BROWN, Justice.

This case is before this Court on three certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

In the primary election held in June 2000, Justice Harold F. See, Jr., an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama, sought the nomination of the Republican party for the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama. As part of his political campaign, Justice See made comments about the record of another candidate in the primary election, Judge Roy Moore. Thereafter, the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission ("JIC") received a complaint that Justice See's comments pertaining to Judge Moore's record of sentencing in drug cases violated Canon 7B.(2) and Canon 2A. of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics.

The Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, which are promulgated and adopted by the Supreme Court of Alabama pursuant to its authority under the Alabama Constitution, govern the character and conduct of judges in the State of Alabama and have the force and effect of law. The Alabama Constitution vests enforcement of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics in the JIC. See Ala. Const. of 1901, Amendment No. 581, §§ 6.17 and 6.18. If the JIC determines that a reasonable basis exists for a finding of an ethics violation, the JIC may file a complaint with the Court of the Judiciary ("COJ"). See Ala. Const. of 1901, Amendment No. 581, § 6.17(b). The COJ convenes to hear complaints filed by the JIC and has the "authority, after notice and public hearing . . . to remove from office, suspend without pay, or censure a judge, or apply such other sanction as may [be] prescribed by law, for a violation of a Canon of Judicial Ethics." See Ala. Const. of 1901, Amendment No. 581, § 6.18(a). Once the JIC has filed a complaint, a charged judge is prohibited by Ala. Const. of 1901, Amendment No. 328, § 6.19, from serving as a judge until final resolution of the complaint by the COJ.

On July 21, 2000, upon finding that a reasonable basis existed to charge Justice See with an ethics violation, the JIC filed a three-count complaint against Justice See with the COJ. That complaint alleged that, through his campaign advertisements, Justice See had violated Canon 7B.(2) and Canon 2A. of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Count 1 of the JIC's complaint specifically alleged that, during his judicial campaign, Justice See distributed "false information" about Judge Moore "either knowing the information to be false or with reckless disregard of whether that information was false," in violation of Canon 7B.(2). Count 2 alleged that Justice See, "in the course of a judicial campaign," disseminated "information" about Judge Moore "knowing that the information would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable person," in violation of Canon 7B.(2). Count 3 alleged that, "in the course of a judicial campaign," Justice See "failed to respect and comply with the law and to conduct himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary," in violation of Canon 2A. More specifically, Count 3 alleged that Justice See violated Canon 2A. when he, "through his campaign spokesperson, criticized Moore's conduct in not explaining his sentences when an explanation by Moore would have been in violation of Canon 3A(6)."

Pursuant to Ala. Const. of 1901, Amendment No. 328, § 6.19, Justice See was immediately disqualified from judicial duty on the Supreme Court of Alabama, pending the COJ's resolution of the complaint filed by the JIC. On July 24, 2000 (three days after the JIC filed its complaint), Justice See responded by bringing an action against the JIC in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, claiming that Canon 7B.(2) and Canon 2A., both facially and as applied, violated his rights protected under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice See also sought a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of the Canons against him and to return him to active duty on the Supreme Court of Alabama. The JIC filed a motion to dismiss Justice See's action in the district court, contending that the federal court should abstain from enjoining the state-court proceeding against Justice See based on the dictates of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 ("the Anti-Injunction Act") and the Younger Abstention Doctrine.

In orders entered on July 28, 2000, and on August 3, 2000, the district court denied the JIC's motion to dismiss and granted the TRO and the preliminary injunction sought by Justice See. Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 111 F. Supp.2d 1224 (M.D.Ala. 2000); and Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 111 F. Supp.2d 1241 (M.D.Ala. 2000). Upon finding that there was a substantial likelihood that Justice See would ultimately prevail on his claim that Canon 7B.(2) and Canon 2A. violated his rights protected under the First Amendment, the district court enjoined the JIC from enforcing the canons and from prosecuting the complaint against Justice See. Id. In addition, the district court prevented the JIC from interfering with Justice See's performance of his judicial duties on the Supreme Court of Alabama.

