MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Anthony Bryant ("Plaintiff") is a nonprisoner litigant who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(D.S.C.), the United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the record and to submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. Upon review, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Amended Complaint (DE#9) should be summarily dismissed , with prejudice, and without issuance and service of process, and furthermore, that a pre-filing injunction pursuant to Riddle be entered, for the following reasons:

I. Relevant Law

A. Liberal Construction

Pro se pleadings are given liberal construction and are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, "[t]he 'special judicial solicitude' with which a district court should view ... pro se filings does not transform the court into an advocate. United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 2401 (2013). Only those questions which are squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed." Weller v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Giving "liberal construction" does not mean that the Court can ignore a prisoner's clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim. "Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints ... [do] not require ... courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).

B. Standard of Review

Upon application, an indigent litigant may commence an action IFP in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows the court to dismiss the case upon finding that the action is "frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte "at any time." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). "Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." Id.

C. Inherent Authority to Dismiss Frivolous Case

The United States Supreme Court has observed that federal district courts possess inherent authority to dismiss a frivolous case. Mallard v. U.S. District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) ("Section 1915(d) ... authorizes courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision."); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-537 (1974) (holding that federal district courts may dismiss claims that are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit").

Consistent with such authority, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "frivolous complaints are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court." Ross v. Baron, 493 F.App'x 405, 406 (4th Cir. Aug. 22, 2012); Cabbill v. United States, Case No. 1:14-cv-4122-JMC-PJG, 2015 WL 6905072, *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 9, 2015) (same), appeal dism'd, 2016 WL 1085106 (4th Cir. Mar. 21, 2016); Anderson v. Patterson, Case No. 6:16-761-MGL-JDA, 2016 WL 1743095 (D.S.C. April 12, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 1732763 (D.S.C. May 2, 2016). "A suit is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325; McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009). Therefore, the Amended Complaint is subject to review pursuant to the inherent authority of this Court to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that the case is not frivolous. See e.g., Carter v. Ervin, Case No. 0:14-cv-00865-TLW-PJG, 2014 WL 2468351, *3 (D.S.C. June 2, 2014), appeal dism'd, 585 F.App'x 98 (4th Cir. 2014); Mayhew, 2014 WL 468938 at *1, fn.1 (exercising inherent authority to summarily dismiss a frivolous case).

II. Allegations

Plaintiff filed a nonsensical Complaint (DE#1, 09/24/2018). This Court gave Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleading. (DE# 6, Order of 09/27/2018). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (DE# 9, 10/01/2018). Plaintiff names the following parties as Defendants: the United States Department of Interior, the United States Marshal, and the Attorney General of United States. He checks the box for "federal question jurisdiction" and states that the basis for jurisdiction is: "the Identity Theft and Assumption and Deterrence Act, False Claims Act, Administrative Procedure." (Id. at 3, ¶ II.A). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's "Statement of the Claim" consists of the following (verbatim):

South Carolina State Trooper ticket 1989 was used to deem Plaintiff IO complaint under False Claims Act leading to physical reprisal 2010

South Carolina state trooper ticket 1989 served 2013 led to a physical reprisal for filing complaint one million eight hundred + [illegible] dollars

III. Discussion

Review of the Amended Complaint reflects multiple grounds for summary dismissal.

A. Failure to State a Claim

The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that more than conclusory statements are required to state a plausible claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009). A plaintiff must allege specific facts that adequately support the claim. Id. The Amended Complaint fails to state any factual or legal basis for any federal claims. Although courts give "liberal construction" to pro se pleadings, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized that federal courts may not "ignore a petitioner's clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim." Wilson, 699 F.3d at 797.

The allegations of the Amended Complaint are nonsensical and incomprehensible. Plaintiff does not allege any supporting facts that suggesting a constitutional violation or any violation of federal law. The Amended Complaint consists of disjointed phrases that fail to state any sort of coherent claim. Even liberally construing the allegations of Amended Complaint, it is not possible to discern any plausible claims from the disconnected sentence fragments in it. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized that "[p]rinciples requiring generous construction of pro se complaints ... [do] not require ... courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them." Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278.

