OPINION

STRINGER, Justice.

An amendment to the prevailing wage law providing that prevailing wages must be paid in all construction or remodeling projects of educational facilities exceeding $100,000 was enacted as part of a 1997 omnibus tax bill relating to tax relief and reform. Respondents Associated Builders and Contractors (Associated Builders), Independent School District No. 882 (ISD 882) and Wright Electric, Inc. (Wright Electric) challenge the constitutionality of the amendment claiming it violates the Single Subject and Title Clause of the Minnesota Constitution, Article IV, Section 17, which states "No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." The district court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment ruling that the amendment violates both clauses of Section 17. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the prevailing wage amendment was "not remotely related [to the bill's subject of] tax reform and relief," and that the title provision was violated because the title made no reference to topics such as "prevailing wage," "school districts" or "labor." Associated Builders and Contractors v. Carlson, 590 N.W.2d 130, 136 (Minn. 1999). The court of appeals then severed the amendment pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 645.20 (1998) permitting severance of an unconstitutional provision where it is unconnected to the remaining provisions of the law. See Associated Builders and Contractors, 590 N.W.2d. at 137. We affirm the court of appeals.

The appropriate context for our analysis begins with a brief history of the prevailing wage law and passage of the challenged amendment. The prevailing wage law a law requiring the payment of wages on projects financed with state funds to be comparable to wages paid for similar work in the community as a whole was first introduced as House File 134 on January 11, 1973 and was the subject of hearings both in the House Labor-Management Relations Committee and Senate Committee on Labor and Commerce. It was passed by a house vote of 84-39, by the senate 56-0 and was enacted as chapter 724 on May 24, 1973. The purpose of the prevailing wage law is explained in the statute's preface:

It is in the public interest that public buildings and other public works be constructed and maintained by the best means and highest quality of labor reasonably available and that persons working on public works be compensated according to the real value of the services they perform. It is therefore the policy of this state that wages of laborers, workers, and mechanics on projects financed in whole or part by state funds should be comparable to wages paid for similar work in the community as a whole.

Minn. Stat. § 177.41 (1998). The statutory scheme requires that employees working on certain state funded construction projects be paid an hourly wage based on prevailing wages in the area. See id. A project is defined as the "erection, construction, remodeling, or repairing of a public building or other public work financed in whole or in part by state funds." Minn. Stat. § 177.42, subd. 2 (1998).

In 1995, in NewMech Cos., Inc. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 206, 540 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. 1995), we held that the prevailing wage statute language "financed in whole or part by state funds" did not include state aid payments to school districts through Debt Service Equalization Aid (DSEA) or Homestead and Agricultural Credit Aid (HACA) because those payments were intended to provide property relief to taxpayers, not to subsidize construction costs. NewMech thus narrowed the prevailing wage law by limiting its application to direct state funding only. Id. at 805.

In response to our decision in NewMech, and with the stated purpose of overturning it, an amendment to the prevailing wage law's definition of "project" was introduced in the House of Representatives on March 13, 1997 and was referred to the House Committee on Labor-Management Relations. There was no companion bill in the senate. House File 1512, now codified at Minn. Stat. § 123B.71, subd. 2 (1998), was described by Representative Thomas Bakk as a "pretty simple little bill, four lines * * * [stating that] on school construction here in Minnesota, it [should be] public policy that any school construction over $100,000 in cost be covered by Minnesota's prevailing wage rate law." The bill amends the previous definition of "project" by including all educational facilities where the estimated cost of building exceeds $100,000:

Minnesota Statutes, 1996, section [ 123B.71, subd. 2], is amended by adding a subdivision to read:

Subd. 1A. PROJECT. The construction, remodeling, or improvement of a building or site of an educational facility at an estimated cost exceeding $100,000 is a project under section 177.42, subdivision 2.

Notably the bill did not amend the prevailing wage law directly instead, it amended Minn. Stat. § 123B.71, subd. 2, relating to "review and comment for school district construction" by adding a new definition of "project" under the prevailing wage law. Thus, only by cross reference could the amendment be tracked to its substantive effect.