The JIC then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the federal courts should abstain from interfering with the ongoing state proceedings against Justice See (i.e., those in the COJ), and that any federal proceedings on the merits of Justice See's federal constitutional claims should be terminated by application of Younger abstention principles. Stating that it could "properly intervene in a state judicial proceeding only when we are convinced that the state forum is inadequate and [that] we are, for now, uncertain about the adequacy of the state forum for Justice See's federal constitutional challenges," the court of appeals certified the following questions to this Court:

"A. IN A PROCEEDING BEFORE THE ALABAMA COURT OF THE JUDICIARY, CAN A DEFENDANT RAISE AND HAVE DECIDED A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO A JUDICIAL CANON, EITHER AT THE COURT OF THE JUDICIARY OR THROUGH DIRECT REVIEW TO THE SUPREME COURT OR BY OTHER MEANS?

"B. IF SO, HOW DO THE PROCEDURAL RULES GOVERNING THE COURT OF THE JUDICIARY PERMIT A REASONABLY SPEEDY DECISION ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES?

"C. IN A PROCEEDING BEFORE THE ALABAMA COURT OF THE JUDICIARY, CAN THAT COURT OR A HIGHER COURT GRANT, IN THAT PROCEEDING, A STAY OF THE JUDGE'S DISQUALIFICATION PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THAT PROCEEDING OR THE OUTCOME OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE POSED IN THAT PROCEEDING?"

Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2001).

In addition to certifying the three questions, the court of appeals invited this Court to address the question whether Canon 7B.(2) and Canon 2A. violate the First Amendment guarantee of free speech and to remedy federal constitutional defects, if any, we may find in the canons. In footnote 9 of its order, the court of appeals stated:

"We observe that because the Alabama Supreme Court adopted the judicial canons at issue here, the court may also be able to remedy federal constitutional defects, if any, that it may find in the judicial canons challenged by Justice See. Our certification to the Alabama Supreme Court does not preclude this activity. See Pogue v. Oglethorpe Power Corp., 82 F.3d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1996) (certification `offer[s] the state court the opportunity to interpret or change existing law.')."

Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission, 245 F.3d at 1266 n. 9. Because of our answer to the question concerning the federal constitutional defects of Canon 7B.(2) and Canon 2A., we deem the certified questions A. and B. to be moot and we decline to answer certified question C. Our discussion of the constitutionality of the canons follows.

1. Constitutionality of Canon 7B.(2)

Canon 7B.(2) of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics provides as follows:

"Campaign Communications. During the course of any campaign for nomination or election to judicial office, a candidate shall not, by any means, do any of the following:

"Post, publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute false information concerning a judicial candidate or an opponent, either knowing the information to be false or with reckless disregard of whether the information is false; or post, publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute true information about a judicial candidate or an opponent that would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable person."

Justice See raises a First Amendment facial challenge to Canon 7B.(2), asserting that that Canon is overbroad and that, as a result, it chills First Amendment speech. After careful consideration of this issue, we conclude that Canon 7B.(2) is indeed facially unconstitutional because it violates the overbreadth doctrine.

"An overbreadth challenge is based on the statute's `possible direct and indirect burdens on speech.'" United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting American Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1499-500 (11th Cir. 1990)). The overbreadth doctrine "permits the facial invalidation of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the impermissible applications of the law are substantial when judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973)). The doctrine "`protects the public from the chilling effect such a statute has on protected speech; the court will strike down the statute even though in the case before the court the governmental entity enforced the statute against those engaged in unprotected activities.'" Acheson, 195 F.3d at 650 (quoting Nationalist Movement v. City of Cumming, 934 F.2d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)).

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the United States Supreme Court stated the following with regard to the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech:

"The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safeguard, we have said, `was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484. `The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.' Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369. `[I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions,' Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270, and this opportunity is to be afforded for `vigorous advocacy' no less than `abstract discussion.' N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429. The First Amendment, said Judge Learned Hand, `presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.' United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)."

Id. at 270-71.

