¶ 1. JON P. WILCOX, J.

This case is not about powers that are explicitly set forth or described in our constitution, or even mentioned in our statutes. Rather, it is about powers that "[f]rom time immemorial . . . have been conceded to courts because they are courts. Such powers have been conceded because without them they could neither maintain their dignity, transact their business, nor accomplish the purposes of their existence. These powers are called inherent powers." State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 536, 221 N.W. 603 (1928). Inherent powers allow the judiciary to maintain their status as a separate and co-equal branch of government.

¶ 2. Indeed, the inherent powers of the courts have been referred to as the "sword and shield of the judiciary." Felix F. Stumpf, Inherent Powers of the Courts: Sword and Shield of the Judiciary, National Judicial College (1994). Using these tools to protect its constitutional independence as a third branch of government, the judiciary should be able to shield against intrusions into its domain of exclusive judicial authority, while using its sword to cut away the constitutionally defective portions of a legislative enactment. Today we must determine whether circuit court judges have the exclusive, inherent constitutional authority to prevent the unilateral removal of their judicial assistants by way of a collective bargaining agreement between county government and its employees. We hold that they do.

¶ 3. This case is before the court on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (1995-96). The circuit court granted the plaintiff judges' ("the judges") motion for summary judgment and declared that a circuit court has the exclusive, inherent authority to appoint and remove its judicial assistant regardless of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the county and its employees under the Municipal Employment Relations Act ("MERA"), Wis. Stat. §§ 111.70- 111.77. Defendants Eau Claire County ("the County") and AFSCME Local 2223 ("AFSCME") appealed from the circuit court's decision and order.

¶ 4. On certification, we consider whether a circuit court judge has the exclusive, inherent authority to appoint and remove his or her judicial assistant, regardless of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. As stated, we hold that a circuit court judge has the exclusive, inherent constitutional authority to prevent the unilateral removal of his or her judicial assistant despite the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. However, we do not address a circuit court judge's power to appoint that assistant. Therefore, we affirm the order of the circuit court granting the judges' motion for summary judgment on the basis that circuit court judges have the exclusive, inherent authority to remove their judicial assistants.

I.

¶ 5. Five Eau Claire County circuit court judges filed a declaratory judgment action pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.04 requesting the court to declare that a circuit court has the exclusive, inherent authority to appoint and remove its judicial assistants, and that such authority cannot be modified by a collective bargaining agreement.

¶ 6. The circuit court made certain findings of fact based upon the parties' pleadings, briefs, and oral arguments, including the following. The County is a municipal employer within the meaning of MERA. AFSCME is the exclusive collective bargaining representative for the Eau Claire County courthouse clerical employees bargaining unit. AFSCME and the County were parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("the agreement") in force for the period of January 1, 1994, through December 31, 1995. Collective bargaining agreements covering courthouse employees have been in effect in Eau Claire County since 1972. See County of Eau Claire v. AFSCME Local 2223, 190 Wis.2d 298, 301, 526 N.W.2d 802 (Ct.App. 1994).

¶ 7. Section 4.02 of the agreement provides that in the event of a layoff, an affected employee has the right to invoke his or her seniority and move or "bump" into a position held by an employee with less seniority within the same bargaining unit, provided that the bumping employee possesses the "necessary qualifications" for that position.

¶ 8. In Eau Claire County, judicial assistant or legal secretary vacancies have always been posted pursuant to the terms of the agreement, and filled through a posting procedure. The last time that a judicial assistant position in the county was filled by posting was on July 13, 1981 — 14 years before the layoff here.

¶ 9. There are five judicial assistant positions within the courthouse clerical employees' bargaining unit. Three of those five positions provide clerical assistance to the circuit court. Ms. Shanan Melland serves as the judicial assistant to Eau Claire County Circuit Court Judge Paul J. Lenz and to the family court commissioner/court commissioner. Although the three judicial assistants for the five Eau Claire County circuit judges have specific responsibilities, they will, if the need arises, assist one another in their assignments.