Plaintiff has also submitted several sets of "Objections to Report and Recommendation," even though no Report and Recommendation had been entered yet in this case. (DE# 8, 13). Those "Objections" are disconnected in logic and grammar, refer to unrelated events, and have been repetitively filed in other pending cases. For example, Plaintiff states:

The Government does not protect the public from the DEEP WEB data that cannot index or cannot find because they are passwords protected or require software comment made to Commission on Law Enforcement Agencies Inc. years 2016 Charleston County Sheriff's Office and 2017 City of Charleston Police Department regarding 1970 Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 1986 Sentencing Laws, 1994 Crime Bill did not prevent drug abuse but criminalized a public health crisis mainly in census tracts in violation of U.S.C. § 241 and 242 Color of the Law as standard and/or best practices. The use of the DARK WEB to entrap occurs anonymously using a special masking for example "Onion Routers."

The exhibits attached to the initial Complaint in the present case shed no light on Plaintiff's allegations, and any relevance cannot be discerned. (DE#1-1). Such exhibits include: page 1 [of 5 pages] from a 2009-2010 Grant to Charleston County by the DOJ's "Office on Violence against Women" (at 1); a response letter (stamped 2009) from the Department of the Interior advising that with respect to Plaintiff's complaint "against the city of South Carolina" regarding an arena project, it had "no jurisdiction in this matter" (at 2); a receipt (with illegible scribbling in the margins) indicating that Plaintiff had applied for a Social Security card in 2009 (at 3); and a 2013 response letter to Plaintiff's FOIA request for records from the Executive Office for the United States Attorneys ("EOUSA") (at 4-5). The Court cannot discern any relevance of such documents to any allegations in the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff mentions one statute -- the "False Claims Act" -- in his "statement of the Claim" in his Amended Complaint. (DE# 9 at 5). See 31 U.S.C. § 3729. The False Claims Act ("FCA") permits either the Attorney General or a private party to initiate a civil action alleging fraud on the United States. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a-b). A private enforcement action under the FCA is called a qui tam action. United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of NY, 556 U.S. 928, 932 (2009); Vermont Agency of Nat. Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 (2000). "The purpose of the [FCA] is to enhance the Government's ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government." Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., L.L.C., 397 F.3d 925, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 816 (2005). It is unclear if Plaintiff is attempting to raise such a claim, but in any event, Plaintiff provides no factual support regarding any qui tam issues, nor any coherent explanation for such statutory reference. Plaintiff mentions a 1989 traffic ticket, but fails to indicate what this might have to do with the FCA. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is devoid of any facts that would state a claim under the FCA. Even with liberal construction, the Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible claim for relief.

Moreover, it is well-settled that pro se litigants, such as the Plaintiff, may not represent the interests of the United States in a qui tam FCA action. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 237 F.App'x 802, 803 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that qui tam FCA actions may "not be pursued pro se"); Under Seal v. Under Seal, 467 F.App'x 236 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2012) (same), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 826 (2012); United States ex rel. Milam v. Univ. of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center, et al., 961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992). Summary dismissal is appropriate.

B. Frivolity

The Amended Complaint appears to lack any arguable basis in law or in fact, and therefore is subject to dismissal as frivolous. Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. For example, Plaintiff refers to a federal criminal statute -- the "Identity Theft [and] Assumption and Deference Act." (DE# 9 at 3). See 18 U.S.C. § 1028. However, Plaintiff is not a prosecutor and lacks the authority to proceed under such criminal statute. Plaintiff fails to indicate what such statute has to do with any allegations in this civil action. Plaintiff's allegations consist only of random unrelated sentence fragments. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges no facts that would state a plausible claim.

Plaintiff's pleading is factually incoherent and legally baseless. Plaintiff cites a criminal statute that does not provide a civil cause of action, and therefore, the deficiencies of the Amended Complaint cannot be remedied by more specific factual pleading. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 76 n.1 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1022 (1995). Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint whose meaning the Court cannot discern, even with liberal construction. Plaintiff's allegations are indecipherable and his exhibits appear irrelevant. Further amendment would be futile.

This case may also be duplicative of some of the seven other pending cases recently filed by Plaintiff in this judicial district. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that "district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits and may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)." Cottle v. Bell, 2000 WL 1144623, *1 (4th Cir. Aug.14, 2000) (per curiam) (citing with approval, Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that "district courts may dismiss a duplicative complaint raising issues directly related to issues in another pending action brought by the same party"); Southern Holdings, Inc. v. Horry Cty., South Carolina, Case No. 4:02-1859-RBH, 2014 WL 11071017, *6 (D.S.C. June 11, 2014) (same); Paul v. de Holczer, Case No. 3:15-2178-CMC-PJG, 2015 WL 4545974, *6 (D.S.C. July 28, 2015) ("the instant Complaint should be summarily dismissed as a frivolous duplicate filing in the interest of judicial economy and efficiency"), affirmed, 631 F.App'x 197 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2016); Reynolds v. Third Circuit Pub. Def. Office, Case No. 4:17-cv-3469-BHH-MGB, 2018 WL 1322102, *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 1124592 (D.S.C. Mar. 1, 2018) (summarily dismissing duplicate case as frivolous). Summary dismissal is appropriate.

C. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiff's allegations are so disconnected and incoherent that it appears that subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking here. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that federal-question jurisdiction requires that a party assert a substantial federal claim. Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962) (holding that if jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the plaintiff must show that he has alleged a claim under federal law that is not frivolous). Plaintiff has failed to do so. His allegations are inadequate to allege a substantial federal claim, and it does not appear that further amendment could cure such pleading deficiency. As a result, this case should be summarily dismissed.

This federal court has an "independent obligation" to investigate the limits of its subject-matter jurisdiction. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). The obligation to examine subject-matter jurisdiction is triggered whenever that jurisdiction is "fairly in doubt." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 671. It is well-settled that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The burden of establishing jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182-83 (1936). The two most commonly recognized and utilized bases for federal court jurisdiction are (1) "federal question," 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) "diversity of citizenship." 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On the pre-printed complaint form, Plaintiff checks the box for federal question. (DE# 1 at 3, ¶ II "Basis for Jurisdiction"). Despite this, no cognizable basis for federal jurisdiction is apparent from the face of the pleading. The allegations of the Amended Complaint do not indicate that this case is one "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff does not plausibly state any facts that would suggest a violation of any federal statute or constitutional provision by the Defendants.

Even though Plaintiff appears to assert federal question jurisdiction, this court is not bound by Plaintiff's characterization of his lawsuit because there are no facts alleged to support any federal cause of action. When considering the issue of whether a case is one "arising under the Constitution," a federal court is not bound by a party's characterization of the case. District courts are authorized to disregard such characterizations to avoid "unjust manipulation or avoidance of its jurisdiction." Lyon v. Centimark Corp., 805 F. Supp. 333, 334-35 (E.D. N.C. 1992); see Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) ("Not every question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit."). Thus, even though Plaintiff appears to assert that his Amended Complaint was filed under federal-question jurisdiction, this court may disregard such assertion because no basis for federal question jurisdiction is actually presented.

D. Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint names the United States Marshal, the Department of the Interior, and the Attorney General of United States as defendants. It is well-settled that federal agencies are entitled to sovereign immunity unless Congress waives immunity and consents to suit. Global Mail Ltd. v. U.S. Postal Service, 142 F.3d 208, 210 (4th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff may not sue the United States or its agencies without their consent. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1994) (holding that suit against federal agency could not proceed); Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 355 n.7 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Bivens does not allow for recovery of money damages, or suits in general, against the government itself."). The same is true for actions brought against federal officials in their official capacities. Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 184 (4th Cir. 2002); Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 1996); Estate of Riopedre v. United States, 2015 WL 505584 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2015). Sovereign immunity deprives a court of jurisdiction. Global Mail Ltd., 142 F.3d at 210; United States v. Jones, 225 F.3d 468, 469 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1053 (2001). Such pleading deficiency cannot be remedied through more specific factual pleading. Rice, 40 F.3d at 76. Thus, the Complaint against the federal agencies and any individual federal officials in official capacity is subject to dismissal based on sovereign immunity.

E. Prosecutorial Immunity

Plaintiff sues the Attorney General of United States, but alleges no actions by such Defendant. If Plaintiff is attempting to complain about any actions taken by the Attorney General in performing his official duties, any claim against such federal official in individual capacity would be subject to summary dismissal. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) ("[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity."); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976) (holding that prosecutors have immunity for performing functions "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process"); Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 249-50 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); Redden v. McMaster, Case No. 8:08-2845-CMC-BHH, 2008 WL 4458877, *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2008) (emphasizing that prosecutors "have absolute immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings").

F. With or Without Prejudice

The only remaining question is whether to dismiss this case with or without prejudice. Despite being given an opportunity to amend, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint that is incomprehensible and fails to state a plausible claim for which relief may be granted. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized that a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally with prejudice unless the court specifically orders that the dismissal is without prejudice (and provides an explanation for using its discretion to deviate from the general rule). Abdul-Mumit, et al. v. Alexandria Hyundai, LLC, et al, 896 F.3d 278, 2018 WL 3405474, *5 (4th Cir. July 13, 2018) (citing Carter v. Norfolk Community Hosp. Assoc., Inc., 761 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1985)). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, is legally and factually frivolous, and seeks monetary damages against federal defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For these reasons, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.