During the committee meeting Tom Deans, legal counsel for the Minnesota School Board Association, offered this comment about the bill:

This bill makes all school district projects, that are projects for purposes of the prevailing wage law, all of them over $100,000, that means whether or not there is a dime of state money that comes in * * * this would require [those districts] to pay prevailing wages as well * * *.

* * * *

* * * So what you're doing is, you're taking those higher costs [from paying the prevailing wage rather than a lower wage] and you're passing them onto property tax payers for 20 to 30 years * * *.

At the close of the committee meeting Representative Bakk moved that the bill be passed and referred to the Committee on Taxes. There was little discussion of the prevailing wage amendment in the tax committee and the bill was incorporated into the Omnibus Tax Bill.

Four days later, on the house floor, Representative Dee Long, Chair of the House Tax Committee, gave an overview of the Omnibus Tax Bill. She described the bill as one that "achieves both property tax relief and long-term reform and does it without raising any other taxes * * *." Representative Long characterized the article in which the prevailing wage amendment was included as making "a number of miscellaneous and minor changes in tax laws." Legislators questioned why a bill pertaining to prevailing wages should be incorporated in a tax bill, but an amendment to delete the provision from the tax bill was defeated by a vote of 50-81.

There was no discussion on the prevailing wage amendment in the senate and, other than brief references to it during Tax Conference Committee meetings on May 13 and 16, 1997, there was no substantive discussion on the merits of the amendment or how it was related to tax relief and reform. The Omnibus Tax Bill passed both legislative houses on May 19, 1997 by a vote of 127 to 6 in the house and 66 to 0 in the senate and was signed into law by Governor Arne H. Carlson on June 2, 1997.

The Omnibus Tax Act, as the bill become known upon passage, is a prodigious work of legislation covering 247 pages with 16 articles and is entitled "An act relating to the financing and operation of state and local government; * * *." The first 15 articles pertain to a variety of subjects including property tax reform, income taxes and property tax refunds, special taxes, regional development commissions, waste management taxes and tax increment financing. Article 16, entitled "Miscellaneous," contains 31 separate sections. The prevailing wage amendment appears as section 4 of article 16 and now appears in the statutory structure as Minn. Stat. § 123B.71, subd. 2. It is included in the statutory chapter covering school district powers and duties. See Minn. Stat. ch. 123B (1998).

The underlying facts of the controversy now before the court are not in dispute. In the fall of 1997 ISD 882 began preparation for bids for the construction of a new Monticello High School in Wright County to be financed by funds received by the sale of ISD 882 bonds the parties agreed that no state funding was provided. The bids were originally scheduled to be submitted in October of 1997 but to comply with the prevailing wage amendment, ISD 882 delayed the bid deadline until December, 1997. It then requested that contractors submit two bids, one based on the prevailing wage amendment and one without consideration of the prevailing wage amendment. The low bidder for the electrical subcontracting work was respondent Wright Electric at $2,217,187.00 on its bid submitted without consideration of the prevailing wage amendment. Appellant Granite City Electric was the low bidder for the electrical subcontracting work at $2,310,000.00 based on the prevailing wage amendment. ISD 882 awarded the contract for electrical subcontracting work to Wright Electric as the low bidder.

Wright Electric, ISD 882 and Associated Builders and Contractors, a construction trade industry organization, commenced this action in Ramsey County District Court on November 12, 1997 against the Governor of Minnesota, the Minnesota Commissioner of Labor and Industry, and the Minnesota Commissioner of Children, Families and Learning seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that the amendment was inapplicable by its terms or, alternatively, that it violated the Single Subject Clause of Article IV, Section 17, of the Minnesota Constitution.