¶ 10. The circuit court also made findings describing the procedural history of this action. On November 15, 1995, the County Board of Supervisors for Eau Claire County adopted Ordinance No. 95-96/237 which abolished certain positions effective January 1, 1996. Ms. Penny Walske, a member of the courthouse clerical bargaining unit, held a position that would be affected by the new ordinance. On November 30, 1995, Ms. Walske, a more senior employee, elected to bump Ms. Melland from her position as judicial assistant to Judge Lenz. The circuit court found that Ms. Walske meets or exceeds all the judicial assistant job qualifications required by the agreement.

¶ 11. The five Eau Claire County circuit court judges expressed their objection to the bumping of Ms. Melland to the County Board Committee on Personnel. The judges claimed to have exclusive authority to appoint and remove their judicial assistants, under the doctrines of inherent judicial authority and separation of powers. Despite these arguments, the Committee on Personnel rejected the judges' arguments. Ms. Melland was notified by both the County and AFSCME that if she did not abandon her position as judicial assistant to Judge Lenz and report for work in the Office of the Clerk of Courts, she might be disciplined for insubordination. Further, a failure to comply meant that Ms. Melland would not be paid by the County after December 31, 1995.

¶ 12. On December 28, 1995, the judges filed a complaint seeking a declaration that they have the exclusive authority to appoint and remove their judicial assistants, and that such authority may not be modified by a collective bargaining agreement. The judges also requested an order enjoining the County from bumping Ms. Melland and from refusing to pay her. On December 29, 1995, the circuit court heard arguments of the parties and issued a temporary injunction to enjoin the County and AFSCME from removing Ms. Melland from her position as judicial assistant to Judge Lenz. Then, on March 18, 1996, the judges filed a motion for summary judgment seeking declaratory relief and a permanent order to enjoin the County and AFSCME from bumping Ms. Melland.

¶ 13. On May 1, 1996, the court entered a declaratory judgment that circuit court judges have the exclusive authority to appoint and remove their judicial assistants under the doctrines of inherent judicial authority and separation of powers. The court held that such authority may not be modified by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between the County and AFSCME under MERA. Even if there were joint authority to appoint and remove, the circuit court concluded that the deliberate removal of a trained, trusted, and compatible employee would significantly impair the efficiency of the court and would irreparably harm the circuit judges as well as the public.

¶ 14. Having reached these conclusions, the circuit court permanently enjoined the County and AFSCME from removing Ms. Melland from her position as judicial assistant to Judge Lenz, from refusing to pay her, and from disciplining her for remaining in her judicial assistant position. Thereafter, the County and AFSCME timely appealed from the decision and order of the circuit court. We granted the court of appeals' request for certification.

II.

¶ 15. In this declaratory judgment action, we must decide whether the County's unilateral act to remove a judicial staff member, albeit pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, intrudes upon the exclusive, inherent constitutional authority of the circuit court. This is a question of first impression in the state of Wisconsin.

¶ 16. A court's power to declare rights is broad. See Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis.2d 400, 407, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982). A circuit court has discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief, but only when there is a justiciable case or controversy. See id. at 409-10. To sustain a discretionary act, we must conclude that the circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach. See id. at 414-15. Most importantly in this case, we must determine whether the circuit court applied the proper standard of law in granting the judges' request for declaratory relief. Whether an act by the legislative branch of government violates the separation of powers doctrine by infringing upon the inherent constitutional authority of the judicial branch of government is a question of law that we review independently of the lower courts. See State v. Holmes, 106 Wis.2d 31, 41 n. 7, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).

III.

¶ 17. The County and AFSCME contend that the legislature has constitutionally delegated power to the County to enter into a collective bargaining agreement, and that the circuit court is not constitutionally empowered to avoid the effect of the agreement's "bumping" provision. The judges, on the other hand, contend that the bumping provision is void as applied to judicial assistants, since the judges' power to appoint and remove such assistants is an exclusive one. To address these conflicting claims, it will be helpful to set forth some general principles regarding the separation of powers.

A.

¶ 18. "The doctrine of separation of powers, while not explicitly set forth in the Wisconsin constitution, is implicit in the division of governmental powers among the judicial, legislative and executive branches." State ex rel. Friedrich v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 192 Wis.2d 1, 13, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995) (citation omitted). "The Wisconsin constitution creates three separate coordinate branches of government, no branch subordinate to the other, no branch to arrogate to itself control over the other except as is provided by the constitution, and no branch to exercise the power committed by the constitution to another." Holmes, 106 Wis.2d at 42.

