ANDREWS, Judge.

Allen Bradford was allegedly injured when a van driven by Gary McCormick collided with Bradford's truck. Bradford filed this action against the Xerox Corporation alleging McCormick was acting within the scope of his employment with Xerox when the accident occurred. Xerox moved for partial summary judgment on Bradford's claim for punitive damages, arguing there was no showing of wilful or wanton misconduct. Bradford appeals from the superior court's grant of Xerox's motion.

In his sole enumeration of error, Bradford contends the superior court erred in granting Xerox's motion for partial summary judgment as to punitive damages because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether McCormick's conduct was wilful, wanton, or demonstrated an entire want of care. We find this enumeration of error without merit.

"Punitive damages may be recovered when it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences. OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b)." (Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. Tommy Roberts Trucking Co., 209 Ga. App. 826, 828 (2) ( 435 S.E.2d 54) (1993). Here, the evidence, viewed with all inferences in favor of Bradford, was insufficient to impose punitive damages on Xerox Corporation as a result of the actions of its driver McCormick under the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). See Coker v. Culter, 208 Ga. App. 651 ( 431 S.E.2d 443) (1993); compare Harrison v. S B Trucking, 179 Ga. App. 291, 292 (1) ( 346 S.E.2d 101) (1986) (decided prior to the July 1, 1987 effective date of OCGA § 51-12-5.1).

The evidence is that McCormick was speeding while on his way to report to his job post. The road was wet and the van he was driving crossed the highway median and struck Bradford's vehicle. There was no evidence of any history of improper driving by McCormick on the job. There was no indication that Xerox had any reason to question McCormick's driving ability. There was no indication that McCormick had consumed any alcoholic beverages during the previous 24 hours nor was there any evidence of a DUI history. McCormick had no medical problems which would cause blackouts nor was he consuming any medication or other drugs on the day of the accident.

As stated in Currie v. Haney, 183 Ga. App. 506 ( 359 S.E.2d 350) (1987), "the fact that appellee's car may have crossed the centerline and struck [the victim's] vehicle would not, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, authorize [the victims] to recover punitive damages. Compare Moore v. Thompson, 255 Ga. 236, 237 ( 336 S.E.2d 749) (1985), wherein the Supreme Court held that `[e]vidence that the defendant's driving under the influence of alcohol caused the plaintiff's injuries is evidence of wilful misconduct, wantonness, and that entire want of care which raises the presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Currie, supra at 506 (pre-1987 enactment of the clear and convincing evidence standard of OCGA § 51-12-5.1). See also Viau v. Fred Dean, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 801, 804 (4) ( 418 S.E.2d 604) (1992) (corporate officer's driving under the influence did not provide basis for recovery of punitive damages against the corporation, but did allow recovery against the individual officer).

We are also guided in our resolution of this case by Coker v. Culter, supra. There, the grant of partial summary judgment to the defendant on the issue of punitive damages was affirmed by this court. In Coker, the defendant "admitted going 40 mph in a 35 mph zone; water was standing on the road; visibility was poor; his car hydroplaned and crossed over the centerline; two passengers in the car were drinking but [defendant], who had drunk beer some time before the accident tested one hour after the accident at .03 percent grams blood alcohol content. Drug paraphernalia was found in the back of [his] car, though he claimed he knew nothing about it. He admitted he may have been driving a little too fast for conditions. After the collision, [defendant] jumped out of the car and stomped and slammed the front end of his car while cursing; [plaintiff], who was pregnant, screamed she was in labor." Id. at 651-652.

Similarly, in Cullen v. Novak, 201 Ga. App. 459 ( 411 S.E.2d 331) (1991), even though there was evidence that Cullen carelessly ran a red light, "[t]here was, however, no evidence of such an entire want of care and conscious indifference to the consequences sufficient to authorize an award of punitive damages. [Cits.]" Cullen, supra at 460 (2). Compare J. B. Hunt Transport v. Bentley, 207 Ga. App. 250 ( 427 S.E.2d 499) (1992).

Accordingly, the court properly granted the motion for partial summary judgment as to the punitive damages.

Judgment affirmed. Birdsong, P. J., Beasley, P. J., Blackburn, and Smith, JJ., concur. Pope, C. J., McMurray, P. J., Johnson and Ruffin, JJ., dissent.

ANDREWS, Judge.

DECIDED DECEMBER 20, 1994 — RECONSIDERATION DENIED JANUARY 17, 1995 — CERT. APPLIED FOR.