On cross motions for summary judgment the district court ruled that the prevailing wage act violated the single subject and title requirements of Article IV, Section 17. The court first rejected appellants' argument that chapter 231 encompassed the single subject matter of "the common notion of taxation and government operations," holding that several provisions in the Act had nothing to do with government operations and that the prevailing wage amendment was unconstitutionally adopted in violation of Section 17 beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also concluded that the Act violated the title provision, noting that although the title contained over 800 words and numerals, neither the words "labor," "wages," "school districts," "construction," and "project," nor "Minn. Stat. § 177.41" appeared in the title.

The court of appeals affirmed, also holding that the amendment violated the Single Subject and Title Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. See Associated Builders and Contractors, 590 N.W.2d at 137. The court reasoned that the bill's broad subject was tax reform and tax relief but the prevailing wage amendment, since it covered educational facilities built regardless of state funding, was not "remotely" related to either. See id. at 136. The court also observed that absent from the bill's title were words that even suggested the inclusion of the prevailing wage amendment such as "labor," "school districts," "construction" or "prevailing wages," and noted this court's repeated warnings to the legislature that omnibus bills were at high risk of running afoul of the single subject and title constitutional requirements. See id. at 135-36. The court then severed the amendment pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 645.20 leaving intact the remainder of chapter 231. See Associated Builders and Contractors, 590 N.W.2d at 135-36.

Appellants challenge the court of appeals decision, arguing that the prevailing wage amendment does not violate the Single Subject and Title Clause of Article IV, Section 17, and that, if it does, the court cannot sever it and must invalidate chapter 231 in its entirety.

I. Constitutionality

In an appeal from a summary judgment where there is no dispute of material fact our review is limited to determining whether the lower court erred in its application of the law . See Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 538 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn. 1995). Where the constitutionality of a statute is at issue our review is de novo, see State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Minn. 1997), and we proceed on the presumption that Minnesota statutes are constitutional and that our power to declare a statute unconstitutional should be exercised with extreme caution. See id.; State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn. 1990). The challenger of the constitutional validity of a statute must meet the very heavy burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional. See Behl, 564 N.W.2d at 566; Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321.

Early in Minnesota history the potential for mischief in bundling together into one bill disparate legislative provisions was well known. In the Minnesota Democratic Constitutional Convention in 1857, a proposal that addressed only the requirement that a title give some indication of the contents of the bill was amended following the comments of Mr. Meeker:

My object in moving this amendment, is to guard against a practice which has been to a greater or less extent, prevalent in this Territory, as well as in other States, of grouping together several different subjects in one bill, and passing them through by means of a system known as log-rolling.

The Debates and Proceedings of the Minnesota Constitutional Convention 124, 262-63 (Francis H. Smith, reporter 1857). Thus evolved the current language in Article IV, Section 17, that "No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." Minn. Const. art. IV, § 17.

The first case to test this constitutional requirement was decided by this court in 1858, only a year after its adoption. In Board of Supervisors of Ramsey County v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330, 339 (Gil. 281, 291) (1858), we upheld the constitutionality of a law reorganizing county and township governments but also requiring the register of deeds to deliver tax documents to the county board of supervisors. We concluded that the single subject requirement was not offended because there was "no attempt at fraud, or the interpolation of matter foreign to the subject expressed in the title." Id. Thirty-three years later we further developed our analysis in Johnson v. Harrison, 47 Minn. 575, 578, 50 N.W. 924, 924 (1891), when we held that "[a]n act to establish a Probate Code" providing for procedures in probate courts and for property rights in deceased's estates did not violate either the subject or the title provision of Section 17. In doing so we clarified the purpose of the Single Subject and Title Clause to prevent "log-rolling legislation" or "omnibus bills."

We explained however, that despite these constitutional restrictions, the single subject provision should be interpreted liberally and the restriction would be met if the bill were germane to one general subject:

[W]hile this provision is mandatory, yet it is to be given a liberal, and not a strict, construction. It is not intended, nor should it be so construed as, to embarrass legislation by making laws unnecessarily restrictive in their scope and operation, or by multiplying their number, or by preventing the legislature from embracing in one act all matters properly connected with one general subject. The term `subject,' as used in the constitution, is to be given a broad and extended meaning * * *. All that is necessary is that the act should embrace some one general subject; and by this is meant, merely, that all matters treated of should fall under some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, one general subject.