¶ 19. In attempting to delineate the powers of our tripartite government, we need not seek a "strict, complete, absolute, scientific division of functions between the three branches of government. The separation of powers doctrine states the principle of shared, rather than completely separated powers. The doctrine envisions a government of separate branches sharing certain powers." Id. at 43 (citations omitted). "In these areas of `shared power,' one branch of government may exercise power conferred on another only to an extent that does not unduly burden or substantially interfere with the other branch's exercise of its power." In re Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis.2d 762, 775, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984).

¶ 20. The majority of governmental powers lie within these "great borderlands" of shared authority, In re Appointment of Revisor, 141 Wis. 592, 597, 124 N.W. 670 (1910), where it is "neither possible nor practical to categorize governmental action as exclusively legislative, executive or judicial." Friedrich, 192 Wis.2d at 14 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, "[e]ach branch has a core zone of exclusive authority into which the other branches may not intrude." Id. at 13-14 (citation omitted). Although finite and restricted in size, these core zones of authority are to be "jealously guarded" by each branch of government. Id. at 14. Therefore, as to these areas of power, we do not employ the undue burden or substantial interference test because " any exercise of authority by another branch of government is unconstitutional." In re Grady, 118 Wis.2d at 776 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

¶ 21. With regard to areas of exclusive judicial authority, we have stated:

For more than a century, this court has been called upon to resist attempts by other branches of government to exercise authority in an exclusively judicial area. These have included an attempt to remove and replace a court employe, In re Janitor, 35 Wis. 410 (1874); an attempt to dictate the physical facilities in which a court was to exercise its judicial functions, In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109 (1912); an attempt to legislate what constitutes the legal sufficiency of evidence, Thoe v. Chicago M. St. P.R. Co., 181 Wis. 456 (1923); an attempt to regulate trials in the conduct of court business, Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501 (1931); bar admission and regulation of attorneys, In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374 (1932), Integration of Bar Cases, 244 Wis. 8 (1943), 249 Wis. 523 (1946), 273 Wis. 281 (1956). In each of these cases we recognized areas of authority exclusive to the judicial branch and, therefore, free from intrusion by another branch of government.

Id. at 778 (holding that the setting and enforcement of time periods for judges to decide cases falls within an area of exclusive judicial authority).

¶ 22. To determine whether a legislative enactment unconstitutionally infringes upon judicial power, the court must consider first whether the subject matter of the legislation falls within the power that is constitutionally granted to the legislature. See Friedrich, 192 Wis.2d at 14. If it does, the court must then inquire whether the subject matter of the legislation also falls within the judiciary's constitutional grant of power. See id. at 14-15.

B.

¶ 23. We examine first the extent of the legislature's constitutional authority in the employment of judicial staff members. The state constitution provides that "[t]he legislature may confer upon the boards of supervisors of the several counties of the state such powers of a local, legislative and administrative character as they shall from time to time prescribe." Wis. Const. art. IV, § 22. Pursuant to that constitutional grant of power, the legislature has delegated certain statutory powers to each county, including the power to "make such contracts and to do such other acts as are necessary and proper to the exercise of the powers and privileges granted and the performance of the legal duties charged upon it." Wis. Stat. § 59.01. The legislature has also delegated to county boards of supervisors the power to "establish regulations of employment for any person paid from the county treasury." Wis. Stat. § 59.22(2)(c). Finally, municipal employers must bargain collectively with public employees regarding wages, hours and other terms of employment. See Wis. Stat. §§ 111.01(3), 111.04, 111.70(1)(a), 111.70(1)(j).

¶ 24. These statutory provisions set out the broad authority of the County, as delegated by the legislature, to regulate employment of county employees, including court staff. Moreover, the subject matter of the agreement seems to fall well within the boundaries of this authority: it covers compensation, holidays, vacation, pregnancy leave, and various types of insurance.

C.