Discussing the First Amendment in the context of elections, the Supreme Court stated in Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982):

"At the core of the First Amendment are certain basic conceptions about the manner in which political discussion in a representative democracy should proceed. As we noted in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966):

"`Whatever differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs. This of course includes discussions of candidates, structures and forms of government, the manner in which government is operated or should be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.'

"The free exchange of ideas provides special vitality to the process traditionally at the heart of American constitutional democracy — the political campaign. `[I]f it be conceded that the First Amendment was "fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people," then it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.' Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971) (citation omitted). The political candidate does not lose the protection of the First Amendment when he declares himself for public office. Quite to the contrary:

"`The candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the election of other candidates. Indeed, it is of particular importance that candidates have the unfettered opportunity to make their views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day. Mr. Justice Brandeis' observation that in our country "public discussion is a political duty," Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (concurring opinion), applies with special force to candidates for public office.' Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1976) (per curiam)."

456 U.S. at 52-53.

The people of Alabama have chosen to select their judges in partisan, contested elections. So long as this is the case, it is essential that judicial candidates have "the unfettered opportunity to make their views known," so that voters may intelligently evaluate the candidates' positions on issues of vital public importance. Thus, the political speech of judicial candidates in this state must be guaranteed the fullest application of the First Amendment's protections.

Because Canon 7B.(2) restricts political expression that "occupies the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment," McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995), this Court will apply "the most exacting scrutiny" when analyzing the Canon's constitutionality.Id.; see also Brown, 456 U.S. at 53-54. When "a State seeks to restrict directly the offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters, the First Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by not only a legitimate interest, but a compelling one, and that the restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression." Brown, 456 U.S. at 53-54. Accordingly, we will uphold the Canon only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349; Brown, 456 U.S. at 53-54; see alsoPerry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).

False statements, when made during political campaigns, "may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large." McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347. Moreover, there appears to be little dispute that preservation of the reputation and integrity of the judiciary is a compelling state interest. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848 (1978) ("There could hardly be a higher governmental interest than a State's interest in the quality of its judiciary.") (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). Thus, with regard to Canon 7B.(2), we conclude that the State of Alabama has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the judiciary. However, we further conclude that Canon 7B.(2) is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face because it is not narrowly tailored to serve that compelling state interest.

In so concluding, we find persuasive the reasoning expressed by the Supreme Court of Michigan in In re Chmura, 461 Mich. 517, 608 N.W.2d 31 (2000). There, the court considered whether Canon 7(B)(1)(d) of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct could withstand First Amendment scrutiny. That canon provided that candidates for judicial office

"should not use or participate in the use of any form of public communication that the candidate knows or reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, or which contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading, or which is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the candidate can achieve."

Applying strict scrutiny and recognizing that the canon was intended to promote civility in campaigns for judicial office, the court nevertheless held that the canon was "facially unconstitutional because it [was] not narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of the election process and ensuring public confidence in the judiciary." Chmura, 461 Mich. at 529-30, 608 N.W.2d at 38. Relying in part on the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Brown, supra, 456 U.S. 45, the Chmura court stated:

"In Brown . . ., the Supreme Court considered a Kentucky statute that voided an election because the victorious candidate had announced during his campaign that he intended to serve at a salary less than that fixed by law. The Court rejected the state's argument that its interest in protecting the political process from distortions caused by false or inaccurate statements justified the sanction. The Court concluded that, absent a showing that the candidate made the disputed statement other than in good faith and with knowledge of its falsity, or that he made it with reckless disregard of its falsity, the sanction `was inconsistent with the atmosphere of robust political debate protected by the First Amendment.'"

Chmura, 461 Mich. at 535-36, 608 N.W.2d at 40-41 (quoting Brown, 456 U.S. at 62).

In finding Canon 7(B)(1)(d) of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct facially unconstitutional in Chmura, the Michigan Supreme Court explained:

"Canon 7(B)(1)(d) attaches adverse consequences to a candidate's statements that are not knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for truth or falsity. The canon applies to any statement that the candidate `reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading, [or] deceptive.' It also applies to a statement that `contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law,' and a statement that `omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading.' It further prohibits a statement that is `likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the candidate can achieve.'