Johnson, 47 Minn. at 577, 50 N.W. at 924. As to the title provision, we explained that the clause is intended to prevent fraud or surprise upon the legislature and the public by prohibiting the inclusion of "provisions in a bill whose title gives no intimation of the nature of the proposed legislation," id., 50 N.W. at 924, but we accord it the same liberal construction as the single subject provision. See State ex rel. Olsen v. Board of Control of State Insts., 85 Minn. 165, 172, 88 N.W. 533, 536 (1902). In Olsen we held "[e]very reasonable presumption should be in favor of the title." Id. at 175, 88 N.W. at 537. Again in State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 552, 287 N.W. 297, 301 (1939), we noted that the generality of the title of an act is not grounds for invalidation as long as the title gives notice of the general subject because "the title was never intended to be an index of the law." We held that the title "An Act relating to persons having a psychopathic personality" and providing for the commitment of sexual offenders did not violate the title clause because it gave notice that the act concerned "sexually irresponsible persons." See id. at 552-53, 287 N.W. at 301.

While the policy objective of the constitutional restriction and framework for analysis have long been settled, early challenges to statutory enactments under Section 17 were more successful than in recent years. In Winona St. Peter R.R. Co. v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 515, 535 (Gil. 392, 410) (1866), this court held that an act to "facilitate the construction of a railroad from Winona westerly by way of St. Peter" violated the single subject provision because it included "Consolidation; bridging the Mississippi; taxation." See id. at 529, 535 (Gil. 394, 410). In Anderson v. Sullivan, 72 Minn. 126, 130-31, 75 N.W. 8, 8-9 (1898), we held that a law authorizing county officers' compensation to be increased was invalid because it was not expressed in the act's title, "An act authorizing and directing the county commissioners * * * to reduce the compensation and number of officers and other employees of such counties." We observed that to hold otherwise would permit logrolling to increase salaries of some officers at the expense of others. See id. at 131, 75 N.W. at 8-9.

Later, in State v. Women's Children's Hosp., 143 Minn. 137, 138-39, 173 N.W. 402, 402 (1919), we held that an act protecting abandoned or homeless children and "for the regulation of agencies receiving such children for care or placing out, and women during confinement" violated the Single Subject and Title Clause because the second part of the provision "relating to women during confinement" was "in no way germane to the former [and] has to do with places where mothers from almost every walk of life are received and cared for during confinement." Finally, in State ex rel. Finnegan v. Burt, 225 Minn. 86, 88, 29 N.W.2d 655, 656 (1947), we held the title provision was violated when a law relating to the discharge and demotion of employees appeared in an act entitled "An act to establish a classification and salary system in all counties of this state." We also held that the law covered a separate and distinct subject not suggested in the title of the act. See id. at 89, 29 N.W.2d at 656-57.

Since the late 1970's we have addressed the Single Subject and Title Clause in five cases and in no instance have we held that the law being challenged offended the constitutional restriction. In Wass v. Anderson, 312 Minn. 394, 399-400, 252 N.W.2d 131, 135-36 (1977), we rejected plaintiff's challenge that the single subject provision was violated by "an act relating to transportation" that incorporated a constitutional amendment levying taxes on fuel for vehicles on public highways and bonds issued to finance highway construction. We held that there was no evidence of fraud and that the single subject provision was not violated because the proposed constitutional amendment was germane to the same general subject as the act's other provisions. See id. at 400; 252 N.W.2d at 135-36. We rejected plaintiff's claim of logrolling and that the term "transportation" was too broad to express a single subject because even though "transportation" is a general term, it was not misleading. See id. at 401-03, 252 N.W.2d at 136-37. We held "it is not essential that the best or even an accurate title be employed, if it be suggestive in any sense of the legislative purpose." Id. at 403, 252 N.W.2d at 137 (quoting Olsen, 85 Minn. at 175, 88 N.W. at 537).