¶ 25. At the same time, it is clear that circuit courts also have constitutional authority over matters of staff and judicial administration. The legislature has delegated some powers of appointment to the circuit court, such as the power to appoint court reporters for each branch of court. See Wis. Stat. § 751.02. Other delegated appointment powers include Wis. Stat. § 48.04, appointment of a clerk of court for juvenile matters, Wis. Stat. § 48.065, appointment of juvenile court commissioners, and Wis. Stat. § 851.71, power to appoint and remove a register in probate. See also, Wis. Stat. § 32.08(2) (power to appoint county condemnation officers); Wis. Stat. § 17.13(3) (power to remove local government officers). Both the County and AFSCME point out that Wis. Stat. § 751.02 also authorizes each supreme court justice and court of appeals judge to appoint and prescribe the duties of a secretary and a law clerk. There is, however, no similar statutory authority for a circuit court judge to appoint a secretary.

¶ 26. However, we do not take the County and AFSCME to seriously contend that courts can only have authority over matters of staff and judicial administration by virtue of legislative delegation. Examples of non-delegated authority over such matters have been recognized in numerous appellate decisions. Circuit court authority in matters of staff and judicial administration emanates not from an express grant of constitutional power, but is an inherent authority derived from the powers granted in sec. 2, Art. VII of the Wisconsin Constitution. Inherent, implied, or incidental powers are those which must necessarily be invoked to enable the courts to accomplish their constitutionally or legislatively mandated functions. See Friedrich, 192 Wis.2d at 16. The outer limits of that authority are not fully delineated in the constitution, nor in our case law. See E.B. v. State, 111 Wis.2d 175, 181, 330 N.W.2d 584 (1983).

¶ 27. We need not comprehensively catalog the powers granted to the courts. For purposes of this case, we need only determine whether the inherent power of the circuit court includes the power to prevent enforcement of the bumping provision against judicial assistants to circuit court judges.

¶ 28. Inherent powers include those powers which are "essential to the expedition and proper conducting of judicial business." In re Janitor of the Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410, 419 (1874). We have also stated:

The authorities, in so far as any can be found on the subject, are to the effect that a constitutional court of general jurisdiction has inherent power to protect itself against any action that would unreasonably curtail its powers or materially impair its efficiency. A county board has no power to even attempt to impede the functions of such a court, and no such power could be conferred upon it.

In re Court Room, 148 Wis. 109, 121, 134 N.W. 490 (1912). Later, in Latham v. Casey King Corp., 23 Wis.2d 311, 314, 127 N.W.2d 225 (1964), this court further stated:

The general control of the judicial business before [the court] is essential to the court if it is to function. `Every court has inherent power, exercisable in its sound discretion, consistent within the Constitution and statutes, to control disposition of causes on its docket with economy of time and effort.' 14 Am.Jur., Courts, p. 371, sec. 171, Inherent Powers of Courts, 1963 Suppl., p. 77.

¶ 29. AFSCME asserts that constitutionally-grounded inherent powers are "need specific" only, and not a prerogative that may be exercised at will. According to the County, the circuit court's need remains filled if Ms. Melland is replaced by a qualified member of the bargaining unit. This instance of employee substitution is in contrast to the need for a new circuit court staff position, or the need to provide the circuit court judges with additional facilities, equipment or services. Because this is not a case of judicial need, the County contends that the judges cannot invoke their inherent authority to avoid the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.

¶ 30. We disagree with the appellants' arguments. We recognize the distinction between this case and cases involving the need for additional facilities or additional staff, but we reject the implication that a court's inherent powers may be asserted only under such circumstances. The courts of this state may call upon their inherent powers when needed to protect themselves against actions that would "unreasonably curtail [their] powers or materially impair [their] efficiency" in expediting and conducting their judicial business. In re Court Room, 148 Wis. at 121. Therefore, we disagree with the County's suggestion that the circuit court's "need" has necessarily been fulfilled when the judicial assistant who "bumps" the incumbent is a qualified member of the bargaining unit.

¶ 31. In fact, when another branch unilaterally removes and replaces an already trained and qualified court employee, the court is forced not only to lose the efficiencies developed by the incumbent employee, but to spend valuable judicial time training and orienting the replacement employee. A positive, productive working relationship is not established overnight. The training time spent by the court on the replacement staff member could be given to other pressing judicial responsibilities.

¶ 32. AFSCME also argues that the exercise of inherent authority is limited to those instances where a circuit court judge acts in a judicial capacity. According to AFSCME, when a circuit court judge makes an appointment decision, it exercises administrative, not judicial, powers.

