. (Post, p. —.)

Citing: State ex rel. v. Herbert, 127 Tenn. (19 Cates), 220.

2. EQUITY. Cause of action. Multiplicity of suits.

A litigant cannot split up his cause of action but must include all grounds upon which he seeks relief in one suit. (Post, p. 466.)

3. EQUITY. Jurisdiction. Misdemeanors. Substitution of civil for criminal procedure.

Equity has no jurisdiction of misdemeanors and it is not the intention of the law that constitutional provisions shall be evaded by substituting a civil for a criminal procedure. (Post, p. 467.)

Citing: 32 C.J., sec. 438, p. 275.

[*] Corpus Juris-Cyc References: Actions, 1CJ, section 276, p. 1106, n. 48; Courts, 15CJ, section 552, p. 1113, n. 44; Injunctions, 32CJ, section 438, p. 276, n. 12, 16; Judgments, 34CJ, section 1415, p. 996, n. 1.

FROM HENRY.

Appeal from the Chancery Court of Henry County. — HON. TOM C. RYE, Chancellor.

Y.Q. CALDWELL, JR., for complainant, appellant.

LEWIS RHODES, for defendants, appellees.


By a former bill complainant sought to enjoin the defendants from converting their dwelling, located in the resident section of Paris, into a funeral home, upon the theory that an undertaking establishment in a nuisance per se.

The Chancellor held otherwise and dismissed the bill, and his decree was affirmed by this court.

Thereupon the present bill was filed, and a fiat for an injunction obtained, upon allegations that defendants were undertaking to remodel said dwelling without first having obtained a building permit from the city, pursuant to an ordinance.

In this situation, a petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas was presented to a member of this court at chambers, and said writs were ordered issued requiring the chancery court to certify the record in said cause to this court and superseding the injunction which restrained defendants from remodeling their building.

This court has jurisdiction in the premises since such a proceeding is an interference with the decree of this court. State ex rel. v. Herbert, 127 Tenn. 220.

It is elemental that a litigant cannot split up his cause of action but must include all grounds upon which he seeks relief in one suit. Were it otherwise, complainant, by alleging different grounds for injunctive relief, could prolong the litigation indefinitely and do the defendants great injustice.

The situation was not changed by amending the bill so as to make Mrs. Morton a party complainant. No cause of action is stated as to her, she did not verify the bill, and filed no injunction bond.

The ordinance which defendants are charged with violating is a misdemeanor, of which equity has no jurisdiction.

It is not the intention of the law that constitutional provisions shall be evaded by substituting a civil for a criminal procedure. The mere fact that officers charged with the duty of enforcing the provisions of the criminal law refuse to perform their duty in this regard is no reason for the interference of a court of equity. 32 Corpus Juris, section 438, p. 275.

In the next section it is said:

"In applying the general rule above stated courts have refused to grant injunctions to restrain the erection or location of wooden buildings within the fire limits of a municipality; to restrain the erection of a livery stable in a city; to restrain the maintenance of a slaughterhouse on a stream flowing through a city; to restrain the permitting stock and cattle to run at large within the city limits; to restrain the transaction of banking business in contravention of law; to restrain a violation of city ordinances, where the acts complained of do not amount to such a nuisance as equity would restrain."

Many cases are cited in the note supporting the text.

The order of supersedeas is made perpetual and the complainant is taxed with the costs.


Summaries of

Caldwell v. Spicer McEvoy

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville. December Term, 1928
Jul 20, 1929
19 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1929)

holding that injunctions cannot be used to prevent criminal acts

Summary of this case from State ex Rel. Dean v. VanHorn
Case details for

Caldwell v. Spicer McEvoy

Case Details

Full title:Y.Q. CALDWELL v. SPICER McEVOY, et al

Court:Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville. December Term, 1928

Date published: Jul 20, 1929

Citations

19 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn. 1929)
19 S.W.2d 238

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