Similarly, in Lifteau v. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm'n, 270 N.W.2d 749, 752-53 (Minn. 1978), we rejected a claim that an act titled "An act relating to metropolitan government; providing for sports facilities; establishing a sports commission and prescribing its powers and duties * * *" violated the title provision of Section 17 when it empowered a commission established pursuant to the act to work with the Metropolitan Council to impose a two percent tax on the sale of alcohol near the stadium. We reiterated the purpose of the title provision and held that the act's title provided sufficient notice of the contents. See id. at 753. We also took judicial notice of the fact that no proposal received more coverage in the media and the legislative process than what was then known as the stadium bill. See id.

In the three most recent cases to come before this court however, while we have held that the challenged law did not violate Section 17, we have taken quite a different approach. In each instance we took the occasion to sound an alarm that we would not hesitate to strike down oversweeping legislation that violates the Single Subject and Title Clause, regardless of the consequences. In State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 778, 783 (Minn. 1986), an act permitting the legislature to transfer responsibilities of the State Treasurer to the Commissioner of Finance was challenged on the ground that the act violated the separation of powers doctrine as well as the single subject and title constitutional restrictions. We held the act unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine and therefore we did not reach the single subject issue, but in a concurring opinion by Justice Yetka, joined by Justice Simonett, the disparate provisions of the act were cited prompting Justice Yetka to declare that "now all bounds of reason and restraint seem to have been abandoned." Id. at 784 (Yetka, J., concurring specially). He referenced, for example, provisions relating to agricultural land, a council of Asian-Pacific Minnesotans and the establishment of a recycling program. See id. Justice Yetka questioned whether this court has been too lax in permitting such legislation and observed "[t]he worm that was merely vexatious in the 19th century has become a monster eating the constitution in the 20th." Id. He concluded with an alert to the legislature as to what was to come if an act violated the single subject and title provisions in the future:

[W]e should send a clear signal to the legislature that this type of act will not be condoned in the future. Garbage or Christmas tree bills appear to be a direct, cynical violation of our constitution * * *. It is clear to me that the more deference shown by the courts to the legislature and the more timid the courts are in acting against constitutional infringements, the bolder become those who would violate them.

* * * [W]e should publicly warn the legislature that it if does hereafter enact legislation similar to Chapter 13, which clearly violates Minn. Const. art IV, § 17, we will not hesitate to strike it down regardless of the consequences to the legislature, the public, or the courts generally.

Id. at 785.

A similar note of alarm was sounded three years later in Blanch v. Suburban Hennepin Regional Park District, 449 N.W.2d 150, 154 (Minn. 1989), where a law was challenged under Section 17 that authorized a metropolitan park district to acquire land and to develop a park in an act titled "relating to the organization and operation of state government." We commented that "[t]he common thread which runs through the various sections of chapter 686 is indeed a mere filament," but we upheld the provision because the park bill was designed to allow the legislature to appropriate funds from the preceding session thus it fell under the broad subject of appropriations for the operation of state government. See id. at 155. Justice Yetka again concurred, joined once again by Justice Simonett, observing that while the court correctly resolved the challenge because the legislature did not have the opportunity to heed the court's earlier warning in Mattson, "[t]he legislature hereafter has full notice of the consequences of overstepping constitutional limitations in its drafting of omnibus bills." Id. (Yetka, J., concurring specially). Chief Justice Popovich also picked up the cudgel when he observed, in a concurring opinion, that "the court is increasingly concerned about the possibilities of future violations of art. IV, § 17. * * * The views of the justices expressed today should be considered as instructive, alerting a co-equal branch of government, the legislature, to our concerns." Id. at 156-57 (Popovich, C.J., concurring specially).