¶ 33. The authorities cited by AFSCME for this proposition are not persuasive. In none of those cases did the courts discuss the distinctions between inherent constitutional powers of the judiciary and the legislature's constitutional authority to delegate employment decisions to counties. Other cases upon which AFSCME relies are also distinguishable, because they assess whether certain employment decisions by judges were sufficiently "judicial" to qualify for immunity from prosecution.

¶ 34. AFSCME's request that we distinguish between "judicial" power and "administrative" authority in order to identify a court's inherent power misses the point. Contrary to AFSCME's assertion, a court's inherent powers are not limited to deciding outcomes in particular cases. "Judicial power extends beyond the power to adjudicate a particular controversy and encompasses the power to regulate matters related to adjudication." Holmes, 106 Wis.2d at 44.

¶ 35. The constitutional obligation to administer justice includes addressing court administration issues which frequently arise "off the bench." Judicial employees can and often do play an extremely important role in the discharge of a court's constitutional duty to deliver justice to the citizens of the state.

¶ 36. Our appellate courts have long recognized the inherent constitutional responsibility of the circuit courts to employ efficient and effective off-the-bench judicial management techniques. The delivery of justice requires much more than presiding over cases and announcing decisions. Judges and their staff also serve as courtroom and calendar administrators, performing a myriad of tasks all designed to carry out constitutionally required responsibilities. A circuit court necessarily has inherent power, derived from the constitution, to protect itself and to control the judicial business before it, business that includes "administrative" tasks. See Jacobson v. Avestruz, 81 Wis.2d 240, 245, 260 N.W.2d 267 (1977). See also, Lentz v. Young, 195 Wis.2d 457, 536 N.W.2d 451 (Ct.App. 1995).

¶ 37. We draw support for this conclusion from a number of examples of the exercise of a circuit court's inherent power in non-adjudicative matters. In Stevenson v. Milwaukee County, 140 Wis. 14, 19, 121 N.W. 654 (1909), for example, we held that a circuit court has inherent power to appoint its own bailiff, notwithstanding a statute restricting appointment to candidates selected by the sheriff. Another example is our conclusion in State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court of Kenosha County, 11 Wis.2d 560, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960), that the court's need to function efficiently included the inherent power to order installation of an air conditioner.

¶ 38. In sum, we are satisfied that courts have inherent constitutional authority to perform their administrative responsibilities. As a result, the subject matter of the agreement also falls within the judiciary's constitutionally-based sphere of inherent powers to "protect itself against any action that would unreasonably curtail its powers or materially impair its efficiency," In re Court Room, 148 Wis. at 121, and to exercise those powers which are "essential to the expedition and proper conducting of judicial business," In re Janitor, 35 Wis. at 419.

IV.

¶ 39. However, that both the legislative and judicial branches exercise power in the realm of staff and judicial administration does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the two branches share this power. See Friedrich, 192 Wis.2d at 20. For example, the bumping provision of the agreement might fall within the legislature's general power to delegate employment decisions to county boards, but might also intrude impermissibly on the judiciary's core zone of exclusive power. We are somewhat more persuaded by AFSCME's argument that the power to remove a judicial assistant is shared with the legislative branch, and not exclusive to the judiciary, via the County's specific, constitutionally-based power to establish regulations of employment for persons paid from the county treasury. See Wis. Stat. § 59.22(2)(c). However, examining such general powers of the legislature provides imprecise guidance in this case.

¶ 40. We reach this conclusion because in our assessment, the "bumping" or removal of a judicial assistant is a power wholly distinct from the power to "establish regulations of employment." In establishing certain regulations of employment, the agreement sets forth guidelines on working conditions such as leaves of absence ( see § 6.07 of the agreement), pregnancy leave ( see § 6.12), vacation ( see § 7.09), sick leave ( see § 7.10), health, life and dental insurance ( see §§ 7.05-.07) and worker's compensation or injury leave ( see § 7.11). These provisions regulate the employment of county personnel, but do not control or commandeer it as the bumping provision of the agreement does. We are satisfied that the bumping provision takes a step down a heretofore unexplored path in collective bargaining negotiations relating to judicial staff, and in doing so, crosses the threshold of the judiciary's private abode.