". . . .

"Canon 7(B)(1)(d) greatly chills debate regarding the qualifications of candidates for judicial office. It applies to all statements, not merely those statements that bear on the impartiality of the judiciary. A candidate for judicial office faces adverse consequences for statements that are not false, but, rather, are found misleading or deceptive. Further, the canon extends beyond the candidate's actual statement to permit discipline for factual omissions. Faced with the prospect of future disciplinary action, a candidate's safest course may sometimes be to remain silent on many issues."

461 Mich. at 536-40, 608 N.W.2d at 41-42. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the only constitutional portion of Canon 7(B)(1)(d) was its proscription against knowingly false statements or statements made with reckless disregard of their falsity.

This Court, too, has recognized that misrepresentations in a political context "must be shown to have been made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth. Otherwise, there would be a danger of chilling the exercise of protected speech, because while an erroneous statement is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate. An innocent misstatement will not be grounds for punishment." Dowling v. Alabama State Bar, 539 So.2d 149, 152 (Ala. 1988) (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).

In addition to Alabama, only three other states — Michigan, Georgia, and Ohio — have enacted broad restrictions on the kind of statements a judicial candidate may make during an election campaign. SeeChmura, 461 Mich. at 529 n. 6, 608 N.W.2d at 37 n. 6. As we have indicated, in Chmura the Michigan Supreme Court found Canon 7(B)(1)(d) of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct to be facially unconstitutional. In Weaver v. Bonner, 114 F. Supp.2d 1337 (N.D.Ga. 2000), the federal district court found Georgia's judicial-election canon to violate the overbreadth doctrine because the canon failed to provide the "necessary `breathing space' to survive First Amendment scrutiny." 114 F. Supp.2d at 1342. Like Canon 7B.(2) of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics (and like the Michigan canon in Chmura), the Georgia canon not only prohibited false statements knowingly made, but also "chill[ed] debate by requiring candidates to attempt to determine whether a reasonable person would view their speech as fraudulent, misleading or somehow deceptive. It, therefore, [had] a great likelihood of forcing candidates to remain silent on questionable matters instead of risking adverse action." Id. at 1342-43.

In concluding that Canon 7B.(2) is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face, not only are we persuaded by the reasoning expressed in Chmura andWeaver, but we are further persuaded by the reasoning expressed in Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 111 F. Supp.2d 1224 (M.D.Ala. 2000), where the United States District Court, in granting the TRO and the preliminary injunction sought by Justice See, found that there was a substantial likelihood that Justice See would ultimately prevail on his claim that Canon 7B.(2) and Canon 2A. violated his rights protected under the First Amendment. We quote in part from the district court's discussion of Canon 7B.(2):

"In this case, the court finds that the canon at issue, i.e., Canon 7(B)(2), appears to be more far-reaching than — or at least on the same par with — the canon held unconstitutional in Chmura and the statute examined in Brown, supra. As in Chmura and Brown, Canon 7(B)(2) of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics extends beyond those statements that are false or made with knowledge of their falsity to speech that a `reasonable person' would deem `deceiving or misleading.' The `deceiving or misleading' clause of Canon 7(B)(2) neither takes into account the candidate's intent nor does it contain a falsity requirement. Therefore, if a `reasonable person' would deem `true information' either `deceiving or misleading,' the candidate violates Canon 7(B)(2) and, thus, is subject to being charged by the JIC for a violation thereof. Further, if the candidate is already serving as a judge, like Justice See, he or she is at risk of being disqualified from service during the pendency of the JIC complaint pursuant to Amendment No. 328, § 6.19, to the Alabama Constitution of 1901. In other words, a violation under the `deceiving or misleading' clause of Canon 7(B)(2) can occur, regardless of whether the candidate acted with knowledge of or in reckless disregard to the `deceiving or misleading' nature of the otherwise `true information.' The same type of scenario was present in Brown.