"Unless otherwise specified, a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is presumed to be both a judgment on the merits and to be rendered with prejudice." McLean, 566 F.3d 396; Carter, 761 F.2d at 974 ("A district court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is, of course, with prejudice unless it specifically orders dismissal without prejudice."). Here, it appears that the legal deficiencies in the Amended Complaint cannot be remedied through more specific pleading of facts. Rice, 40 F.3d at 76 n.1 (holding that dismissal with prejudice was therefore appropriate). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that "[o]nce a court has determined that the complaint is truly unamendable, a dismissal without prejudice is of little benefit to the litigant, as the claim cannot be made viable through reformulation." McLean, 566 F.3d at 399. In fact, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is so incoherent that subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. Thus, alternatively, the District Court would be within its discretion to dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

G. Pre-filing injunction pursuant to Riddle

To date, Plaintiff has filed nine civil cases in this judicial district since March 2018. See Case Nos. 2:18-cv-606-MBS, Bryant v. Internal Revenue Service, et al; 2:18-cv-607-MBS Bryant et al v. Internal Revenue Service, et al.; 2:18-cv-1436-MBS-MGB Bryant v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al; 2:18-cv-2159-MBS-MGB, Bryant v. U.S. Department of Transportation et al; 2:18-cv-2217-MBS-MGB, Bryant v. US Dept. of Education et al; 2:18-cv-2467-MBS-MGB, Bryant v. Federal Communication Commission et al; 2:18-cv-2582-MBS-MGB, Bryant v. U.S. Marshal et al; 2:18-cv-2593-MBS-MGB, Bryant v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, et al.; 2:18-cv-02738-MBS-MGB, Bryant v. U.S. Secret Service, et al. In these cases, Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP.

Plaintiff's allegations in all of these cases are nonsensical and indecipherable. No plausible claims can be discerned from the disconnected sentence fragments in the pleadings. Plaintiff has been given repeated opportunities to amend, but has filed amended pleadings that are also incomprehensible. In all nine cases, Plaintiff has persisted in filing exhibits of no discernible relevance. Plaintiff has submitted numerous nonsensical "declarations" and other documents randomly throughout the record in these cases. In the present case, he has even filed two sets of "Objections" (DE#8, 13), even though no Report and Recommendation had been filed yet.

Plaintiff's repetitive filing of frivolous cases and his submission of nonsensical pleadings and exhibits justifies that the Court place him under a specifically-tailored pre-filing injunction. See Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133, 134-135 & n.* (4th Cir. 1977); see also Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 972-974 & nn. 5-14 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982); Lyszaj v. ATT Affiliates, 554 F. Supp. 218, 219-222 & nn. 1-3 (E.D.Va. 1982), affirmed, 714 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1983); Holsey v. Bass, 519 F. Supp. 395, 405-409 and 417 (D.Md. 1981) (warning that court would be justified in imposing pre-filing order under Riddle if Plaintiff continued to file frivolous suits), affirmed, 712 F.2d at 70-74. Other circuits follow similar procedures. See Safir v. United States Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 23-25 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1099 (1987)(outlining five factors that a district court considers before imposing order of pre-filing review); Gabel v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 124, 125 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073-1074 (11th Cir. 1986)(en banc); and Jackson v. South Carolina, 498 F. Supp. 186, 193-195 & nn. 17-19 (D.S.C. 1979).

In Riddle, the plaintiff had filed six frivolous repetitive complaints. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that the district court's decision to deny leave to file IFP, "in view of fact that such complaints were essentially replicas." Riddle, 554 F.2d at 135 ("the district court did not abuse its discretion. It had experienced a plethora of frivolous, repetitive complaints. When it entered its order ..., it had every reason to expect the pattern to continue, as indeed it did.").

This Court has the inherent authority to protect its jurisdiction from a litigant's conduct that wastes judicial resources and impairs the Court's ability to carry out its Article III functions. Riddle, 554 F.2d at 135 (holding that the district court "could properly follow the procedure of pre-filing review implicit in the discretionary authority vested in it by 28 U.S.C. s 1915(a)"). Similarly, in Procup, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained that:

There should be little doubt that the district court has the jurisdiction to protect itself against the abuses that litigants like Procup visit upon it. Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions...The fact that Procup's complaint in this case may have failed to state a justiciable federal claim is of no impact on the court's power to enter injunctive relief against such a recalcitrant litigant. The court has a responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by others. Were a frivolous lawsuit a bar to the court's inherent jurisdiction, the court would be powerless to act upon even a flood of frivolous lawsuits which threatened to bring judicial business to a standstill.

