Summary
dismissing claims against District Attorney where no personal involvement is alleged
Summary of this case from Conte v. County of NassauOpinion
06 Civ. 2234 (SAS).
November 27, 2006
Plaintiff (Pro Se): Henry Barrington, # 03-A-3724, Green Haven Correctional Facility, Stormville, N.Y.
Counsel for Defendants: Mary O'Flynn, ASSISTANT CORPORATION COUNSEL, New York, N.Y.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
1. INTRODUCTION
Henry Barrington, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of false arrest and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff is suing Robert Johnson, the Bronx County District Attorney, and Raymond Kelly, the New York City Police Commissioner. Defendants now move to dismiss on three grounds: (1) plaintiff has failed to state a claim; (2) plaintiff has failed to allege the personal involvement of either defendant; and (3) the District Attorney is entitled to absolute immunity. For each of these reasons, the Complaint is hereby dismissed.
Defendants filed their motion on August 18, 2006. Because plaintiff failed to respond, this Court issued an order on October 4, 2006, directing plaintiff to file opposition papers no later than November 3, 2006, and notifying him that if he failed to file any papers, the Court would decide the case based solely on defendants' submission. To date, plaintiff has failed to file any papers in opposition to the motion.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss should be granted only if "`it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" The task of the court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is "merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." The Second Circuit has held that all complaints "must be read liberally; dismissal on the pleadings never is warranted unless the plaintiff's allegations are doomed to fail under any available legal theory." When deciding a motion to dismiss, courts must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. A complaint "`need not set out in detail the facts upon which the claim is based.'" Thus, a complaint may not "`be dismissed on the ground that it is conclusory or fails to allege facts.'" However, although "`the pleading standard is a liberal one, bald assertions and conclusions of law will not suffice.'"
Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
Eternity Global Master Fund Ltd. v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y., 375 F.3d 168, 176 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted). Because "most pro se plaintiffs lack familiarity with the formalities of pleading requirements, [courts] must construe pro se complaints liberally, applying a more flexible standard to evaluate their sufficiency." Lerman v. Board of Elections in the City of N.Y., 232 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Hughes v. Rose, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980) and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
See Ontario Pub. Serv. Employees Union Pension Trust Fund v. Nortel Networks Corp., 369 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1050 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, courts generally do not consider matters outside the pleadings but may consider documents attached to, referenced in, or integral to the pleadings. See Subaru Distribs. Corp. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 425 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005).
Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 445 F.3d 586, 591 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47)).
In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., v. Bell Atl. Corp., 309 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996)).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff concedes that he was indicted for the crimes as to which he claims both false arrest and malicious prosecution. A grand jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause. The presumption of probable cause is a complete defense to an action for malicious prosecution. Therefore, with respect to plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
See Complaint ¶ IV.
See Green v. Montgomery, 219 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2000).
See McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2006).
The fact that he was found not guilty of the charged crimes after trial is irrelevant. See, e.g., Johnston v. Town of Greece, 983 F. Supp. 348, 351 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
B. Plaintiff Has Failed to Allege Any Personal Involvement by Either Johnson or Kelly
It is well established that "personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983." Plaintiff has failed to allege any personal involvement by either defendant. The mere fact that one defendant is the District Attorney and the other defendant is the Police Commissioner is insufficient to support a finding of personal involvement. When a complaint fails to allege personal involvement by a defendant, it is "`fatally defective' on its face" and must be dismissed. Because neither defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations, the case against each of them must be dismissed.
Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Accord Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District, 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir. 2004).
See Back, 365 F.3d at 127 (stating that an "individual cannot be held liable for damages under § 1983 `merely because he held a high position of authority'") (quoting Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 886 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Black v. United States, 534 F.2d 524, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1976)).
C. The District Attorney Is Entitled to Absolute Immunity
The Supreme Court has held that absolute immunity extends to all of a prosecutor's activities which are "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process" such as "initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State's case." Because the only actions alleged against the District Attorney include initiating the prosecution and presenting the case (through an assistant District Attorney), Johnson is entitled to absolute immunity and the case against him must be dismissed.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976). Accord Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Day v. Morgenthau, 909 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1990).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion (docket # 10) and this case.
SO ORDERED: