Summary
holding that "there is no need to resort to extrinsic evidence to discern" meaning of unambiguous provision
Summary of this case from Coleman & Assocs. Enters., Inc. v. Verizon Corporate Servs. Grp., Inc.Opinion
2012-02-7
ATLANTIC AVIATION INVESTMENTS LLC, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. MATLINPATTERSON GLOBAL ADVISERS LLC, et al., Defendants–Appellants.[And a Third Party Action].
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York (Thomas C. Rice and David J. Woll of counsel), for appellants. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York (Jeffrey A. Rosenthal of counsel), for respondent.
Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York (Thomas C. Rice and David J. Woll of counsel), for appellants. Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York (Jeffrey A. Rosenthal of counsel), for respondent.
SAXE, J.P., FRIEDMAN, CATTERSON, FREEDMAN, MANZANET–DANIELS, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard B. Lowe III, J.), entered May 5, 2011, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on its claim for breach of contract against defendants Volo Logistics LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners II LP and MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners (Cayman) II LP (collectively the MP Funds), unanimously affirmed, with costs.
Under the plain language of the parties' Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and the embedded Make–Whole Agreement, nonparty VarigLog was an “affiliate” of Volo, an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of the MP Funds. The sale of the shares at issue was an “Exit,” as expressly defined in the MOU. Under the Make–Whole Agreement, Volo and the MP Funds are obligated to ratably share with plaintiff the funds received by VarigLog, Volo's affiliate, in connection with the sale of shares. We find that the parties' agreements are unambiguous. Thus, there is no need to resort to extrinsic evidence to discern their meaning ( see South Rd. Assoc., LLC v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 4 N.Y.3d 272, 278, 793 N.Y.S.2d 835, 826 N.E.2d 806 [2005]; W.W.W. Assoc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162–163, 565 N.Y.S.2d 440, 566 N.E.2d 639 [1990] ). This is so regardless of whether the Make–Whole Agreement is carved out from the MOU's merger clause. Although the parties clearly intended for the Make–Whole Agreement to be an interim arrangement, to be supplanted by a “definitive final agreement” upon the Second Closing, it is nonetheless facially complete and contains all of the essential terms of an enforceable contract.
We have considered defendants' remaining arguments and find them unavailing.