Then in Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm'n v. County of Hennepin, 478 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 1991), we held that a law exempting certain space in the Metrodome from property taxation did not violate the single subject provision of Section 17 because the amendment was part of an omnibus fiscal bill and the title of the bill included taxation. We concluded that the property tax provision was germane and not unexpected. See id. We also acknowledged that while the bill could have been more consistent with the single subject requirement, it was enacted prior to the Blanch warning about the constitutional frailty of "garbage bills." See Metropolitan Sports Facilities Comm'n, 478 N.W.2d at 490.

With the benefit of the history of Section 17 in this court, we turn to the claims of the parties here. Appellants assert that the prevailing wage amendment is germane to the subject of tax relief and the "operation of state and local government" since the amendment was intended to overturn NewMech, a decision impacting tax relief. None of our prior rulings would indulge such a strained reasoning however, nor do we believe the clear wording of Section 17 permits the inclusion of such disparate provisions in one bill. While the amendment may have a tax impact by affecting construction costs, clearly that is not its purpose and nowhere is consideration of tax relief and reform mentioned in its very short text. The connection between the amendment and any subject of tax in the Omnibus Tax Act falls far short of even the mere filament test. The other sections in chapter 231 concerned subjects such as property tax reform, income taxes and property tax refunds, sales and special taxes, tax increment financing and mineral taxes all subjects related to tax reform. In any event, clearly more than an impact on state finances is required to establish even a minimum thread of germaneness, as virtually any bill that relates to government financing and government operations affects, in some way, expenditure of state funds.

Respondents contend that the prevailing wage amendment is even less germane to the subject of financing and operation of local government because under the amendment prevailing wages are required to be paid regardless of whether the school project is publicly funded. Appellants counter that the legislature did not intend the amendment to apply beyond publicly funded projects. We do not resolve that argument of statutory ambiguity, but note that the language of the amendment contains no apparent limitation on the school projects to which it applies other than the $100,000 requirement. We have held that taxes on motor vehicle fuel and bonds issued to finance highway construction are germane to the subject of transportation, property tax exemptions in the Metrodome are germane to the subject of taxation, and a metropolitan park district acquisition of land is germane to an appropriations bill. But even under a liberal interpretation to avoid "embarrassment" of legislation to construe an amendment requiring prevailing wages that lacks any express limitation to public funding as related to the subject of financing and operation of state and local government would push the mere filament to a mere figment. We decline to do so.

Appellants next argue that there was no evidence of impermissible logrolling and therefore the mischief the constitutional restriction was intended to address is not present. Appellants' contention is misdirected. The Single Subject and Title Clause, as Minnesota's first "sunshine law," requires that the legislature not fold into larger, more popular bills, wholly unrelated and potentially unpopular provisions that may not pass as a stand-alone bill. The purpose of preventing logrolling is to preclude unrelated subjects from appearing in a popular bill, not to eliminate unpopular provisions in a bill that genuinely encompasses one general subject. We fully recognize that it is the legislature's prerogative to establish our state's public policy in the area of prevailing wages and that the legislative process is not bound by rigid textbook rules. Nonetheless, lawmaking must occur within the framework of the constitution. So while we do not conclude that there was suspicious conduct on the part of the legislature nor impugn its motive in including the prevailing wage amendment in a bill that was predominately tax reform and relief, we are concerned about the lack of a single subject and the characteristics of logrolling. First, prevailing wages have been historically discussed in the labor committees, not tax committees. Amendments to Minn. Stat. § 123B.71, subd. 2, where the prevailing wage amendment now appears, have historically come about through education bills. That most discussions on prevailing wages took place in the tax committee suggests, if not logrolling, an unexplained deviation from the history of labor committee discussions on the prevailing wage act.

Second, the issue of prevailing wages had no companion bill in the senate, received little consideration in the house committee hearings and was inserted into a much broader and popular bill with an entirely different legislative theme. Third, while we acknowledge that the legislative process is complicated and the rationale for pursuing one particular process or another is not always clear, obviously a more direct route to adopting the amendment would have been to redefine "project" in Minn. Stat. § 177.42, which includes the original definition of "project" for prevailing wage purposes. These factors raise concerns about the legislative process, and with the lack of germaneness to the general subject of taxes and tax reform, we conclude that the prevailing wage amendment violates the single subject provision of our constitution.