"The Supreme Court in Brown explained that a candidate's liability under the statute before it `is absolute: [The appellant's] election victory must be voided even if the offending statement was made in good faith. . . . .' 456 U.S. at 61, 102 S.Ct. 1523. `The chilling effect of such absolute accountability for factual misstatements in the course of political debate is incompatible with the atmosphere of free discussion contemplated by the First Amendment in the context of political campaigns.' Id.

"Here also, as in Brown, the `deceiving or misleading' portion of Canon 7(B)(2) does not allow for erroneous but unintentional or innocent statements. As a result, it has the potential to squelch free speech by inhibiting candidates from speaking for fear of violating the canon and being disciplined. Without an intent element or falsity requirement, candidates risk violating the canon for mistaken but innocent dissemination of `deceiving or misleading' information. Thus, rather than risk violating the canon, the candidate may choose to remain silent rather than exercise his or her freedom of speech. The court finds that such a result is unacceptable under the First Amendment. As stated in Chmura,

"`[a] rationale for judicial elections is that meaningful debate should periodically take place concerning the overall direction of the courts and the role of individual judges in contributing to that direction. Such debate is impossible if judicial candidates are overly fearful of potential discipline for what they say.'

"608 N.W.2d at 42. Based on the foregoing, Canon 7(B)(2) does not appear to afford the `breathing space' required to overcome First Amendment scrutiny. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-272, 84 S.Ct. 710."

Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 111 F. Supp.2d at 1234-36 (footnotes omitted).

We find Canon 7B.(2) to be facially unconstitutional because it is not narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the judiciary. The language in the latter clause of Canon 7B.(2) prohibiting the dissemination of "true information about a judicial candidate or an opponent that would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable person" is unconstitutionally overbroad because it has the plain effect of chilling legitimate First Amendment rights.

As we noted above, the court of appeals invited this Court to remedy federal constitutional defects, if any, we may find in Canon 7B.(2) or Canon 2A. Accordingly, similar to what the Michigan Supreme Court did with the canon at issue in Chmura, we narrow Canon 7B.(2) to provide that a candidate for judicial office shall not disseminate demonstrably false information concerning a judicial candidate or an opponent "with `actual malice' — that is, with knowledge that it [is] false or with reckless disregard of whether it [is] false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280. "[D]emonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements. But `erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the "breathing space" that they "need to survive."'" Brown, supra, 456 U.S. at 60 (citation omitted), quoting New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271-72, quoting, in turn, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).

Our limiting of Canon 7B.(2) is designed to render the canon narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the judiciary. "The burden of proving `actual malice' requires [the JIC] to demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that [Justice See] realized that his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his statement."Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 n. 30 (1984); New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 280. "Authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment guarantees have consistently refused to recognize an exception for any test of truth — whether administered by judges, juries, or administrative officials — and especially one that puts the burden of proving truth on the speaker." New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271.

2. Constitutionality of Canon 2A.

Justice See challenges the constitutionality of Canon 2A. as applied to him. The JIC alleged that Justice See violated Canon 2A. when he, "through his campaign spokesperson, criticized [Judge] Moore's conduct in not explaining his sentences when an explanation by Moore would have been in violation of Canon 3A(6)."

Canon 3A.(6) of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:

"A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to his direction and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has noted that certification "offer[s] the state court the opportunity to interpret or change existing law." See Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 245 F.3d at 1266 n. 9. We therefore take this opportunity to clarify the scope of Canon 2A.

Canon 2A. of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics provides as follows:

"A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."

Canon 2A. regulates conduct. However, in the setting of political speech at issue in these proceedings, a candidate's conduct with reference to speech by the candidate or the unrepudiated statement of an aide is essentially the candidate's speech and is, therefore, not chargeable under Canon 2A. Hence, Canon 2A. does not apply to any of the matters made the basis of this complaint.

QUESTIONS ADDRESSED; RESPONSE ISSUED.

Harwood, Woodall, and Stuart, JJ., concur.

Lyons, J., concurs specially.

Johnstone, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

Houston, J., dissents.

Moore, C.J., and See, J., recuse themselves.

BROWN, Justice.

Appendix (Excerpt from the district court's opinion)

"Second, Canon 7(B)(2)'s prohibition also appears to be overbroad for the same reasons articulated in Iowa Right To Life Committee, Inc. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963 (1999). In Williams, which involved an appeal from a preliminary injunction, the Third Circuit examined, in part, the constitutionality of an Iowa campaign administrative code rule (`rule') which limited expenditures for `express advocacy' of candidates made independently of the candidate and his or her campaign. Id. at 968-69. The portion of the rule at issue provided that `express advocacy' constitutes communication that:

"`b. When taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events such as the proximity to the election, could only be interpreted by a reasonable person as containing advocacy of the election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s) . . . because:

"`(1) The electoral portion of the communication is unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of only one meaning; and

"`(2) Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether it encourages action to elect or defeat one or more clearly identified candidate(s) . . . or encourages some other kind of action.'

"Id. at 969 (quoting Iowa Admin. Code r. 351-4.100(1)(b)).

"The Iowa Right To Life Committee, Inc. (`IRLC'), which publishes `voter guides' containing information about the political positions of elected candidates (id. at 965), argued that the rule's definition of `express advocacy' chilled its First Amendment rights `to public discussion of issues.' Id. at 968. According to IRLC, the chilling effect occurred because the rule's definition of `express advocacy' was `unconstitutionally overbroad and swe[pt] in a substantial amount of protected speech, creating uncertainty.' Id. In arguing that the definition was overbroad, IRLC focused on the language in the rule pertaining to `what reasonable people or reasonable minds would understand by the communication.' Id. at 969. IRLC contended that, under this aspect of the definition, `[t]here [was] no way for IRLC to know ahead of time whether its speech does or does not meet the definition and therefore subjects them to government reporting and disclosure requirements.' Id. According to the IRLC, `[t]he possible intent and effect attributed to the speech creates uncertainty.' Id.

"In affirming the lower court's decision, the Third Circuit held `that the State's definition of express advocacy created uncertainty and potentially chills discussion of public issues' and, thus, `there is a likelihood of success on the merits.' Id. at 970. The Third Circuit explained that, where an interpretation of a definition of a statutory or regulatory phrase involves `[q]uestions of intent and effect,' the speaker cannot `safely assume how anything he might say would be understood by others.' Id. at 969 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43, 96 S.Ct. 612). `A speaker should not be put "wholly at the mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and consequently of whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent and meaning."' Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43, 96 S.Ct. 612). Thus, `[w]hen a definition depends on the meaning others attribute to the speech, there is no security for free discussion because the definition "blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said," requiring "the speaker to hedge and trim."' Id.

"Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction in favor of IRLC. Id. at 970. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that the district court did not err in finding that the IRLC `would likely succeed on the merits in its action to have the regulation declared unconstitutionally overbroad because it chills legitimate First Amendment rights to public discussion of issues.' Id. at 966, 970.

"The court recognizes that the rule at issue in Williams regulated a different aspect of political speech than the Canon at issue in this case. Nevertheless, the court finds that the reasoning in Williams is pertinent to the issues presented in this case. Here, in order for a candidate to know whether he is disseminating `true' but `misleading or deceiving' information, as prohibited by Canon 7(B)(2), he or she is at the mercy of what a `reasonable person' would think. The candidate must go inside the mind of a `reasonable person' to ascertain what inferences a reasonable person would or could draw from the candidate's advertisement.