It should be emphasized that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Riddle is not designed to frustrate a pro se litigant who has a facially meritorious complaint. Rather, imposition of a Riddle order is designed to prevent the diversion of judicial work hours (needed to review frivolous pleadings) from other litigation pending in this court, not to mention the time of the court's support personnel, who must process and docket frivolous pleadings. Since the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Riddle, numerous pre-filing injunctions pursuant to Riddle have been issued by district courts in this judicial district. See, e.g., Von Fox v. South Carolina Judicial Dept., Case No. 2:16-cv-209-RMG-MGB (DE#10, ordering that "the Clerk not accept any filings by Plaintiff ... without proper payment of required fees" after pro se litigant filed 21 cases in a few months). In light of the present Plaintiff's history of filing frivolous nonsensical pleadings, it is appropriate to place a pre-filing injunction on him.

Although Plaintiff, if this Report and Recommendation is accepted, would be under a pre-filing injunction, the Clerk's Office may docket any new cases from Plaintiff and assign civil action numbers for docket control purposes. In Re Green, 598 F.2d 1126, 1127 (8th Cir. 1979) (pre-filing injunctions should be tailored to the specific circumstances presented). In other words, if Plaintiff files a new civil action and seeks to proceed IFP, the newly-filed civil action would be summarily dismissed pursuant to the Court's Riddle order.

Plaintiff persists in bringing lawsuits, such as the one now under review, that are facially inadequate to state any plausible federal claims and that recite criminal statutes that do not provide a civil cause of action. Plaintiff's filings are frivolous and place an unreasonable demand for the expenditure of limited judicial resources to address each case on initial review. It appears that Plaintiff has a propensity to file frivolous law suits, and that he will continue to pursue such activity which results in waste of this court's precious judicial resources unless restrictions are placed on Plaintiff's future submissions to the court. Plaintiff is hereby admonished that further filing of frivolous or vexatious lawsuits in this court may lead to the imposition of sanctions by this Court.

Plaintiff was granted permission to proceed IFP status in all nine of his pending cases in this judicial district. However, the right to proceed IFP is not without limitations and continued filing of frivolous cases is the type of behavior that may subject Plaintiff to restrictions on his continued ability to file lawsuits without paying the full filing fee. A district judge has the power to enjoin frequent litigators from filing frivolous suits. In re Chapman, 328 F.3d 903, 905-06 (7th Cir. 2003). "Abusers of the judicial process are not entitled to sue and appeal without paying the normal filing fees -- indeed, are not entitled to sue and appeal, period. Abuses of process are not merely not to be subsidized; they are to be sanctioned." Free v. United States, 879 F.2d 1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989). Here, one effective sanction to impose on Plaintiff for his continued filing of frivolous cases is to deny him the privilege of proceeding IFP in future cases. Perhaps if he is required to pay the full filing fee in future cases, Plaintiff will more thoughtfully consider the types of claims he attempts to pursue in this federal court.

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, is legally and factually frivolous, and seeks monetary damages against federal defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B). Therefore, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice. Alternatively, if the Amended Complaint is deemed to be so incoherent that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, then dismissal without prejudice would be appropriate. Plaintiff has already had the opportunity to amend his initial Complaint. Given his failure to remedy the deficiencies of the initial Complaint, it appears that further amendment of the pleadings would be futile. In light of Plaintiff's demonstrated propensity to file frivolous lawsuits, this Court should enter a Riddle Order denying Plaintiff the privilege of proceeding IFP in future cases.

V. Recommendation

Accordingly, it is recommended that the Amended Complaint (DE#9) should be summarily dismissed with prejudice, and without issuance and service of process; alternatively, if the District Court determines that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the Amended Complaint may be dismissed without prejudice, and without issuance and service of process; additionally, it is recommended that this District Court enter a Riddle Order denying Plaintiff the privilege of proceeding IFP in future cases.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

/s/_________

MARY GORDON BAKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE October 9, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina Plaintiff's attention is directed to the Important Warning on the following page:

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4^th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk

United States District Court

Post Office Box 835

Charleston, South Carolina 29402

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).