Finally, appellants argue that chapter 231 does not violate the title provision of Section 17 because its title gave sufficient notice of the amendment to the prevailing wage law. The single subject and title provisions of Section 17 are often discussed together, but the title provision serves a different purpose and requires a somewhat different analysis. The purpose of the title provision is to prevent fraud or surprise on the legislature and the public in essence to provide notice of the nature of the bill's contents. See Johnson, 47 Minn. at 577, 50 N.W. at 924. Here, the title references "financing and operation of state and local government" and property tax relief and rate reform, tax rebates, truth in taxation, local tax levies and tax credits all themes of tax reform and relief. Nowhere is there a reference to labor, wages, school construction or a myriad of other words that would suggest that it contains a provision having a potentially significant impact on the cost of school construction. The first clause in the title of the bill seems to be virtually generic, as other appropriations bills passed in the same legislative session have the same general title "relating to the organization and operation of state government" hardly giving notice of "the interests likely to be affected" we required in Wass, 312 Minn. at 398, 252 N.W.2d at 134, or that is "suggestive in any sense of the legislative purpose." Olsen, 85 Minn. at 175, 88 N.W. at 537. Even with "every reasonable presumption * * * in favor of the title," id., 88 N.W. at 537, the failure of chapter 231 to give even a hint that the prevailing wage amendment was part of the bill leads us to the conclusion that the title did not provide sufficient notice of the amendment to legislators and school districts to meet the constitutional requirement of Section 17.

II. Severability

We consider next whether the entirety of chapter 231 must be held unconstitutional because it contains more than a single subject and its title does not give reasonable notice of its contents, or whether there can be a severance of the offending amendment permitting to stand the other statutory provisions of chapter 231. For several reasons we conclude that the constitutional construal of Article IV, Section 17, does not require the entire law to be declared unconstitutional.

First, the words of Section 17 do not require such a draconian outcome. By the plain words of the article, it does not prohibit a bill from becoming law if it does embrace more than one subject it only states that "No law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." Minn. Const. art. IV, § 17. It is at least implicit that on judicial review, the court has the option of bringing the law into constitutional compliance by severing a provision that is not germane to the theme of the law. Cf. Sullivan, 72 Minn. at 133, 75 N.W. at 9-10 (stating that "while a part of the statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void also"). Moreover, litigation calls into challenge but one aspect of the law. Our goal of constitutional compliance relates to the particular provision of the law being challenged only and we are not prejudging that any other aspect of the law is germane.

Second, it is no more reasonable to conclude that the constitution's language requires the entire law to be declared unconstitutional than it is to proceed on a far less disruptive course of severing from the law the offending provision here the prevailing wage amendment and preserving its other parts. Indeed it could well be argued that to hold the entire law unconstitutional, when the great weight of the other provisions are so singularly related to the common theme of tax relief and reform, would be overstepping our judicial bounds in disregard of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. See Koehnen v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. 1999).

Third, the severance remedy is certainly not a novel resolution of how far the effect of unconstitutionality reaches when the challenged provision is unrelated to the theme of the law. Over a hundred years ago, in Sullivan, we invalidated one provision of a law but upheld the remainder:

The familiar rule on the subject is that, while a part of the statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in subject-matter, depending on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the one without the other.