"Determining who represents a `reasonable person' is just one of the problems evidenced by Canon 7(B)(2). Even if it were clear as to who is a `reasonable person' further difficulties arise in ascertaining when the dissemination of `true information' should be deemed `deceiving or misleading' by that `reasonable person.' Could not even reasonable, fair-minded individuals differ and reach diametrical conclusions as to what types of information, although technically true, are `deceiving or misleading'? What is `deceiving or misleading' to one reasonable person may not necessarily be `deceiving or misleading' to another reasonable person. In other words, a judicial candidate cannot know ahead of time by reading Canon 7(B)(2) what types of information may fall within Canon 7(B)(2)'s `deceiving or misleading' proscriptions. Such broad proscriptions appear to be exactly the kind prohibited by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Buckley, 997 F.2d at 230 (`A statute that forbids, or can fairly be read to forbid, privileged speech is not saved by the fact that it also forbids unprivileged speech and could in application be confined to the latter.'); see also Beshear v. Butt, 863 F. Supp. 913, 916-17 (E.D.Ark. 1994) (finding that an Arkansas judicial canon that prohibited a judicial candidate from `announc[ing] views on disputed legal or political issues' was `substantially overbroad and vague' and noting that `[t]ruly, a judicial candidate striving diligently to conduct a campaign that is consistent with the canons, without the benefit of any specific standards as a guide, would in all likelihood refrain from expressing his views, while permissible under the First Amendment, in order to avoid the risk of a probable cause hearing likely to result in a public reprimand. . . .'). Consequently, the court finds that there exists a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on Plaintiffs' facial challenge to Canon 7(B)(2).

"Third, neither Party has suggested any method by which Canon 7(B)(2) could be read narrowly so as to comport with the First Amendment. The lack of argument on this point is understandable. No Alabama court has interpreted this canon; thus, the court cannot look to state law for guidance as to the construction of the `misleading or deceiving' clause of Canon 7(B)(2). Moreover, while a federal court cannot interpret a state law so as to bind a state court, see Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir. 1993), this court nonetheless can conceive of no way, without rewriting the canon, to limit the construction and narrow the canon's proscriptions. However, the court emphasizes that it is not at liberty to rewrite the canon, even if it desired to do so. Id. at 230. As stated by the Seventh Circuit in Buckley, it was not the court's `proper business to patch up' the state judicial canon. Id. The Seventh Circuit continued: `A "savings" construction . . . would cast us in the role of a Council of Revision empowered to make such changes in a proposed enactment, state or federal, as might be necessary to render it constitutional. We are not authorized to play such a role.' Id. Therefore, once again, the court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits on their challenge to Canon 7(B)(2).

"Fourth and finally, the court emphasizes that time and time again the Supreme Court of the United States has reaffirmed the importance of the First Amendment to the electoral process. In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has strictly scrutinized and invalidated laws imposing restrictions on the conduct of campaigns. For example, the Supreme Court has struck down statutory restrictions on the amount of money a candidate may spend campaigning for office. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 96 S.Ct. 612. (`A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.'). Similarly, in Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., the Supreme Court struck down a statute limiting the amount of money an independent political committee can spend on behalf of a candidate seeking election. See 470 U.S. 480, 105 S.Ct. 1459, 84 L.Ed.2d 455 (1985); see also Brown, 456 U.S. at 45, 102 S.Ct. 1523, discussed supra. In these decisions, and many others like them, the Supreme Court has relied on the strong presumption that First Amendment protections have little to do with the caliber and quality of the speech involved, but rather, the First Amendment is more concerned with the broad protection of the speech itself in order to encourage a robust exchange of ideas in political campaigns for elected office. Therefore, it appears that, short of using known or reckless falsehoods, candidates for judicial office may safely voice their opinions without shedding the cloak of protection provided under the First Amendment. See, e.q., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 272-73, 84 S.Ct. 710 (`Where judicial officers are involved, this Court has held that concern for the dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify the punishment as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision. This is true even though the utterance contains "half-truths" and "misinformation."') (internal citation omitted) (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 342-343 n. 5, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed. 1295 (1946)). Accordingly, the court, again, finds that Plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on their claim.

"In sum, based on the foregoing, the court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the first element for obtaining a temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs may likely succeed on a facial challenge to Canon 7(B)(2) on the ground that Canon 7(B)(2), as written, is overbroad and, thus, chills free speech. As a result, Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits in their action to have Canon 7(B)(2) declared unconstitutionally overbroad because it chills legitimate First Amendment rights."

Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 111 F. Supp.2d at 1236-39 (footnotes omitted).