LAUREL BEELER United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

Re: ECF No. 26

INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND

In this Social Security appeal, the parties stipulated to remand the case to the Commissioner for further administrative action. On remand, the plaintiff was awarded past-due benefits in the amount of $131,510.00. The Commissioner withheld 25% of the retroactive benefits, or $32,877.50.

The plaintiff's counsel now seeks $22,877.50 of those benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and the parties' attorney-client fee agreement, which provides for a 25% § 406(b) contingency fee. Counsel already received $4,789.51 in fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), which results in a net fee of $18,087.99. Counsel also informs the court that the National Security Disability Advocates, "the legal entity that represented Mr. Butler in the proceedings before the Administration[,] intends to separately move the Administration for the $10,000 that would remain from Mr. Butler's past-due benefits." The Commissioner submitted an analysis of counsel's request.

The court can decide this matter without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). The court grants the motion because the amount of fees requested is reasonable.

ANALYSIS

Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), "[w]henever a court renders a judgment favorable to a [social security] claimant . . . , the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee" for the claimant's counsel, which can be no more than 25% of the total of past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). A court may award such a fee even if the court's judgment did not immediately result in an award of past-due benefits; where the court has rendered a judgment favorable to a claimant by reversing an earlier determination by an ALJ and remanding for further consideration, the court may calculate the 25% fee based upon any past-due benefits awarded on remand. See, e.g., Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

In considering a motion for attorney's fees under section 406(b), the court must review counsel's request "as an independent check" to ensure that the contingency fee agreement "yield[s] reasonable results." See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Section 406(b) "does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements." Id. at 808-09. To evaluate the reasonableness of a fee request under section 406(b), the court should consider the character of the representation and the results achieved. Id. at 808; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. This includes analyzing whether substandard representation justifies awarding less than 25% in fees; any delay in the proceedings attributable to the attorney requesting the fee; whether the benefits of the representation are out of proportion to time spent on the case; and the risk counsel assumed by accepting the case. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151-52 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808).

The court must offset an award of section 406(b) attorney's fees by any award of fees granted under the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796; Parrish v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 698 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2012).

The court finds that the fee request is reasonable. The 25% contingency fee agreement is within section 406(b)(1)(A)'s statutory ceiling. The work was reasonable given the favorable outcome and the time spent is not out of proportion to the fee award.

CONCLUSION

The court finds that fees of $22,877.50 are reasonable under § 406(b), reduces the award by the $4,789.51 in EAJA fees, and authorizes a net fee award of $18,087.99.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2017

/s/_________

LAUREL BEELER

United States Magistrate Judge