¶ 41. The distinction between establishing regulations of employment and making the ultimate decision to retain an employee once hired is made clear by several authorities. The American Bar Association has promulgated certain standards for courts in the area of court organization. See ABA Standards Relating to Court Organization § 1.42.5(a), Collective Bargaining for Nonjudicial Personnel (1990). These standards indicate that "[t]he scope of collective bargaining should be limited to those matters concerning compensation, working conditions, and related subjects permitted by state law applying to public employees, including those in the judicial branch." Id. A study done by the American University Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project similarly indicates that "[u]nions bargain for strength on wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. The courts retain management's right to hire, administer, discipline, and remove their employees." Harry O. Lawson, et al., Personnel Administration in the Courts 141 (1978). See also Stumpf, Inherent Powers of the Courts at 54-55 and cases cited therein ("Generally, the line that has been drawn in collective bargaining litigation is whether the judiciary when not designated as the managerial representative has retained control of selecting, supervising, and discharging court personnel.").

¶ 42. Therefore, we conclude that the unilateral removal of a circuit court judge's judicial assistant without permission from the judge is not synonymous with, or even a logical extension of, "establish[ing] regulations of employment." Thus, while we agree that the legislature has constitutionally-based authority to regulate the conditions of county employment, this fact does not aid in our analysis of whether it has ever shared the power to remove a judicial assistant without the circuit court judge's permission. Therefore, we look to the historical practices and laws of this state to determine whether the power to remove a judicial assistant is shared with the legislature or exclusive to the judiciary. See Friedrich, 192 Wis.2d at 20.

¶ 43. The legislative powers to control and regulate county personnel have significant history in the state of Wisconsin. Since 1945, Wisconsin counties have had the ability to establish "rules and regulations" of county employment. Wis. Stat. § 59.15(2)(c) (1945) provided:

The county board . . . may provide, fix or change the salary or compensation of any . . . employe . . . and also establish the number of employes in any department or office . . . and may establish rules and regulations of employment for any or all persons paid from the county treasury . . . .

¶ 44. Prior to that date, statute provided that the board could "at any time fix or change the number of deputies, clerks and assistants that may be appointed by any county officer, and fix or change the annual salary of each such appointee." Wis. Stat. § 694(4)(b) (1915) (emphasis added). The phrase "county officer" was defined and clarified in 1929 to include "any elective officer whose salary or compensation is paid in whole or in part out of the county treasury . . . ." See 1929 Wis. Laws 362. This definition would have included both county and circuit judges prior to the court reorganization of 1978, since they were typically paid, at least in part, out of the county treasury.

¶ 45. By engaging in the historical analysis employed by Freidrich, it becomes clear that there is no evidence that the legislature has ever held the power to unilaterally remove a judicial assistant without the judge's authority. To the contrary, the history of the statutes upon which the County and AFSCME rely suggests that the legislature has historically had only the limited power to set the number and salaries of assistants, along with other secondary powers to regulate employment. The power to remove such assistants appeared to rest in the hands of the judge alone, so that once again, the legislature could regulate employment, but not control the employment decision altogether.

¶ 46. This analysis is similar to that we employed in State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 155 Wis.2d 94, 99, 454 N.W.2d 770 (1990), where this court concluded that a legislative enactment imposing a continuing legal education requirement on attorneys prior to their appointment as guardians ad litem improperly intruded upon a regulation of the practice of law that is exclusively within the province of the judiciary. See id. at 98. As a result of this intrusion, we held that the statute was void as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine. See id.

¶ 47. In Fiedler, we first concluded that the judiciary is concerned with the qualifications of attorneys in the exercise of its inherent power to regulate the bar. See Fiedler, 155 Wis.2d at 101. We also noted that the legislature may prescribe minimum qualifications for persons desiring to be admitted to practice law in the state as an incident to its general power to protect the public. See id. at 102. "Once admitted, however, it does not follow that the legislature shares with the judiciary the authority to establish minimum qualifications in specific areas of law." Id.

¶ 48. Having determined that "[t]his court has never in the past authorized the legislature to adopt rules or enact legislation attempting to establish a threshold level of competency to practice in a particular area," we concluded that "once an attorney has been determined to have met the legislative and judicial threshold requirements and is admitted to practice law, he or she is subject to the judiciary's inherent and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law." Fiedler, 155 Wis.2d at 103.