72 Minn. at 133, 75 N.W. at 9-10. On several occasions between 1901 and 1932 this court held provisions of a statute unconstitutional under Section 17 but, without even a comment on the breadth of the ruling, declined to invalidate the entire statute. See, e.g., Egekvist Bakeries, Inc. v. Benson, 186 Minn. 520, 523, 243 N.W. 853, 854 (1932) (holding that sanitary wrapping of bread was not germane to an act regulating the weight of bread and severing only the unconstitutional portion of the statute); In re Day, 93 Minn. 178, 182, 102 N.W. 209, 211 (1904) (invalidating only the last provision of a law); Winters v. City of Duluth, 82 Minn. 127, 132-33, 84 N.W. 788, 790 (1901) (holding that one provision of an act was invalid because the title of the act was not broad enough to include it, but "we do hold that the act * * * is constitutional"). In Finnegan, we upheld the remainder of a statute after invalidating one of its provisions on the ground that the unconstitutional provision was unrelated to the subject matter of the remainder of the law and thus could be severed. See 225 Minn. at 89-90, 29 N.W.2d at 657.

Precedent leading to the more draconian result of invalidating the entire law is not particularly useful. In Women's Children's Hospital, we ruled that the law violated Section 17 and invalidated the entire law, but the circumstances were clearly distinguishable from those here. See 143 Minn. at 139, 173 N.W. at 402. There the law contained two distinct subjects and if either provision was to survive, the court would be required to engage in a balancing of importance between the two clearly a legislative process. Here, where chapter 231 includes a provision that clearly is not germane to the subject of otherwise massive legislation, we need not engage in such a pursuit.

In State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 246 Minn. 181, 200, 74 N.W.2d 249, 261 (1956), we observed that an entire law is unconstitutional generally in two instances: where its terms conflict with a constitutional provision, or where the method of enactment does not comply with constitutional requirements. There, we held unconstitutional a law that included an amendment never passed by the legislature. See id. at 185, 192, 74 N.W.2d at 253, 257. We invalidated the entire law noting that although the balance of a constitutionally enacted law can be upheld even if one provision violates the constitution, "[i]t does not follow that, where a bill never has become a law for failure to follow constitutional mandates in the process of enactment, a part of it can be sustained." Id. at 199, 74 N.W.2d at 261. Importantly, and as the special concurrence and dissent seems to overlook, we specifically distinguished the circumstances in Naftalin from "cases where the constitutional prerequisites to enactment of a law have been followed but where parts of the act are unconstitutional for some other reason such as failure to comply with Minn. Const. art 4, [§ 17]." 246 Minn. at 199, 74 N.W.2d at 261 (emphasis added); see also Freeman v. Goff, 206 Minn. 49, 53, 287 N.W. 238, 241 (1939).

The court of appeals relies heavily on Minn. Stat. § 645.20, enacted in 1941, permitting courts to sever an unconstitutional provision from a comprehensive law. We have reservation that an act of the legislature could substantively determine the breadth of the sweep of Section 17 under traditional principles of separation of powers. See, e.g., Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 199, 12 N.W.2d 515, 518 (1943) ("The supreme court is thereby made the final authority and last resort in [interpreting] * * * the constitution."). Since the legislature cannot authorize the court to do what the constitution prohibits, we reiterate that our authority to sever the offending provision comes not from the legislature, but from the constitution itself and precedent interpreting Section 17.

Central to our determination to sever a provision from a law is whether "all the provisions are connected in subject-matter." Sullivan, 72 Minn. at 133, 75 N.W. at 10. As we have determined that the prevailing wage amendment is not connected in subject matter to the common theme of the law, severance is a resolution clearly consistent with our holding that the prevailing wage provision is unrelated to tax reform and relief. In light of our prior case law and our review of Naftalin and Blanch we conclude that severance is appropriate.

Appellants correctly point out that in Blanch we questioned whether we would invalidate entire laws in future violations of Section 17. See Blanch, 449 N.W.2d at 155. We decline that path now in favor of a more pragmatic result that is consistent with our constitution and the cases interpreting provisions in violation of the Single Subject and Title Clause. This decision both informs the legislature that we do not hesitate to declare unconstitutional a statutory provision violating the Single Subject and Title Clause, but avoids the draconian outcome of holding, on these facts, that an unrelated provision in a law should bring the whole law down. Where the common theme of the law is clearly defined by its other provisions, a provision that does not have any relation to that common theme is not germane, is void, and may be severed.

Affirmed.