¶ 49. In the same way, we conclude that the power to remove a judicial assistant falls not within an area of shared powers, but within an area that historically has belonged exclusively to the judiciary. The legislature has set limits on employee hours and wages, set compensation levels, and has even established a posting procedure for appointment to judicial assistant positions, but once a county employee has been appointed to the position of judicial assistant, the legislature has, until now, never enjoyed the power to remove that assistant without the judge's permission. To the contrary, history illustrates that judicial assistants have traditionally been subject to the judiciary's exclusive authority once appointed.

¶ 50. Because we are left with an action that lies wholly within the judiciary's sphere of exclusive power, we conclude that the bumping provision is unconstitutional, and therefore void and unenforceable as it applies to judicial assistants. We also note that § 2.02 of the agreement provides for final and binding arbitration in the event of an alleged breach of the "bumping" provision. As a result, any attempt to enforce the provision would transfer the removal decision to an arbitrator. See Iowa County v. Iowa County Courthouse/Social Servs. Employees, Local 413, 166 Wis.2d 614, 621, 480 N.W.2d 499 (1992). Because this directly conflicts with a circuit court judge's exclusive, inherent power to remove a judicial assistant, we also hold that the bumping provision is not subject to arbitration.

V.

¶ 51. Having reached the conclusion that the bumping provision of the agreement impermissibly intrudes upon the judiciary's core zone of exclusive authority, it is important to set forth the foundation upon which the exclusive, inherent power to remove one's judicial assistant rests. Early in the history of this state we considered the invocation of inherent authority after the abrupt removal of a court employee by another branch officer. See In re Janitor, 35 Wis. 410 (1874). There, the state superintendent of public property served, without cause or notice to the justices, an order of removal upon the person serving as janitor of the supreme court. The superintendent then appointed another person, someone unknown to the supreme court justices, to serve as the new janitor. See id. at 410-11.

¶ 52. Up until the unilateral action of the superintendent, the supreme court janitor had always been removed by the justices, or "by and under their direction and with their consent and approval." Id. at 411. Moreover, the court's opinion demonstrated that the justices had developed a very positive working relationship with the janitor, and that they depended on him to perform many necessary functions. See id. at 412-16. Citing these customs, the Janitor court reasoned that "no removal should be ordered . . . without the advice and approbation of the justices." Id. at 416.

¶ 53. Following this reasoning, the court first considered statutory support for the superintendent's power to remove a janitor. One of those statutes provided that the superintendent was authorized "to employ such workmen in and about the capitol and public grounds as may be necessary to keep the same in a proper state of cleanliness . . . ." In re Janitor, 35 Wis. at 419-20. After concluding that the statute did not give the superintendent the powers asserted, see id. at 420-21, the court considered the division of powers between the three branches of government:

As a power judicial and not executive or legislative in its nature, and one lodged in a co-ordinate branch of the government separated and independent in its sphere of action from the other branches, it seems to be under the protection of the constitution, and therefore a power which cannot be taken from the court, and given to either the executive or legislative departments . . . .

Id. at 419. From this reasoning, the court concluded that the power to remove a court assistant was exclusive to the judiciary, and declared the superintendent's order of removal void. See id. at 421.

¶ 54. In sum, the Janitor court held that the power to remove a court assistant was exclusive to the judiciary based in part on custom, and in part on the nature of the relationship between the justices and their janitor. In the same way, we conclude that the exclusive, inherent power of a circuit court judge to remove his or her judicial assistant springs from historical custom, as well as the unique relationship between judges and their immediate assistants.

¶ 55. As stated, we find no historical support for the proposition that the legislative branch has ever possessed the power to remove judicial assistants without the judge's permission. To the contrary, Janitor strongly supports the conclusion that circuit court judges have exclusive power to protect their assistants from removal by another branch of government. At the same time, we conclude that a unique relationship exists between a judge and his or her judicial assistant. Judges share their labors and confidences with their assistants, rely upon their assistants' experience in managing an increasingly complex caseload, and entrust highly sensitive matters to their assistants' good judgment. As the Janitor court observed: "This principle of trust and confidence pervading every department of active life, both public and private, the law also recognizes and acts upon and will enforce and protect." 35 Wis. at 415.

¶ 56. The integral role played by judicial staff in the overall administration of justice is also reflected in Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 70.39(11)(a) (1996), which recommends that "[e]ach branch of circuit court should be staffed by one full-time judicial assistant." The Comment to the Rule explains the basis for that recommendation:

The trial court system faces ever increasing caseloads and cases of ever increasing complexity. The judge today must take charge and aggressively manage his or her caseload. To do so the judge needs a full-time judicial assistant. This staff position will permit each judge to devote more of his or her efforts to the primary judicial task — presiding over and judging lawsuits.

The position of judicial assistant should be in the state service. It will perform for the court the following work: type . . .; assist with calendar management . . .; hold scheduling conferences; assist with file and record acquisitions; . . . maintain judge's law library; act as receptionist in answering telephone, handling visitors and processing mail; . . . such other work as required by the court. See, sec. 758.19(h), Stats., "The director of state courts shall establish a description of the qualifications and duties of . . . a judicial assistant. . . ."

Judicial experience and expertise support the long-standing position of the Wisconsin Judicial Conference that this staff position is vital to a well-functioning court. Where judicial assistants now exist as part of the court staffing, caseloads are much more current and the oldest cases are disposed of with priority consideration.

The citizens of this state have a right to communicate directly with each judge's office during normal work day hours and get immediate answers to their questions and service on their requests without waiting for return calls from the judge, court reporters, or court clerk who at the time of the call are working in the courtroom . . . . Also, judges must be protected from ex parte communications by having their telephone calls screened by knowledgeable staff.

¶ 57. Evidence of this unique relationship can be found in statutory law as well. As mentioned, each justice and court of appeals judge in the state of Wisconsin "may appoint and prescribe the duties of a secretary and a law clerk to assist the justice or judge in the performance of his or her duties." Wis. Stat. § 751.02. This statute also reveals the unique and confidential relationship that is inherent to a judge and his or her assistant. Although the legislature has chosen not to provide equivalent statutory authority to a circuit court judge, we see no reason why the relationship is any different at the circuit court level.

¶ 58. The reasons for protecting this relationship are arguably stronger at the circuit court than they are at the appellate level. Circuit court judges handle numerous court and jury trials, have dockets that are equally if not more crowded than those at the appellate level, and have more contact with the parties and the public in general. Under these circumstances, stripping a judge of his or her assistant without prior approval could impair the court's constitutional function more than it would at the appellate level.

¶ 59. In Iowa County, 166 Wis.2d 614, this court faced a situation nearly identical to the present case. The county had argued that the circuit court judge's statutory authority to appoint a register in probate could be harmonized with a county board's power to establish working conditions pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 59.15(2)(c), the precursor to Wis. Stat. § 59.22(2)(c), and 111.70(1)(a). See id. at 621. Thus, the county argued, a provision of the labor agreement requiring the judge to post a vacancy in the register in probate position prior to appointment could coexist with the statute granting a circuit court judge the power to appoint the register in probate. See id. at 618.

¶ 60. The court held that the collective bargaining agreement could not supersede the judge's statutory authority to appoint a register in probate. See id. at 621. Therefore, the provisions within the agreement which purported to regulate the judge's statutory authority were void and unenforceable. See id. In essence, the judge's statutory authority to appoint a register in probate was held to be exclusive.

¶ 61. Once again, the nature of the relationship between a judge and his or her judicial assistant does not change simply because there is no statutory authority to appoint an assistant at the circuit court level. Given our decision in Iowa County, we find it difficult to conclude that the appointment and removal of a register in probate is a power to be more "jealously guarded" by the judiciary than the power to remove assistants to the judges themselves. See Friedrich, 192 Wis.2d at 14.

VI.

¶ 62. Based on the customary practices in our state, and the unique relationship between a judge and his or her assistant, we conclude that the bumping provision cannot be harmonized with the circuit court judge's exclusive, inherent power to remove a judicial assistant. Because the provision obstructs the judiciary in its exclusive sphere, and thereby violates the separation of powers principles implied by our constitution, it is void, unenforceable, and not subject to arbitration.

¶ 63. The circuit court applied the proper standard of law, and reached a sustainable conclusion in doing so. Therefore, the grant of declaratory relief for the judges was proper.

By the Court. — The order of the circuit court is affirmed.